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ABSTRACT 
This dissertation analyses the process of the disintegration of the Communist Party of 
the Soviet Union (CPSU), which is central to the Soviet collapse. The disintegration process 
also provides a good opportunity to test existing theories of political regime change. In terms 
of source use, this disseliation makes extensive use of the party archives that became 
available after the Soviet collapse. This makes possible a very detailed analysis of work of the 
party apparat. 
The importance of the subject and a review of existing theories that offers some 
hypotheses are discussed in the first chapter. In the second chapter, the reason why the party 
reform was necessary is considered through analysing the situation within the party before the 
perestroika period. The analysis makes clear that the CPSU faced a dilemma between 
monolithic unity and monopolistic control before the perestroika period, which made party 
reforms necessary. The third chapter deals with party-state 'relations under Gorbachev's 
reform in detail. This chapter discusses the fact that, as a result of the reorganisation of the 
party apparat that was intended to stop the party's interfering in the state body, the party lost 
its traditional administrative functions. This, however, led to a 'power vacuum' because no 
other alternative power centre was established quickly, and complicated further reform 
attempts. Moreover, the party failed to find a new function as a 'political party', as considered 
in detail in the fourth chapter. Despite attempts at competitive party elections and the 
emergence of party platforms, Gorbachev failed to transform the CPSU into a 'parliamentary' 
rather than a 'vanguard party'. Therefore, the CPSU lost its raison d 'etre, which accelerated a 
mass exodus of members. The rapid decline in party membership caused a financial crisis, 
which is considered in the fifth chapter. The financial crisis and the soviets' demands for the 
nationalisation of party property forced the CPSU to engage in commercial activity. 
Nonetheless, commercial activity unintentionally caused the fragmentation or dispersal of 
party property. On the other hand, the 'power vacuum' expanded so much that some 
emergency measures seemed necessary to som,e top state leaders. The August attempted coup 
is discussed in the sixth chapter in the context of party-military relations. When Russian 
president Yeltsin suspended its activity, the CPSU had lost its raison d' etre and its property 
had been fragmented or dispersed. Thus, the CPSU had no choice but to accept the reality that 
it was 'dead' de facto. The final chapter gives an overview of this pattern of developments, 
and compares it with the experiences of other communist parties' reforms in East Europe. The 
theoretical implications are also considered in the final chapter, which argues that existing 
theories of political regime change are not sufficient and that a further effort of 
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Chapter 1 On the Research Subject and Some Theoretical Considerations 
I. Introduction 
The USSR, which was the first socialist state, one pole of the cold war, and the last empire in the 
modem world, collapsed in 1991. There is no doubt that it is a challenging subject for all social scientists, 
including historians, to investigate what the Soviet system was, why and how it collapsed. Many analyses 
have already been advanced around this subject. The purpose of this dissertation is also to contribute to an 
understanding of the collapse of the USSR. 
The research object here is the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), which had presided 
over the state and society in the Soviet Union. Unquestionably, the CPSU was a key in understanding 
what was the Soviet system. It is clear that the CPSU as the only legal party had monopolistic control over 
both the state and society. On the one hand, for the state, the fact that it was the only party meant that it 
was the ultimate organisation to make decisions, to monitor the implementation by the state, and to 
intervene in state functions. On the other hand, for society, the CPSU was the only route to legitimately 
express their interests. However, these interests were easily distorted since within the party a unity of 
interests was assumed and any fractions were not permitted because of the monolithic unity over which 
the CPSU presided. 
Although it was supposed to be the strongest organisation in the Soviet Union, the CPSU, in the 
event, collapsed quickly. In August 1991, after the attempted coup, Boris Yeltsin, the president of Russian 
Republic at that time, declared a prohibition on the activity of the CPSU, and it did not resist vigorously. 
The problem is why it did not. It is natural to speculate that the CPSU was in a disintegrating process well 
before the attempted coup. After the disintegration of the CPSU, the collapse of the USSR followed in 
December 1991. It seems that these two processes unfolded side by side. Thus, the analysis of the 
disintegration of the CPSU can enormously contribute to understanding the collapse of the USSR. In 
addition, if the extraordinary or exceptional situation reveals the essence of the matter as Carl Schmitt 
1 
once argued, Gorbachev's perestroika period may be the ideal case for understanding the essence of the 
Soviet system. [ 
The CPSU was a huge organisation. The number of members reached nearly 20 million at its peak. 
It encompassed almost all elites in the country: political, economic, social elites, intellectuals, sports men 
and so forth. In general, such a huge organisation necessitates an administrative core. In the CPSU, the 
core was the party apparat, which is the main research object of this dissertation. Through investigating 
the work of the party apparat and other related issues in the final years of the CPSU, this dissertation tries 
to contribute to understanding the Soviet collapse. 
II. What the Soviet System Was 
1. Basic Characteristics of the Soviet Political System 
The Soviet political system or a communist regime in general, the collapse of which is the subject 
of this dissertation, had prominent characteristics in comparison with other regimes. It is frequently 
assumed that the party's function was the key in this regime, since the communist party was the only or 
hegemonic party in communist countries. The communist regime had two characteristics: the monolithic 
unity of the communist party and the monopolistic control over the state and society. Firstly, the 
communist party was committed to its own monolithic unity. Based on Marxist and Leninist doctrine, 
which was the only legitimate ideology, the party was supposed to be the vanguard organisation to lead 
the countries to communism. It seems that the party's activities were a kind of art of war to change the 
countries. Just as no one in the military doubts the aim of war during war itself, no party member 
questioned the aim of the party's activities. Thus, any fraction within the party was strictly forbidden since 
it could cause a division in the 'war' the party was conducting. 2 Secondly, the communist party had 
monopolistic control over both the state and society.3 Although the congruence of the communist party 
[ Karu Shumitto, Seijiteki na Mono no Gainen (Tokyo: Miraisha, 1970). This is a translation of Carl 
Schmitt, Der BegrifJ des Politischen. 
2 On this analogy to war, see Takayuki Ito, 'Porando ni Okeru Nomenkuratura Ronso: Ichigenteki Shihai 
no Tasogare (Jo) [Controversy over Nomenklatura in Poland: The Twilight of Monopolistic Control (I)" 
Kyousanshugi to Kokusaiseiji [Communism and International Politics], Vol. 6, No.4 (1982) pp. 58-59. 
3 Shiokawa firstly advocated the view that a communist regime consists of triangle of the party, the state, 
and society instead of traditional view of bilateral relation between the state and society. In his view, the 
communist party is not a part of society. See Nobuaki Shiokawa, Shuen no Naka no Sorenshi [Soviet 
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and the state was frequently assumed in communist countries, it was not always precise. Rather, the 
relation between the party and the state is the consistent problem. There was the functional division of 
labour between the party and the state: on the one hand, the main role of the party was decision-making, 
mass mobilisation, monitoring and direction; the state, on the other hand, played the role of 
implementation. As this functional division of labour shows, the communist party had a superior position 
to the state. Moreover, the party often interfered with this division and substituted (or duplicated) the 
functions of the state. In addition, in communist countries, it would be natural that we assume a distinction 
between the party and society. The party as the mobilising organisation confronted society. There was no 
room for independent associations to play a political role, even if they informally existed. Society was 
always the object of the party's control and the party had its sections even in the workplace. The party was, 
therefore, composed of a huge hierarchy from the all-union level (Central Committee) to the work places, 
schools and others (Primary Party Organisations: PPOs) in the case of the Soviet Union. The parties in 
other communist countries had a similar hierarchy. In addition, soviets or equivalent organisations of other 
communist countries could be regarded as an instrument to control society. Candidates in soviet elections 
were controlled by the party. Moreover, it is well-known that the mobilisation of the party in soviet 
elections was extensive (99% turnout). It is clear from the discussion above that one of the prominent 
characteristics in the communist regime was the strict prohibition of other independent organisations. Of 
course, control could not perfectly be implemented. There was always room not to be controlled. The 
Catholic Church in Poland was a well-known example. Even the soviets in the Soviet Union functioned as 
a route to express the interests of society, though they were weak. Nonetheless, severe control was 
prominent in comparison with other regimes. Although according to Przeworski every dictatorship cannot 
and does not permit counter-hegemony,4 the strictness of the prohibition in the communist regime was so 
different from the authoritarian regime that the communist regime could be regarded as a distinct type. 
Hist01Y in Perspective] (Tokyo: Asahi Shinbunsha, 1993), pp. 23-56; Nobuaki Shiokawa, Genzonshita 
Shakaishugi [Socialism that Really Existed] (Tokyo: Keisoshobo, 1999), pp. 144-149. 
4 Adam Przeworski, Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and 
Latin America (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 54. 
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It was the nomenklatura system that sustained this monolithic unity and monopolistic control over 
the state and society.5 The nomenklatura system was a personnel system of the communist regime. This 
system basically consisted of two lists. One list was of important jobs. Another was the list of persons who 
were appropriate for the jobs. The Secretariat of the Central Committee in the communist party controlled 
these lists of the highest echelon of the party, the state and society. One reason that the first (or general) 
secretary of the communist party became the top person in communist countries was this system. At lower 
echelons, the relevant party organisations managed these lists. According to Ito, the nomenklatura can be 
analysed from three perspectives. 6 The first is the method to recruit elites (the nomenklatura as a 
recruitment mechanism). Due to this system, higher-level organisations had the right to appoint 
appropriate persons to lower organisations within the party. Even outside of the party, the communist 
party had the right to 'approve' persons to organisations of the state and society. This means that the party 
could recruit the appropriate elites from society. This leads to the second perspective. This system was 
also a mechanism to maintain the hierarchy of the party and to control the state and society (the 
nomenklatura as a ruling mechanism). The party could control other 'organisations through its personnel 
allocation. This system had Janus-like two functions for the regime. Firstly, it had the positive side of 
effectively mobilising scarce intellectual resources. Due to this system, the party could appoint qualified 
persons to important realms, for example industry or the military. Secondly, however, this system entailed 
patronage. For lower organisations, this system meant that their promotion depended on the level above 
them. Thus, the lower-level officials had to eagerly demonstrate their loyalty. Moreover, patrons had an 
incentive to pick loyal clients regardless of their ability. When this patronage system stabilised, the people 
to be appointed to the nomenklatura list became close to a kind of 'new class'. This is the third perspective, 
that is, the nomenklatura as a class. While the first and second perspectives connect with each other, the 
third perspective is a little different. 7 The following discussion of this dissertation primarily will 
concentrate on the first and second perspectives. 
5 The established work on nomenklatura system of the Soviet Union is presented by Harasymiw. See 
Bohdan Harasymiw, 'Nomenklatura: The Soviet Communist Party's Leadership Recruitment System', 
Canadian Journal of Political Science, Vol. 2, No.4 (December 1969). 
6 Ito, 'Porando ni', pp. 56-65; Takayuki Ito, 'Controversy over Nomenklatura in Poland: Twilight of a 
Monopolistic Instrument for Social Control', Acta Slavica Iaponica, Vol. 1 (1983), pp. 58-62. 
7 Shiokawa, Shuen, pp. 51-52. Hill and Lowenhardt distinguish the nomenklatura as a mechanism from the 
nomenklatura as the 'ruling class'. It seems that the first and second perspectives of Ito overlap the 
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It seems that the manner of budget formation helped to sustain the monolithic unity of the 
communist party.8 The budget of the party was formed as follows. Firstly, primary party organisations 
collected membership dues from each member. Secondly, these dues were totally transferred to a regional 
(oblast' in the Soviet Union) party organisation. Thirdly, the regional party organisation distributed them 
to lower (city and district) party organisations. Thus, though it may be possible to argue that regional party 
organisations were more autonomous in terms of finance, the lower party organisations did not have 
financial independence, which could contribute to sustain the party hierarchy. 
The next question is to review how scholars conceptualise such a system. 
2. Conceptualisation of the Soviet System 
(a) Totalitarianism 
The 'orthodox' conceptualisation has been totalitarianism. Although a popular image of the Soviet 
system may be that of Orwell's 1984, a standard academic formulation of the totalitarian regime was 
advanced by Friedrich and Brzezinski. According to them, Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union shared 
following six characteristics of totalitarianism: 1. An elaborate ideology, 2. A single mass party typically 
led by one man, the 'dictator', 3. A system of terror, 4. A near-complete monopoly of control of all means 
of effective mass communication, 5. A near-complete of monopoly of the effective use of all weapons of 
armed combat, 6. A central control and direction of the entire economy.9 Here the party clearly possesses 
the central position in the system. The dictator leads the party that is dedicated to the ideology and 
controls mass communication, armed combat, and economy. Although some proponents of totalitarian 
regime stressed more the role of a dictator, even such an argument did not deny the central role of the 
party as one of the pillars of totalitarianism. 10 Totalitarianism is, according to the proponents, a modern, 
dynamic, bureaucratically controlled new type of personal dictatorship. 
nomenklatura as a mechanism, and the third fits the 'ruling class'. See Ronald J. Hill and John 
L6wenhardt, 'Nomenklatura and Perestroika', Government and Opposition, Vol. 26, No.2 (Spring 1991), 
pp. 230-231. Thus, the author's argument on the nomenklatura primarily focuses on nomenklatura as a 
mechanism. 
8 The author's knowledge on this issue is limited to the Soviet case. For more detail on the party finance, 
see Chapter 5. 
9 Carl J. Friedrich and Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy, 2nd ed. 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1965). 
10 Leonard Schapiro, Totalitarianism (London: Macmillan Press, 1972). 
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(b) Modified Totalitarianism 
After Stalin's death, some questioned totalitarianism. Particularly, the role of Khrushchev did not 
seem as crucial as that of Stalin. Juan Linz's standard reference on political regimes does not emphasise 
the role of dictator. Instead, he indicates three characteristics: 1. A monistic centre of power, 2. An 
exclusive, autonomous, and elaborate ideology, 3. Active mobilisation through a single party. While he 
argues that his concept of the totalitarian regime can be applied only to the Stalin era, later changes are 
considered as a development toward a 'post-totalitarian regime', which is a sub-category of an 
authoritarian regime. 11 
Nonetheless, some main features of the system did not seem to change. Many thought the core of 
the system lay in bureaucracy. Especially the party bureaucracy (the party apparat) developed a huge 
hierarchical network throughout almost all spheres of the society. Rigby characterised the system as a 
'mono-organisational society'. Post-Stalinist development was, according to him, 'mono-organisational 
society without the personal dictatorship'. 12 Thus, 'mono-organisational society' itself was intact even 
after Stalin's death. In this conceptualisation, the place of the party is crucial. The party is the core of 
power in 'mono-organisational society'. Jan Pakulauski's 'partocracy' shares the same characterisation of 
the Soviet-type political system. 13 
(c) Qualified Pluralism 
During the Brezhnev period, such a totalitarian formulation, including modified one, of the system 
was challenged. Besides the rough identification of the Nazi and the Soviet Union, main criticisms were 
11 Juan Linz, 'Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes', in Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby eds., 
Handbook of Political Science, Vol. 3: Macropolitical TheOlY (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1975). 
Later the 'post-totalitarian regime' became an independent category rather than sub-category. See Juan J. 
Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South 
America, and Post-Communist Europe (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996). 
12 T. H. Rigby, 'Stalinism and the Mono-organisational Society', in T. H. Rigby, The Changing Soviet 
System: Mono-organisational Socialism from its Origins to Gorbachev's Restructuring (Aldershot: 
Edward Elgar, 1990): pp. 82-112 (Chap. 4). The phrase 'mono-organisational society without the personal 
dictatorship' is in p. 107. See also T. H. Rigby, 'Reconceptualising the Soviet System', in Stephen White, 
Alex Pravda, and Zvi Gitelman eds., Developments in Soviet and Post-Soviet Politics (London: Macmillan 
Press, 1992). 
13 Jan Pakulski, 'Bureaucracy and the Soviet System', Studies in Comparative Communism, Vol. 19, No.1 
(Spring 1986). 
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directed to the hierarchal control image of totalitarianism and ideological presumption. Some argued that 
some groups other than the party (for example, the KGB, the military, a trade union, the Council of 
Ministers and so on) formed some kind of 'interest groups'. Thus, they argued, party control could not be 
overestimated. Jerry Hough emphasised that conflicts among specialists (for example, industry, agriculture, 
education and so forth), between centre and regions, and among regions were everyday matters even 
within the party apparat. The full-time party workers were not always ideological fanatics. Thus, Hough 
tried to replace totalitarianism by his 'institutional pluralism'. 14 The party was, according to these 
criticisms, not necessarily the centre of power, or the party itself was fragmented by conflicting interests 
of society. 
It seems clear that the place of the party in the system was a crucial element for these 
conceptualisations. To research the CPSU disintegration, therefore, will provide a good test for them. The 
strength and weakness of these conceptualisations will be discussed in the final chapter after the detailed 
analysis. 
III. Why the Soviet System Collapsed: Theories of Political Change and the Soviet Collapse 
1. International Explanations 
Despite being the core of power, the CPSU has not been treated properly in research on the Soviet 
collapse. Some argue that United States' victory over the USSR in the cold war is a main reason. This can 
be called the 'international explanation', since it considers that regime change came from outside. 15 There 
are two variations within this argument. The first one is the military explanation: this school emphasized 
the priority of the United States to the USSR in the arms race. 16 The USSR, they maintained, could not 
find a way to overcome SDI. With the end of the USSR, the United States was left as the only power to 
preserve the world order. Although it appears easy to understand, this argument does not look so 
14 Jerry F. Hough, The Soviet Union and Social Science Theory (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1977); Jerry F. Hough and Merle Fainsod, How the Soviet Union Is Governed (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1979). 
IS While the 'international explanation' is advanced mainly by researchers on international politics in the 
context of the end of the cold war rather than collapse of the Soviet Union, the most elaborate study is 
presented by Brown. See Archie Brown, 'Transnational Influences in the Transition from Communism', 
Post-Soviet Affairs, Vol. 16, No.2 (2000). 
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convincing. Firstly, the loss of the anns race cannot necessarily produce a domestic change of regime. 
Secondly, this ignores the autonomy of Soviet diplomacy. Gorbachev's 'new thinking' diplomacy 
appeared successful in the late 1980s. In the early stages of the ending of the cold war (around 1987-1990), 
military explanation was rarely advanced. It is after the Gulf War and the collapse of the Soviet Union that 
this explanation gathered support. 17 It seems that this is an example of hindsight since we now know the 
United States is the only remaining superpower. 
The second international explanation regards the power of ideas as the main factor in the victory 
of the United States. 18 According to this, the fonn of democracy and the market economy that is typically 
embodied in the United States became more attractive for the Soviet people than socialism, which caused 
ideological decay and led to the dissolution of the USSR. It seems that this has some explanatory power. It 
appeared that the groups who advocated democracy and the market economy had won in the struggle with 
conservatives thanks to their popular support. Nonetheless, this explanation has certain weaknesses. 
Firstly, this argument cannot directly explain how such ideas as democracy and the market economy 
influenced the Soviet people. Secondly, as discussed in later chapters, there is some doubt whether what 
happened in the Soviet Union was the victory of democrats. Thirdly, the 'international explanations' are 
very difficult to confinn by empirical evidence. Though to integrate international politics with domestic 
politics is certainly an attractive research agenda, it seems that we have not had yet been shown a 
satisfactory research design. Finally, it seems that these 'international explanations', both the military and 
the ideational one, overestimate international influence on Soviet domestic politics, though it is certainly 
an important aspect. A regime change of this kind can be explained only through domestic politics except 
in the case of occupation by a foreign country. 
2. Transitology and Civil Society Theory 
16 Although this explanation is accepted mainly by American politicians and commentators, as a scholar's 
paper, see Richard Pipes, 'Misinterpreting the Cold War: The Hard-Liners Had It Right', Foreign Affairs, 
Vol. 74, No.1 (January/ February 1995). 
17 Kiichi Fujiwara, 'Reisen no owarikata [How the Cold War Ended]', in Tokyou Daigaku Shakaikagaku 
Kenkyujo ed., 20seiki Shisutemu [The Twentieth Century Global System], Vol. 6 (Tokyo: University of 
Tokyo Press, 1998). 
18 For example, Takuya Sasaki, 'Amerika to Reisen [the United States and the Cold War]', in Chihiro 
Hosoya and Naoki Maruyama eds., Posuto Reisenldno Kokusaiseiji [International Politics in the Post-
Cold War Era] (Tokyo: Yushindo, 1993). 
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Now it is necessary to tum our attention to domestic politics. Works on political change 
concentrating on domestic politics can be categorised by two axes (see Table 1-1). The first axis 
distinguishes actor-centred and structural approaches. The second axis distinguishes change from 'above' 
and from 'below'. Although this typology may be arbitrary, it seems to be useful to explain previous 
approaches. Some scholars took an 'actor-centred approach' to discuss politics in the perestroika period. 
Their focus is major political figures and their interaction rather than the CPSU as an organisation: figures 
such as Gorbachev, Ligachev, Yakovlev, Ryzhkov, Yeltsin and others. Some of these works are well-
organised biographies. One successful study considers Gorbachev as the central factor in perestroika. 19 
This actor-centred approach is theoretically influenced by 'transitology', which generalised the democratic 
transition in Southern Europe and Latin America (to which Eastern Europe was added later) and 
emphasized the role of the strategic choices of political elites in regime change.2o Civil society theory can 
also be regarded as a school within the actor-centred approach, since this emphasizes the strategy of civil 
19 Archie Brown, The Gorbachev Factor (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996). 
20 Major works on transitology are following. Dankwart A. Rustow, 'Transitions to Democracy', 
Comparative Politics, Vol. 2, No.3 (April 1970); Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter, 
Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies (Baltimore: 
The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986); Adam Przeworski, 'Some Problems in the Study of the 
Transition to Democracy', in Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead, eds., 
Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Comparative Perspectives (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1986); Adam Przeworski, 'Democracy as a contingent outcome of conflicts', in John 
Elster and Rune Slagstad eds., Constitutionalism and Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press 1988); Przeworski, Democracy and the Market; Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: 
Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991); Juan J. 
Linz, 'Transitions to Democracy', The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 13, No.3 (Summer 1990); Juan J. Linz 
and Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation; Terry Lynn Karl and Philippe 
C. Schmitter, 'Modes of Transition in Latin America, Southern and Eastern Europe', International Social 
Science Journal, Vol. 43, No. 128 (1991). 
On the application of transitology to post-communist countries, see Russell Bova, 'Political Dynamics of 
the Post-Communist Transitions: A Comparative Perspective', World Politics, Vol. 44, No.1 (October 
1991); Grzegorz Ekiert, 'Democratization Processes in East Central Europe: A Theoretical 
Reconsideration', in Geoffrey Pridham ed., Transition to Democracy: Comparative Perspective from 
Southern Europe, Latin America and Eastern Europe (Brookfield: Dartmouth, 1995); Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, 
'The Connection Between Political and Economic Reform in Communist Regimes', in Gilbert Rozman 
with Seizaburo Sato and Gerald Segal eds., Dismantling Communism: Common Causes and Regional 
Variations (Washington! Baltimore: Woodrow Wilson Center Press/ Johns Hopkins University Press, 
1992); Takayuki Ito, 'Minshuka to Koshokodo: Roshia Toou Shokoku no Seijihendo ni Sokushite 
[Democratisation and Negotiation Behaviour: Based on the political changes in Russia and East European 
countries]" in Hiroshi Kimura ed., Kokusaikoshogaku (Tokyo: Keisoshobo, 1998); Michael McFaul, 
'Lessons from Russia's Protracted Transition from Communist Rule', Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 
114, No. 1 (1999); Michael McFaul, Russia's Unfinished Revolution: Political Change from Gorbachev to 
Putin (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001). Although McFaul's works include some critical statements 
and qualifications of transitology, we can find some influence of it in his works. 
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society elites rather than structural constraints.21 However, the civil society approach is an actor-centred 
approach 'from below' while trans ito logy is an approach 'from above'. In spite of controversies over the 
validity of transitology in Eastern Europe, it is not necessary to abandon the attempt at comparison itself 
and transitology provides useful conceptual tools in analysing political change: for instance, the distinction 
between liberalisation and democratisation, between civil society and political society, pacts, and others.22 
Moreover, it is important to find that opening of political change begins with cracks in an authoritarian 
regime rather the rise of civil society. In any case, let us confirm that these actor-centred approaches 
emphasise the strategic choice. 
3. Modernisation Theory 
On the other hand, structural approaches emphasise the structural constraint. The classical 
structural approach is modernisation theory. 23 According to this theory, modernisation, especially 
economic development, urbanisation and education, produces the conditions for democratisation as 
following: while economic development and urbanisation leads to the emergence of a middle class, the 
spread of general education infuses the idea of democracy to this class. The enlightened middle class seeks 
democracy. Some emphasised more internal dynamics of political institution under modernisation. For 
21 On civil society theory, see Akira Kawahara, Chutoouno Minshukano Kozo [Structure of 
Democratisation in Central Eastern Europe], (Tokyo: Yushindo, 1993). Fish uses the word 'movement 
society' instead of civil society since civil society in the Soviet Union was premature. M. Steven Fish, 
Democracy from Scratch: Opposition and Regime in the New Russian Revolution (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1995). 
22 Controversies over transitology have occurred both the US and Japan. On controversies in the United 
States, see Philippe C. Schmitter with Terry Lynn Karl, 'The Conceptual Travels of Transitologists and 
Consolidologists: How Far to the East Should They Attempt to Go?' Slavic Review, Vol. 53, No.1 (Spring 
1994); Valerie Bunce, 'Should Transitologist Be Grounded?' Slavic Review, Vol. 54, No.1 (Spring 1995); 
Terry Lynn Karl and Philippe C. Schmitter, 'From an Iron Curtain to a Paper Curtain: Grounding 
Transitologists or Students of Postcommunist?' Slavic Review, Vol. 54, No.4 (Winter 1995); Valerie 
Bunce, 'Paper Curtains and Paper Tigers', Slavic Review, Vol. 54, No.4 (Winter 1995). In Japan, see 
Nobuaki Shiokawa, "'Taiseitenkan" no mokuteki ha "Seiouka" ka? [Is the Aim of "Regime Change" 
"Westernisation"?]' in Surabu Yurashia no Hendo: Jutenryouikikenkyu Houkokushu [Proceedings of a 
Conference: the Changes in the Slavic-Eurasian World] (Sapporo: Hokkaido University, 1998); Takayuki 
Ito, 'Shiokawa hokoku wo chushintosuru comento [Comments on Shiokawa's Paper]', in Ibid.; Shiokawa, 
Genzonshita, pp. 433-437. 
23 The representative work in modernisation theory is Lipset's one. See Seymour Martin Lipset, 'Some 
Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy', The American 
Political Science Review, Vol. 53, No. 1 (March 1959). More sophisticated works in modernisation theory 
include the following: Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Society (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1968); Barrington Moore Jr., Social Origin of Dictatorship and Democracy 
(Harmondsworth: Penguin University Books, 19731 First published in 1966). 
10 
example, Talcott Parsons advanced 'evolutionary universals'. Society, according to him, develops from a 
primitive stage, through social stratification and cultural legitimation, toward a bureaucratic organisation, 
market system, universal norm and a democratic association.24 
Such a view had some influence on Soviet studies. Richard Lowenthal, in 1970, argued that 
communist regimes were bound to face a dilemma between an ideological utopian goal and economic 
development. After ideological decay, he argued, the communist regime went toward developmental 
authoritarian dictatorship rather than totalitarian one. 25 Later he developed this line of argument. The 
communist system that had been unable to adopt some element of pluralist democracy would face erosion 
oflegitimacy and, therefore, a political crisis.26 
As another example of a modernisation theorist, Thomas Remington can be noted. After the 
Soviet collapse, he argues that contradictions between industrialisation and urbanisation, for instance 
environmental problems, and between educational improvement and job structure in Soviet Union, an 
example of which is that one who had a good education could not have an appropriate job where manual 
workers were demanded, led people to organise opposition movements. 27 These arguments have 
contributed to understanding the influence of economic and social change on political change. 
4. New Institutionalism 
While many structural approaches investigate the conditions for regime change from society 
(below), new institutionalism considers political change comes from the state (above). There are at least 
two new institutionalisms which have developed with little mutual relation. Nonetheless, some scholars 
try to find the theoretical core of new institutionalism. According to them, while political institution can be 
considered as rules constraining actors, the behaviour of actors gradually changes institutions. Political 
24 Talcott Parsons, 'Evolutionary Universals in Society', American Sociological Review, Vol. 29, No.3 
(June 1964). 
25 Richard Lowenthal, 'Development vs. Utopia in Communist Policy', in Chalmers Johnson ed., Change 
in Communist Systems (Stanford: Stanford university Press, 1970). 
26 Richard Lowenthal, 'On "Established" Communist Party Regime', Studies in Comparative Communism, 
Vol. 7, No.4 (Winter 1974). Though this is an abbreviated version of Richard Lowenthal, 'The Ruling 
Party in a Mature Society', in Mark G. Field ed., Social Consequences of Modernisation in Communist 
Societies (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976), the abbreviated version is more sophisticated. 
27 Thomas F. Remington, 'Regime Transition in Communist Systems: The Soviet Case', Soviet Economy, 
Vol. 6, No.2 (1990). Ada W. Finifter and Ellen Mickiewicz, 'Redefining the Political System of the 
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change can occur as a result of the long-term development of the relation of actors and institution.28 Since 
this theoretical core is too broadly defined, it seems necessary to introduce each variant of new 
institutionalism. The first variant is rational choice institutionalism. This school presumes that behaviour 
of actors is rational within the constraints of institutions. Thus, the preference of actors is the 
maximisation of personal interests. Moreover, it is based on methodological individualism: it focuses on 
individual actors rather than collective actors. On the other hand, the second variant, sociological 
institutionalism, rejects rational choice. This school does not presume actors' preferences a priori, since 
preferences are formed by institutions. In addition, it is not based on methodological atomism. Thus, 
actors are not individuals but, for instance, social class, parties, and others. 
Up to now, some studies that applied new institutionalism to the Soviet case are based on rational 
choice institutionalism. The common element of these studies is the focus on intra-state (including the 
party) affairs rather than society. Philip Roeder applies rational choice institutionalism to the explanation 
of structural cycles and the final collapse of communist regime. He exclusively focused on relations 
between the top (Politburo) level elites and second (Central Committee) level elites by supposing their 
relations were reciprocal rather than hierarchical. In order to secure their political position, the top elites 
had to seek support from the second level, which was bound to lead to a transition from collective 
leadership to one-man directive leadership. In addition, the directive leadership was bound to be 
conservative, because it could not betray the interest of second level elites. If betrayed, he was expelled by 
USSR: Mass Support for Political Change', American Political Science Review, Vol. 86, No.4 (December 
1992) also provides some evidence for modernisation theory. 
28 On new (or neo) institutionalism generally, see Peter A. Hall and Rosemary C. R. Taylor, 'Political 
Science and the Three New Institutionalisms', Political Studies, Vol. 44, No.4 (1996); Ellen M. Immergut, 
'The Theoretical Core of the New Institutionalism', Politics and Society, Vol. 26, No.1 (1998); Rosa 
Mule, 'New Institutionalism: Distilling some 'Hard Core' Propositions in the Works of Williamson and 
March and Olsen', Politics, Vol. 19, No.3 (September 1999). On sociological institutionalism, see Paul J. 
DiMaggio and Walter W. Powell. 'The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective 
Rationality in Organizational Fields', American Sociological Review, Vol. 48, No. 2 (April 1983). On 
historical institutionalism, see Kathleen Thelen and Sven Steimo, 'Historical institutionalism in 
comparative politics', in Sven Steinmo, Kathleen Thelen, and Frank Longstreth, eds., Structuring Politics 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992); Colin Hay and Daniel Winscott, 'Structure, Agency and 
Historical Institutionalism', Political Studies, Vol. 46, No. 5 (1998); Peter A. Hall and Rosemary C. R. 
Taylor, 'The Potential of Historical Institutionalism: a Response to Hay and Wincott', Political Studies, 
Vol. 46, No. 5(1998). On rational choice institutionalism, see Douglass C. North, 'Institutions and a 
transaction-cost theory of exchange', James E. Alt and Kenneth A. Shepsle, eds., Perspectives on Positive 
Political Economy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Douglass C. North, Institutions, 
Institutional Change and Economic Performance (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990). The 
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second level elites, as in the case of Khrushchev. Thus, the Soviet system was bound to stagnate. 
Gorbachev's reforms were attempts to replace the old second level elites with new ones, but he failed to 
create a new structure.29 Though this is not institutionalism, one study that applied rational choice to the 
Soviet case can be introduced here. According to Susan Batty and Vesna Danilovic, Gorbachev's strategy 
of centrism between radical reformers and conservatives was rational in order to make sure their 
cooperation in the short run. However, such a centralist strategy could not be sustained in a sequential 
process as polarisation increased. They explained this mechanism by nested game theory. 30 In another 
study, Steven Solnick also utilises rational choice institutionalism to account for the collapse of the 
Komsomol and other youth organisations. He focuses on the middle level bureaucracy (e. g. regional full-
time Komsomol workers). According to him, the middle level bureaucracy tended to be autonomous 
because of agency problem. Though they were agents of top elites, middle level elites could get more 
information on their own affairs. Thus, they could hide their real capacity and information from the central 
elites. The bureaucratic hierarchy was bound to weaken. Gorbachev's reforms delegating authority to the 
middle level elites enhanced centrifugal fragmentation and caused a hierarchy breakdown.31 Although she 
did not apply rational choice, Bunce's treatment of the collapse of the communist regime is logically 
similar to Solnick's explanation. Her bird-eye's view explanation emphasises that the formal monopoly of 
power and resources internationally (within the Soviet bloc) and domestically (within the Soviet Union) 
caused unbearable high costs for the central organisation. Thus, throughout its history, the Soviet Union 
informally delegated power to lower organs as well as satellite countries. Gorbachev's reforms accelerated 
this centrifugal process by the formal power delegation to lower organs. Therefore, the Soviet bloc 
disintegrated and the Soviet Union also collapsed.32 
author includes historical institutionalism into sociological institutionalism because the crucial distinction 
in new institutionalisms is in the acceptance of rational choice. 
29 Philip G. Roeder, Red Sunset: The Failure 0/ Soviet Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1992). 
30 Susan E. Batty and Vesna Danilovic, 'Gorbachev's Strategy of Political Centrism: A Game-Theoretic 
Interpretation', Journal o/Theoretical Politics, Vol. 9, No.1 (1997). 
31 Steven L. Solnick, 'The Breakdown of Hierarchies in the Soviet Union and China', World Politics, Vol. 
48, No. 2 (January 1996); Steven L. Solnick, Stealing the State: Control and Collapse in Soviet 
Institutions (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1998). 
32 Valerie Bunce, Subversive Institutions: The Design and the Destruction o/Socialism and the State (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 1999). 
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It seems that few studies applied sociological institutionalism to the Soviet or Communist case. 
One study on the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party applies sociological institutionalism, which seems 
instructive in understanding of the disintegration of the CPSU. According to this, the Hungarian 
communist party had failed to adequately co-opt the new professionally qualified elites as party workers 
especially at a regional and local level. Such isolated elites began to form informal reform circle, which, in 
the end, made it possible to change the party from within.33 
As we have seen, although there are some variations in new institutionalism, the common element 
is that it focuses on the ruling organisation rather than top elites as in the case of transitology or society as 
in the case of modernisation theory. 
5. Marxist Views 
Some Left scholars advanced a somewhat similar view to some new institutionalists on the Soviet 
'demise'. David Kotz and Fred Weir argue that Gorbachev's reforms gave a great opportunity to conduct a 
capitalist revolution to party-state elites. For example, economic refonh allowed middle and lower elites to 
spontaneously privatise state property. Political reform destroyed central control and middle and lower 
party officials became independent. The Soviet system was, therefore, fragmented by party-state elites 
themselves. The revolution came 'from above'. A high degree of elite continuity after the collapse, they 
argue, supports their argument.34 
6. Some Hypotheses on Political Change 
Here, we can make some hypotheses about why and how the Soviet system collapsed based on 
these theories. 
1. The central factor in the Soviet collapse is the strategy of top elites, for example, Gorbachev, 
Yeltsin, Ligachev and so forth (transitology). 
33 Patrick H. O'Neil, Revolutionfrom Within: The Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party and the Collapse of 
Communism (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 1998). A condensed version is Patrick H. O'Neil, 'Revolution 
from Within: Institutional Analysis, Transition from Authoritarianism, and the Case of Hungary', World 
Politics, Vol. 48, No.4 (July 1996). 
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2. Social and economic change or the failure to legitimate its rule through economic development 
was the crucial factor in the Soviet collapse (modernisation theory). 
3. Intra-state structure accumulated friction within the ruling body that led to the final collapse by 
the failure of reform (new institutionalism). 
4. The Soviet system came to an end by transforming party-state elites into new economic elites 
(Marxist view). 
After investigating the CPSU disintegration in detail, we will return to these hypotheses in the final 
chapter. 
IV. How the Soviet System Collapsed: Temporal Sequences of Political Change 
1. Application of Different-Type Concepts 
So far, we have seen several theories of the Soviet system and its collapse. In this section, let me 
clarify some terminology on the temporal sequences of political change, which are used in this dissertation. 
Although transitology's conceptual tools, that is, liberalisation and democratisation, have been influential 
in defining the temporal sequences of political change, some concepts that are more appropriate may have 
been advanced by an older study of the breakdown of democratic regimes. 35 True, the Soviet system was 
far from a liberal democracy. Therefore, the application of such concepts may be the dangerous case of 
'conceptual stretching'. Nonetheless, it seems to me that the concepts used in the breakdown of 
democratic regimes are more neutral than those of teleological transitology. Whether or not the application 
is appropriate should be decided only by the result of such an attempt. Thus, this issue will be considered 
in the final chapter after the detailed analysis. 




In his Breakdown of Democratic Regimes, Linz utilised Karl Dietrich Bracher's concepts of 
temporal sequences: crisis, loss of power, power vacuum, and takeover of power (a breakdown). In each 
phase, there is a chance to find a solution (reequilibrium). If a regime fails to secure reequilibrium in the 
first phase, it reaches the second phase. If it keeps failing, the regime faces breakdown. The first phase is 
crisis. This is characterised by a situation in which a regime is incapable of resolving problems. Serious 
problems tend to destroy a consensus of regime-supporting elites, because such serious problems are, by 
definition, difficult to resolve, therefore, a solution acceptable to the majority cannot be found. Therefore, 
they are called 'unsolvable problems'. Unsolvable problems accumulate in this phase. Nonetheless, 
unsolvable problems are usually not the immediate cause of the breakdown. '[I]t is not the technical 
characteristics of the problems but the political context in which they are placed, the constraining 
conditions on the regime, and the alternatives offered by the existence of one or more disloyal oppositions 
that ultimately trigger the process of breakdown' .36 
3. Loss of Power and Power Vacuum 
In the phase of loss of power, the regime begins to suffer a crisis of legitimacy. The ruling 
capacity of the regime significantly declines. A tense atmosphere, widespread circulation of rumours, 
increased mobilisation in the street and so forth may lead regime-supporting elites to take action to 
strengthen the power of executive, or to make an attempt to incorporate part of the opposition. 
Nonetheless, such measures may fail to produce the expected result. In this case, the immobilism 
of political forces and the process of polarisation continue, and a pre-civil war situation emerges. This is 
the phase of power vacuum. None rules the country in this phase. There are two options for regime-
supporting leadership: to withdraw, turning over its power to the armed forces, or to appeal to the nation 
and to mobilise organised forces. 37 
35 Juan J. Linz, The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Crisis, Breakdown and Reequilibration 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978). 
36 Ibid., pp. 50-55. Citation is p. 55. 
37 Ibid., pp. 75-77. 
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These phases are similar to what Samuel Huntington called 'praetorianism'. The government loses 
its capacity to satisfy the demands of the people. That is, the level of political participation exceeds that of 
political institutionalisation, which induces military intervention.38 
4. Takeover of Power and a Breakdown 
When opposition forces assume power, the process reached the phase of breakdown. This may be 
a result of a violent confrontation or secret negotiation. In the latter case, the process is carried out by only 
a small number of individuals.39 Once the opposition assumes power, its rule must be institutionalised. 
This is the inauguration of a new regime. 
To investigate the process of CPSU disintegration, utilising these concepts, is the task of the 
following chapters. Before starting the task, it is necessary to examine the existing research on the final 
years of the CPSU. 
V. Previous Studies of the CPSU and Features of This Research 
1. Categorisation of Existing Studies of the CPSU 
Almost without exception, every study of the collapse of the Soviet Union touches the CPSU issue. 
In fact, it is not possible to discuss the Soviet collapse without including the CPSu. Still it seems 
impossible to give an overview of all these studies, because of their huge number. It is necessary to limit 
and categorise the arguments to specifically the CPSU, though, since most of the previous studies on the 
CPSU are based on firm historical and empirical evidence, it is dangerous to do so. Nonetheless, it seems 
that there are some differences in focus and crucial issues such as the possibility of reform (see Table 1-2). 
The first difference lies in the focus of research. While some studies pay more attention to institutional 
issues, others investigate ideology and the opinion of party members. The second criterion is the 
possibility of reform of the CPSU, though it is not always clear. Some scholars admit a certain possibility 
of party reform, which implies that party reform could have led to the successful consequence of total 
system reform. Other scholars argue that party reform in communist system is impossible, since the party 
38 Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order. 
39 Linz, The Breakdown, pp. 78-79. 
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apparat concentrated power in its own hands and any reform would necessarily undermine its power, 
which must cause an intense reaction from the apparat. 
2. Institutional Analysis 
The following introduces previous studies along this typology. However, the possibility of party 
reform is not always clear. Thus, previous studies are introduced by considering their research focus. The 
first category is institutional analysis. Many studies seem to be included in this category. The most 
extensive work is Graeme Gill's.40 He historically discusses many issues from personnel change to the 
institutional framework that the CPSU faced by using many published materials, especially newspapers. If 
forced to mention some problems, firstly, his study is all-inclusive (although it can be also a positive 
point), therefore, the focus of the discussion is not always clear. This leads to a second problem: why, after 
all, the CPSU disintegrated is not necessarily clear, though he suggests its disintegration was caused by the 
failure of adaptation to a changing environment.41 Related to it, he does not suggest the possibility of party 
reform. Later scholars should discuss some crucial topics that are not considered in his excellent sketch. 
Toshihiko Ueno, a Japanese scholar, also analyses many problems of the CPSU. The main foci of his 
works are institutional change, social composition, the authority of the party in the whole system, and 
others.42 Although he does not refer to the possibility of party reform, it seems that he thinks there was 
some possibility of this kind at the 28th party congress in 1990. Some works in this category argue that 
party reform is impossible by investigating resistance from the top-level (Central Committee) party 
apparat. Though he changed his opinion on this matter, Gordon Hahn's previous view seems typical. 
According to him, reform of the CPSU was impossible since power was so concentrated in the hands of 
the CC apparat that any reform undermined its interests, which led to strong resistance. Another feature of 
his research is the use of party archives. Probably his research is one of the earliest attempts to understand 
40 Graeme Gill, The Collapse of a Single Party System: The Disintegration of the Communist Party of the 
Soviet Union (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994). 
41 Ibid., pp. 183-184. 
42 Toshihiko Ueno, 'Gorubachofu Seikenka niokeru Sorenpokyosanto no Henka [Changes of the CPSU 
under Gorbachev)" Hogaku Kenkyu [Studies of Law], Vol. 63, No. 2 (1990); Toshihiko Ueno, 
'Sorenpokyosanto Kaitaikatei no Bunseki [The Analysis of Processes of the Disintegration of the CPSU]', 
Kokusaiseiji [International Politics], Vol. 104 (1993); Toshihiko Ueno, 'Sorenpokyosanto Dai28kai 
Taikai womeguru Shomondai [Problems around the Twenty Eighth Congress of the CPSU]', Hogaku 
Kenkyu, Vol. 68, No.2 (1995). 
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the Soviet collapse through investigating party archives. 43 In addition to these works, Cameron Ross 
discusses the problem of party-state relations.44 
3. Ideologies and Opinion Analysis 
Some scholars analyse ideological issues and the emergence of various groups in the CPSU. 
Ronald Hill's study is included in this group. The purpose of his discussion is to investigate the strategy of 
Gorbachev's reform which led to institutional collapse and cracks in the monolith.45 He distinguishes these 
cracks among strands of opinion inside the CPSu. He does not discuss the possibility of reform either. 
Nobuo Shimotomai, a Japanese scholar, also investigates the divergence of opinion within the party.46 
Among other scholars, Stephen White should be mentioned. He produced many works on the 
CPSU from an overview of the disintegrating process to more detailed analysis of the 28th party 
congress. 47 Although some of these are beyond the ideology and opinion analysis, for the sake of 
convenience his works are introduced here. In two works that were written well after the disintegration, he 
suggests the clear possibility of party reform. Based on opinions of 10wer level party members that were 
included in party archives, he states 'there was a real potential for Party renewal in the early 1990s, based 
upon a commitment to social justice and a far-reaching democratization of the party structure,.48 However, 
43 Gordon M. Hahn, Gorbachev versus the CPSU CC Apparat: The Bureaucratic Politics of Reforming the 
Party Apparat, 1988-1991 (PhD Dissertation, Boston University, 1995); Gordon M. Hahn, 'The Politics of 
the XXVIII CPSU Congress and the Central Committee Open Letter', Russian History, Vol. 22, No.4 
(Winter 1995); Gordon M. Hahn, 'The First Reorganisation of the CPSU: Central Committee Apparat 
under Perestroika', Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 49, No.2 (1997). His later view that admits the possibility 
of party reform is presented by Gordon M. Hahn, Russia's Revolution from Above, 1985-2000: Reform, 
Transition, and Revolution in the Fall of the Soviet Communist Regime (New Brunswick: Transaction 
Publishers, 2002). 
44 Cameron Ross, 'Party-State Relations', in Eugene Huskey ed., Executive Power and Soviet Politics: The 
Rise and Decline of the Soviet Politics (Armonk: M. E. Sharpe, 1992). 
45 Ronald 1. Hill, 'The CPSU: From Monolith to Pluralist?' Soviet Studies, Vol. 43, No.2 (1991); Ronald 1. 
Hill, 'The CPSU: Decline and Collapse', Irish Slavonic Studies, Vol. 12 (1991). 
46 Nobuo Shimotomai, 'Sorenpo Houkai no Nakano Kyosanto [The CPSU in the Collapse of the USSR]" 
Kokusaiseiji [International Relations], Vol. 99 (1992). 
47 Stephen White, 'Rethinking the CPSU', Soviet Studies, Vol. 43, No. 3 (1991); Stephen White, 
'Background to the XXVIII Congress', in E. A. Rees ed., The Soviet Communist Party in Disarray: The 
XXVIII Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (London: Macmillan Press, 1992); Stephen 
White 'The Politics of the XXVII Congress', in Ibid.; Stephen White, 'Communists and their Party in the 
Late Soviet Period', The Slavonic and East European Review, Vol. 72, No.4 (October 1994); Stephen 
White, 'The Failure ofCPSU Democratization', The Slavonic and East European Review, Vol. 75, No.4 
(October 1997); Stephen White and Ian McAllister, 'The CPSU and Its Members: Between Communism 
and Postcommunism', British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 26, No.1 (1996). 
48 White, 'Communists and their Party', p. 663. 
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it is always not clear why this possibility could not be realised. Many reasons may be indicated: the 
indecision of Gorbachev, the reaction of conservatives and others. His two articles are another early 
attempt that used party archives. 
The analysis of the right wing in the CPSU by Robert W. Orttung shows interesting points. 
Ideologically right wing in the Communist Party of Russian Republic who sought the unity of the CPSU 
made the condition of fractionalism by itself because it was one 'fraction' within the CPSu.49 On party 
reform, it seems that he thinks it depended on the attitude of the right wing. If they had accepted pluralism, 
the party could have renewed itself. He states, 'While the Right was willing to use factionalism in its battle 
against the democratic reformers, it could not accept pluralism as a permanent state of affairs' .50 
Concerning Gorbachev's strategy of party reform, there is a study on the discourse of Gorbachev 
by Neil Robinson.51 He argues that Gorbachev's reform of the CPSU was not very reformist. Gorbachev, 
according to Robinson, avoided any change to the place of the party in the whole system. His study 
suggests Gorbachev's ambiguity on the role of the party. Similarly, a recent book by Jonathan Harris 
makes an important contribution to understanding Gorbachev's contradictory and ambiguous strategy of 
reforming the party apparat. His focus is the content of Gorbachev's strategy rather than the institutional 
framework of the party apparat. According to him, Gorbachev tried to change the role of the party by 
emphasising the 'political' rather than 'economic-management' role, which destroyed the fundamental 
function of the party apparat. 52 
Therefore, the crucial issues in the study of the CPSU are as follows. The first is why party reform 
was introduced. The second is whether the possibility of party reform existed or not. Thirdly, if there was 
such a possibility, why was it not realised? Alternatively, if there was no such possibility, what prevented 
the reform? While some scholars who think the possibility existed tend to attribute the reasons to 
49 Robert W. Orttung, 'The Russian Right and the Dilemmas of Party Organization', Soviet Studies, Vol. 
44, No.3 (1992). The author does not give this 'fraction' a formal meaning, since the fraction was 
prohibited by the end of the CPSU. Only platforms were admitted in the twenty-eighth congress. 
50 Ibid., p. 474. 
51 Neil Robinson, "The Party is Sacred to Me": Gorbachev and the Place of the Party in Soviet Reform, 
1985-1990, Discussion Paper Series No. 10 (Essex: Russian & Soviet Studies Centre, University of Essex, 
June 1991); Neil Robinson, 'Gorbachev and the Place of the Party in Soviet Reform, 1985-1991', Soviet 
Studies, Vol. 44, No.3 (1992). 
52 Jonathan Harris, Subverting the System: Gorbachev's Reform of the Party's Apparat, 1986-1991 
(Lanham, MD.: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2004). 
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indecision of Gorbachev and reaction of conservatives, other scholars who consider party reform was 
impossible are likely to seek their explanation in the institutional structure of the CPSU. 
4. Features of this Research 
Compared with the studies mentioned above, this dissertation has the following features. Firstly, 
the focus is on the institution. Although the author admits that institutional analysis tends to be a dry 
description, it is necessary to research this issue. After the Second World War, political science sought 
more dynamic approaches by dismissing an institutional approach. Nonetheless, the old institutional 
approach has not yet lost its merit. Before turning to a new approach, scholars should think what they can 
recognise by using such an approach. 
Secondly, the author's analysis pays more attention to the party apparat and its work. This seems 
to be a natural research subject because it is frequently assumed that the party apparat is the key to 
understanding the Soviet system. However, the study of the party apparat was not easy. Published 
materials that were available told little about the actual work of the party apparat. Materials that were 
found by chance (such as the Smolensk archive) provided great opportunities for such research. 
Now the situation has changed, and new archival materials become available. This dissertation 
bases itself mainly on the party archive, which is the third feature of this dissertation. This research utilises 
party archives of Russian State Archive of Recent History or RGANI (formerly TsKhSD, the Centre for 
Preservation of Contemporary Documents), fond 89 and Russian State Archive of Social and Political 
History or RGASPI (formerly RTsKhIDNI, Russian Centre for the Preservation and Study of Documents 
of Recent History), fond 582, opis' 6 (formerly fond 646, opis' 1).53 
These features may not be very new. In fact, this dissertation shares many features with other 
studies mentioned above. For example, in terms of focus, the institutional analysis is also attempted by 
many other scholars, including Gill. Nonetheless, this dissertation tries to conduct a deeper institutional 
analysis of the party apparat. The party apparat, which is the second feature, has been analysed by Hahn 
and Harris. Still, Harris's work did not utilise the party archives and it researches Gorbachev's 
(ambiguous) strategy rather than institutions. But, party archives have been utilised by White and Hahn. 
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This dissertation is, nonetheless, different from White's two articles in terms of focus. While his focus is 
more on party ranks, the Central Committee (CC) apparat is this dissertaion's main interest. Thus, Hahn's 
works share many features with this dissertation. The difference will be shown through the whole 
argument in terms of interpretation. 
VI. Structure of This Dissertation 
The dissertation consists of seven chapters. In this chapter, the research subject, some theoretical 
issues, and previous research were considered. In the next chapter, based on mainly existing literature, the 
situation of the party before perestroika will be discussed. This will show the reasons why party reform 
was necessary. In the third chapter, the reform of party-state relations will be considered. This issue relates 
to streamlining the party's old functions. The fourth chapter will deal with issues of party elections and the 
party programme. These issues relate to defining the new function of the party. However, the party failed 
to achieve the new function desired by Gorbachev. Rather, it was converting itself into other functions: 
economic and security functions in the final months of the party. These issues will be discussed in the fifth 
and sixth chapters. Finally, the summarised argument, brief comparison and theoretical consideration will 
be given in the final chapter. 
53 Incidentally, the name 'TsKhSD' rather than 'RGAN!' is used in this dissertation, because the author 
referred to microfilm form documents edited before the renaming. 
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Chapter 2 The Phase of Crisis: The General Problem in the USSR 
I. Introduction 
The phase of crisis is characterised by the accumulation of 'unsolvable problems'. What were the 
'unsolvable problems' in the Soviet system? Some may indicate the nature of the Soviet economic system. 
Firstly, the command economic system theoretically had fundamental problems as Mises and Hayek 
argued many years ago. Secondly, the economic system was practically far from efficient. Especially after 
the oil shock, the lack of efficiency caused a difficult problem in the realm of high technology. Others may 
indicate a changing nature of society. The emerging civil society, they may say, became less amenable to 
the party control. My argument, nonetheless, suggests that 'unsolvable problems' were accumulating in 
the political system itself. The basic features of the Soviet political system tended to face a dilemma. Let 
us, first of all, consider the basic dilemma of communist regimes in general. Then we will move on to the 
Soviet case. 
II. The Tension between Monolithic Unity and Monopolistic Control: a General Problem 
As discussed in Chapter 1, the basic characteristics of the communist regime are monolithic unity 
of the party and the party's monopolistic control over the state and society. However, these two 
characteristics presented a dilemma. The party tried to monopolistically control the state and society, for 
which the party had to exercise a whole series of functions. Still, the party had to integrate these functions 
to maintain its monolithic unity. It was not always a difficult task if the purpose was clearly defined. For 
instance, in wartime, this system worked rather well since the party could mobilise the state and society 
for the only aim, to win the war. Or, at the early stage of its development, utopian goal of ideology could 
mobilise people to build 'communism' to a significant degree. l 
Nonetheless, the more complicated the system became, the more difficult it was for the party to 
control it. For example, in the realm of economy this problem was clear. Economic development was one 
of the most important tasks of the regime. At the early stage, rapid industrialisation seemed to lead to 
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building the utopian communist society. At a later stage, where the legitimation by a utopian ideology 
faded away, it substituted the function of legitimacy. 2 However, the party workers were originally 
revolutionaries, that is, amateurs in economics. They, therefore, had to train experts in economics. 
Although at the first stage of economic development, they could relatively easily control these experts, the 
more complicated the economic system became, the harder it was to control them. This problem was 
reflected in the divergence between so-called 'reds' and 'experts'. While the 'red' was the person who 
engaged in the party from youth organisations and was educated by the party, experts were raised in the 
economic spheres. 'Reds', on the one hand, were fully devoted to party activities. For experts, on the other 
hand, joining the party meant one step in their career promotion. The difficulty of controlling the experts 
meant that they became influential and independent within the party. Almost the same story was true in 
other realms. It became increasingly difficult for the central party organisation to monitor regional party 
organisations since the ruling structure became very complex. In the early stages, the central organisation 
tried to monitor regional ones by violent methods. Nonetheless, violent methods had the potential to 
prevent rational ruling due to the arbitrariness of central organisations. Regional ruling elites usually had 
more professional knowledge on regional matters than central ones. The more stable did the personnel 
policies become, the more autonomous the local organisations. Thus, the party became an assembly of 
experts. Ideological decay accelerates this tendency. Monolithic unity faces a crisis of integrity. 
Moreover, control over society also might become weak. It is impossible for any forceful 
organisation to extend its control to such a typical private realm as the family. It is well-known that the 
Catholic Church was rather independent of the control of the party in Poland. Even organisations founded 
to control society might become autonomous. Generally, organisations develop their own interests once 
they have been established. For example, there was a tendency that academic organisations became 
independent of the party since these organisations had special knowledge and authority. The party could 
1 Shiokawa states that socialist system had effectiveness rather than efficiency at the early stage of 
development. See Shiokawa, Genzonshita Shakashugii (Tokyo: Keisoshobo), p. 127. 
2 See Takayuki Ito, 'Eastern Europe: Achieving Legitimacy', in Gilbert Rozman with Seizaburo Sato and 
Gerald Segal eds., Dismantling Communism: Common Causes and Regional Variations (Washington! 
Baltimore: Woodrow Wilson Center Press/ Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992), pp. 288-294. Ito 
indicates three legitimating formulas or legitimacy claims in communist countries, which are a 
revolutionary-millennial formula, the formula of rapid industrialisation, and formula of economic 
effectiveness. Shiokawa argues that factors that integrated the masses in communist countries were an 
ideology, economic achievements, and paternalism. See Shiokawa, Genzonshita, pp. 184-196. 
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not force an arbitrary personnel policy upon them. The same tendency was observable in other 
organisations. Trade unions, for instance, might take some autonomy from the party if the party was not 
popular with the workers. Thus, monopolistic control over the state and society was gradually undermined. 
III. The Soviet Case 
Let us turn our attention to how the general problem of a communist regime emerged in the USSR. 
The communist regime in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union had some of the same difficulties 
discussed above. Nonetheless, it seems that how the difficulty was reflected and how to cope with it had 
certain differences among the countries. The following sections will specifically look into the Soviet case. 
Firstly, the structure of CPSU organisations is considered. Secondly, two distinct types of communist 
party elite will be introduced from raion level to centre. The third task is to discuss centre-regional 
relations. Finally, why reform of the CPSU was needed will be considered. It will suggest that the reason 
why the reform in the USSR occurred from the leadership was directly connected with these problems. 
1. Hierarchy of the party organisations 
Before discussing career patterns from raion to centre, the structure of party organisations should 
be noted briefly.3 Figure 2-1 shows the hierarchy of the CPSU. The lowest party organisations were 
primary party organisations (PPOs), which were formed in any organisation if it included more than three 
party members, and which every party member had to join. The upper organisations of PPOs were raion 
(district) party committees (raikoms) or in the case of cities, city party committees (gorkoms). Let us 
define this level as 'local'. 
The party organisational hierarchy was complicated at its upper levels. On the one hand, in Russia, 
Ukraine, Belorussia, Georgia, Azerbaidzhan, Uzbekistan, Kirgizia and Kazakhstan, raikoms and gorkoms 
were subordinate to oblast' or krai party committees (obkoms or kraikoms). Some party committees of 
capital or very huge cities (e.g. Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev and so forth) had the same status as obkoms. 
Here we call an oblast' level as 'regional'. Except in the Russian republic, obkoms were supervised by 
republican central committees. On the other hand, the parties of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldavia, 
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Turkmenia and Armenia did not have obkoms, therefore, the republican central committee of each 
republic controlled raikoms and gorkoms in these republics. Then, republican party committees were 
under the all-union central committee. However, the Russian republic did not have its own central 
committee until 1990. Thus, obkoms and kraikoms in Russia were directly subordinate to the all-union 
central committee. This meant that obkoms in Russian republic were as important as (or frequently more 
important than) other republican central committees for the all-union central committee, since, besides the 
exceptional importance of the Russian republic, obkoms and kraikoms in Russia outnumbered republican 
central committees. 
At each level, the party committee had full-time party workers. In the all-union central committee, 
membership of the Secretariat was a full-time job. CC secretaries directed other full-time party workers of 
Central Committee departments. It is well-known that the General Secretary became the top person of the 
USSR by holding that position. Though the Politburo was the highest organ of decision-making, 
membership of the Politburo was not a full-time job, that is, Politburo members had another paid job. For 
example, members included the General Secretary, chairman of the Council of Ministers, some republican 
party first secretaries, and others, which were full-time jobs. It seems that the Politburo coordinated the 
most important interests of various organs of the Soviet system. 
At the lower levels, party organisations except for PPOs also had the Secretariats. The equivalents 
of the Politburo at the lower levels were party bureaux, which included important persons in other organs 
as well as party officials, for example, the chairman of the soviet executive committee (ispolkom), the 
director of a huge factory in the region and so forth. PPOs did not have a Secretariat, but had secretaries 
(PPO secretaries). They were usually, but not always, full-time. The party apparat consisted of this huge 
hierarchy of full-time party workers from the CC secretaries to the PPO secretaries. 
2. Apparatchiki and Kltozyaistvell1liki at a Local Level 
How did revolutionaries train economic experts? According to Azrael, Lenin attempted to manage 
this problem by utilising the bourgeois specialists from the old regime and the red directors, which led to 
the rise of red directors in the political field. However, Stalin's Great Purge extinguished them. The new 
3 On the structure of CPSU organs in more detail, see Ronald J. Hill and Peter Frank, The Soviet 
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red specialists after the Purge were politically obedient and dependent on leadership through the Stalin and 
Khrushchev era. Under Brezhnev, a new managerial elite, which was well educated, pragmatic and 
politically reliable for the regime rather than democratic, consequently emerged.4 This well-known story 
has been discussed by many scholars.5 While most of them researched oblast' or upper level elites because 
of limitations of information, Matsuzato researched the career patterns of raion level elites, by which he 
distinguishes two different types of elites: apparatchiki and khozyaistvenniki. 6 The criteria that are 
relevant to this distinction are the timing of joining the party, higher education qualifications, higher 
political education qualifications, and the timing of becoming a full-time party worker.7 Now it seems 
possible to discuss this question from raion to central level. The discussion in this section of the raion is 
mainly based on Matsuzato's distinction. The relation between apparatchiki and khozyaistvenniki at the 
oblast' and central level is discussed in the following sections. 
(a) Khozyaistvenlliki 
Khozyaistvennik is a word that derives from khozyaistvo' (economy). It literally means an 
economic manager. This clearly indicates their character. They have a higher education, and pursue their 
careers in a management body. Joining the party is rather late, and they have only a little political 
education. Once they become a full-time party worker, their promotion is quick. 
Matsuzato introduces five typical cases in Tver' oblast'. One of them is Kozlov in Staritsa raion, 
who was born in 1945. He entered Leningrad Polytechnic Institute in 1963, joined the party in 1964, and 
graduated from an institute in 1969. He began to work in a machine factory in Staritsa raion in 1969, and 
became a new electric factory manager in 1978. In 1985 he became second secretary in the raikom after a 
Communist Party, 3rd ed. (Winchester, Mass.: Allen & Unwin, 1986), esp. chap. 3. 
4 Jeremy R. Azrael, Managerial Power and Soviet Politics (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 
1966). 
5 An excellent survey of theoretical arguments is presented by Stephen White, 'Communist Systems and 
the "Iron Law of Pluralism"', British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 8, No. 1 (January 1978), pp. 102-
106. His own view is critical of pluralist arguments. 
6 Kimitaka Matsuzato, 'Roshia Chiho Shidosha no Kyaria Patan: Toveri shu wo jireini shite [Career 
patterns of local leaders in Russia: the case of Tver'],' in Akihiro Ishikawa, Nobuaki Shiokawa, and 
Matsuzato Kimitaka eds., Surabu no shakai [Slavic Society ](Tokyo: Kobundo, 1994). One problem of his 
studies is how his findings in Tver' oblast' can be generalised. Nonetheless, it seems that his argument is 
valid as a general tendency. 
7 A full-time worker of the party and soviet was called an 'exempted' (05vobozhdennyi) worker. 
According to Matsuzato, this terminology has not changed yet. See Ibid., p. 331. 
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short period of study in a higher party school. Except for his early party membership, Kozlov is a typical 
khozyaistvennik: high technical education, and a latecomer as a full-time party worker, with little political 
education. 8 Other figures whom Matsuzato introduces, Sel'vonenko in Torzhok city and Kurbatov in 
Kalinin raion, have similar careers. His study discovered that technical experience and education was (and 
'is' still now) required to be elites at the raion level. 
(b) Apparatchiki 
Matsuzato's usage of the words apparat and apparatchiki is a little confusing. Usually, apparatus 
is used as a translation of apparat and an apparatchik denotes its full-time member. However, his use of 
these words is more complex. For example, if all full-time workers of the party are apparatchiki, even 
khozyaistvenniki are included in the category of apparatchiki when they become full-time workers. 
Apparatchiki are, by his definition, people who devote themselves more to the party or executive apparat. 
They had some common characteristics: they join the party at a relatively early age, become full-time 
workers early, have lower level tec1mical education,9 but a higher pO'litical education, and at slow to be 
promoted. Let me introduce two persons among those whom Matsuzato discusses. The first was born in 
1947, and began to work when he was 15 years old. He completed an all-union correspondence (not full-
time) industrial technical school in 1971. This education offered him a chance to join the party in 1972. He 
became a full-time worker (the chairman of a poselok (village) ispolkom) early in 1973. In 1974, he 
moved to the Propaganda and Agitation department of Firosovo raikom and then to the Organisational 
department in 1975. After a higher political education in Leningrad (1976-1980), which indicates the 
strong expectations of the party organisation since he was transferred to such a huge city as Leningrad, he 
returned and was promoted to the deputy chairmanship of the raion ispolkom (raiispolkom) in 1980 and 
then to the second secretaryship of the raikom in 1983. However, his promotion stagnated here. He 
remained second secretary until 1990. 10 Another example of an apparatchik worked mainly in an 
ispolkom. He was born in 1937. He completed an agricultural machinery school in 1957. When he was 22, 
8 Matsuzato, 'Roshia Chiho', pp. 307-310. 
9 On Soviet education system, we should distinguish lower technical education from higher one though 
this is not always regarded as important. The latter, on the one hand, indicates education in universities or 
institutes, while, on the other hand, the former was offered in 'professional technical schools (PTU: 
professional 'no-tekhnicheskoe uchilishche)' . 
29 
he was recruited as a secretary of a village ispolkom from a kolkhoz worker. He joined the party when he 
was 24. Then he became a full-time worker of Tver' oblispolkom in 1966 when he was 29. From 1968 to 
1970, he studied at Leningrad higher party school. In 1970, he began to work as an instructor in a Tver' 
obkom. Then, he returned to the ispolkom. He worked in Kalinin gorispolkom (city soviet executive 
committee). He was promoted to be an assistant of the chairman of the oblispolkom in 1979 when he was 
42. Then he became the 'second head' of the oblispolkom in 1982. However, his promotion stagnated 
here. II Other apparatchiki Matsuzato discusses share more or less this pattern. Then, he concludes that 
khozyaistvenniki had priority over apparatchiki in career patterns at the raion level. 
Figure 2-2 summarises the career patterns discussed above. This shows economic managers 
(khozyaistvenniki) could be promoted to second secretaryships of raikoms or the chairmanships of 
raiispolkoms, skipping the lower level party work. Of course, the distinction between khozyaistvenniki and 
apparatchiki is not always clear. There are mixed figures. Some, who became a full-time worker of 
Communist Youth Organisation (Komsomol) when they were young, had a higher technical education. 12 
Nonetheless, what was discussed above shows the following. Firstly, at least at the raion level, 
khozyaistvenniki stood at a higher point in career terms. Secondly, this priority of khozyaistvenniki was a 
result of meritocracy since this meant that practical managers rather than propagandists were regarded as 
important. Thirdly, according to Matsuzato, these career patterns were established under Brezhnev during 
the 1970-80s. These findings are reinforced by statistical evidence. According to 1971 Tver' statistics, 30 
people completed a higher education among 33 chairmen of raiispolkoms in the oblast'. Nonetheless, it 
seems for 19 of them (about three-quarters) higher education meant only that they had graduated from a 
higher party school. On the other hand, 1989 statistics show that 5 of 30 raiispolkom chairmen (one sixth) 
completed a higher party school only. During these years (from 1971 to 1989), the priority of 
khozyaistvenniki was established at least in the raions of Tver' oblast'. 13 
3. Apparatchiki and KllOzyaistvelllliki in Regional and Republican Levels 
10 Matsuzato, 'Roshia Chiho', pp. 317-320. 
II Ibid, pp. 320-321. Matsuzato states he does not understand what was the 'second head'. 
12 Ibid., pp. 321-322. 
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As shown in figure 2-1, obkoms in the RSFSR were almost equivalent to republican central 
committees in the structure of the CPSu. Therefore, although the argument of this section includes 
obkoms in the RSFSR and other republics, the primary concern here is obkoms in the RSFSR. 
Since career patterns at the oblast' level have been investigated by many researchers, there is 
much statistical information that shows that many obkom first secretaries had economic background. 14 
Frank studied the profiles of first secretaries of most obkoms and kraikoms (including republican obkoms 
and kraikoms) based on 1966 data. According to him, 134 of 139 first secretaries had completed a higher 
education. In addition, according to the other data which takes together all secretaries of party obkoms, 
kraikoms and central committees of republic parties in January 1967, the figure for higher education 
indicates a clear increase from the past: the figure in 1947 was 41.3 per cent while the corresponding 
figure in January 1967 is 97.6%. If our concern is directed to details of higher education of obkom first 
secretaries as of 1966, the largest group was people who completed only a higher party school (36/134: 
26.8 per cent) and the second largest was agricultural-technical (34/134: 25.3 per cent). Nonetheless, if 
agricultural-technical, industrial-technical (25/134: 18.6 per cent), agricultural-technical and party (7/134: 
5.2 per cent), and industrial technical and party (9/134: 6.7 per cent) backgrounds, who were assumed to 
be khozyaistvenniki, are put together, they clearly formed the largest group (75/134: 55.9 per cent). 15 The 
general tendency of the rise of khozyaistvenniki was already clear in 1967 though the higher party school 
group was still large. It is necessary to investigate this tendency after 1967. 
Rigby has researched RSFSR obkoms in the later period. According to his study, the decline of 
number of obkom first secretaries having only a party education from September 1965 to September 1976 
is clear. While in 1965 the group of first secretaries who had completed only a higher party school was 
19.4 per cent (14/72), in 1976 this number decreased to 9.7 per cent (7172). It seems certain that people 
13 Ibid, p. 330; Kimitaka Matsuzato, 'Gyoseifuto toha Nanika [What is the Administrative Party?]', 
Surabu kenkyu senta hokoku shirizu [Slavic Research Center Occasional Paper] No. 56 (Sapporo: Slavic 
Research Center, Hokkaido University, 1995), pp.26-27. 
14 For example, Peter Frank, 'The CPSU Obkom First Secretary: A Profile', British Journal of Political 
Science, Vol. 1, No. 2 (April 1971); T. H. Rigby, 'The Soviet regional leadership: the Brezhnev 
generation', in T. H. Rigby, Political Elites in the USSR: Central leaders and local cadres from Lenin to 
Gorbachev (Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 1990); Joel C. Moses, 'The Impact of Nomenklatura in Soviet 
Regional Elite Recruitment', Soviet Union, Vol. 8, No. 1 (1981). 
IS Frank, 'The CPSU Obkom', pp. 182-183. 
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lacking professional qualifications found it more difficult to become first secretaries. 16 Nonetheless, it 
should be remembered that people having a professional higher education were appointed first secretaries 
with a rather long experience of full-time party work. Many obkom first secretaries had been raikom first 
secretaries, and this number increased from 1965 to 1976. 17 This may reflect the way in which 
professional qualifications had become necessary at the raion level as discussed above. In addition, the 
long party experience of obkom first secretaries does not necessarily mean that they identify themselves as 
apparatchiki. Mawdsley and White introduce the case of Viktor Dobrik, an obkom first secretary in 
Ukraine since 1969. Although he had been a full-time party worker since he was thirty years old, he 
denied that he was regarded as a party careerist since he thought that he had been promoted because of his 
professional skill. 18 It seems that the word apparatchiki carried a negative image in the USSR. This is 
suggested in that the word, a full-time worker in the party and ispolkom, was (and is) an 'exempted' 
worker in Russian. This implied that an ordinary work was more valued than a professional bureaucratic 
work. 19 Because certainly most obkom first secretaries had long party work experience, it is difficult to 
insist on the absolute rise of khozyaistvenniki in career patterns at the regional level. Nonetheless, it seems 
that their priority can be admitted even at the regional level to a lesser degree than at the locallevel.20 
4. Apparatchiki and Khozyaistvenniki in the Centre 
At the central level, it seems that there was a division of labour between apparatchiki and 
khozyaistvenniki. Nonetheless the distinction of these two types is not always clear at the central level. 
There were few persons who did not have highly qualified education. It seems better to distinguish central 
party members in terms of periods of a full-time party work. David Lane and Cameron Ross studied 
careers of governmental elites (USSR ministers, and similar status executives, e.g. chairs of USSR state 
committees) from 1984-1991. They distinguished four types of governmental elites, measured by 'party 
16 Rigby, 'The Soviet regional leadership', pp. 237-239. 
17 Ibid., pp. 242-243. 
18 Evan Mawdsley and Stephen White, The Soviet Elite from Lenin to Gorbachev: The Central Committee 
and its Members, 1917-1991 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 210. 
19 Matsuzato, 'Roshia Chiho', p. 331. 
20 Matsuzato argues that the priority of khozyaistvenniki was weaker at the higher level. See Matsuzato, 
'Gyoseifuto', p. 36. 
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saturation' that was counted by the ranks of party posts and years of full-time party work 21: i) 
Governmental elites with no party saturation were 'non-party careerists'. They had no experience of a full-
time party work and had a career totally within one ministry or sector of the economy, ii) 'Party careerists' 
were governmental elites with high party saturation. They had been transferred from the party apparat and 
had had rather long experience of the high rank party work. And hybrid careerists were divided by iii) 'a 
low-level party saturation group' who had had only a few years experience in the party apparat, and iv) 
'an intermediate group' who had had mixed careers in both governmental and party work.22 This first two 
are close to Matsuzato's khozyaistvenniki and apparatchiki, and hybrid careerists are close to the mixed 
figures introduced in section 3. Lane and Ross assume that the high party saturation represented strong 
control of the party. They find that party saturation was very low among pre-Gorbachev governmental 
elites, that is, non-party careerists were predominant. In addition, non-party careerists were the most 
influential among directing and planning ministers and industrial production and building ministers. Thus, 
they argue, the party experienced difficulties in asserting hegemony over the USSR Council of Ministers 
at that time.23 It means khozyaistvenniki were superior in the economic'sphere. 
The career of Nikolai Ryzhkov is a good example. Ryzhkov, chairman of the USSR Council of 
Ministers from 1985 to 1991, is a typical khozyaistvennik. His career was exclusively in industry. He was 
born in 1929. Working at a defence industry plant from 21 years old, he completed firstly the Kramatorsk 
machine construction technical school in 1955, then a higher engineering education (at the Ural 
Polytechnic Institute) in night school in 1959. He joined the party in 1956. In 1971, he became general 
director of Uralmash, one of the largest production associations in the world. In 1975 he was appointed 
first deputy minister of heavy and transport machine building and in 1979 first deputy chairman of the 
USSR State Planning Committee (Gosplan). In late 1982, when Ryzhkov was 53, Andropov, General 
Secretary at that time, coopted him into the Central Committee apparat. In 1985, he became a full member 
of the Politburo. 24 Ryzhkov can be regarded an excellent example of the khozyaistvennik: a higher 
21 Thus, a USSR minister who had been an ex-high rank party official with long party work experience 
gained a high party saturation number. 
22 David Lane and Cameron Ross, The Transition from Communism to Capitalism: Ruling Elites from 
Gorbachev to Yeltsin (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999), pp. 61-65. 
23 Ibid., pp. 65-67. 
24 On Ryzhkov's career, see Dzhin Vronskaya and Vladimir Chuguev, Kto est' Kto v Rossii i Byvshem 
SSSR (Moskva: Terra, 1994); Tsentr Politicheskoi Informatsii, Federal'naya i Regional'haya Elita Rossii: 
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education, and no political education (there is no evidence to suggest that he went to a higher party school). 
Though the party admission itself was relatively early as a khozyaistvennik (at the age of 27), he had not 
been a full-time party worker until he became 53. 
However, at the central level, khozyaistvenniki were not always influential. Brezhnev's career was 
that of apparatchik rather than khozyaistvennik, though he had knowledge of technical engineering. He 
was a full-time party worker since 1938 when he was 32. Chernenko was a devoted apparatchik. His 
education was mainly higher party school and worked in propagandist realm in the party apparat. 
Gorbachev was also an apparatchik. His career was dedicated almost entirely to the party. At the top level 
of the party apparat, apparatchiki seemed predominant. Lane and Ross studied careers of CC secretaries 
and heads of CC departments from 1981-1991. They found that many of them devoted to full-time party 
work throughout their careers and did not have experience of governmental work, though they also 
confirmed that the large portion of other party officials were co-opted from non-governmental sectors (e.g. 
industrial work, professional work and so forth).25 Such devoted party officials could be regarded as 
apparatchiki. Therefore, it seems that there was a rather clear division' of labour between apparatchiki and 
khozyaistvennild. In addition, such division took an institutional form: the party and the government. 
Combinations of Brezhnev and Kosygin, Gorbachev and Ryzhkov were examples of such a division of 
labour. While, at the lower level, both khozyaistvenniki and apparatchiki could be found within the party 
apparat and khozyaistvenniki were more influential in the party apparat, the picture was somewhat 
different at the central level. 
5. Centre-Regional-Local Relations in the Soviet Union 
As we have seen, the rise of khozyaistvenniki took place especially in lower party organisations 
during the Brezhnev period. It is difficult to judge if this development led to better performance of the 
party organisations. On the one hand, there is an opinion that argues that the party stagnated. For example, 
during perestroika, Gorbachev frequently complained that lower party organisations did not work well, 
Kto est' Kto v Politike i Ekonomike (Moskva: Izdatel'stvo GNOM i D, 2001); Date Base of Slavic 
Research Center, Hokkaido University, URL: http://src-home.hokudai.ac.jp/politics/rawalrul.html; Archie 
Brown ed., The Soviet Union: A Biographical Dictionary (London: Weidenfield and Nicolson, 1990), pp. 
320-321. See also Lane and Ross, The Transition, pp. 212-213; Jerry Hough, Democratization and 
Revolution in the USSR 1985-1991 (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1997), pp. 92-93. 
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and that they usurped the functions of other organisations, which led to stagnation. Nonetheless, on the 
other hand, it is obvious that public service and the living standards of ordinary people were best under 
Brezhnev in Russian history (including Gorbachev and Yeltsin), though, of course, party practices 
involved a huge waste of resources. Taking into account the fact that local party organisations were much 
closer to the life of ordinary people, we can point out that the party at least at the local level worked 
relatively well. In addition, such relatively good performance was related to the establishment of the 
career patterns. With such career patterns, the party had capable raikom first secretaries who knew the 
actual work of production. 
At the regional and republican levels, it is more difficult to judge how well or badly these 
structures operated. Firstly, there is a consensus among scholars that regional and republican party 
organisations became more autonomous from the centre. Brezhnev's policy of 'trust in cadres' provided a 
good incentive and time to manage their regional problems with first secretaries. According to Blackwell, 
cadres were highly stabilised during the Brezhnev era at both the central and the lower levels. Let me take 
the figures of lower levels. In repUblican party committees, the turnover of republican Politburos (or party 
bureaux) under Brezhnev decreased by about half in comparison with the Khrushchev era. In the case of 
republican secretaries, the rate of turnover also declined. In obkoms, the rate was almost half ofthat of the 
Khrushchev period. 26 John Miller also discussed that the centre did not control regional staffing in a 
systematic way.27 In other realms, the republican and the regional autonomy at that time has been 
confirmed by many scholars. For example, Mary McAuley discussed republican autonomy in nationality 
policy. She studied the national composition of republican party congresses, republican party recruitment, 
and nationalities of party members of republican parties. Though her argument did not give a definite 
answer because of lack of information, there was no uniform central policy on nationality matters. Thus, a 
certain autonomy was confirmed.28 Gill and Pitty also discuss republican autonomy within the party. They 
argued that a republican party's autonomy increased significantly under Brezhnev. Visits by the central 
25 Lane and Ross, The Transition, pp. 47-54. 
26 Robert E. Blackwell, Jr., 'Cadres Policy in the Brezhnev Era', Problems of Communism, Vol. 28, No.2 
(March-April 1979), pp. 33-35. 
27 John Miller, 'Nomenklatura: Check on Localism?' in T. H. Rigby and Bohdan Harasymiw eds., 
Leadership Selection and Patron-Client Relations in the USSR and Yugoslavia (London: George Allen & 
Unwin, 1983). 
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leadership became ceremonial and criticism on personnel matters also became moderate?9 One study of 
Kazakhstan Party personnel by a Japanese student revealed that Dinmukhamed Kunaev, first secretary of 
the Kazakh party, enjoyed rather a lot of independence from the centre. After 1976 even second secretaries, 
who usually had Russian nationality and had been regarded as 'watchdogs' of the centre, had worked in 
Kazakhstan and been promoted within Kazakhstan after graduating from universities, that is, well before 
becoming second secretaries. Of course, Kunaev's special relationship with Brezhnev would be very 
useful to enjoy such autonomy.30 In any case, it is certainly possible to recognise the republican and 
regional autonomy in the party under Brezhnev. 
Secondly, we may be able to assume that such regional and republican autonomy was also related 
to local autonomy. It seems that an oblast' or a republic was too large to monitor all of its cities and raions. 
It is likely that a relatively good performance by raikoms discussed above led often to their de facto 
autonomy. As mentioned above, most obkom first secretaries had been raikom first secretaries. Many 
scholars suggested that regionalisation of the all-union Central Committee (the representation of obkom 
first secretaries in Central Committee) was evidence of regional autonomy. If this suggestion was correct, 
localisation of obkoms could be considered proof of local autonomy. For example, Gorbachev states in his 
memoirs that although his transfer from head of department of Stavropol' kraikom to first secretary of 
Stavropol' gorkom was movement to a lower job in terms of the nomenklatura list, he was attracted to 
greater independence of the gorkom first secretaryship.31 In addition, one study of Oktyabr' raion party 
committee in Moscow city shows that the raikom scarcely received any instructions from Moscow 
gorkom. 32 A case study of Kazakhstan mentioned above argues that Kunaev's Kazakhstan was not 
'Kunaev's kingdom' but that he coordinated interests of various regions just as the all-union centre did 
28 Mary McAuley, 'Party Recruitment and the Nationalities in the USSR: A Study in Centre-Republican 
Relationships', British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 10, NO.4 (1980). 
29 Graeme Gill and Roderic Pitty, Power in the Party: The Organization of Power and Central-Republican 
Relations in the CPSU(New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997). 
30 Tetsuro Chida, 'Sorenpo Chuo-Kazafusutan Kankei no Hensen (1980-1991): To Erito Jinjidoko wo 
Sozai toshite [The Central-Republican Relationship and Party Elites in the Soviet Union: Kazakhsatan 
(1980-1991)]" Surabukenkyu [Slavic Studies], Vol. 50 (2004), pp. 37-39. 
31 Mikhail Gorbachev, Zhizn' i Reformy, Vol. 1 (Moskva: Novosti, 1995), p. 109; Mihairu Gorubachofu, 
Gorubachofu Kaisoroku, Jo (Tokyo: Shinshosha, 1996), p. 144. Emphasis added. 
32 Itsuro Nakamura, Soren no Seijiteki Tagenka no Katei [The Process of Political Pluralisation in the 
USSR] (Tokyo: Seikeido, 1997). 
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among regions.33 Thus, the centre allowed people, who knew their own region better and had professional 
knowledge, to direct the region. This meant that republican and regional leaders could enjoy rather 
significant independence in their own republics and regions. Moreover, regional leaders in their tum 
probably allowed some autonomy to local (raion and city) leaders. If this analysis is the case, it is possible 
to argue that the relatively better performance of lower party organisations must have been sustained at the 
expense of the centre. By dismissing strict control, the Soviet system could perform relatively well in the 
Brezhnev period. John Miller indicates, in his study of regional party personnel, the reason why the centre 
did not exercise the power to arrange the systematic rotation of officials from place to place 'seem[ed] to 
lie in the imperatives of rapid economic growth'. 34 
Given such a situation, a serious task for the central leadership was how to regulate the republican 
and regional party organisations. In addition, republican and regional leadership faced the same difficulty 
in their relations with local party organisations. Patronage may provide a clue to understanding this issue. 
Although patronage has been regarded as evidence of corruption and inefficiency of the Soviet system 
(and of course this is, to some degree, the case), it may have been a reasonable response to the centre-
regional-local problem. When the systematic hierarchical regulation does not work well, a reliable client is 
a useful or even necessary instrument of central control. It seems to me that this logic was the case at least 
in the Brezhnev era. When the centre had to allow some autonomy to regional leaders, patronage could be 
a guarantee that they would not rebel against the centre. 
However, patronage would face difficulties when the patron changed. The aging of top leaders 
might have been a reasonable response in order to escape a destruction of patron-client relations. Still, the 
time when top leader died was inevitable. A new leader would face considerable difficulty in constructing 
new centre-regional relations. Some signs of huge turnover of central and regional personnel were there 
even in the Andropov period.35 Here we can recognise one of reasons why Gorbachev had to attempt a 
high level of turnover of regional leaders in his early years. The reason lay in patronage and centre-
regional relations. 
33 Chida, 'Sorepo Chuo', p. 37. 
34 Miller, 'Nomenklatura', p. 90. 
35 Stephen White, After Gorbachev (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), p. 5. 
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6. Fragmentation within the Party and Needs of Reform from Above 
From what was discussed above, it is clear that the monolithic unity of the CPSU was weakened 
to some degree. At the local level, raikoms worked relatively well given de facto autonomy. Regional 
leaders also became autonomous. Moreover, the professional background of local and regional party 
leaders, which were necessary for economic development and public service, made the party an assembly 
of professionals. Jerry Hough argued that such regional and functional cleavages became a prominent 
characteristic of the Soviet political system under Brezhnev and that the system was no longer 
totalitarianism but was moving towards 'institutional pluralism' .36 
To some degree, his argument was valid. Regional autonomy and professionalism certainly 
increased under Brezhnev. The performance of such professional elites was not necessarily bad. Moreover, 
it seems that his argument assumed that such 'plural' elements contributed to the system's stability. 
However, he may have underestimated the extent to which such 'plural' elements could be obstacles for 
the central leadership. 
In addition, the Soviet economic system was too centralised and inevitably inefficient. This leads 
to another reason why we can say that the relatively good performance of the lower party organisations 
must have been sustained at the expense of the centre. Let us imagine that one raikom, which was asked to 
produce some kilograms of vegetables valued at 1000 roubles, spent 1100 roubles to produce them. Such 
inefficiency may have been acceptable at this level. Still if all raions of one oblast' were inefficient to the 
same degree, the cost would become much higher at the oblast' level. Such inefficiency, then, would 
become too huge at the centre. And only at the centre this inefficiency in total scale could be recognised. 
Thus, the problem may not have been the decline of the economic development rate itself Even 
theoretically economic problems do not necessarily cause political problems immediately. In fact, despite 
several problems in the economy, some keen observers recognised that there was not a clear indication of 
the Soviet regime collapse. Actually, despite the macro level economic decline, the average living 
standard of ordinary people was sustained by the relatively good performance of lower level party 
organisations. The problem was that such good performance could be realised only by de facto autonomy 
36 Jerry F. Hough, The Soviet Union and Social Science TheOlY (Cambridge, M.A.: Harvard University 
Press, 1977), esp. chap. 1. 
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of local and regional party organisations and the professionalism of lower elites. In a sense, the party faced 
a crisis of its integrity not because of economic decline but because of economic development. 
That the initiative for reforms came from above in the USSR was, therefore, not a coincidence. So 
far, an influential explanation is presented by totalitarian theory. According to this, since a regime was 
firmly controlled by the dictator, only the dictator could have the broader latitude of choice that would 
undermine his power.37 However, this fails to explain why reform was necessary at all. My argument 
would suggest a different cause: Only the centre could realise the seriousness of the systemic problems. 
Regional and local autonomy, professionalism of elites, and patronage became obstacles only for the new 
top leader. The total scale of systematic economic problems could be visible only at the centre because the 
performance of lower level was not necessarily bad. Reform came only from the top. If the metaphor of 
war activity is used, this situation can be explained as follows: While each unit managed their activity 
relatively well in the front line, at the headquarters the centre could not supervise the activity of each unit 
because the war line was so extended. Just like 'friction' in a war, the CPSU suffered dysfunction of huge 
hierarchical bureaucracy. According to Patrick O'Neil, the Hungariah communist party could not work 
well at the local or regional level. Professionally qualified elites were not co-opted into the local or 
regional party leadership very much. Thus, reform initiative came from locales within the party.38 The 
picture was different in the Soviet Union. Local party organisations, by co-opting khozyaistvenniki, 
worked more or less well. In this situation, the initiative for reform could come only from the centre. 
Of course, it was the top leaders who judged how acute these problems were. In this term, it was 
decisive that the Soviet Union had Gorbachev as a leader. It seems clear that he recognised (or began to 
recognise at some point) these problems as a 'crisis' ofthe system. Soon after Gorbachev became a leader, 
the Soviet political system entered the phase of crisis. 
IV Conclusion 
37 For example, see William E. Odom, 'Soviet politics and After: Old and New Concepts', World Politics, 
Vol. 45, No.1 (October 1992), p. 71. 
38 Patrick H. O'Neil, 'Revolution from Within: Institutional Analysis, Transition From Authoritarianism, 
and the Case of Hungary', World Politics, Vol. 48, No.4 (July 1996); Patrick H. O'Neil, Revolutionfrom 
Within: The Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party and the Collapse of Communism (Cheltenham: Edward 
Elgar, 1998), pp. 71-86. 
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Some of 'unsolvable problems' in the communist regime that divided ruling elites, therefore, lay 
in the party's dilemma between monolithic unity and monopolistic control. In the Soviet Union, the 
dilemma led to de facto regional and local autonomy, and the rise of khozyaistvenniki in lower party 
organisations at the expense of central control. These problems required reforms, but there was little 
consensus among ruling elites on what kinds of reforms were necessary. Some thought what was needed 
was more discipline. Others thought the problems were more acute. Gorbachev was or became one such 
person who recognised that problems were more serious. The problems became 'unsolvable' under the 
current system, because of the lack of consensus. 
Then, what kinds of reforms were necessary for leaders who recognised the problems acutely? 
Firstly, the new leader may have thought that the party would have to streamline its functions, because it 
had become an assembly of various professionals. Thus, it was necessary for the party to remove its 
burdensome economic functions. Reforms of party-state relations would be required. Probably the 
institutional form of division of labour between apparatchiki (the party) and khozyaistvenniki (the Council 
of Ministers) at the centre would make the leadership feel it easy to decide such a reform. Secondly, 
central leaders must have fought against 'regionalism'. When, despite a huge turnover of regional leaders, 
the situation did not improve, the central leaders would attempt competitive party elections, which, they 
expected, would destroy patronage within the region that had frustrated the implementation of central 
policies. 
In the next two chapters, we will closely look at these reforms. Chapter 3 will investigate party-
state relations under the impact of Gorbachev's reforms. In Chapter 4, we will look into party elections. 
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Source: John A. Armstrong, Ideology, Politics, and Government in the Soviet Union: All 
Introduction, 4th ed. (New York: Praeger, 1978), p. 75. 
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Figure 2-2: Career Patterns at Raion Level from the 1980s to the Last Period of the CPSU 
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Source: Kimitaka Matsuzato, 'Gyoseifuto toha Nanika [What is the Administrative Party?]', in 
Surabu kenkyu senta hokoku shirizu [Slavic Research Center Occasional Paper] No. 56 (Sapporo: 
Slavic Research Center, Hokkaido University, 1995), p.25; Kimitaka Matsuzato, 'Roshia 
chihoshidosha no kyaria patan: Toveri shu wo jireini shite [Career patterns of local leaders in Russia: 
the case of Tver']', in Akihiro Ishikawa, Nobuaki Shiokawa, and Matsuzato Kimitaka eds., Surabu 




Chapter 3 Streamlining the Party Apparat: Party-State Relations 
I. Introduction 
As we have discussed in Chapter 2, the party had to conduct various functions and one 
of the most burdensome functions was economic management. Therefore the party's relations 
with the state became a serious concern. In fact, this topic had attracted many scholars before 
the Gorbachev period.' This chapter also considers the party's control over the state.2 It is well 
known that the party controlled state organs. The party had various controlling mechanisms. 
Firstly the party developed the party apparat to check the activity of state organs. For example, 
the CC apparat had departments that paralleled the central ministerial branches. Secondly, the 
party controlled the staffing of the state organs through the nomenklatura system. For instance, 
the all-union Central Committee approved the important posts in the military, ministries, and so 
forth. Thirdly the party had primary party organisations (PPOs) in state organs (and almost 
, On party-state relations before perestroika, see Ronald J. Hill, 'Party-State Relations and 
Soviet Political Development', British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 10, No.2 (April 1980); 
Ronald J. Hill, 'The apparatchiki and Soviet political development', in Peter J. Potichnyj ed., 
The Soviet Union: Party and Society (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988); Ronald J. 
Hill and Alexander Rahr, 'The General Secretary, the Central Party Secretariat and the Apparat', 
in David Lane ed., Elites and Political Power in the USSR (Hants: Edward Elgar, 1988). 
Though the author admits that the word 'state' (and Soviet) has been used to denote both 
legislative and executive organs, the executive organs (the Council of Ministers and Ispolkoms) 
are referred to as the 'state' here, partly because to analyse the competitive elections of 'Soviets' 
(Congress of people's deputies in all-union and Russia and Supreme Soviets and local Soviets in 
other republics) is such a huge subject that this needs other chapters, and primarily because the 
party-executive organs relationship has, the author believes, a crucial importance. 
2 The major existing studies on party-state relations during perestroika period are the following. 
Cameron Ross, 'Party-State Relations', in Eugene Huskey ed., Executive Power and Soviet 
Politics: The Rise and Decline of the Soviet Politics (Armonk: M. E. Sharpe, 1992); Gordon M. 
Hahn, 'The First Reorganisation of the CPSU: Central Committee Apparat under Perestroika', 
Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 49, No.2 (1997); Gordon M. Hahn, Russia's Revolution from Above, 
1985-2000: Reform, Transition, and Revolution in the Fall of the Soviet Communist Regime 
(New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2002); Alexander Rahr, 'The CPSU in the 1980s: 
Changes in the Party Apparatus', Journal of Communist Studies, Vol. 7, No.2 (June 1991); 
Jonathan Harris, Subverting the System: Gorbachev's Reform of the Party's Apparat, 1986-1991 
(Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2004). 
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every organisation in the Soviet Union). The party could monitor the activity of the state 
through PPOs. 
Why did the party need to control the state? To some degree, this was the natural 
consequence of one-party dominance. The very close relations between party and state can be 
recognised under an authoritarian regime and under a democratic regime with a predominant 
party system as in Japan. 3 Nonetheless, party control under the communist party regime 
differed in the following respects. Firstly, in term of the scope, the control of the party reached 
from the all-union level to the raion, the lowest administrative division. This total control does 
not happen even in an ordinary authoritarian regime. Secondly, this strong orientation to control 
the state is, to some extent, a practical requirement of the planned or command economy. Since 
many of the state organs were responsible for economic management, the party could not 
release this control. Thirdly, the Soviet administrative system necessitated party control. It is 
well known that the Soviet system functioned both as a legislative and executive body. In 
addition, each level soviet was sovereign. Therefore, a 'dual subordination' existed as stated in 
the Constitution of the USSR, 1977, that 'Executive Committees of local Soviets of People's 
Deputies shall be directly accountable both to the Soviet that elected them and to the higher 
executive-administrative body.' This principle could have caused a problem if the decision of 
the soviet had differed from that of the higher executive body. Such an anarchical principle 
needed the hierarchic control of the party behind the formal administration system. This 'dual 
subordination' was, it seems, unique to the Soviet system. An ordinary authoritarian regime does 
not have such administrative system. Fourthly, the Leninist theory of revolution demanded the 
seizure of the state by the party. Lenin's State and Revolution projected that socialist revolution 
would take place by replacing an old state bureaucracy with a new 'bureaucracy' controlled by 
3 On the concept 'predominant-party system', see Giovanni Sartori, Parties and Party Systems: 
A FrameworkforAnalysis (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1976), pp. 192-201. 
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the proletariat.4 As the famous distinction between a totalitarian regime and an authoritarian 
one by Linz indicates, the systemic ideology was a prominent feature of the communist party 
regime. Thus, party control was a theoretical requirement as well as a practical one in economic 
and administrative terms. 
How did party-state relations change under Gorbachev? What happened if party 
control was removed? To investigate these questions is the task of this chapter. The structure is 
as follows. Firstly party-state relations up to the 28th Party Congress are discussed. Then, their 
relations after the 28th Party Congress follow. 
II. Reasons for the Reform of Party-State Relations 
Before investigating the concrete process of party-state relations, the reasons for this 
reform should be considered. Gorbachev's initiative on this policy is clear, though it is very 
likely that he took into account his reformer colleagues' opinions. However, when, as General 
Secretary, Gorbachev's power base was the party and the party's power derived from its 
supervision over the state, it did not seem rational for him to release its supervisory power. What 
made him think the reform was necessary? So far several interpretations have been advanced. 
The first one argues that the reform was to resolve the problem of podmena 
(substitution).5 The constant problem of relations between party and state was that the party 
controlled state organs (the Council of Ministers in the centre, Ispolkoms in local areas) so 
tightly that the state organs could not take any initiatives, which led to economic stagnation. 
Particularly the party organised departments along the same lines as the structure of state organs, 
4 V. I. Renin, Kokka to Kakumei (Tokyo: Chikumashobo, 2001). This is a translation of 
Vladimir Il'ich Lenin, State and Revolution. 
5 This is an officially stated reason. Thus, most existing studies suggest this reason. For 
example, Toshihiko Ueno, 'Gorubachofu Seikenka niokeru Sorenpokyosantono Henka 
[Changes of the CPSU under Gorbachev],' Hogakukenkyu, Vol. 63, No.2 (February 1990), p. 
167. 
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by which the party substituted and/or duplicated the work of the state. By dismissing party 
control, according to this argument, state organs would be able to work independently. 
Gorbachev himself supports this interpretation in his memoirs.6 This argument stresses the 
connection with economic reform. 
The second interpretation emphasizes political struggle within the leadership. 
According to this, faced by the strengthening authority of Ligachev who was based in the party 
apparat, Gorbachev advanced the party apparat reorganisation to curb him.7 
Thirdly, Gorbachev might think that the party and state apparat colluded to frustrate 
his reforming efforts. Dividing the party and state function, he might have thought, would made 
it possible to defeat the anti-reform coalition of the party-state apparat. 8 
Fourthly, the reform might be aimed at improving centre-regional relations. 9 As 
discussed in the earlier chapter, one problem within the party was that the party function 
extended so widely that the centre could not devote sufficient attention to supervising regional 
organisations. In addition, the leadership might think that the party spent so much time and 
energy on economic activities that it forgot 'political' activities such as propaganda, agitation 
and so forth. Therefore, streamlining party functions could be one way to reform centre-regional 
relations and party's 'political' activity. This interpretation implies that it was necessary for the 
party itself to relinquish party control over the state organs because economic management was, 
6 Mikhail Gorbachev, Zhizn' i Reformy Vol. 1 (Moskva: Novosti, 1995), p. 410; Mihairu 
Gorubachofu, Gorubachofu Kaisoroku Jo (Tokyo: Shinchosha, 1996), p. 512; Mikhail 
Gorbachev, Memoirs (London: Doubleday, 1996), p. 268. 
7 Jerry F. Hough, Democratization and Revolution in the USSR, 1985-1991 (Washington, D. C.: 
Brookings Institution Press, 1997), p. 200. In addition, Hough states as the immediate purpose, 
'to begin the process of destroying the central institutions of the Communist Party, including the 
Politburo.' Ibid. However, this interpretation is, it seems, an example of hindsight. It is not 
persuasive to consider that Gorbachev intended to destroy his own power base in 1988 when the 
1989 election of the Congress of the Peoples' Deputy did not take place yet, therefore, he did 
not have any other power centre than the party. 
8 Archie Brown, The Gorbachev Factor (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 184; 
David Lane and Cameron Ross, The Transition from Communism to Capitalism: Ruling Elites 
from Gorbachev to Yeltsin (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999), p. 55. 
9 Graeme Gill and Roger D. Markwick, Russia's Stillborn Democracy? From Gorbachev to 
Yeltsin (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 55. 
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according to this, burdensome for the party. 
Two points can be suggested in respect of these explanations. Firstly the fourth 
interpretation (centre-regional relations) is logically consistent with the author's previous 
argument, which is neglected by many scholars. Secondly, it should be borne in mind that the 
first interpretation tends to regard the party organs as superior to those of the state, while the 
third one argues that party-state relations were more equal and closer than had been thought. It 
is instructive that the third and fourth explanations are advanced by scholars relatively closer to 
the pluralist school. The pluralist school tends not to emphasise party control, but to signify the 
checks and balances of various interests. We will return these points after discussing the 
concrete process of party-state relations. 
III. The First Reorganisation of the Party Apparat: from the 19th Party Conference up to 
the 28th Party Congress 
1. The Process of Decision Making on the First Reorganisation 
(a) The Reorganisation of the CC Apparat and the Establishment of the CC 
Commissions 
Many decisions on apparat reorganisation were taken at the party Conference of 1988 
and at CC plenums. The first reorganisation of the party apparat was set out in the 'Theses of the 
Central Committee of the CPSU to the 19th All-union Party Conference,' which were approved 
by the CC plenum in May 1988, which stated 'Taking into account the increasing role of the 
party as a political vanguard, and the division of function of party committees and state's 
economic organs, [it is necessary to] undertake necessary change in the structure and 
composition of the party apparat.' 10 This statement developed into Gorbachev's address on 28 
June 1988 to the 19th All-union Party Conference. He proposed to reject organising of the CC 
10 Pravda, 27 May 1988, p. 2. 
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apparat and of lower party organs in parallel with branches of administration, to reconstruct 
their structure in accordance with the proper function of the party, and to reduce their number. II 
The resolution of the 19th conference (1 July 1988) approved a proposal to 'carry out, by the end 
of this year, the reorganisation of the party apparat' and to 'make the necessary change in its 
structure.' 12 
The role of directing the reorganised apparat was entrusted to the Politburo members 
and to the Commission that the conference decided to establish. At the conference Gorbachev 
referred to the necessity to create Commissions in the CC along the main directions of internal 
and external policy, in which the CC members would regularly work. The party apparat also 
was expected to occupy its own appropriate place in the Commissions. 13 The resolution of the 
19th Party Conference 'On Democratisation of Soviet Society and Reform of Political System' 
provided a basis for the creation of the Commissions from among CC members. 14 Thus, the 
function of the Secretariat, which had checked the work of the CC apparat, was to be weakened 
by the participation of CC members. 
It took some time to develop a concrete plan of reorganisation. The plan of 
reorganisation was still not clear at the time of the 19th Conference. The CC plenum took a 
decision 'On the Basic Directions of the Perestroika of the Party Apparat (30 July 1988)' which 
mandated the CC Politburo to examine and establish a new structure of the apparat, and to 
define new links with the apparat of lower party organs. 15 Then, Gorbachev issued a 
memorandum 'On the question of the reorganisation of the party apparat' dated 24 August 1988 
to the Politburo. In this memorandum, Gorbachev, paying attention to the delay in the apparat 
reorganisation and referring to the further activation of the CC CPSU through the creation of 
1\ Materialy XIX Vsesoyuznoi konferentsii Kommunisticheskoi Partii Sovetskogo Soyuza 
(Moskva: Politizdat, 1988), p. 80. 
12 Materialy XIX Vsesoyuznoi, p. 106. 
13 Materialy XIX Vsesoyuznoi, p. 77. 
14 Materialy XIX Vsesoyuznoi, p. 126. 
15 Pravda, 31 July 1988, p. 2. 
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Commissions, proposed the function of each CC department. The Department of Party 
Construction and Cadre 'Policy,16 should concentrate on internal party work. The Ideology 
department was to take responsibility for all theoretical, ideological, scientific, and cultural 
problems. On social-economic matters, Gorbachev proposed that the CC departments surrender 
this function to governmental organs and to establish a single department of economic and 
social policy. The Agrarian Department and Defence Production department, which related to 
economic affairs, were to be kept, though their functions were to be changed. International 
affairs, which three CC departments had engaged in, were to be under the jurisdiction of a single 
International department. A new department, which related to the creation of a law-based 
socialist state, was to be founded. The General Department and Administration of Affairs were 
to be kept. This reorganisation, as Gorbachev proposed it, entailed a reduction in apparat 
numbers, amounting to 1940 responsible workers and 1275 support staff at that time. In addition, 
he proposed greater autonomy for lower party organisations on apparat reorganisations. 17 The 
Politburo approved Gorbachev's memorandum on 8 September 1988. 18 
The discussion at the Politburo meeting shows that every Politburo member admitted 
the necessity of the reorganisation, though the reasons were not necessarily the same. Let us 
consider the statements of major Politburo members. The first person who gave his comments 
on Gorbachev's memorandum was Ligachev. His statement shows that he totally supported the 
memorandum at that time, though, of course, the possibility that he pretended to support it 
cannot be denied. In addition, he recognised that Gorbachev intended that the CPSU's original 
political function rather than its administrative role should be improved, stating, 'I want to 
emphasise that ... this apparat should engage in political and theoretical questions ,19 
16 Gorbachev stated 'Policy' rather than 'Work' in the memorandum. Izvestiya TsK KPSS, 1989, 
No.1, p. 83. 
17 Izvestiya TsK KPSS, 1989, No.1, pp. 81-86. 
18 Izvestiya TsK KPSS, 1989, No.1, p. 81. 
19 Tsentr Khraneniya Sovremennoi Dokumentatsii (TsKhSD), fond (f.) 89, perechen' (p.) 42, 
delo (d.) 22, page (p.) 1. 
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Moreover, his argument emphasised the centre-regional relationship, which was one prominent 
feature of his statement compared with those of other members. He stated, 'The strengthening of 
the connection with local areas, local organisations, [and] with workers [is necessary], because 
if any apparat does not closely connect with local affairs, [and] local working collectives, it is 
not able to help the CC to work out the policy and bring the theoretical and political work for 
problem-solving. ,20 This judgement may derive from his past career as CC secretary 
responsible for organisational matters. In any case, this statement is important because it shows 
that centre-regional relations provided the reason for the apparat reorganisation beyond the 
reform-conservative cleavage in the leadership. 
Politburo members from the executive organs were concerned about the consequences 
of the reorganisation for party-state relations. For example, Ryzhkov's argument was related to 
the economic sphere, particularly the Social-Economic Department. He opposed the suggestion 
that this department should have sub-divisions on social policy, economic policy, and 
science-technology policy, because these jurisdictions were interconnected. His argument was 
directed to prevent the Social-Economic Department from paralleling the sub-divisions of the 
Council of Ministers, that is, podmena. 21 He also mentioned the naming of the Defence 
Production Department and Agrarian Policy,z2 Vitalii I. Vorotnikov, the chairmen of the RSFSR 
Council of Ministers and a full member of the Politburo, also suggested coordination among the 
party and economic organisations. He asked not only to reorganise the party apparat, but also to 
strengthen the cadre of soviet and economic organs.23 In addition, Gorbachev said, 'It is 
necessary to strengthen influence. Now we suffer from operational-economic questions, and 
follow ministries, which pass their own memorandum to us. This distracts us from concentrating 
20 Ibid., p. 1. 
21 Ibid., p. 3. 
22 Ibid., pp. 3-4. 
23 Ibid., pp. 7-8. 
50 
on the cardinal political questions. ,24 Thus, the hypothesis, which argues that the purpose of the 
reorganisation was to prevent podmena, has some basis in fact. 
What, then, was the party supposed to do? A. Yakovlev mentioned such an ideological 
problem as the optimal concept of political vanguard, and the interrelationship between the 
executive and the political apparat. In addition, he argued that the party should concentrate on 
its political and ideological influence in order to improve the role of the local soviets.25 Though 
Vadim Medvedev's comment was brief, he also referred to the political function of the party as 
vanguard.26 Improving its political function in domestic affairs would be one way to be an 
ordinary party. Anatolii Luk'yanov demanded to precisely demarcate the function of the CC 
Commissions that would supervise the CC apparat, though his political position seemed more 
conservative than those ofYakovlev and Medvedev.27 From their statements, we can understand 
that some Politburo members thought the party should be a 'normal' political party that engaged 
in political and ideological work. 
Together with the reorganisations of the CC apparat, new Commissions were founded. 
The CC plenum on 30 September 1988 decided to establish six new Commissions.28 Figure 3-1 
shows the new Commissions and their chairmen who were CC secretaries. On internal party 
affairs, Georgii Razumovskii was to lead the Commission on the Questions of Party 
Construction and Cadre Policy. Nikolai Slyun'kov, a full Politburo member and a close 
colleague of Ryzhkov, became chairman of the Commission of Socio-Economic Policy. 
Yakovlev became the chairman of the Commission on International Policy. Chebrikov was to 
lead the Commission on Legal Policy, and was promoted from KGB chairman to CC secretary. 
Kryuchkov replaced him as KGB chairman. Medvedev was to be chairman of the Ideology 
Commission, replacing Ligachev, and, in a remarkable change, Ligachev was moved to 
24 Ibid., p. 13. 
25 Ibid., pp. 9-10. 
26 Ibid., p. 24. 
27 Ibid., p. 17. 
28 Pravda, 1 October 1988, p. 1. 
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Agrarian work. The hypothesis that attributes the reorganisation to leadership struggles is based 
on this fact. 29 
The new composition of the CC apparat mostly corresponded with Gorbachev's 
proposals. Figure 3-1 shows the new composition. The former 20 departments were reorganised 
into 9 departments. The most prominent feature of the changes was a huge reduction in 
economic functions, while the departments on internal party affairs (Department of Party 
Construction and Cadre Work, General Department, Administration of Affairs) did not face a 
comparable reorganisation. Though some scholars argue this was a result of these organisations' 
resistance to reorganisation, it does not necessarily seem to be the case.30 Because Gorbachev's 
memorandum itself made only a few references to these departments, it seems that he originally 
intended to reduce the economic function of the party, while keeping its internal cohesion in 
order to concentrate on the ideological and cadre work that were the party's original function, 
though the resistance to the reorganisation certainly existed. The resistance can be inferred from 
the fact that Gorbachev issued an instruction and a memorandum demanding that each 
department finalised its plans on the structure and staffing on 5 December 1988 when several 
months had passed since the Politburo's decision in September. In addition, a memorandum on 
29 September 1988 from a CC official, K. Mogil'nichenko, suggests that anxiety for their 
personal fates grew among the members of the party apparat, which might lead to their 
resistance.3l Nonetheless, few changes of the apparat on internal party affairs can be recognised 
from lower party apparat reorganisation, which suggests the original intention to keep the 
internal cohesion. Let us consider it in the next section. 
(b) The Reorganisation of the Lower-Level Party Apparat 
29 Ligachev himself, of course, supports this argument. See Egor Ligachev, Zagadka 
Gorbacheva (Novosibirsk: Interbuk, 1992), p. 93; Yegor Ligachev, Inside Gorbachev's Kremlin 
(Boulder: Westview Press, 1996), pp. 109. 
30 Gordon M. Hahn, 'The First Reorganisation of the CPSU: Central Committee Apparat under 
Perestroika,' Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 49, No.2 (1997), p. 284. 
3l Istochnik, 1995, No.3, pp. 159-160. 
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Concerning the lower party organisations, the Politburo took a decision 'On the 
reorganisation of the apparat of local party organisations' on 10 September 1988, which was 
based on the proposal of the CC Department of Organisational-Party Work 32 and 
Administration of Affairs. According to this, the CCs CPs of union republics, kraikoms and 
obkoms were to have the following departments: the Department of Organisational-Party Work, 
Ideological Department, Social-Economic Department, Agrarian Department, State-Law 
Department, General Department, and Administration of Affairs. At gorkom and raikom level, 
the apparat was reorganised into Organisational, Ideological, and General Departments. In 
addition, gorkoms in the huge industrial centres might create a Department of Social-Economic 
Development, and raikoms in huge agricultural raions might have an Agrarian Department. 33 It 
is obvious that the departments on internal party affairs (Organisational-Party Work, General, 
and Administration of Affairs) did not face a large reorganisation. Because this decision charged 
the CC Department of Organisational-Party Work and Administration of Affairs to examine this 
proposals from lower party organisations, later (18 October 1988) these two departments issued 
an information memorandum on the proposals from lower party organisations, which proposed 
that the reorganisation of the lower-level party apparat should correspond with the previous 
decisions of the 19th Party Conference, plenums, and the Politburo.34 This argued that the 
departments on organisational-party, cadre, and ideological work should become stronger, 
which, it seems, testifies that the first reorganisation was intended to primarily change 
party-state (esp. economic) relations rather than internal party life. 
The implementation of this decision was reported in some places. For example, the 
October plenum of the Ukrainian Party approved a resolution, 'On the formation of 
commissions of the CC CP of Ukraine and reorganisation of apparat of party organs of 
32 At that time this department was still called the CC Department of Organisational-Party 
Work. 
33 Izvestiya TsK KPSS, 1989, No.1, p. 87. 
34 Izvestiya TsK KPSS, 1989, No.1, p. 89. 
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republic. ,35 The Moscow obkom case was reported in December. Before the Moscow party 
conference, V. Mesyats, first secretary of the Moscow obkom, was interviewed by Pravda, in 
which he said that 18 departments in its obkom would be reduced to 9. In addition, according to 
him, two departments, the Ideological department and Organisational-party and cadre work, 
would be strengthened. 36 Later, the report of the Moscow obkom party conference also 
mentioned the reorganisation.37 In any case, through these cases we can confirm that these 
reorganisations were in accordance with the central policy that demarcated party and state and 
strengthened intra-party cohesion. 
2. The Internal Structure of the Party Apparat after the Reorganisation 
(a) The Internal Structure of the CC CPSU Apparat 
Then, what was the internal structure of CC departments after the reorganisation? This 
can be now understood on the basis of internal party documents. On 29 December 1988, 
Razumovskii (Party Construction and Cadre Work), Boldin (General), and Kruchina 
(Administration of Affairs), heads of the CC departments on internal party affairs, presented to 
the CC CPSU (CC secretaries and Politburo members) a proposal on the structure and staffing 
of the departments of the CC CPSU and it was approved as a decision of the CC CPsu. 38 
Various tables 3-2 show the details of the first reorganisation. In addition, it is reasonable to 
assume that each department had around 100 responsible workers, because Gorbachev stated in 
his memorandum of August 1988 that the total CC apparat was 1940 (and 1275 support staff), 
and that a total of 20 departments existed at that time.39 By comparing this assumed old staff 
35 Pravda Ukrainy, 12 October 1988, p. 1. 
36 Pravda, 5 December 1988, p. 2. 
37 Pravda, 12 December 1988, p. 3. 
38 TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 4, d. 9. 
39 Izvestiya TsK KPSS, 1989, No.1, p. 85. Incidentally, it does not seem useful to count the 
average number of support staff, because it was likely that the number of support staff differed 
significantly by the department, which can be inferred from the support staffs number in the 
first reorganisation plan. 
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number with the proposed one, we can know the supposed degree of the change. 
First of all, it should be noticed that the three departments responsible for internal 
party affairs did not present their own proposals on the reorganisation, though the reason is not 
clear. As discussed above, it seems reasonable to think that this was part of Gorbachev's original 
idea. 
The Ideological Department was to have six sub-departments, one consultant group 
and one secretariat. This department basically integrated three former department functions 
(Propaganda, Science and Educational Institutions, Culture). The total number of staff was 145 
(141 responsible workers and 4 support staff), which was the result of a 61 per cent reduction of 
all workers of leading composition, instructors, and lecturers.4o 
The largest reorganisation took place in the Social-Economic Department. Eight 
former departments were considered to be reorganised into this department.41 This was to have 
four sub-departments and one consultant group. Despite Ryzhkov's opposition in the Politburo 
meeting on 8 September 1988 (see III-I of this chapter), this department had individual 
sub-departments on social policy, economic policy, and science-technology policy. The function 
of this new department was the preparation of general proposals, touching all fundamental 
aspects of social-economic policy. The number of staff was 157 (128 responsible workers and 
29 support staff). According to the memorandum, the number of instructors was increased at the 
expense of consultants.42 As a result, it seems obvious that many economic functions were to be 
removed from the party, though some scholars argue that the CC apparat violated the proposed 
division of function between the party and the state because of bureaucratic inertia.43 It is 
certainly possible to suggest sporadic cases of violation. Nonetheless, it is also clear that this 
number of staff was not enough to allow it to interfere in daily economic management. To 
40 TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 4, d. 9, p. 23. 
41 Veno, 'Gorubachofu seikenkaniokeu,' p. 165. 
42 TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 4, d. 9, pp.6-8, p. 23. 
43 Hahn, 'The First Reorganisation', pp. 294-295. 
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conclude that the party had reduced its economic function is not unreasonable. 
The Agrarian Department had eight sectors and one secretariat and total staff was 88 
(85 responsible workers and 3 support staff). This number of staff was one third of that of the 
former CC Department of Rural Economy and Food Production. A reference to the need to 
avoid the duplication of a state organ (Gosagropom) can be found in this memorandum, which 
may suggest, again, that the main aim of reorganisation was party-state (esp. economic) 
relations.44 
The State-Law Department was a successor to the former Administrative Department. 
As shown in the sub-departmental composition, this department related to armed forces, KGB 
and so forth. Though this department reduced its number of consultants, it was not a huge 
reduction. It may be natural that this department did not face massive reductions in the first 
reorganisation, because the party did not reduce its control over security organs even in the 
second reorganisation. The demarcation between the party and the state concerned the economic 
sphere rather than security organs. 
The International Department integrated three former Departments (Foreign Cadres, 
Liaison with Communist and Workers' Parties of Socialist Countries, and International). This 
department had eight sub-departments, one consultant group, one group of 'party technicians', 
and one secretariat. The total number of staff was 209 (203 responsible workers and 6 support 
staff), and 20 categories of posts were introduced into the department, which was about twice 
more than other departments.45 Though this was the largest of the departments included in the 
proposal, the tendency of reduction was clear because this department was to integrate four 
former departments. 
The former Defence Production Department was reorganised into the Defence 
Department with three sub-departments, one group of consultants, and one secretariat. Total 
44 TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 4, d. 9, pp.6-8, p. 24. 
45 TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 4, d. 9, pp.6-8, p. 24. 
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staffwas 62 (54 responsible workers and 8 support staff) which was a reduction of32.5 per cent 
compared with the former department. This small number of staff suggests that this 
department's supervisory power on economic sphere diminished to a large degree. 
(b) The Party Apparat Hierarchy after the Reorganisation 
The internal structure of the party apparat from the centre to the branches can be 
inferred from the posts and salary list of party workers. This list, dated 29 July 1989, was 
presented by Razumovskii, Boldin, and Kruchina and approved by the Politburo on 3 August 
1989.46 This was demanded because the first reorganisation significantly changed the apparat 
structure and the full-time party workers' salaries were so low that the party could not recruit 
appropriately qualified workers. Though this list does not include the posts and salary of the CC 
Secretary and General Secretary, it covers, it seems, all other party posts. In addition, salary 
reflected position within the party apparat.47 Thus, this list is worth introducing regardless of its 
length. 
Table 3-3-1 shows the CC CPSU job list, which was discussed in detail above. A new 
finding was that this made it possible to infer the structure of the Administration of Affairs, 
whose posts were indicated in categories independent of other departments. 
Table 3-3-2 indicates posts and salary of republican party officials. Though it is not 
possible to consider the size and internal structure of the republican CC apparat more precisely 
than discussed above, it is possible to infer that the internal structure of republican CC 
departments was similar to that of the CC CPSU because the names of posts corresponded with 
each other. 
Tables 3-3-3 to 3-3-5 show posts and salary from obkom level down to the PPOs. 
46 TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 9, d. 13. 
47 Gorbachev states that his transfer from head of department of Stavropol' kraikom to first 
secretary of Stavropol' gorkom was movement to a lower job in terms of the nomenklatura and 
salary list. Thus, the nomenklatura list corresponded with the salary list. Mikhail Gorbachev, 
Zhizn' i Reformy, Vol. 1, p. 109; Mihairu Gorubachofu, Gorubachofu Kaisoroku, Jo, p. 144; 
Mikhail Gorbachev, Memoirs, p. 77. 
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These substantiate the lower-level party structure discussed above, and PPO party officials' low 
salary was remarkable. The privilege of party workers will be considered in an appendix. 
3. Implementation of the Proposal 
(a) Some Quantitative Results 
To what degree was the proposal of the first reorganisation implemented?48 A massive, 
but slow, reduction of the party apparat can be inferred from some fragmentary and sometimes 
contradictory quantitative results. Before the reorganisation Gorbachev's memorandum 
mentioned above identified 1940 responsible workers and 1275 support staff at that time.49 In 
the Politburo meeting on 8 September 1988, Ligachev stated that they would cut about 700-800 
thousand people in the whole country and 550 thousand in republic party organisations, obkoms, 
gorkoms, and raikoms. In addition, when he was asked how the reduction was going by 
Gorbachev, he answered, 'There is no difficulty at the moment, Mikhail Sergeevich 
[Gorbachev], no.' He added that it was urgently proceeding and there was a special 
announcement that it would be completed by 1 January.50 Compared with other information that 
we will see, Ligachev's figures are so huge that the basis of measurement must be different from 
others. In any case, it is obvious that these far-reaching reductions and time limits were too 
optimistic and could not be kept. 
A memorandum from the CC official K. Mogil'nichenko mentioned above (September 
1988) states that some 700 responsible workers, without counting 255 pension-age people, 
would be subject to replacement. 51 The Central Auditing Commission reported that during the 
48 There are few studies on the implementation of the apparat reorganisation. Gill's most 
extensive study on the collapse of the CPSU states, 'There is no real discussion of how this 
change was carried out.' See Graeme Gill, The Collapse of a Single Party System: The 
Disintegration of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1994), p. 74. 
49 Izvestiya TsK KPSS, 1989, No.1, p. 85. 
50 TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 42, d. 22, p. 2. 
51 Istochnik, 1995, No.3, pp. 159-160. 
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second half of 1988 about 700 posts of responsible and support staff were cut and that about 
7,000 posts were released in lower party organs due to the reorganisation.52 These figures of the 
Central Revision Commission might be exaggerated because the figures that appeared later were 
more moderate. 
In the January 1990 issue of Izvestiya TsK KPSS (that is, about one year after the 
Central Revision Commission report), two articles appeared on the apparat reduction. One 
article, in response to a reader's question, stated that 536 CC CPSU responsible workers had 
been released. Among them, 224 became pensioners and 312 went to other jobs.53 Another 
article shows slightly different figures. According to this source, more than 700, including 600 
responsible, workers went out. In addition, this article stated that the CC CPSU had 2365 
workers and among them 1303 workers were responsible ones. 54 Because Gorbachev 
memorandum's figures were 1940 responsible workers and 1275 technical ones (that is 3215 in 
total), a simple calculation, which excludes new recruitment which might happen during the 
reorganisation, means that 637 responsible workers and 213 technical ones (in total 850) were 
cut. In March 1990 Kruchina stated that party organisations had 102,450 responsible and 33,420 
support staff in total. In addition, there were 79 responsible workers in one obkom, kraikom, or 
CC CP of union republic on average and 20 responsible workers in one gorkom or raikom on 
average. Full-time workers in PPOs amounted to 77,000.55 In his report to the 28th Party 
Congress, Kruchina stated that 8,500 workers had been released at all levels of party committees 
and that 680 persons had been released in the CC CPSU apparat. 56 The reduction of 680 was 
lower than indicated in the previous Central Revision Commission Report. Further figures were 
presented in the documents prepared for the 28th congress on the activity of the Secretariat. 
52 Izvestiya TsK KPSS, 1989, No.4, p. 24. 
53 Izvestiya TsK KPSS, 1990, No.1, p. 113. 
54 Izvestiya TsK KPSS, 1990, No.1, pp. 116-117. 
55 Pravda, 12 March 1990, p. 3. 
56 XXVIII s"ezd Kommunisticheskoi Partii Sovetskovo Soyuza: Stenograficheskii Otchet Vol. 1 
(Moskva: Politizdat, 1991), p. 233. 
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According to it, during the period from March 1986 to 20 June 1990, 9,756 workers, including 
3,097 'party' (technical?) workers, were appointed and 8,266 workers, including 3,380 'party' 
(technical?), workers were released at all levels of the party organisations. 57 In addition, 
between the 2ih and 28th congresses the CC Secretariat appointed 824 workers and released 
1,4940nes.58 
It is difficult to evaluate the results of the first reorganisation. Even taking into account 
the fact that the CC Ethnic Relations department (early 1990) and the department on Work with 
Social-Political Organisations (April 1990) were founded, the reduction in number of the CC 
CPSU was massive but moderate in view of the proposed staff numbers. In addition, the time 
schedule was prolonged because at the beginning Ligachev stated that it would be completed by 
1 January 1988 as discussed above. It is understandable that some studies have attributed the 
result to apparat resistance. 59 Nonetheless, the author inclines to the view that the exercise was 
not without success. It would have a huge impact, when an organisation that had had about 2000 
workers lost some 700 persons within a few years. It seems that the reduction was huge enough 
to make the CC apparat malfunction especially in the realm of the economy, that is, in relation 
to the Council of Ministers. To emphasise the resistance too much may distract our attention 
from the important fact of 'loss of power' and a developing 'power vacuum', which will be 
discussed later. 
(b) Where the released members went 
The discussion above makes it clear that party workers were released to a more or less 
huge degree. Obviously it was not possible to make all pensioners. Where, then, did they go 
later? The Gorbachev memorandum proposed that the freed full-time party workers of the CC 
apparat should support central and other organs of administration, scientific establishments, 
57 Izvestiya TsK KPSS, 1990, No.9, pp. 22-23. Though it is not clear what the 'party' worker 
means, it seems to indicate a support staff, because the numbers are close to those given in the 
previous interview with Kruchina in Pravda, 12 March 1990, p. 3 (n. 41). 
58 Izvestiya TsK KPSS, 1990, No.9, p. 23. 
59 For example, Hahn, 'The First Reorganisation. ' 
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institutions of higher education, and the means of mass information.60 Though party archival 
documents are fragmentary and it should be remembered that TsKhSD fond 89 selectively 
disclosed party documents, it seems to indicate a general tendency of transference from the 
party apparat to the apparat of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. It was natural that new officials 
were required for the supposed new power centre. Anatolii Luk'yanov, first deputy chairman of 
the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet at that time, asked the CC CPSU to confirm five persons 
as heads of department of the Supreme Soviet secretariat on 26 January 1989. Three of them 
had been CC CPSU apparat officials. In addition, he asked the CC department of Party 
Construction and Cadre Work to send CC CPSU workers to the Secretariat of the Supreme 
Soviet.61 On 2 February 1989, Luk'yanov submitted a proposal to confirm an official ofthe CC 
VLKSM (Komsomol) as head of department of the Supreme Soviet secretariat.62 A further 
demand was made on 10 February, in which Luk'yanov asked the CC CPSU to transfer 19 CC 
CPSU workers to the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet. On the 15th of the same month, the 
transfer of 8 CC officials to the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet was requested by Luk'yanov.63 
On 21 February 1989, T. N. Menteshashvili64 asked the CC CPSU to confirm one CC CPSU 
official to be an official of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet. 65 Further, Luk'yanov proposed 
2 officials' movement to the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet.66 Though these documents 
certainly show that the party still had the right to check the personnel of the Supreme Soviet 
because non-CC officials (e.g. a Komsomol official) who were to be heads of the Supreme 
Soviet Secretariat, were included in these documents, they, it seems, also suggest the general 
tendency of staff transfers from the party to the Supreme Soviet. In addition, these transfers 
60 Izvestiya TsK KPSS, 1989, No.1, p. 85. 
61 TsKhSD f. 89, p. 30, d. 18, pp. 1-2 
62 TsKhSD f. 89, p. 30, d. 20, pp. 1-3. 
63 TsKhSD f. 89, p. 30, d. 21, pp. 1-2. 
64 Unfortunately, the author could not confirm who he was. Probably, he was a high rank 
member of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet. 
65 TsKhSD f. 89, p. 30, d. 22, p. 1. 
66 TsKhSD f. 89, p. 30, d. 21, p. 3. 
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were not sufficient to make the Supreme Soviet function effectively. While the party was losing 
control, the alternative power structure was slow to establish itself. Here we can recognise that 
the Soviet system enter the phase of the loss of power and that it showed the ominous signs of a 
power vacuum. 
(c) How the new institution worked 
(i) The CC departments 
How these new commissions and departments worked could be understood by the 
documents presented to the 28th Party Congress. Let us firstly see the CC departments. Table 3-4 
shows how many basic issues that were submitted by the CC departments were discussed by the 
CC Secretariat. Though these 'basic' issues were not all issues raised by the CC departments, 
this can be regarded as an indicator of activeness of the CC department. Firstly the general 
tendency of decline of the CC departments' activity is obvious. From a peak of 274 issues in 
1987 it reduced to 54 in 1989 and 36 by 20 June. 
This stagnation allows a mixed interpretation. On the one hand, it may be because the 
CC apparat lost some of its functions due to the reorganisation. If this is the case, the CC 
departments, which had been deprived of their functions, thus could not work rather than did not 
work. On the other hand, this may be deliberate prevarication on the part of the CC apparat, 
intended to suggest that the CC departments had many things to do but intentionally did not 
respond. Ligachev, it seems, suggests the former interpretation, stating, '[A]fter the creation of 
the Commissions [that is, the reorganisation of the CC apparat], the meetings of Secretariat 
ceased simultaneously. The party was deprived of an operating staff of its leader. ,67 Gorbachev 
in his memoirs supports the later argument, frequently referring to party officials' 'sabotage,.68 
67 Egor K. Ligachev, Zagadka Gorbacheva, p. 93; Yegor Ligachev, Inside Gorbachev's Kremlin, 
pp. 190-110. It seems that Ligachev uses the word 'Secretariat' in a broader sense including the 
departments, because' an operating staff of its leader' must include the CC departments' staff. 
68 For example, Gorubachofu, Jo, p. 497, 567; Zhizn' i Reformy Vol. 1, p. 396. Zhizn' i Reformy 
does not have a corresponding paragraph of Gorbachofu, p. 567. Incidentally, the word 
'sabotage' (sabotazh) keeps probably French connotation and, therefore, has a weaker sense in 
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Though it is difficult to define which is the case, it seems clear that CC officials felt deprived of 
their traditional function and could not understand what to do in new circumstances. Therefore, 
they stopped working or did not work. This would be particularly the case for the most 
significantly reorganised department, the Social-Economic Department. 
So, secondly let us see the changes of each department's activity in Table 3-4. 
Obviously the Social-Economic Department's activity declined, despite the rapid economic 
recession at that time. In addition, it is remarkable that the Ideology Department, which had 
been supposed to playa central role in the new environment, could not actively work. Valentin 
Falin, CC secretary and Politburo member, said about the International Department at a 
Politburo meeting on 13 September 1990, in which a second reorganisation of the CC apparat 
was discussed, that after the changes of the 19th Party Conference, the International Department 
did not take any responsibility for the selection of cadres directed abroad.69 It is reasonable to 
assume that Gorbachev's new thinking had deprived the International Department of its basic 
function. On the other hand, two departments, the Department of the Party Construction and 
Cadre Work and the State-Law Department that supervised the security organs as discussed 
above, show relative activism. Some arguments emphasise the strength of the Department of 
Party Construction and Cadre Work and, it is argued, it was able to resist the reorganisation.70 
Though cadre work was a key concern of the whole party (as Stalin once said 'Cadres decide 
everything'), it should be noted that the relative strength of the Department of Party 
Construction and Cadre Work increased as a result of the reorganisation. One report of an 
official of the department showed this at lower levels, stating 'It is possible to speak of a 
so-called 'vacuum' in the leadership of people's economy of oblasti and raions, when, in the 
party, the [economic] branch departments were abolished, but local soviets, particularly at raion 
level, do not have structural sub-divisions for managing corresponding branches. In these 
Russian than in English. The appropriate translation might be 'going slow.' 
69 TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 42, d. 29, p. 9. 
70 See Hahn, 'The First Reorganisation' and his Russia's Revolution from Above. 
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conditions, at local level, instead of actual transmission to soviets of efficient functions on the 
economic questions that had been decided in the branch departments of party committees, the 
department of organisational-party and cadre work was entrusted with them. That is, everything 
is examined in the party apparat just as under the notorious command system. ,71 Of course, the 
organisational department's economic work, it seems, was far from excellence. In the end, all 
these indicate the worst combination: the CPSU was losing its traditional administrative 
function; but could not become a 'political' party in a Western sense, being inclined toward a 
security function given the loss of power and the increasing power vacuum. 
(ii) The CC Commissions 
The 28th Party Congress documents also show the CC Commissions' activity. Table 
3-5 gives the basic information on the Commissions. Though it is difficult to understand the 
activism of the Commissions, they seem inactive because four to six meetings over one and half 
years cannot be regarded as vigorous activity. At a Politburo meeting mentioned above (13 
September 1990), most participants agreed that the Commissions should be strengthened, which 
suggested that the Commissions had not been working well. For example, Ivan T. Frolov, chief 
editor of Pravda and a Politburo member, said, 'If we want, as we say, to have a working and 
lively Central Committee, the accent should be on the work of the Commissions. It is necessary 
to precisely and clearly specify that the centre of all activity of the Central Committee is the 
Commissions. ,72 
A more difficult problem is to recognise the relation between CC departments and the 
CC Commissions. Presumably, the following statement of Frolov was accurate: 
'Regarding the departments, these should be the groups to secure the work of the 
Commissions, not the contrary relationship as we see. Members of the CC should not run to 
the departments, leading instructions should not come from the departments, but members 
71 M. Sokolov, 'Kakim byt' partiinomu apparatu,' Partiinaya Zhizn', 1989, No. 19 (October), 
pp.23. 
72 TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 42, d. 29, p. 7. 
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of the CC should be masters. For this it is necessary to have not departments but groups 
under Commissions. ,73 
This statement suggests that the Commissions, which were supposed to supervise the 
departments, did not work properly. Rather, the weakened departments' instructions decided the 
main direction of the Commissions. Hence the same evaluation as the case of the CC 
departments: the new system did not function; the CPSU could not become a 'political' party. 
4. Preliminary Summary 
The process of the first party apparat reorganisation has been investigated so far. As a 
preliminary summary the following points can be indicated. Firstly, the first reorganisation 
related primarily to party-state (particularly economic organs) relations. While the 
social-economic department significantly reduced its supervisory power, the CC departments on 
internal party affairs changed their structure to a far lesser degree. In addition, this was not only 
the result of their resistance but, presumably, of Gorbachev's original intention. Secondly, 
related to the first point, the Council of Ministers received a certain autonomy, though the 
Council of Ministers itself was losing control over the whole country's economy. Thus, thirdly, 
while the party was reorganised, no new power centre could found itself. The party was 
gradually losing control over the state organs. However, the Supreme Soviet at the centre and 
local soviets were too weak, ineffective, and/or chaotic to supervise these organs. When 
hierarchal control from the party was lost, the soviets at each level frequently made 
contradictory decisions, that is, a local soviet's decision often contradicted that of a higher 
soviet. Thus, executive organs could no longer recognise which decisions should be 
implemented. The contradiction of a 'dual subordination' became obvious.74 The establishment 
73 Ibid., p. 7. 
74 Shimotomai emphasises the problem of 'dual subordination'. See Nobuo Shimotomai, 
'Peresutoroika' wo Koete [Beyond Perestroika] (Tokyo: Asahi Shinbunsha, 1991), p. 299; 
Nobuo Shimotomai, Dokuritsu Kokka Kyodotai heno Michi [the Road to the CIS] (Tokyo: Jiji 
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of an apparently strong Presidency in March 1990 was a response to this situation, while the 
party could not become a political party, so remained a kind of an administrative organ. 
However, a series of 'highest' administrative organs cannot coexist in one country. If it happens, 
it necessarily leads to immobilism. The phase of the loss of power develops into the next phase: 
the power vacuum. The only way to escape from this problem is to weaken other administrative 
organs. This was the case for the Soviet Union. The Soviet system faced immobilism, and 
Gorbachev went into the second reorganisation of the CC CPSU apparat intending to weaken 
the administrative function of the party further. 
IV. Further Reform of Party-State Relations: the 28th Party Congress and After 
1. A Power Vacuum as a Given Factor: Controversy over Party-State Relations at 
the 28th Party Congress 
As discussed above, the loss of power emerged in the process of the first 
reorganisation of party-state relations. The phase developed into a power vacuum after the 
establishment of the presidency. It seems this became a structural constraint for making 
decisions of further refonn. This section investigates how political actors recognised the 'power 
vacuum' from the debates at the 28th Party Congress. 
In the opening speech, Gorbachev admitted the difficult situation with regard to refonn 
of party-state relations, stating, 'The process of refonn of the political system is going with 
difficulty. The role and function of the party, state, and soviet organs are being changed. Frankly 
speaking, this all is taking place abnonnally.' Still he insisted that the situation would have been 
worse, if they had not taken such a course.75 
A further discussion on party-state relations took place at the section 'Party, Soviet, 
Tsushinsha, 1992), pp. 78-80. 
75 XXVIII s "ezd Kommunisticheskoi Partii Sovetskogo Soyuza, Vol. 1, p. 76. 
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and Social-Political Organisations and Movements (5 July 1990)'. This section was chaired by 
Valentin Kuptsov, head of the CC department on Work with Social and Political Organisations, 
and more than 500 delegates participated.76 The two main speakers were Aleksandr Vlasov, 
chairman of the RSFSR Council of Ministers and Candidate Member of the Politburo, and 
Luk'yanov. Both emphasised power vacuum in their speech. Vlasov said, 'Particularly, the 
questions of political reform, demarcation of functions of party and soviet power should be 
mentioned. ... The very concepts did not work, the work was conducted unsystematically, 
structures and functions of soviet organs at local levels did not work. " Absolutely this can be 
said of the work of executive organs. . .. In a word, the party transferred its economic function 
to ispolkoms, but soviets proved to be unprepared to receive them. >77 He went on to state that a 
similar problem existed in relations between the legislative and executive organs in the soviets, 
which led to 'bureaucratism' and 'additional friction.'78 In addition, when he was asked at what 
level the lack of preparation to assume new function existed, he replied, 'I think at all levels, 
from the Council of Ministers to rural soviets. ,79 Luk'yanov's speech also referred to the same 
issue, stating, 'half of our misfortune in the centre and branches in the past two years came from, 
in the author's opinion, the fact that party committees, first of all, had stopped ruling in practice, 
then soviets ... could not take over the administrative function at all. That is, ... actually power 
vacuum is arising in real life. ,80 He also referred to the division of legislative and executive 
functions in the soviets. According to him, such a division was positive at oblast' and krai level. 
However, at raion level, 'We remember the Leninist principle not only of division but also of 
unity of power.'81 This statement was accepted with applause. This statement, it seems, 
reflected the recognition that the legislative-executive division had led to stalemate at raion 
76 Rossiiskii Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Sotsial'no-Politicheskoi Istorii (RGASPI), fond (f.) 582, 
opis' (0.) 6. ed. khr. 15, p. 1. 
77 Ibid., p. 6. 
78 Ibid. 
79 Ibid.,p.10. 
80 Ibid., p. 16. 
81 Ibid., p. 20. See also pp. 17-18. 
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level and to the problem of 'dual subordination'. 
Other speakers in the section also referred to the failure of power transfer from the 
party. For example, Veniamin Yakovlev, USSR minister of justice, stated that the party had 
stopped administering society but the soviets had not fully taken the power into their own 
hands.82 The same statement was presented by E. A. Gershkaron, head of an oil and gas 
investigation combine in Krasnodar. 83 
On the other hand, some speakers advanced a different view. That is, the problem was 
that the party still kept power in its hands. Georgii Popov, head of department at a Donetsk 
medical institute, argued for the necessity of demarcating the functions of party organisations, 
soviets and economic organs; while the party should take political responsibility, government 
and economic organs should take one for their own concrete activity.84 Viktor Dyatlov, a reader 
at Irkutsk state university, said, 'the main task today ---- this is destatification 
[razgosudarstvlenie] of the party. . .. Reject the nomenklatura system, the right to control the 
activity of the administration, and an evaluation by the party. ,85 Anatolii Sobchak, chairman of 
Leningrad city soviet and a famous radical reformer, stated that it was, first of all, the party that 
was guilty; the party interfered in the task of state organs and substituted itself still for state 
power.86 Such a view was reflected in the final report of the section meeting on 7 July. Kuptsov 
mentioned that the party should abandon the command method in relations with the Soviets.87 
The two arguments mentioned above were different in their evaluation of the chaotic 
situation. The former one assumed that the failure of power transfer was the reason. The latter, 
on the other hand, ascribed responsibility to the party's power holding. It seems to the author 
that the latter argument, which was presented mainly by soviet deputy and/or intellectual people 
82 Ibid., p. 28. 
83 Ibid., p. 35. 
84 Ibid., p. 51. 
85 Ibid., pp. 59-60. 
86 Ibid., p. 70. 
87 XXVIII s "ezd Kommunisticheskoi Partii Sovetskogo Soyuza, Vol. 1, p. 583. 
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(e.g. university teachers), failed to take into account the fact that party officials, for their part, 
felt they could not control the situation. The Vlasov and Luk'yanov statements clearly reflected 
such a feeling. A 'power vacuum' certainly existed at least in the leadership's cognition and 
constrained the decisions of the leadership. 
2. The Politburo 
As is well known, the Politburo had been the highest organ of decision making of the 
Soviet Union until the establishment of the state presidency.88 The members of the Politburo 
included not only top party officials but also the top state officials, e.g. the chairman of the 
Council of Ministers, chairman of KGB and so forth. The reorganisation of the Politburo at the 
28th Party Congress led to reform of party-state relations. 
The March CC plenum (1990) approved a draft of the new party Rules, which 
included a radical change in the highest party decision making organs. The draft projected the 
abolition of the Politburo and the creation of a Presidium. Its members were to be confirmed by 
the congress of the CPSU; the chairman (not general secretary) of the CPSU, his deputies and 
leaders of repUblican parties were to join the Presidium ex officio. The Presidium, in its own 
name, was to direct the decisions to the party organisations for their implementation; was to 
bring the decisions on the most important political questions for the confirmation of the CC 
plenum; and was to report annually on its activity to the CC plenum. 89 Thus, the ex officio 
Presidium members were supposed to be party officials rather than the whole country's top elite. 
However, the new draft Rules that appeared on 28 June 1990 significantly modified 
this proposition. This draft stated only that the chairman of the CPSU was to lead the working 
Presidium, and there was no other statement on Presidium membership, that is, the proposal on 
88 The standard reference on the Politburo is John L6wenhardt, James R. Ozinga, and Erik van 
Ree, The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Politburo (London: UCL Press, 1992), to which the author 
owes a lot in this section. 
89 Materialy Plenuma Tsentral 'nogo Komiteta KPSS, 11, 14, 16 marta 1990 g. (Moskva: 
Politizdat, 1990), p. 203 (Article 31). 
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the republican party leaders' membership was eliminated.9o In addition, while the chairman of 
the CPSU, who was to be elected by the party congress, was retained, the CC plenum was to 
elect the first secretary.91 Their relation was not clear, which required further revision at the 
party congress. 
The party Rules that were finally approved at the 28th Party Congress were in the event 
on somewhat traditional lines. Firstly, the General Secretary remained and the post of chairman 
of the CPSU disappeared, though the post of General Secretary was to be elected by the party 
congress rather than the CC plenum. At the congress Gorbachev was elected the new General 
Secretary and was freed from the control of the CC plenum. Secondly, the proposed Presidium 
was eliminated and the Politburo, to which members were to be elected by the CC plenum, was 
revived. On these points, Gorbachev stated in the congress that it was because a majority of 
Communists did not support the new institution and post.92 Nonetheless, the General Secretary, 
his deputy and first secretaries of the republican parties entered the membership of the 
Politburo.93 As a consequence, the new composition of the Politburo became as in Table 3-6. 
While only Gorbachev had a state post (USSR President) and other prominent political figures 
joined the Presidential Council, the Politburo became an assembly of republican party leaders. 
Thus, in the highest organ, the party was basically deprived of most state ties. 
Still, one problem remains. Why did Gorbachev not leave his party post? Rather many 
people criticised that he occupied both presidential and party posts. On the one hand, some 
argued that Gorbachev should resign the party post and concentrate on the presidential job. On 
the other hand, there were some suggestions that he should resign from President and 
concentrate on the party job. It does not appear very unreasonable to think that he had a chance 
to leave the party and make the presidency stronger because major political figures had left the 
90 Pravda, 28 June 1990, p. 2 (Article 29). 
91 Pravda, 28 June 1990, p. 2 (Article 30). 
92 XXVIII s"ezd Kommunisticheskoi Partii Sovetskogo Soyuza, Vol. 1, p. 100. 
93 Pravda, 18 July 1990, p. 2 (Article 28). 
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Politburo and moved to the Presidential Council after the 28 th Party Congress. However, it 
seems to the author this choice was too risky for him given the 'power vacuum'. The party was 
still a kind of administrative organ. The new presidential system had not been working well up 
to the party congress and there was no guarantee that a presidential system would work properly. 
If Gorbachev had concentrated on only his state post, the chaotic situation might have become 
worse. Thus, it is better to understand not that Gorbachev 'did' not leave the party, but that he 
'could' not.94 
3. The CC Apparat 
(a) The Controversy over Apparat Reorganisation up to the 28th Party Congress 
Compared with the first reorganisation, the second reorganisation of the CC apparat 
has attracted little attention from researchers. 95 In fact, only fragmentary information is 
available. The turning point toward the second reorganisation was, of course, the 28th Party 
Congress. 
The controversy over the party Programme and new party Rules touched the problem 
of the CC commissions and party apparat. Let me consider the process of the approval of the 
'Programmatic Declaration' and new party Rules on this point. The February CC plenum 
approved a 'Platform of the CC CPSU toward the 28th Party Congress' named 'Toward Humane 
Democratic Socialism.' This included a statement on the party apparat, to the effect that: 'The 
party apparat is necessary. It will make perfect its structure, improve its competence, and 
eradicate its bureaucratic appearance. It is necessary to create conditions that attract 
well-prepared, educated and competent party members to its work. The apparat must be 
94 This does not deny that Gorbachev had rather strong identity as a party official. Certainly his 
love of the party would influence his decision. 
95 A few exceptions are the followings. Cameron Ross, 'Party-State Relations;' Alexander Rahr, 
'The CPSU after the Twenty-eighth Party Congress,' RLIReport on the USSR, 2-45 (November 
9, 1990); Gordon M. Hahn, Gorbachev versus the CPSU CC Apparat: The Bureaucratic 
Politics of Reforming the Party Apparat, 1988-1991 (PhD Dissertation, Boston University, 
1995). 
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optimised in its number and strictly subordinated to elected organs. ,96 The March 1990 draft of 
the new party Rules also stated about the apparat, 'Leading elected organs of the party create a 
subordinate working apparat, which realises basically analytic, prognosis and sociological and 
consulting service of their activity. The party apparat is formed by electoral organs on the basis 
of the recommendation of primary party organisations, and the recommendation is discussed at 
their meetings. Labour law is applied to workers of the party apparat. ,97 As to the Commissions, 
'In the CC CPSU the permanent Commissions are created on the basis of direction of its activity. 
They are formed in the plenum of the CC CPSU from the members of the CC and also other 
communists who are confirmed as advisers. The Commissions are headed by CC secretaries 
who are elected by the CC plenum, and [the Commissions] have right to take decisions within 
their own competence. Communists working in the CC CPSU and its Commissions on a 
permanent basis receive a salary from party funds;' 'The CC Secretariat is formed from the 
leaders of the Commissions. It ... directs the work of the CC apparat. ,98 
Leading up to the 28th Party Congress, the party apparat became one of the main 
arenas of controversy. For example, the head of the Ideological department of Sasovskii gorkom 
in Ryazan oblast' proposed the abolition of the distinction between the Organisational and 
Ideological departments, and the creation of a department of party organisers which would carry 
out organisational, ideological, political, educational, and economic activity at intermediate 
level. He also argued for the improvement of cadre work in the party.99 There was a proposal to 
allow PPOs to decide how to form raikom, gorkom and obkom apparats, and it was also 
proposed to liquidate departments at raikoms. loo This idea of department liquidation at raion 
96 Materialy Plenuma Tsentral'naga Kamiteta KPSS, 5-7 fevralya 1990 g. (Moskva: Politizdat, 
1990), p. 381. 
97 Materialy Plenuma Tsentral'naga Kamiteta KPSS, 11, 14, 16 marta 1990 g., p. 196 (Article 
14). 
98 Ibid., pp. 203-204 (Article 31). 
99 V. Sal'nyi, 'Kakoi Byt' Strukture Apparata,' Partiinaya Zhizn', 1990, No.3 (February), pp. 
34-36. 
100 N. Medvedev, 'Osilila Kabinetnaya Sueta', Partiinaya Zhizn', 1990, No. '3 (February), pp. 
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level was repeated by another party worker. He argued for abolishing the departments and 
creating two 'commands' (organisational and ideological).101 There was also some defence of 
the function of the apparat. For instance, V. Ryabov, a party official in the CC department, 
presented a defence of the party apparat, arguing in a Pravda article that it was necessary not to 
eradicate the apparat, but to change its mode of work. 102 
Probably the results in the party congress reflected such a harsh controversy. The 
'Programmatic Declaration' approved by the congress did not include any statement on the 
party apparat. 103 On the other hand, the June draft of the party Rules and the approved party 
Rules did not change its article on the party apparat. This may not be surprising because the 
apparat itself was necessary for any organisation. In any case, the second reorganisation took 
place on the basis of the new party Rules. 
(b) Continuing Controversy after the Party Congress 
Some arguments on the second reorganisation were advanced after the 28th congress. 
At the Secretariat meeting on 28 July Gorbachev stated that the renewal of cadres was necessary 
in all sections and urged that new, trustworthy and fresh-thinking people should be brought into 
party work. Then he said, 'All this relates to the CC apparat.' 104 The Secretariat meeting on 7 
August thought it necessary to substantially reduce the CC apparat, and to considerably renew it. 
For this aim, it was decided to carry out the attestation of all CC apparat workers, and to widely 
disseminate the principle and practice of its formation. 105 
The concrete plan of reorganisation of the CC apparat was discussed at the Politburo 
meeting of 13 September 1990. Oleg Shenin, CC secretary for Organisational Matters, 
presented a preliminary plan. He stated that there were 1,493 persons in the 'KPK' (Party 
66-68. 
101 A. Aliev, 'Nuzhny Ii Otdely?' Partiinaya Zhizn " 1990, No.5 (March), p. 38. 
102 Pravda, 3 April 1990, p. 2. 
103 See Pravda, 15 July 1990, p. 1,3. 
104 Pravda, 29 July 1990, p. 2. 
lOS Pravda, 9 August, p. 2. 
73 
Control Committee)106 and CC at that time and proposed to reduce this to 603 persons (or by 
40.4 percent),107 which was the same figures that had been reported by Aleksandr Dzasokhov, 
CC secretary for Ideology, before this Politburo meeting. 108 Still, the content of this massive 
reduction reveals a kind of a fa9ade character. Ofthe 603 workers, 275 were to go to the CC CP 
RSFSR. Thus, the real reduction was just 328 workers. 109 The new CC departments were 
planned to be the following. An Organisational Department was proposed to concentrate wholly 
on work with party organisations including party organisations in the armed forces, border and 
interior troops. Here we can understand that the party did not lose its tie with the security organs. 
On the other hand, work on social organisations, soviets, international relations, and science was 
proposed to go to other departments. The Ideology Department was, Shenin said, to have two 
functions: theoretical and ideological. In addition, the Ideology Department was expected to 
strengthen the Press Centre. 110 The Department on 'Work' with Social and Political 
Organisations had been created before the 28th Party Congress (on 9 April) by the Politburo 
decision with 28 members including V. I. Mironenko, former first secretary of the CC 
Komsomol, as first deputy head. III This department was renamed as the Department on 
'Relations' with Social-Political Organisations and was to expand its activity. A Department on 
Legislative Initiatives and Legal Questions was to be formed and the State and Law Department 
was to be liquidated; the Ethnic Relations Department, which had been established at the 
beginning of 1990, was to be kept. On the basis of the Social and Economic Department, a 
106 Shenin mistakenly said 'KPK,' because the Central Control Commission, which integrated 
the functions of KPK and Central Auditing Commission, established itself at the 28th Party 
Congress. 
107 TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 42, d. 29, p. 2. 
108 Izvestiya TsK KPSS, 1990-9, p. 4. In this article he reported the activity of the Secretariat 
after the 28th party congress. This shows that his statement was made before the confirmation of 
the Politburo. 
109 TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 42, d. 29, p. 2. 
110 Ibid., p. 2. 
III This information was stated by Luk'yanov at the 28th Party Congress. RGASPI, f. 582, o. 6. 
ed. khr. 15, p. 48. The Politburo confirmed its creation on 29 March 1990, and entrusted the 
Secretariat to submit the proposal on its structure and so forth within two weeks. TsKhSD, f. 89, 
p. 9, d. 91, p. 1. Thus, its establishment on 9 April perfectly fitted the time-schedule. 
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Social and Economic 'Policy' Department was to be formed, which was planned to include the 
work of the Defence department, which was to be liquidated. The Agrarian department was to 
be reorganised into a Department on Work with Peasants. The International department was to 
engage in relations with foreign parties and organisations rather than a general foreign policy. 
The General department and Administration of Affairs were to be kept. 112 As represented in the 
name of Social-economic 'Policy' or 'Work with Peasants,' this reorganisation was, it seems, 
intended to make the CPSU a political party rather than an administrative organ. 
Shenin made proposals also on the CC Commissions, though less detailed ones. He 
proposed to have two types of Commission: permanent ones and the commissions that were to 
be formed in accordance with the 28th Party Congress resolutions. This proposal meant that 
there were more Commissions than CC secretaries. 
The responses from Politburo members and other participants to this proposal were 
very confusing as compared with the discussion of the first reorganisation in which every 
member had argued more or less from the whole party and country point of view. Not many 
participants presented their own ideas on the apparat reorganisation, and others complained of 
the current situation or argued their own interest. For example, Ivan Polozkov, first secreraty of 
the CP RSFSR, asked for a larger apparat for his own party.l13 V. Falin, the head of the 
International Department, complained that staffing levels were too low to work effectively. I 14 O. 
Baklanov argued for the necessity to have a Defence Department. 115 S. Gurenko, first secretary 
of the CP Ukraine, supported protecting the apparat. 116 A. Mutalibov, first secretary of the CP 
Azerbaijan, harshly complained of his situation such that he was called a neo-stalinist, which 
made Gorbachev very angry. I I? Some other participants presented new proposals. For example, 
112 TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 42, d. 29, pp. 2-3. 
113 Ibid., pp. 5-7. 
114 Ibid., pp. 9-11. 
115 Ibid., p. 11. 
116 Ibid., p. 16. 
II? Ibid., pp. 24-25. 
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Frolov mentioned relations between the Commissions and the departments as discussed above. 
V. Kuptsov put forward some ideas in connection with social organisations. 118 N. Nazarbaev, 
first secretary of the CP Kazakhstan, proposed the renewal of the mode of apparat work and to 
keep the Agrarian departments. 119 G. Semenova, CC secretary for Women Affairs, argued for 
creating a sub-division for women's affairs. 120 Overall, there were too many new proposals and 
demands for Gorbachev to summarise at once. Then they entrusted the Secretariat to work out 
this problem taking into account the exchange of opinions. 121 The result was reported at the 
October CC plenum. 
(c) Composition of the New Commissions and Departments 
The outline of the second reorganisation was reported by Shenin to the October CC 
plenum. l22 In the end, thirteen departments and eleven Commissions were established. Figure 
3-2 shows the composition of the new departments. The departments were rather significantly 
changed from the previous proposal to the Politburo meeting. The Ideology Department was to 
engage in questions of propaganda, mass information and other ideological matters. The 
Humanitarian Department was to make contact with creative and scientific intellectuals, work 
out theoretical questions of social development, and prepare party cadres. The Press Centre was 
retained. Presumably the three departments mentioned above had been under the jurisdiction of 
the former Ideology Department. The Department on Relations with Social and Political 
Organisations was to concentrate on social and political relations including workers and youth 
movements. The Department on Legislative Initiatives and Law Questions replaced the former 
State and Law Department. The Ethnic Policy Department, which also had been created from 
the State and Law Department, was renamed as the Ethnic 'Relations' Department. The 
118 Ibid.,p.12. 
119 Ibid.,pp. 12-13. 
120 Ibid., p. 14. 
121 Ibid., p. 26. 
122 Materialy Plenuma Tsentral'nogo KomUeta KPSS, 8-9 oktyabrya 1990 g. (Moskva: 
Politizdat, 1990), pp. 41-47. 
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Department of Social and Economic 'Policy' was created on the basis of the former Social and 
Economic Department. The Centre of Information Processing replaced the Defence Department. 
The Agrarian Department was renamed as the Agrarian 'Policy' Department and was to engage 
in relations with peasant movements. The International Department was kept but its function 
was clarified as ties with foreign parties and organisations. The General Department and 
Administration of Affairs were also kept and the Department of Party Construction and Cadre 
Work was replaced by the Organisational Department, which was to concentrate on supervision 
of party organisations including those in the armed forces, border and interior troops, and on 
renewal of party life. This department was to coordinate the ties of the CC apparat with 
lower-level party organisations and organise all-party events. The Organisational Department 
was to play the central role after this reorganisation. 
Compared with the proposal to the Politburo meeting, some differences can be 
indicated. Firstly, the Agrarian Policy Department, which had been supposed to become the 
Department on Work with Peasants, survived. This was noticeable because Gorbachev insisted 
on the name 'Work with Peasants' at the Politburo meeting of 13 September and the agrarian 
sphere had been under his jurisdiction during the Brezhnev period. If Gorbachev could not 
implement his intention even in the agrarian sphere, it may suggest he was losing his overall 
leadership of the CPSu. Secondly, the Defence Department was not liquidated but renamed the 
Centre ofInformation Processing. Thirdly, the creation of the Humanitarian Department was not 
included in the proposal to the Politburo. Overall, the number of the departments was increased. 
New Commissions were also reported and approved at the October CC plenum. Figure 
3-2 shows the new Commissions. Eleven Commissions in total were formed and there were two 
different kinds of Commissions as suggested by Shenin's proposal to the Politburo. The first 
was permanent Commissions created in accordance with paragraph 29 of the party Rules: 
Ideology, Social and Political, Social and Economic, on Agrarian Policy, on Questions of 
Women and Family, on Ethnic Policy, on Problems of International Policy, and on Renewal of 
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the Activities of Primary Party Organisations. The second group was created by the resolutions 
adopted at the 28th Party Congress: on Science, Education and Culture, on Questions of Youth 
Policy, on Military Policy. This group of Commissions were to be chaired by Politburo members 
or CC secretaries. 123 Furthermore, a new Commission on Questions of Financial and Economic 
Activity of the Party was created at the December CC plenum. 124 
The relationship between the departments and the commissions is not clear. While 
some departments clearly had relations with certain commissions, some commissions had 
communications with several departments. At the Politburo meeting mentioned above (13 
September) Shenin stated, 'For four commissions, which will be, by virtue of their own 
character, connected with a series of CC departments, a small coordinating apparat will be 
created.' 125 Though it is not clear which were these 'four commissions', it is possible to infer 
that they were the commissions on Questions of Women and Family Issues, on Military Policy, 
on Questions of Youth Policy, and on Science, Education and Culture. Still, that the last one 
(Commission on Science ... ) supervised the Humanitarian department was made pUblic. 126 
Perhaps, this department had relations with both Ideological commission and the one on Science, 
Education, and Culture. Thus, it seems that the relations between the departments and the 
commissions were as in Figure 3-2. To investigate how the decisions on the CC apparat were 
implemented and how these new institutions worked is the next task. 
(d) Implementation of the Decisions 
(i) Some Quantitative Results 
As mentioned above (3-(b)), the scale of the CC apparat was to be significantly 
reduced. The 40 per cent reduction was referred to by some Secretariat members. Dzasokhov's 
123 Ibid., pp. 41-42 (Shenin's report), p. 201 (decision). 
124 Materialy Plenuma Tsentral'nogo KomUeta KPSS, 10-11 dekabrya 1990 g. (Moskva: 
Politizdat, 1991), p. 5. 
125 TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 42, d. 29, p. 3. 
126 Izvestiya TsK KPSS, 1990, No. 11, p. 29. 
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report has already been mentioned. 127 Just before the October CC plenum (1990) Shenin stated 
that the CC apparat would be reduced but that the quality of workers and effectiveness of work 
c 
would be improved. 128 
These published reports, however, did not show the concrete content of the reduction. 
A document on the wages of party workers, which was prepared by the CC Administration of 
Affairs on 15 October and circulated to the Secretariat and CCC, shows the contents. Firstly, the 
mentioned target of 40 per cent reduction denoted only 'responsible workers'. That is, the CC 
apparat was to reduce its 1493 responsible workers to 890 (in total 603 persons or 40.4 per cent). 
Then, support staff were to be reduced by 30-35 percent. Secondly, as also mentioned, this 
reduction had a fayade element, because many of the released workers (275 responsible and 150 
support staff) went to the CC of CP RSFSR. Thus, the 'real' proposed reduction was 328 
responsible workers (21.9 percent).129 There was no comprehensive information on how further 
this reduction was implemented, though it is very likely, inferred from the first reorganisation, 
that the process was not smooth at all. Still, some fragmentary information on where the 
released workers went is available, which, it seems, suggests the difficulty in its implementation. 
Let us consider it further in the next section. 
(ii) Where the released members went and Staffing in the CC apparat 
It would be natural to assume that the released party workers went to the new 
presidency after its establishment in March 1990. One surprising fact is, however, that their 
transfers to the presidential apparat were very slow. Just before the 28th Party Congress (on 28 
June 1990) Luk'yanov asked to transfer one CC official in the Ideological Department to the 
'Supreme Soviet Secretariat' .130 Even after the congress, this tendency continued. On 24 or 25 
July a transfer of one CC official to the Supreme Soviet Secretariat was requested by 
127 Izvestiya TsK KPSS, 1990, No.9, p. 4. 
128 Izvestiya TsK KPSS, 1990, No. 10, p. 6. 
129 TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 8, d. 42, p. 1. 
130 TsKhSD f. 89, p. 30, d. 29, p. 2? Because this delo's numbering was messy, it is impossible 
to denote the precise page. 
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Luk'yanov. 131 On 25 July Luk'yanov asked to employ one released CC official as a head of 
department in the Supreme Soviet Secretariat, though this proposal was not supported by the 
Presidium of the Supreme Soviet. 132 A further transfer of one CC official to the Supreme Soviet 
Secretariat was requested by Luk 'yanov on 2 or 3 October. 133 On 17 or 18 October he asked to 
transfer one CC official again. 134 On 5 November he made an additional request. 135 Taking into 
account that the Presidency was founded in March, these transfers to the Supreme Soviet 
apparat are a striking fact. In fact, the Presidency did not have its own apparat until December 
1990, just before the further extension of presidential power was approved.136 According to 
Valerii Boldin, head of the CC General Department, the leadership had the idea to create the 
presidential apparat even before the establishment of the presidency, but creating the 
presidential apparat was complicated by its relationship with the state ministries. 137 In any case, 
this was, without doubt, an important reason for the poor implementation of presidential decrees 
and the 'power vacuum' . 
As far as the evidence of fond 89 archive shows, transfers to the presidential apparat 
took place after December 1990. On 7 December, A. Pavlov, head of the CC 'State and Law 
Department' (which means this department that the October CC plenum had decided to liquidate 
still existed at the time), wrote 'in connection with the reorganisation of the CC apparat, it is 
proposed to release comrade V. N. Putilin from his current posts of deputy head of sector of this 
131 TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 30, d. 41, p. 37 This delo's numbering is also messy. This document gives 
its date as both 24 and 25 July. 
132 Ibid., pp. 1-27 
133 Ibid., p. 47 This also states both dates. 
134 Ibid., p. 57 This also states both dates. 
135 Ibid., p. 67 
136 At the Politburo meeting of 16 November 1990, Nursultan Nazarbaev, first secretary of 
Kazakh party and president of Kazakhstan union republic, strongly recommended Gorbachev to 
create the presidential apparat. According to Nazarbaev, he established it immediately after he 
became Kazakh president. See TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 42, d. 30, p. 21. See also Stephen White, 
Graeme Gill and Darrell Slider, The Politics of Trallsition: Shaping a Post-Soviet Future 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), p. 74. 
137 Valerii I. Boldin, Krushenie P 'edestala: Shtrikhi k Portretu M. S. Gorbacheva (Moskva: 
Respublika, 1995), pp. 367-372; Valery Boldin, Ten Years That Shook the World: The 
Gorbachev Era as Witnessed by His Chief of StajJ(New York: Basic Book, 1994), p. 249-253. 
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department.' Then, he added four other officials to be released. They were to work in the 
Presidential apparat. 138 The CC Secretariat approved these releases on 13 December. 139 On 9 
January 1991, three officials in the General Depaliment were released and went to the 
Presidential apparat. 140 Nikolai Kmchina, Administrator of Affairs, made a proposal to transfer 
one official in his department to a Department on Questions of Defence and State Security 
under the Presidential apparat on 24 May 1991 and the Secretariat approved the proposal on 30 
May.141 An additional thirty CC officials in the 'Defence Department' were transfened to the 
conesponding department of the Presidential apparat. The Secretariat approved it on 30 May, 
stating, 'in connection with the reorganisation of the CC apparat'. 142 This means that the 
Defence Department that was supposed to be abolished in October 1990 still existed until May 
1991. 
Some officials went to the state ministries, which were supposed to be directly 
subordinated to the presidency after December 1990. For example, it was approved by the 
Secretariat on 3 April that one official in the CC depatiment on Legislative and Legal Questions 
was transfened to the USSR Cabinet of Ministers. 143 On 30 May 1991, the Secretariat approved 
the transfer of two CC officials in the General Depatiment to the Cabinet of Ministers. 144 
Besides the retirement of pensioners, 145 a different type of transfer also took place. On 
26 December 1990, the Secretariat approved the release of A. I. Vol'skii, who would play an 
important role as a representative of 'Civic Union' in the privatisation period under Yeltsin, 
from 'head of the CC department' because he had been elected president of a 
138 TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 20, d. 16, p. 2. 
139 Ibid., p. 1. 
140 TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 20, d. 19, pp. 1-2. 
141 TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 20, d. 52, pp. 1-2. 
142 TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 20, d. 54, d. 55, d. 56. See also, f. 89, p. 23, d. 12, p. 6. 
143 TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 20, d. 44, pp. 1-2. This official was named by the Cabinet of Ministers on 
16 March 1991, then the department on legislative and legal questions made the proposal later 
(one day in March, invisible because of bad printing). 
144 TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 20, d. 53, pp. 1-4. 
145 Retirement, of course, took place. See TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 20, d. 20, pp. 1-2. Three officials of 
the General Department retired and were approved by Secretariat on 9 January 1991. 
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Scientific-Industrial Union. 146 Incidentally, this decision has a strange aspect. According to his 
official biography in Izvestiya TsK KPSS, Vol'skii was supposed to be the chairman of 
Committee of special administration of Nagorno-Karabakh autonomous oblast', though he had 
been head of the Machine Building Department before that. 147 Still, the Machine Building 
Department was abolished in the first CC apparat reorganisation and there is no evidence that he 
returned to the CC department. This may be a simple mistake. In any case, such a transfer to 
newly established economic unions or associations as in Vol'skii's case happened during the 
apparat reorganisation. On 24 June 1991 the Secretariat approved the transfer of one CC official 
of the Social and Economic Policy Department to an 'Inter-branch state-cooperative 
association.' 148 
New staffing of the CC apparat has an ominous sign. For example, on 4 December 
1990, the Secretariat agreed to employ three persons in the CC Organisational Department, two 
of whom were to remain as cadres in the USSR anned forces. 149 In addition, on 21 January 
1991, that two persons working in the Administration of Affairs should remain each as cadres in 
the armed forces and as acting reserve of the KGB was approved by the Secretariat. ISO 
In the end, all these show important points. Firstly the second reorganisation of the 
party apparat, as the first, prolonged as the fact that 'State and Law Department' and 'Defence 
Department' that were supposed to be liquidated at the October CC plenum (1990) existed in 
December 1990 (the State and Law Department) and May 1991 (the Defence Department) 
indicates. Secondly the preparation of the Presidential apparat was very slow. According to 
Boldin, it had fewer than 400 staff including support staff by August 1991. Compared with some 
1600 managerial and support staff in the Cabinet of Ministers, its relative power was obviously 
146 TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 33, d. 10, pp. 1-2. The proposal to approve the release was made by the 
department of 'Party Construction and Cadre Work' (not the Organisational department) on 6 
November 1990. Ibid. p. 3. 
147 Izvestiya TsK KPSS, 1990, No. 10, p. 44. Vol'skii was a member of the CC CPSU. 
148 TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 23, d. 23, pp. 1-2. 
149 TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 20, d. 14, p. l. 
ISO TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 20, d. 26, pp. 1-2. 
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smaller, though both were supposed to be directly subordinate to the President. 151 In addition, 
there is no evidence that the Cabinet of Ministers could work well. Here we can see the 'power 
vacuum' again. Thus, thirdly, the party apparat certainly weakened and lost most of its power of 
control over the state organs, but tightened its ties with security organs. This may be a natural 
response given a 'power vacuum'. We can confirm this point from different points of view. 
(iii) How the New Institution worked 
There is only fragmentary information on the Commissions' and CC departments' 
activity after the second reorganisation. Table 3-7 shows the number of meetings of the CC 
Commissions. Firstly, compared with Table 3-5, which shows the activity of the Commissions 
before the 28 th Party Congress, it seems that the Commissions became slightly more active. 
Secondly, nonetheless, the level of activism differed by Commission. As well as the late 
established Commission on Questions of Financial and Economic Activity of the Party, the 
Ideological and Social and Economic Commissions were inactive. On the other hand, the Social 
and Political, on Agrarian Policy, on Militaty Policy, and on Renewal of the Activity of Primary 
Party Organisations were more vigorous. Particularly the last two Commissions' activeness is, it 
seems, suggestive because Military Policy, by its very name, denotes a connection with the 
armed forces and the Shenin-Ied Commission on Renewal of the Activity of PPOs supervised 
the party organisations including those in the armed forces. This tendency can be confilmed by 
the depatiments' activity. 
It is, nonetheless, not possible so far to research the entire activity of the CC 
departments. Let me indicate basic tendencies by collecting the fragmentary information that is 
available. From April 1991 Izvestiya TsK KPSS monthly published articles on the activity of the 
CC departments. Though this series of articles was interrupted by the attempted coup and, 
therefore, covered only five departments, they can provide some basic information on the work 
of the CC departments. 
151 Boldin, Krushenie P'edestala, p. 372; Boldin, Ten Years, p. 253. 
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The Social and Economic Policy Department had 62 full-time workers (it is not clear 
if they were only responsible workers or including support staff) and five sectors (Social Policy, 
Economic Policy, Scientific and Technological Policy, Economy of Defence Complex, on the 
Connection with Soviet and Social and Economic Organisations). This department's activity 
was directed to research on the economic situation and preparation for the transition to a market 
economy. 152 This department's downgrading seems obvious. Compared with the first 
reorganisation plan (Table 3-2-2), in which its predecessor was planned to have 128 responsible 
workers and 29 support staff, staffing was reduced by more than half. 
The number of staff of the Ethnic Policy Department was not shown. It had three 
sectors (an Analysis sector, a Propaganda and Information sector, and a sector on Discussion of 
the permanent CC Commission on Ethnic Policy of the CPSU). This department prepared 
decisions and information for the plenums, conferences and congresses of the party.153 The 
level of activism of this department cannot be defined. Nonetheless, taking into account the 
violent situation around ethnic problems at that time, it seems that it could claim its importance. 
The Humanitarian Depmiment had 35 responsible workers. Its structure was not clear, 
though, presumably, it had two sub-divisions (for working out (i) complex problems of the 
development of science, and (ii) theoretical problems of social development, political analysis 
and forecasting) and sectors. 154 It seems that this depmiment's activity, by its nature, duplicated 
one of the Ideological Department. For example, though it was reported that the Humanitarian 
Department participated in the preparation of the draft of new party Programme, a document of 
this kind clearly concemed both departments. How cooperative these two departments were 
cannot be recognised. Still, one can imagine that this duplication sometimes could caused a 
conflict, because, on the one hand, the Commission on Science, Education and Culture that 
supervised the Humanitarian department was chaired by Frolov, a Politburo member but not CC 
152 Izvestiya TsK KPSS, 1991, No.4, pp. 78-79. 
153 Izvestiya TsK KPSS, 1991, No.5, pp. 66-67. 
154 Izvestiya TsK KPSS, 1991, No.6, pp. 90-91. 
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secretary, and the Politburo became less active after the 28th Party Congress, while, on the other 
hand, the Ideological Commission was chaired by Dzasokhov, a CC secretary and Politburo 
member, and the Secretariat became more active after the party congress. 
The International Department consisted of 100 responsible workers, though, it was 
reported, it had about 500 workers in the past. Its structure was composed of groups. Some 
groups were created on geographical basis (e.g. Western Europe, Eastern Europe, Socialist 
Countries in Asia and so forth). In addition, there were a group of consultants and a group 
engaging in studies of huge questions and long-term tendencies of the development of world 
politics. I55 It is not likely that this department had a significant influence on Gorbachev's 
foreign policy. 
The key of all departments was the Organisational Department, which conducted an 
organisational and coordinating role within the party: from training and education of cadres, 
structural unification of the party, to plan making and implementation by party organs. This 
department had six regional sectors. FUlthermore, it had the following sectors: an Armed Forces 
sector; a border, internal, and railway troops sector; a sector of party organisations in the Soviet 
foreign establishment; a service commission of the CC CPSU; a consultants' sector; a sector of 
[party] Rules' questions; a organisational questions sector; an unitary party ticket sector; and a 
sector of recording and analysis of cadres. 156 Here we can recognise that the party never lost its 
ties with security organs. In addition, this department had a significant role in composing a new 
nomenklatura list. 
Finally, though the work of the Administration of Affairs will fully be analysed in 
Chapter 5, one important Secretariat decision on 30 July should briefly be mentioned here. By 
this decision, the Secretariat approved that the Administration of Affairs became an 
'independent subdivision' of the CC apparat; it become a 'judicial person' in order to utilise 
155 Izvestiya TsK KPSS, 1991, No.7, pp. 57-59. 
156 lzvestiya TsK KPSS, 1991, No.8, pp. 85-86. 
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CPSU property; its activity was to be financed by the party but also from its own 
productive-financial activities. I57 This decision suggests that the CPSU as an organisation was 
converting its function into an economic organisation comparable with the Komsomol. 
Further activities of the CC departments can be understood by the Secretariat decision 
'On the plan of measures for realisation of decisions ofJuly (1991) plenum of the CC CPSU' on 
30 July 1991. This plan included preparing the draft of new party Programme, accepting and 
organising proposals on the party Rules, summoning the extraordinary 29th Party Congress, 
adopting measures on the election of USSR people's deputies, on the party budget, and so forth. 
The CC departments were assigned to such tasks and inter-department working groups were 
organised, but there was no task regarding the state organs. Thus, the party certainly lost its 
control over the state. 158 
Overall, these activities of the CC Commissions and departments show the following 
tendencies. Firstly, the party lost most of ties with the state except for the security organs. Party 
control over the state by departmental supervision was over. Secondly, nonetheless, the party 
faced considerable difficulties in changing its function to 'political party' as shown by the 
inactivity of the Ideological Commissions and an assumed friction between the Ideological and 
Humanitarian departments (see also Chapter 4). Then, thirdly, the patty began to change its 
function to an economic organisation to defend itself (see Chapter 5). Finally, given a 'power 
vacuum', the patty had no other reliable force than its ties with security organs (see Chapter 6). 
These points can also be confirmed by the last nomenklatura list. Let us consider it in the next 
section. 
4. The Nome1lklatura System around the 28 th Party Congress and After 
(a) Controversy and Decisions 
157 TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 20, d. 64, pp. 1-l3. 
158 TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 20, d. 62, pp. 1-17. 
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The nomenklatura system had been a target of harsh controversy. Though it was not 
always clear what was meant by 'nomenklatura', it was frequently used to denote party control 
over the state organs. The February 1990 CC plenum's 'Platform of the CC CPSU toward the 
28th Patty Congress,' however, did not have any reference to the nomenklatura. 159 The 
Democratic Platform argued for the abolition of the nomenklatura system. In the end, the 
'Programmatic Declaration' accepted by the 28 th Party Congress included a statute indicating 'In 
the cadre work, the party rejects formalism and a nomenklaturist approach.' 160 
Presumably, based on this 'Programmatic Declaration,' the Secretariat meeting on 7 
August 1990 planned to fully and finally reject the nomenklaturist stereotype in the near 
future. 161 Later at the end of August, the Secretariat acknowledged it expedient to abolish 
nomenklatura in its existing form. Thus, the CC CPSU was to confirm only patiy cadres. 162 
Shenin commented in the October 1990 issue of Izvestiya TsK KPSS that its number of cadre 
posts examined by the CC CPSU was to be reduced from about 15 thousand to 2 thousand, 
which identified what was mentioned as party workers and so forth.163 Therefore state posts 
were to be excluded from the nomenklatura list. 
Still, the implementation of abolition was prolonged. In July 1991 Shenin reported that 
the party demolished the nomenklatura mechanism. 164 Though he did not indicate when they 
abolished the nomenklatura system, the last nomenklatura list shows that its implementation 
was prolonged. The list was presented by the Organisational department on 6 August 1991. It 
states, 'In accordance with a request (20 Septelnber 1990), the proposals on the list of posts ... 
is submitted ... ' 165 This prolongation may reflect the resistance of the patiy apparat or the 
confusion, ineffectiveness and malfunction in the party apparat. In any case, the problem here is 
159 See, Materialy Plenuma Tsentral'nogo Komiteta KPSS, 5-7 fevralya 1990 g., pp. 353-382. 
160 Pravda, 15 July 1990, p. 3. 
161 Pravda, 9 August 1990, p. 2. 
162 Pravda, 30 August 1990, p.2. 
163 Izvestiya TsK KPSS, 1990, No. 10, p. 6. 
164 IzvestZ]ia TsK KPSS, 1991, No.7, p. 4. 
165 TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 20, d. 77, p. 3. Emphasis added. 
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the content of the nomenklatura list. 
(b) The Nomenklatura List 
This list included 7735 posts in total and divided these posts into six groups. The first 
group consisted of 945 party posts of the CC CPSU, CC CP RSFSR, CCC CPSU, and CCC CP 
RSFSR. The second group was made up of 1882 posts, including first and second secretaries of 
union republican parties, secretaries of the RSFSR party, first secretaries of [autonomous] 
republic party committee,166 obkoms, kraikoms and some huge cities' (e.g. Moscow) gorkoms. 
Responsible workers in the CC apparat and some party publishing, academic institutions' 
leading posts and others were also included. These were party posts. In addition, the second 
group also included secretaries of all-army party committees, KGB, intemal troops of MVD, 
and railway troops. Though, certainly, they were also 'party' posts and probably the 
appointments to these posts were to be confirmed ex post jacto, such anned forces posts were 
crucial for the party leadership, because this meant that they were as important to the party 
leadership as first and second secretaries of union republican party organisations or first 
secretaries of republican parties, kraikoms and obkoms. In total, the CC Secretariat was to 
confirm 2447 posts. The second group also included posts that were to be confirmed not by the 
CC secretariat but by the sector of recoding and analysis of cadres in the Organisational 
department. These were 380 party postS. 167 
From the third to fifth group were the posts for which 'the confirmation in the CC 
CPSU will not be carried out.' It was just for information collecting. The third group consisted 
of 429 party posts at slightly lower levels including secretaries of union republic parties 
(excluding first and second secretaries); secretaries of party committees in USSR ministries and 
branches; foreign Soviet establishments; chaim1en of control commissions of union republican 
parties, republican parties, krais, oblasti and some large cities' party organisations; deputy 
166 At that time, autonomous republics were called just 'republics.' 
167 TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 20, d. 77, pp. 3-4, p. 7. The affixed post list of the first and second group 
is incomplete. 
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secretaries of party committees in the army, KGB, internal troops of MVD, and railway troops; 
secretaries of the party committees of all forms of armed forces, military okrugs, fleets, troops 
groups and armies and flotillas. 168 
The fOUlih group included 977 non-party posts. For example, vice-president, prime 
minister, chairman of the Supreme Soviet, ministers, chairmen of state committees; chairmen 
and their deputies of general confederation of USSR trade union; secretaries of CC Komsomol; 
leaders of USSR Academy of Science, state bank; chiefs and their deputies of General staff and 
Main military-political administration in USSR armed forces; commanders-in-chief of armed 
forces; commanders of troops of military okmgs, groups of troops and fleets, armies, and 
flotillas, internal troops of MVD and so forth. 169 It is noticeable that many military posts were 
excluded from the confirmation. Because the anned forces were to be directly subordinated to 
the President, the party, it seems, had to surrender them. 
The fifth group consisted of 341 posts including presidents of union republics, leaders 
of Supreme Soviets and Councils of Ministers in union republics and republics; chailmen of 
krais, oblasti, and some large cities' soviets and their ispolkoms. 17o 
The sixth group was for 'collection of brief directory-biographical information.' That 
is, they were not subjects of confirmation. This consisted of 3161 posts of responsible workers 
of CC of union republican parties, kraikoms, obkoms, also arnlY, state and social organisations, 
the economy, science, means of mass information, and spheres of public education, culture and 
foreign apparat. 171 
From the last nomenklatura list, we can confirm that the party lost control over state 
organs. Nonetheless, it was clUcial to the party to retain its control over the party organisations 
in the armed forces. 
168 Ibid., p. 4, pp. 8-22. 
169 Ibid., pp. 4-5, pp. 23-40. 
170 Ibid., p. 5, pp. 41-57. 
171 Ibid., p. 5, pp. 58-103. 
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5. Primary Party Organisations 
As far as party-state relations concerned, the controversy over PPOs developed around 
the organisational principle. 172 Previously PPOs were formed in a workplace (the so-called 
production principle). However, if the party had to strive for seats in the legislature, that is, if it 
should be a 'political party,' the principle needed to be changed to a telTitorial one to struggle in 
electoral districts, because people's workplace was often different from their electoral district. In 
addition, this had an implication for party-state relations. State officials' workplace was, of 
course, state ministries or other state organs. If the party had dropped the principle entirely, the 
logical consequence would have been that PPOs in state organs were bound to disappear. 
The CC platform approved by the CC plenum (Februaty 1990) supported the 
territorial-productive principle, that is, to keep party organisations in workplaces. 173 The draft 
party Rules approved by the March CC plenum also stated that PPOs were created in both 
working and residential places. 174 Another draft of the party Rules published just before the 28th 
Party Congress did not change this point. 175 
At the congress, Gorbachev took this problem in his opening address. He said, 
'Territorial or productive principle. To the question, to be or not to be, the party organisations in 
production, the answer is self-evident--- to be. . .. It is argued that the maintenance of the 
production principle in the construction of the CPSU should simultaneously strengthen the party 
organisations' work in residential areas.' 176 This issue was also discussed in the section meeting 
on 'Renewal of the Party' of the party congress.177 G. P. Kaz'min, first secretary of Khakass 
172 The debates on PPOs were not limited to this matter. For example, to delegate the financial 
right to PPOs was one of them, which will be discussed in the next chapter. 
173 Materialy Plenuma Tsentral'nogo KomUeta KPSS, 5-7 fevralya 1990 g., p. 379. 
174 Materialy Plenuma Tsentral'nogo Kamiteta KPSS, 11, 14, 16 marta 1990 g., p. 197 (article 
18). 
175 Pravda, 28 June 1990, p.l (article 16). 
176 XXVIII s "ezd K0l11111unisticheskoi Partii Sovetskogo Sayuza, Vol. 1, p. 97. 
177 On the fullest introduction of the discussion of this section, see Stephen White, 'The Failure 
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obkom, supported the telTitorial-productive principle, that is, to keep the production unit. 178 A. 
S. Podol'skii, a deputy head at the higher military-political school, emphasised the telTitorial 
principle, though he did not deny the productive principle. 179 Yu. K. Nepochanov, chief worker 
of an electric-vacuum factory in Nobosibirsk, proposed to allow the PPO to decide the 
organisational foml by itself. 180 D. M. Sergeev, deputy secretary of the party committee of Ural 
political institute'S. M. Kirov,' supported strengthening the telTitorial principle. 181 1. 1. 
Mel 'nikov, secretary of the party committee of Moscow State University at that time and later a 
CC secretmy, summarised the arguments as the majority supported telTitorial-productive 
principle, but it was necessary to strengthen work in residential areas. 182 
Eventually, the party congress approved the Programmatic Declaration and new party 
Rules that kept both telTitorial and productive principles, while emphasising the telTitorial 
one.
183 Thus, in a structural sense, it did not become necessary to dissolve PPOs in the state 
organs (and the militmy).184 
Nonetheless, the party faced a strong pressure later. Because, as we have seen, the 
party lost most of its relations with state organs, it had no power to resist it. So, the party 
organisations in the state organs began to dissolve themselves. 
V. The Disorganisation of Party Organs in the State 
The displacement of the party organisations from social, economic, political, 
ofCPSU Democratization', The Slavonic and East European Review, 75-4 (October 1997). 
178 RGASPI, f. 582, o. 6. ed. khr. 16, p. 14. 
179 Ibid., p. 36. 
180 Ibid., p. 74. 
181 Ibid., p. 77. 
182 Ibid., p. 83. See also his report on the section meeting at the general meeting of the congress 
on 7 July. XXVIII s "ezd Kommunisticheskoi Partii Sovetskogo Soyuza, Vol. 1, p. 566. 
183 Pravda, 15 June 1990, p. 3 (Programmatic Declaration); Pravda, 18 July 1990, p. 1 (article 
16). 
184 This issue was also related to the party organisations in the militmy. This will be discussed 
in Chapter 6. 
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organisations or 'departyisation' began in universities. 185 To investigate this is beyond the task 
of this chapter. The' departyisation' of the state organs was shown in a memorandum written by 
N. S. Stolyarov, chairman of the CCC CP RSFSR, 'on the attempt of departyisation of 
administrative organs of RSFSR' (6 May 1991) to Ivashko. This memorandum is worth citing 
regardless of its length: 
'1. Recently in ministries and branches in RSFSR, the policy to departyisation of the 
administrative apparat and the factual displacement of party organisations beyond a 
limit is actively calTied out. In many cases this is assisted by an uncertain or 
ambivalent position of top leaders. However, the main course is in systematic pressure 
on party organisations on the part of the cOlTesponding republican power structure, 
which is energetically exploiting this departyisation for the achievement of its political 
aim and full neutralisation of the CPSU .... 
2. Taking into account the situation forming around the party organisations in a series 
of republican ministries and branches, it is considered expedient (a) to carry out an 
exchange of opinions on this problem in the CC CPSU with the participation of 
secretaries of party committees, first secretaries of raikoms of Moscow city and 
Moscow gorkom, and leaders of the CC Organisational department, the CC CP RSFSR, 
and the CCC CP RSFSR; (b) to foresee reserve variants of organisational formation of 
party organisations of republic administrative apparat, taking into account the new 
reality.' 186 
As suggested by the memorandum, the Organisational department made a further 
report on this problem dated 30 May and Ivashko agreed it on 7 June. It showed a rather serious 
185 See, for example, TsKhSD f. 89, p. 20, d. 51; p. 8, d. 65. 
186 TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 11, d. 91, p. 5. 
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situation. In the Office of Public Prosecutor of RSFSR, the formation of the apparat was carried 
out without the participation of communists, and displacement of patty committees from the 
workplace was realised. Minister of Health Care, V. 1. Kalinin, displaced the patty bureau and 
the deputy minister called for departyisation of the ministry. In the RSFSR Ministry of 
Communication, Info1TI1ation, and Space, the party committee was also liquidated. The party 
organisation in RSFSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs was split from the party organisation of the 
RSFSR Council of Ministers in October 1990, but up to that time it did not register itself under 
the CP RSFSR. During 1991 (up to May 1991) 305 party members in ministries and state 
committees and branches left the CPSU and only 33 joined. The report made clear the 
continuing difficulties. For example, it mentioned the lack of a party Programme, the 
ideological foundations of its activity, full-time party workers' uncertain feeling about the future, 
and social defencelessness because of the party apparat reduction. The combination of elected 
posts with economic [or managerial] work, constant structural change, cadres' 'starving' among 
secretaries of workshop party organisations, according to this report, all negatively influenced 
the party's activity. [In Moscow] uncertainty was expressed in connection with the weakening of 
the influence of central party organs, gorkom and raikoms on the activity of party committees 
and party bureaux. 187 As shown in these memoranda, the party organisations were 
disintegrating themselves well before the attempted coup. 
A further attack on the patty was made by Russian President Yeltsin. A Presidential 
decree 'On suspending the activity of organisational structures of political parties and mass 
social movements in state organs and establishments of RSFSR' (20 July 1991) was to prohibit 
the party organisations in state organs within the territory of Russia. 1S8 This would certainly 
accelerate the party disintegration. The party complained of its illegality. Patty newspapers 
published a series of articles arguing that the decree was not legal. The USSR Supreme Soviet 
187 Ibid., pp. 1-4. 
188 Izvestiya, 22 July 1990, p. 1. 
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led by Luk'yanov asked the USSR Committee for Constitutional Compliance to examine the 
legality of the decree. 189 Still there was nothing more than that. No huge protest demonstration 
for the party, and no severe battles in the party organs of state bodies took place. The party's 
control over the state had finished defacto before Yeltsin's decree. 
VI. Conclusion 
The fact that the party lost most of its ties with the state under Gorbachev's refonn is 
not news at all. The aspect that has been little discussed by many researchers is that the 
implementation of refonn of party-state relations led to a 'power vacuum'. It seems that the 
party's rather strong supremacy over the state is clear here, because if the state had been more 
independent of the party than usually thought, the 'power vacuum' would not have been created. 
Therefore, the hypothesis of anti-reform coalition (see section II) is not be supported by the 
circumstantial evidence reviewed in this chapter. In addition, though the hypothesis of the 
leadership struggle has some evidence in the first reorganisation, this cannot explain the second 
reorganisation at all. Thus, it seems that two hypotheses, to prevent podmena or substitution and 
to streamline the party's function for improving centre-regional relationship and its 'political' 
activity, are accurate. In the Soviet Union, the party (and its apparat) was the core of power or 
power itself. 
Under such a political regime, attempts to transform the party were extremely difficult. 
The new Presidency that was for filling up the 'power vacuum' did not work well. Given such a 
situation, Gorbachev failed to change the party's function to a 'political party'. It could not 
surrender its ties with security organs, at least partially because to do so was too risky in a 
'power vacuum'. While, on the one hand, the party lost its traditional administrative functions, it 
189 For details see Elizabeth Teague and Julia Wishnevsky, 'El'tsin Bans Organized Political 
Activity in State Sector', RL/ Report on the USSR, 3-33 (August 16, 1991). 
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failed to find new functions. In the end, the party lost its raison d 'etre. 
In this chapter we mainly considered the process whereby the party lost the traditional 
administrative functions. The failure to transform the party into a 'political party' will be 
considered more deeply in relations with party elections in the next chapter. What, then, 
remained with the party? They were huge propelty asset and ties with the security organs. We 

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 3-1: The Prospective Number ofthe CC Departments' Staff! 
Department Responsible Workers Support Staff Total 
Ideological Depatiment 141 4 145 
Social-economic Department 128 29 157 
Agrarian Department 85 3 88 
State-Law Department 65 13 78 
International Department 203 6 209 
Defence Department 54 8 62 
Total 676 63 739 
Source: TsKhSD, Fond 89, Perechen' 4, Delo 9, pp. 3-20. 
1 The design of the table is suggested by Gordon Hahn's study. See Gordon Hahn, 'The First 
Reorganisation of the CPSU: Central Committee Apparat under Perestroika', Europe-Asia Studies, 
Vol. 49, No.2 (1997), p. 285. However, the way to count the staff number is different from him. See 
Table 2 on the reasons of diflerence. 
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Table 3-2: The First Reorganisation of the CC Apparat in 19891 
Table 3-2-1. The CC Ideological Department 
Head of department: S. Kapto 
First deputy head: A. Ya. Degtyarev 
Structure 
1. Sub-depmiment of basic scientific research: Head of sub-depmiment -deputy head of depmiment 
5 sectors2 
2. Sub-department of party propaganda: Head of sub-department -deputy head of department 
2 groups and 2 sectors 
3. Sub-department of means of mass information: Head of sub-department -deputy head of 
department 
4 sectors 
4. Sub-department of foreign political information and international connection: Head of 
sub-department -deputy head of department 
4 sectors 
5. Sub-department of problems of youth teaching and education: Head of sub-department -deputy 
head of department 
3 sectors 
6. Sub-department of culture and art: Head of sub-department -deputy head of department 
4 sectors 
7. Group of consultants: Leader of consultants 
8. Secretariat 
Staffs=145 (141 responsible workers, 4 support staff3) 
Responsible Workers 
Head of department 
First deputy head of department 
Deputy heads of department -heads of sub-departments 6 
Leader of consultant group 1 
Heads of sectors 22 
Deputy heads of sectors 4 
Leaders of responsible organisers group 
Leaders of lecturer group 1 
Consultants 10 




Head of secretariat 
Helper of head of department 
Deputy heads of secretariat 2 
Source: TsKhSD Fond 89, Perechen' 4, Delo 9, pp. 3-5; David Wells and John Miller, 'A Directory of 
Heads and Deputy Heads ofCPSU Central Committee Departments 1952-1991', Lortol1 Paper 8 (1993), 
p. 16, on Head and First deputy Head. 
I Regarding this first reorganisation of the CC apparat, the first detailed analysis, which utilises patiy archive, is 
advanced by Gordon Hahn. See Gordon Hahn, 'The First Reorganisation of the CPSU: Central Committee Apparat 
under Perestroika', Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 49, No.2 (1997). However, many technical mistakes are found, which 
are indicated in the later notes. One general point is suggested here. Though Hahn does not count 'helper of head of 
department' as support staff, it seems appropriate that this is included in the categOlY of suppOli staff, because 
'helper' belonged to Secretariat in most CC Departments except for the Defence department. 
2 Hahn does not mention 'Sector of party scientific and educational institution'. See Hahn, 'The First Reorganisation', 
p.292. 
3 Hahn miscalculates support staff as '2'. However, they should be 4 (one head of secretariat, two deputy heads of 
secretariat and one helper of head of depatiment). See Hahn, 'The First Reorganisation', p. 285. 
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Table 3-2-2. The CC Social and Economic Department 
Head of department: V. I. Shimko 
First deputy head: V. P. Moznin, N. A. Stashenkov 
Structure 
1. Sub-department of Social Policy 
4 sectors 
Staff=33 
2. SUb-department of Economic Policy 
5 sectors 
Staff=38 
3. Sub-department of Foreign Economy 
2 sectors 
Staff=15 
4. Sub-department of Science-Technology Policy 
4 sectors 
Staff=30 
5. Consultant Group 
Staff=l1 
Staffs=157 (128 responsible workers, 29 support staffl) 
Responsible workers 
Head of department 
First deputy heads Ihead of sub-department 2 
Deputy heads of department Ihead of sub-department 2 
Deputy head of department Ileader of consultant group I 
Deputy heads of subdepartment 4 




Head of secretariat 
Deputy head of secretariat 
Helper of head of department 
Support staff 26 
Source: TsKhSD Fond 89, Perechen' 4, Delo 9, pp. 6-8; David Wells and John Miller, 'A DirectOlY of 
Heads and Deputy Heads ofCPSU Central Committee Departments 1952-1991', Lorton Paper 8 (1993), 
p. 28, on Head and First deputy Head. 
1 Hahn fails to count 'helper of head of depatiment' which is included in support staff here. See Hahn 'The First 
Reorganisation', p. 285, p. 288. 
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Table 3-2-3. The CC Agrarian Department 
Head of Department: 1. 1. Skiba 




Staffs=88 (85 responsible workers, 3 support staff) 
Responsible workers 
Head of department 
First deputy head 
Deputy heads 4 





Head of secretariat 
Deputy 1 
Helper of head of department 
Source: TsKhSD Fond 89, Perechen' 4, Delo 9, pp. 9-ll; David Wells and John Miller, 'A Directory of 
Heads and Deputy Heads of CPSU Central Committee Depariments 1952-1991', Lorton Paper 8 (1993), 
p. 8, on Head and First deputy Head. 
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Table 3-2-4. The CC State and Law Department 
Head of Department: A. S. Pavlov 
First deputy head: 1. A. Larin, V. E. Sidrov 
Structure 
1. SUb-department on control for decisions taken on the countlY's armed forces 
2 sectors 
2. Sub-department of legal problems 
2 sectors 
3. Sub-department of inter-ethnic relation 
2 sectors 
4. Sector on problems of state security 
5. Group of consultants on problems of perfection of legislation 
6. Helper of head of department 
7. Secretariat 
Staffs=78 (65 responsible workers, 13 support staff) 
Responsible workers 
Head of department 
First deputy heads of department Ihead of sub-department 2 
Deputy head of department Ihead of sub-department 1 
Leader of group of consultants 1 
Deputy heads of sub-department 3 
Heads of sectors 7 




Helper of head of department 
Head of secretariat 1 
Workers of secretariat 11 
Source: TsKhSD Fond 89, Perechen' 4, Delo 9, pp. 12-13; David Wells and John Miller, 'A Directory of 
Heads and Deputy Heads ofCPSU Central Committee Departments 1952-1991', Lorton Paper 8 (1993), 
p. 28, on Head and First deputy Head. 
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Table 3-2-5. The CC International Department 
Head of department: V. M. Falin 
First deputy head K. N. Bmtents, R. P. Fedrov 
Structure 
1. Consultant group 
26 members 
2. Sub-department (Napravlenie) of New Political Thinking in Intel11ational Relations 
3 groups and 18 members 
3. Sub-department of Fundamental Problem of World Economic Relations 
2 groups and 11 members 
4. Sub-department ofIntel11ational Party and Social Organisations and Movements 
4 groups and 1 sector, and 25 members l 
5. Sub-department of Socialist country of Europe and Connections with Communist and Workers' Patiies of 
These Countries 
19 members 
6. Sub-department of Socialist countries of Asia and Cuba and Connections with Communist and Workers' 
Parties of These Counties 
21 members 
7. Sub-department of Connections with Paliies and Other Social Forces of Developing Capitalist Countries 
21 members 
8. Sub-department of Connections with Parties and Other Social Forces of Developing Countries 
30 members 
9. Sub-Department (Podtdel) on Work with Foreign Cadres and Party Organisations Abroad 
24 members 




Staffs=209 (203 responsible workers and 6 support staffi 
Responsible workers 
Head of department 
First deputy heads of department 2 
Deputy head of department 7 
Leader of consultant group 1 
Head of sub-department 
Deputy head of sub-department 
Deputy leaders of consultant group 2 
Leaders of group 23 
Heads of sector 3 
Deputy leaders of group 23 
Deputy heads of sector 3 
Instmctors 15 
Senior consultants 5 
Consultants 24 
Senior readers 87 
"Parttekhnik" 5 
Support Staff 
Head of secretariat 
Deputy heads of secretariat 3 
Helper of head of department 
Leader of code-group (Rukovoditel' shifrogmppy) 
Source: TsKhSD Fond 89, Perechen' 4, Delo 9, pp. 14-17; David Wells and John Miller, 'A Directory of Heads 
and Deputy Heads ofCPSU Central Committee Departments 1952-1991', Lorton Paper 8 (1993), pp. 17-18, on 
Head and First deputy Head. 
1 Hahn miscalculates as 24 members. See Hahn, 'The First Reorganisation', p. 293. 
2 Hahn miscalculates as 200 responsible workers because he fails to include two first deputy heads and miscalculates 
member mentioned in the above note. See Hahn, 'The First Reorganisation', p. 293. 
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Table 3-2-6. The CC Defence Department 
Head of DepaJiment: O. S. Belyakov 
First Deputy Head: N. M. Luzhin 
Structure 
1. Sub-department of All-embracing problem 
2. Sub-department of Special System 
3. Sub-department of InfOllllation 
4. Sectors of Economic analysis 
5. Group of Consultants for Negotiation on Arms Reduction 
6. Secretariat 
Staffs=62 (54 responsible workers, 8 suppOli staff) 
Responsible workers 
Head of department 
Helper of head of department 
First Deputy Head of department IHead of sub-department 
Deputy heads of Department !Heads of sub-departments 2 
Leader of Groups of Consultants 1 
Deputy heads of sub-department 3 
Head sector 1 




Instmctors on accounting 2 
Helpers of head of secretariat 2 
Secretary of head of department 
Secretaries of deputy head of department 2 
Messenger 1 
Source: TsKhSD Fond 89, Perechen' 4, Delo 9, pp. 18-20; David Wells and John Miller, 'A Directory of 
Heads and Deputy Heads ofCPSU Central Committee Departments 1952-1991', Lortoll Paper 8 (1993), 
p. 12, on Head and First deputy Head. 
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Table 3-3 Posts and Salary of the Party Apparat 
Table 3-3-1. Central Committee of the CPSU level 
N arne of the posts Salary (rouble)* 
Administrator of affairs 1000 
Head of departments 1000 
First deputy head (in the department led by CC secretaries) 825 
First deputy head of Administration of affairs, deputy chairman 775-800 
of the Party Control Committee (PCC) 
Deputy head of departments, deputy administrator of affairs, 750-775 
members of the PCC 
Helper (Pomoshchnik) of CC general secretary 875 
Helper of CC secretary 750-800 
Reader (referent) of CC general secretaty 650-700 
Reader of secretaty of CC secretaty 600-650 
Head of sub-department (podotdeT), leader of consultant group 700-775 
Heads of depatiments of Administration of Affairs 650-725 
Depub' Head of sub-dep_atiment 625-715 
Head of book-keeper (bukhgalter) of Administration of Affairs 650-700 
Head of sector, leader of group on direction, lectures' and 625-700 
responsible organisers 
Deputy head of depatiments of Administrations of Affairs, 600-690 
deputy leader of group of consultants 
Senior consultant 575-670 
Consultant, res£onsible olEaniser 550-650 
Helper of deputy chairman of the PCC, deputy of leader of 600-6507 
lecturers' group, helper of heads of departments, deputy head 
of book-keeper 
Head of "secretariat" 600-7007 
Deputy head of sector, deputy leader of group on direction, 575-6?? 
responsible inspector (kontroler), leader of code-group 
(shifi'ogruppa) of international department 
Deputy head of 'secretariat' 550-677 
Head of sector of production depatiment of party publisher of 560-677 
Administration of Affairs 
Instructor, lecturer, senior reader, head of sector of managing 475-677 
department 
'Secretary' of CC general secretary 500-777 
• 'Secretary' of CC Secretary 500-7?? 
Head of archival preservation (arkhivokhranilishche) 350-??7 
! Reader (General depatiment, department of party construction 315-777 
of cadre work) 
Head of typing sector (mashbyuro) 315-777 
Senior 'secretary' of General department 250-??7 
Source: TsKhSD, Fond 89, Perechen' 9, Delo 13, pp. 22-23. *The salaries from 'helper of deputy 
chairman of the PCC' are not complete in the source, which is indicated as '?' in this table. 
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• 
T c .--~ - - --. - - -- --- - --------- - - -- --- - ---- - --- - -- ---- ---------
Name ofthe Posts Salary (roubles) 
CC PC of CCs CPs of CCs CPs of 
Ukraine Belorussia, other union 
Kazakhstan and republics 
Uzbekistan 
First secretmy 1100 950 900 
Second secretary 950 850 800 
Secretary 870 770 730 
Helper of first secretary 570-620 520-570 480-530 
Helper of secretary 500-550 450-500 430-480 
Instructor 570-620 520-570 480-530 
Head of depmiment, Administration of 650-700 600-650 550-600 I 
Affairs, chairman of commission of party 
control 
First deputy head of department 600-650 550-600 510-560 
Head of sector, leader of lecturers' group, 500-550 450-550 430-480 
I member of commission of party control, 
head of book-keeper 
Responsible organiser 480-530 430-480 400-450 
Consultant of department, deputy head of 430-480 400-450 400-450 
book-keeper 
Instructor, lecturer 400-450 380-430 350-400 
Source: TsKhSD, Fond 89, Perechen' 9, Delo 13, p. 21. 
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Table 3-3-3: Obkorn level 
N arne of the post Salary (roubles) 
Moscow Moscow Out of I group II group III 
gorkorn, obkom, group group 
Leningrad Leningrad 
obkom gorkom 
First secretar~ 950 900 850 800 750 700 
Second secretary 850 800 750 700 650 630 
Secretary 770 730 700 650 600 580 
Helper of first secretary 500-550 480-530 
Helper of secretary 430-480 430-480 480-530 450-500 430-480 420-470 
Inspector 500-550 480-530 480-530 450-500 430-480 420-470 
Head of department, 580-630 550-600 550-600 530-580 500-550 480-530 
administrator of affairs, and 
chairman of commission of 
party control 
First deputy head of 530-580 510-560 5lO-560 490-540 470-520 450-500 
department 
Deputy head of department 500-550 480-530 480-530 450-500 430-480 420-470 
Head of sector. Leader of 430-480 430-480 430-480 400-450 380-430 370-420 
lecturers' group, member of 
the commission of party 
control, (head of 
book-keeper) 
Responsible orgamser, 400-450 400-450 380-430 380-430 350-400 350-400 
consultant of department, 
(deputy head of 
book-keeper) 
Instructor, lecturer 350-400 350-400 350-400 350-400 330-380 330-380 
Source: TsKhSD, Fond 89, Perechen' 9, Delo 13, pp. 19-20. 
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Table 3-3-4: Raik k 1* 
N arne of the post Salary (roubles) 
First secretary 500-550 
Second secretary 450-500 
Secretmy 420-460 
Head of department, chainnan of party commission 360-400 
Deputy head of department 330-360 
Deputy head of department---head of sector (office of political 330-360 
education), head of office work sector 
Instructor, lecturer, consultant 280-330 
Source: TsKhSD, Fond 89, Perechen' 9, Delo 13, p. 14. *From this to lower level, the structure of 
the party apparat significantly varied by regions (e.g. by the size of city, industrial or rural area, and 
so forth). Therefore, this table shows the simplest one of a rural raikom. 
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ie, 
Table 3-3-5: P . P o 1* 
Name of the post Salary (roubles) 
Secretary of pmiy committee (party buro) of productive 85% of basic salary of main 
(scientific-productive) association, enterprise (industrial complex, director (chief, manager) 
management) 
Deputy secretary of pmiy committee (party buro) 85% of basic salary of 
secretary I 
Secretary of party committee (party buro) of shop party 85% of basic salary of chief of I 
organisation the shop i 
Deputy secretary of party committee (party buro) of shop party 85% of basic salary of 
organisation secretmy 
Other full time workers of PPOs 
In party committees with rights of raikom 
Chairman of party commission -up to 75% of office salmy of 280-300 
secretmy of party committee, but not more than 
Head of office of political education -up to 70% of office salary of 250-270 
secretmy of party committee, but not more than 
Head of sector of party account, instructor -up to 65% of office 240-260 
salary of secretmy of party committee, but not more than 
In party committees (party buro) of party organisations not having 
the rights of raikom of the party 
Head of office political education -up to 70% of office salmy of 230-250 
secretmy of party committee (party buro), but not more than 
Instructor of party committee -up to 65% of office salmy of 210-230 
secretary of pmiy committee, but not more than 
Source: TsKhSD, Fond 89, Perechen' 9, Delo 13, pp. 9-10. *At the PPO level, the structure is varied 
significantly by the type of organisation (e.g. in an enterprise, railways, a rural place, a scientific 
establishment and so f01ih). This table shows the example of the PPO apparat of enterprises 
(association), construction and planning organisations of industty, building, transport, connection 
and other production branches of people's economy. 
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Table 3-4: Examination, by the CC Secretariat, of the Basic Issues Submitted by the CC 
Departments 
The CC Departments 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 (20 
June) 
Party Construction and 24 56 10 12 12 
Cadre Work 
Ideology 20 73 17 9 7 
Social and Economic 26 60 12 10 2 
Agrarian 18 23 5 1 -
International 3 36 4 4 4 
State and Law 7 18 5 13 5 
Defence 2 4 2 1 1 
Ethnic Relation - - - - 2 
General 6 1 3 2 2 
Administration of Affairs 2 3 - 2 1 
Total 108 274 58 54 36 














Table 3-5: S Data of the CC C (J , 1989-J 1990) , 
Name ofthe CC Commission Number of Number of Examined 
people of the meetings questions 
Commission 
On questions of the party construction 24 4 11 
and cadre policy 
Ideology 25 5 8 
On questions of social and economic 21 5 9 
policy 
On question of agrarian policy 23 6 17 
On questions of international policy 23 4 14 
On questions of lawful policy 20 4 10 
Source: Izvestiya TsK KPSS, 1990, No.9, p. 24. 
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Table 3-6: the Memb fthe Politb 
- --




M. Gorbachev General Secretary of the CPSU, USSR President 
V. Ivashko Deputy General Secretary of the CPSU 
M. Burokyavichus First Secretary of CP Lithuania 
A. Dzasokhov CC Secretaty for Ideology 
1. Frolov Chief Editor of Pravda 
G. Gumbaridze First Secretary of CP Georgia 
S. Gurenko First Secretary of CP Ukraine 
1. Karimov First Secretary of CP Uzbekistan 
P. Luchinskii First Secretary of CP Moldova 
A. Masaliev First Secretary of CP Kirgizia 
K. Makhkamov First Secretary of CP Tajikistan 
V. Movsisyan First Secretary of CP Armenia 
A. Mutalibov First Secretary of CP Azerbaijan 
N. Nazarbaev First Secretaty of Kazakhstan 
S. Niyazov First Secretary of Turkmenistan 
1. Polozkov First Secretary of CP RSFSR 
Yu. Prokofev First Secretary of Moscow gorkom 
A. Rubiks First Secretary of CP Litvia 
G. Semenova CC Secretary for Women Affairs 
O. Shenin CC Secretary for Ol"ganisational Matter 
E. Silliari First Secretaty of CP Estonia 
E. Sokolov First Secretaty of CP Belorussia 
E. Stroev CC Secretary for Agriculture 
G. Yanaev CC Secretary for International Affairs 
Source: Izvestiya TsK KPSS, 1990, No.8, pp. 7-50. 
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Table 3-7: Activitv of the CC C October 90-J 91 
The CC Commissions Number of Meetings 
Ideological 2 (14 Nov 90/12 Apr 91) 
Social and Political 4 (25 Oct 90/ 30 Jan! 19 Apr/ 30 May 91) 
on Ethnic Policy 3 (21 Nov 90/1 Feb/ 23 Apr 91) 
Social and Economic 2 (4 Dec 90/ 17 May 91) 
on Agrarian Policy 4 (8 Dec 90/27 Mar/ 16 May/ 5 June 91) 
on Problems of International Policy 3 (26 Nov 90/ 1 Feb/ 26 Apr 91) 
on Renewal of the Activity of Primary Party 4 (26 Oct/ 8 Dec 90/ 25 Mar/ 21 June 91) 
Organisations 
on Questions of Women and Family Issues 3 (10 Oct 90/ 30 Jan/ 23 Apr 91) 
on Science, Education and Culture 3 (26 Oct 90/ 9 Feb/ 20 May 91) 
on Military Policy 4 (29-30 Oct/ 8 Dec 90/ 1 Feb/ 26 Apr 91) 
on Questions of Youth Policy 3 (14 Nov 90/ 2 Feb/ 23 Apr 91) 
on Questions of Financial and Economic Activity 2 (17 Jan! 8 Apr 91) 
of the Party 
Source: Izvestiya TsK KPSS, 1990 No. 11, pp. 9-10; 1990, No. 12, p. 8; 1991, No.1, pp. 9-10; 
1991, No.2, pp. 11-12; 1991, No.4, p. 7; 1991, No.5, pp. 10-11; 1991, No.6, pp. 11-12; 1991, 






Chapter 4 Failure of Making a 'Political Party': Party Elections and 
Party Unity 
I. Introduction 
As we have seen in Chapter 2, the hidden power diversity was widening before 
perestroika. In order to manage this problem, Gorbachev tried to streamline the party's 
functions, and the party lost its traditional administrative functions, as we have seen in Chapter 
3. The subject of this chapter is to investigate how the party leadership succeeded or failed to 
find a new function of the party, that is, to make the communist party a 'political party'. 
One ofthe most crucial attempts for making a 'political party' was to 'democratise' the 
party. A 'monolithic unity' has been regarded as a prominent feature of the communist party. It 
is well known that the party maintained its unity by various methods. Particularly its personnel 
or nomenklatura system has been considered the central mechanism. Still, these methods did not 
necessarily fit its theoretically democratic principles. What happened if there were attempts to 
change this practice so as to fit the principle of intra-party democracy? Let us consider four 
issues related to this: competitive elections of party secretaries, the election of delegates to the 
19th Party Conference in 1988, and to the 28th Party Congress in 1990, the emergence of 
platforms, and controversy around the 28th Party Congress and after. The problem here is the 
extent to which the controlling mechanisms disintegrated. 
II. Mechanisms to Maintain Party Unity 
Before discussing party reform, briefly considering the main methods for controlling 
the patty hierarchy is appropriate. These were the nomenklatura system, the ban on fractions, 
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and democratic centralism. 
1. Intra-Party Nomenklatura 
The intra-party nomenklatura system meant that higher pmiy organs had personnel 
appointing rights to lower organs. For example, the all-union Central Committee approved a 
personnel list of republican and regional first secretaries, a republican central committee control 
its regional secretaries, and so forth. 
What then was the problem of the system? Most organisations in the world have such 
an appointing system. In a private company in the capitalist world, personnel appointing is 
usually decided from above. The self-management of a factory is hardly successful in any 
modern society. Nonetheless, this practice of the party did not fit its principle. In theOlY, 
personnel appointing was supposed to be decided by election from below. Elections had actually 
taken place in the party for many years before perestroika. However, only one candidate for one 
post was fixed before the election from above by nomenklatura lists. Therefore, the elections 
had not been competitive and electorates unanimously approved the nominated candidates. To 
investigate what happened when these elections became competitive is the research subject of 
this chapter. 
2. Ban on Fractions 
The second mechanism for sustaining party unity was a ban of fractionalism. 1 Since 
the 10th Party Congress in 1921, the party had prohibited fractional activity. Though there is no 
agreement on this measure's interpretation (that is, some argue it was intended as a temporary 
measure, while others consider that it was to be a permanent feature), it seems sufficient here to 
confirm that the ban on fractions worked for controlling the party hierarchy. The reason why 
1 The author uses the word 'fi'action' rather than 'faction' as a translation of 'Faktsiya' along 
with Sartori's terminology. See Giovanni Sartori, Parties and Party Systems: A Frameworkfor 
Analysis (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1976), pp. 72-75. 
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this could be a useful measure is self-evident. Party members could not, at least publicly, 
organise their opinions independent of the leader, because fractions were prohibited. This does 
not mean there was no division within the pmiy through party histOly. Stalin's power struggle, 
the struggle after Stalin's death, a change from collective leadership to individual rule under 
Brezhnev and so forth all suggest cleavages within the leadership. In addition, divisions 
between the centre and regional organisations frequently caused a serious problem as discussed 
in Chapter 2. However, the point is that even opponents within the leadership or lower 
organisations could not organise themselves. The appearance of monolithic unity was 
accordingly maintained. 
3. Democratic Centralism 
The other mechanism for controlling the party hierarchy was democratic centralism. 
Usually this has been regarded as a way of decision making, by which party members can 
discuss freely before the approval of a decision, while, after the approval, the member must 
implement the decision unconditionally. Obviously, this concept was ambiguous. On the one 
hand, it was used for creating the democratic fa9ade of the party. On the other hand, it was 
regarded to mean that lower party organisations had to obey decisions from above. Though this 
ambiguity became a problem during the perestroika period, we confirm for a moment that this 
principle was one of mechanisms for controlling the party hierarchy. Because before the 
perestroika period, decisions had been made without a truly free discussion, had come only 
from above, and their implementation had been compulsOlY. 
III. Reasons for the Competitive Election of Party Secretaries 
As easily understood, the nomenklatura system within the party would not be 
necessmy ifparty secretaries were elected by competitive and secret elections from below. Thus, 
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party unity would possibly be destroyed. 
Why was competitive party election necessary at all? If the power of General 
Secretary depended on his control over personnel by the nomenklatura system, it would have 
been irrational for him to destroy its own power base. Some reasons should be indicated. The 
first reason concerns centre-regional relations. Gill and Pitty argue that the introduction of 
multi-candidate secret ballot elections was intended to combat 'localism', that is, local cliques 
who had prevented the smooth implementation of central policies.2 They use Mann's concept of 
weak infrastructural power to describe this situation. 3 This concept, infra structural power, 
denotes the power to implement policy. While the party-state was strong enough to make 
decisions independently of social organisations (strong despotic power), the Soviet Union was a 
weak state in terms of infrastructural power, that is, it could not implement decisions. 4 As 
discussed in Chapter 2, one of the party's most serious problems was that its activity expanded 
so much that the central organisation could not take account regional and local situations. It 
appeared to the centre that lower organisations distorted sound central policies by forming 
regional and local cliques. Therefore, party elections were, it seems, aimed at destroying these 
cliques from below. 
2 Graeme Gill and Roderic Pitty, Pmver in the Party: The Organization of Power and 
Central-Republican Relations in the CPSU (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997), pp. 131-133. 
They use the word 'local' as a general term to denote the lower levels. Thus, their usage is 
different from the way the author used in Chapter 2, in which the 'local' level denoted raion and 
city level. 
3 Michel Mann, 'The Autonomous Power of the State: Its Origins, Mechanism and Results', in 
John Hall ed., States in History (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986). 
4 Gill and Pitty, Power in the Party. See also Don Von Atta, 'The USSR as A "Weak State": 
Agrarian Origins of Resistance to Perestroika', World Politics, Vol. 42, No. 1 (October 1989). 
These concepts, dictatorial power and infrastructural power, are similar to Skocpol's state 
'autonomy' and 'capacity'. See Theda Skocpol, 'Bringing the State Back In: Strategies of 
Analysis in Current Research', in Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueshemeyer and Theda Skocpol 
eds., Bringing the State Back in (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985). McFaul uses 
Skocpol's concepts to analyse post-Soviet Russia. See Michael McFaul, 'State Power, 
Institutional Change, and the Politics of Privatization in Russia', World Politics, Vol. 47, No.2 
(January 1995). Since Skocpol's terminology seems more neutral, her ones might be better for 
objective analytic purposes. 
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Secondly, related with the first reason, Gorbachev may have intended to destroy 
established career patterns by competitive party elections. As discussed in Chapter 2, career 
patterns in the party under Brezhnev showed the rise of khozyaistvenniki. When Gorbachev tried 
to prevent the paliy from intervening in economic management and to improve the party's 
political activity like propaganda, un-ideological or pragmatic, khozyaistvenniki were not 
appropriate. It may have been assumed that competitive elections would improve the party's 
political activity through their campaign. For Gorbachev, competitive party elections could be a 
tool to change career patterns. In fact, criticism of technocratic cadres became quite common 
during the perestroika period, as we will see. 
While admitting these arguments are persuasive and logically connected with the 
argument of previous chapters, it may be better to add the leadership's belief as the third reason: 
'the more elections, the more democratic, the better performance.,5 It seems there was a strong 
conviction at that time that democracy, if it is authentic, could resolve any problem. The author 
cannot deny that this policy included something beyond a pure calculation. 
Fourthly, the experience of other communist countries, especially Poland and Hungaty, 
would influence the Soviet leadership idea. 6 It seems that the early stage of perestroika 
followed these two countries' experience of political (Poland) and economic (Hungary) refol1n. 
The election of party secretaries had been conducted in Poland inside the deepening crisis of 
1981. The Soviet leadership might intend to forestall the difficulty which the party would face 
by democratising the party. 
These four reasons, it seems, are the case to some extent and it would be impossible to 
identify a single hue explanation. In any case, the results of competitive party election were far 
5 Such a convlctlOn is indicated by Deno. See Toshihiko Deno, 'Roshia no Senkyo 
Minshushugi: Peresutoroikaki niokeru Kyososenkyo no Donyu [Electoral Democracy in Russia: 
Competitive Elections during the Perestroika Period], in Shugo Minagawa ed. Ikoki no Roshia 
Seiji [Russian Politics in Transition] (Hiroshima: Keisuisha, 1999), p. 339. 
6 Werner Hahn, 'Electoral Choice in the Soviet Bloc', Problems o/Communism, Vol. 36, No.2 
(March-April 1987). 
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from the ones desired by the leadership. 
N. Competitive Election of Party Secretaries before the 19th Party Conference 
1. Decisions on the Competitive Party Election 
The first address about party election by Gorbachev was made at the Central 
Committee plenum in January 1987, in which he stated, 'It is necessary to think of a change in 
the procedure of elections of secretaries of raikoms, okrugkoms, gorkoms, obkoms, kraikoms, 
the republican CCs .... With this [change], members of party committees would have the right 
to bring any number of candidates to the electoral list. ,7 However, it is reasonable to think that 
he could not obtain sufficient support on this point because the decision of the plenum, 'On 
Perestroika and the Cadre Policy of the Party,' mentioned only on the further democratisation of 
the party but not competitive elections.8 
2. Early Attempts at Competitive Party Elections 
Nonetheless, some competitive party elections took place in lower party organs with a 
detailed documentation in party press.9 For example, the first secretary of the Izhmorskii raion 
of Kemerovo oblast' in the Russian republic was elected from two candidates in February 1987. 
This election took place under the supervision of obkom first secretary N. Ermakov. The 
candidates were Ivan Malkov, chairman of the raiispolkom, and Gennadii Sedykh, director of a 
sovkhoz 'Izhmorskii'. At the raikom's plenum, both candidates expressed their opinions and 
participants also made comments on each candidate. After such a discussion, Malkov was 
7 Materialy Plenuma Tsentral'nogo KomUeta KPSS, 27-28 yanvaJya 1987g. (Moskva: 
Politizdat, 1987), p. 31. 
8 Ibid., pp. 74-91. The further party democratisation specifically is discussed on p. 79. 
9 A detailed study on the early attempt of a competitive party election is Toshihiko Ueno, 
'Gorubachofu Seikenka niokeru Sorenpokyosantono Henka [Changes of the CPSU under 
Gorbachev]" Hogakukenkyu, Vol. 63, No.2 (February 1990), pp. 148-157. 
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elected first secretary by secret ballot. lo Because, as we have seen, it was common that the 
chairman of the ispolkom was promoted to the first secretmyship at raion level, this was not a 
surprising result. Rather it seems that this aim was for appealing for support for Gorbachev's 
policy. 
In Ukraine, Oratov raikom in Vinnitsa oblast' had a competitive election for first 
secretalY, which was reported in Februmy 1987. Though the raikom was about to elect A. N. 
Dvorets, chairman of the raiispolkom, as first secretary in the traditional way, that is, single 
candidate way, Vinnitsa obkom interfered in this personnel matter, and determined that the 
raikom was to have a competitive election. 1. P. Dem'yanchuk, chairman of a RAPO (raion 
agricultural-production combine) council, became another candidate. In terms of experience of 
party work and knowledge of the raion, Dvorets had more obvious claims and was expected to 
win. However, the result of the secret ballot was unexpectedly for Dem'yanchuk. The report 
attributed the result to new leader's eagemess to seek a new decision, latest science and 
technology in agricultural work, and his strong leadership. I I 
The other case, in which two candidates were advanced for the first secretmyship, took 
place in the Sovetskii raikom of Khanty-Mansii autonomous okrug in Tyumen' oblast', which 
was repOlied in March 1987. Though at the beginning the proposal to conduct a competitive 
election was not welcomed, it was finally accepted. The post was contested for by Gennadii 
Borin, chairman of the raiispolkom, and Gennadii Zelentsov, raikom second secretary. As in 
other competitive elections, members of the raikom plenum discussed whether or not each 
candidate was appropriate as first secretary before the election at the plenum. Though the 
participants' comments included a personal character of candidates (e.g. alTogance), the critical 
point was which they should vote for: on the one hand, an economic manager or, on the other, 
an ideological-theoretical leader, as showed in participants' statements that 'we are to elect not 
10 Pravda, 10 February 1987, p. 2; Sovetskaya Rossiya, 10 February 1987, p. 2. 
II Pravda Ulo'ainy, 26 February 1987, p. 3 
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an economic leader, but the party's'; 'As an economic manger (khozyaistvennik) he [Borin] is 
not bad, but as the post of first secretaty he cannot [be good].' After such a discussion, the 
candidates spoke of their own ideas. Then, voting took place. Zelentsov, the second secretary, 
was elected first secretaty.I2 This result was not the same as established career patterns, 
according to which the chairman of the raiispolkom progressed to raikom first secretary. That 
the central press reported and recommended such a process may have showed the leadership 
intention to destroy established career patterns. 
A plenum of Sakhnovshina raikom in Khar'kov oblast' attempted another competitive 
election for the first secretaryship, which was reported in March 1987. The post was competed 
for by two candidates, Nikolai Karnaukh, instructor of the department of agricultural economy 
and food production of Kharikov oblast', and Nikolai Semenets, chairn1an of Sakhonovshino 
raiispolkom. The organisation of the election was the same as the other cases: an open 
discussion by plenum members and then a vote. In the end, Karnaykh was elected. This was 
also a deviation from established career patterns. According to V. Mysnichenko, first secretary 
of Khar'kov obkom, who supervised the election, the critical point was that the person chosen 
should pay more attention to social questions and the concerns of ordinary people. I3 
A competitive election of the first secretaryship of the Kol'chugino gorkom was 
attempted in Vladimir oblast' in May 1987. Six candidates, including the chairman of 
gorispolkom, appeared in this election. After discussion and voting, N. Mochalov, secretary of 
the party committee of the non-ferrous metal processing factOlY 'Ordzhonikidze,' was elected. 
The report criticised too many candidates in this election. I4 In addition, we can confirm again 
that this was not in line with established career patterns. 
According to an article explaining the party's cadre policy in Partiinaya Zhizn', 120 
12 Partiinaya Zhizn', 1987, No.5 (March), pp. 32-35. 
13 Partiinaya Zhizn', 1987, No.6 (March), pp. 43-46. 
14 Partiinaya Zhizn', 1987, No.9 (May), pp. 72-73. 
121 
(not necessarily first) party secretaries of 909 newly appointed were elected by competitive and 
secret ballot in 1987. 15 Because this figure was the same as one repeated later, it seems 
plausible. 16 These early attempts at competitive elections show the following characteristics. 
Firstly they present some evidence for the hypothesis that the competitive party election was 
attempted to change the established career patterns, because, as we have seen, the results of 
these elections frequently deviated from the norm. It seems likely that the party leadership 
intended to prevent podmena (substitution) of the state function by the party. Secondly, while 
the resistance to competitive elections undoubtedly existed, this may not always be because of a 
conservative ideology or the reluctance to sunender the appointing or nomenklatura power. It is 
obvious that many raion level elections were directed by a higher pmiy organisation. Thus, these 
elections did not undermine their appointing power very much. One problem may have been a 
way of organising the elections. Participants had to openly discuss the quality of candidates, 
including such personal shortcomings as anogance in front of the candidates themselves. It 
seems very likely that such a procedure made for a nervous atmosphere for both candidates and 
participants, though everyone, including losing candidates and voters, made a positive comment 
on the attempt to undertake competitive elections. In any case, competitive elections were not 
compulsory at all (no fOlmal decision on the competitive election at the Central Committee was 
taken, as mentioned above) and did not reach oblast' level at this time. A further decision was 
taken at the 19th Pmiy Conference. 
V. The 19th Party Conference and Competitive Elections 
1. Delegates Election to the 19th Party Conference 
15 Partiinaya Zhizn', 1988, No. 11 (June), p. 15. 
16 Partiinaya Zhizn', 1988, No. 17 (September), p. 11. This is an interview with G. K. 
Kryuchikov, deputy head of CC Department of Patiy Construction and Cadre Work, on the 
report and election campaign and its instruction. 
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At the June 1987 CC plenum, Gorbachev, in the name of the Politburo, submitted a 
proposal to convene the 19th Party Conference in order to begin political reform. 17 The CC duly 
took a decision 'On Convening the 19th All-Union Party Conference', which included the 
procedure for the election of delegates. One delegate was to be elected for each 3,780 party 
members; the elections were to be conducted by secret ballot (but not necessarily on a 
multi-candidate basis) at the plenums of union republican party organisations, kraikoms, and 
obkoms or, in the case of delegates election from party organs in military, at the military 
associations' party conferences; and the elections were to begin between April and May 1988. 18 
Nonetheless, the delegates' elections did not take place after Gorbachev's speech at the 
meeting with leaders of the mass media on 7 May. In his speech, Gorbachev mentioned no quota 
of delegates and was in favour of the active participation of lower party organisations. 19 
Though this was not clear at all as an instmction on electoral procedures, the election became a 
battle arena between reformers and the party apparat, which is well documented by Alyeh 
Unger and Bamch Hazan. 2o Although there is little to add to their studies, the following points 
that were mentioned but not emphasised by them should be indicated. Firstly, reformers were far 
from organised at this time. They did not have a coherent alternative idea of how to conduct the 
election, nor had they a clear vision of party reform. These matters were alien to the party 
before the conference, when democratic centralism and the ban on fractions prevailed over the 
views of party members. Organised opposition began to take place after the conference. 
Secondly, the apparat's manipulation of delegates was, it seems, not only because of a malicious 
intention or their reluctance to surrender nomenklatura power, but also of an inertia of 
17 Materialy Plenuma Tsentral 'nogo Komiteta KPSS: 25-26 iyunya 1987 g. (Moskva: Politizdat, 
1987), p. 37. 
18 Ibid., pp. 81-82; Partiinaya Zhizn', 1987, No. 13 (July), p. 47. 
19 Pravda, 11 May 1988, p. 2. 
20 Aryeh L. Unger, 'The Travails ofIntra-Party Democracy in the Soviet Union: The Election to 
the 19th Conference of the CPSU', Soviet Studies, Vol. 43, No.2 (1991); Bamch A. Hazan, 
Gorbachev's Gamble: The 191h All-Union Party Conference (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990), 
pp. 7-20, 69-76. 
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bureaucratic organs. Any bureaucratic organ has such an inertia that makes it hesitate to change 
traditional methods. It seems that this was the case for the CPSU as well. Thirdly, there is little 
evidence that rank and file party members tried to participate actively. Rather, 'the great 
majority of party members remained "silent". ,21 Fourthly, in any case, neither the CC plenum 
decision nor Gorbachev's speech made it clear how to conduct multi-candidate elections. The 
party apparat had enough excuse just to follow traditional methods. 
The result of the election is shown in Table 4-1. Compared with the delegates' 
composition at the 2ih Party Congress, whose electoral process was clearly controlled from 
above, the result of the 19th Party Conference was not very different from that of the 27th 
congress. This result had an influence on the future of the party, because, as we will see later, 
some party members, who were unhappy with the result, began to develop infomlal clubs within 
the party. In addition, it is well known that the debate at the conference was very vocal and that 
the conference approved a resolution on party election, which is considered in the next section. 
2. Decisions on Competitive Party Elections around the 19th Conference 
In May 1988 the CC plenum approved the 'Theses toward the 19th Party Conference,' 
which envisaged competitive party elections including higher level ones. That is, 'Communists 
have the right to propose more candidates than mandates available in the case of elections to all 
party committees. ... Such a way of promotion, discussion, and election of members of party 
committees and secretaries may be extended, in the process of the formation of party organs, 
from raikoms and gorkoms to the CCs of communist parties of union republics and the CC 
CPSu.,22 
At the conference Gorbachev stated that a majority supported the proposal of 
21 Unger 'The Travails', p. 349. 
22 Pravda, 27 May 1990, p. 2. 
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multi-candidate election at all levels of party organisation.23 Finally the 19th Party Conference 
approved a resolution, 'On Some Urgent Measures for the Practical Realisation of Reform of 
Political System of the Country,' which included a sentence, 'the Conference considers it is 
necessary to conduct, this year, a report-and-election campaign in party organisations, which is 
guided by the decisions of the conference on reform of political system, [and] democratisation 
of party life. ,24 The other resolution 'On Democratisation of Soviet Society and Reform of 
Political System', stated 'In the case of elections of members and secretaries of all party 
committees --up to the CC CPSU-- ensure a wide discussion of candidates and secret ballot, the 
possibility to include more number of candidates in the electoral bulletin than mandates 
available. ,25 Thus, the party was to conduct a report-and-election campaign, which would 
continue until the final days of the party. 
VI. Implementation up to the 28th Party Congress 
1. The Decision and Instruction on Party Elections 
The conference resolutions on party election were a general guideline, but lacked a 
concrete procedure to embody the resolution that was to be approved by the CC plenum. The 
July CC plenum (1988) took a decision 'On Reports and Elections in Party Organisations,' by 
which the patiy organisations up to the obkom level were to conduct the reports and elections to 
the end of 1988. This decision also referred to the possibility of including more candidates than 
mandates. The schedule of implementation followed: PPOs in September to October, raikoms, 
gorkoms, and okrugkoms in October-November, obkoms and kraikoms in November to 
23 XIX Vsesoyuznaya konferentsiya Komll1unisticheskoi Partii Sovetskogo Soyuza: 
Stenograficheskii Dtchet, Vol. 1 (Moskva: Politizdat, 1988), p. 82. 
24 Materialy XIX Vsesoyuznoi konferentsii Komlnunisticheskoi Partii Sovetskogo Soyuza 
(Moskva: Politizdat, 1988), p. 106. 
25 Ibid., p. 126. Emphasis added. 
125 
December. The Plenum entrusted the Politburo to make a more precise instruction for the 
d 1 · . 26 report-an -e ectlOn campaIgn. 
The Instruction was made and published in the name of the CC CPSU on 12 August 
1988. This instruction more concretely prescribed how to conduct party elections, for example 
how frequently the party organisations should carry out the elections. Small PPOs were to have 
reports and elections every year; large ones were to do so every two or three years; raikoms, 
gorkoms, okrugkoms, obkoms, kraikoms and union republic party organisations-every five 
years. As is clear from the above, the reports and elections were organised by a bottom-up 
principle. The conferences of lower organisations were to have the right to propose candidates 
to the composition of higher organisations. This also included the statement of the possibility of 
including more candidates than mandates. 27 Thus, all resolutions and decisions admitted the 
possibility of a competitive election. Still, it was just possible, but not obligatory. Let us 
consider how the report-and-election campaign was carried out in the next section.28 
2. The Report-and-Election Campaign in 1988 
If the reports and elections had been fully free and competitive, the logical 
consequence would have been the abolition of intra-party nomenklatura. In fact, an article, just 
before the campaign began, mentioned the possibility of 'making a formal-nomenklaturist 
approach to cadre [selection] U11l1eCessmy. ,29 Also at the beginning of the campaign in an 
interview in Pravda Georgii Razumovskii, a candidate member of the Politburo and CC 
secretmy, stated that this electoral experiment would fundamentally changed the concept of the 
26 Pravda, 31 July 1988, pp. 1-2; Materialy Plenuma Tsntral'nogo Komiteta KPSS, 29 iyulya 
1988 g. (Moskva: Politizdat, 1988), pp.43-45. 
27 Partiinaya Zhizn', 1988, No. 16 (August), pp. 30-35. A comment on this instruction is 
Partiinaya Zhiz/1', 1988, No. 17 (September), pp. 8-14. 
28 A contemporaneous study on the report-election campaign in 1988 is Dawn Mann, 'Results 
of the 1988 CPSU Report-and-Election Campaign', RLI Report on the USSR, Vol. 1, No.8 
(February 24,1989), pp. 4-7. 
29 Pravda, 3 August 1988, p. 1. 
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nomenklatura.3D Such a negative statement on the nomenklatura was repeated elsewhere in 
connection with the party election.3! 
The campaign began with workshop party organisations. One article introduced the 
election of these organisations. Though they were not competitive, the atmosphere can be 
understood. They discussed practical problems of their own workplaces (e.g. alcoholism), 
improvement of the authority of party organisations, rush work, and so forth. 32 Around the end 
of August, the election process reached the PPOs. An article asked PPOs and higher party 
organisations to have competitive elections, and to consider the secretaries' platforn1s for their 
own work. 33 In Moscow city one third of shop and primary party organisations conducted 
competitive elections. 34 In September a CC official told the western press that about 10,000 low 
level party leaders had been replaced in competitive elections.35 According to an article in 
Partiinaya Zhiz/1' on party elections, more than half the PPOs had competitive elections,36 
though a later result showed that this was a little exaggerated (see below and Table 4-2). 
The gorkoms and raikoms had elections around October and November. In Moscow 
city nine raikom party secretaries, including two first secretaries, were elected on an alternative 
basis.37 An information memorandum of the CC Department of Party Construction and Cadre 
Work (3 November 1988) stated that by 1 November (unknown from when) 778 raion and city 
party conferences had taken place. Though some active participation was reported, according to 
this memorandum the competitive elections for party secretaries had not been satisfactory. In the 
end, 174 gorkom and raikom secretaries, including 40 first secretaries were elected on an 
3D Pravda, 18 August 1988, p. 2. 
3! Partiinaya Zhizn', 1988, No. 22 (November), p. 10. 
32 Pravda, 15 August 1988, p. 2. 
33 Pravda, 31 August 1988, p. l. 
34 Izvestiya TsK KPSS, 1989, No.3, p. 27. 
35 RLI Research Bulletin, 422/88 (September 23, 1988), p. 8. The party official is Georigii 
Ktyuchkov, a deputy head of the CC Department of Party Construction and Cadre Work and, 
according to RL, the western press report was in the New York Times on 21 September. 
36 Pa/'tiinaya Zhizn', 1988, No. 22 (November), p. 9. 
37 Izvestiya TsK KPSS, 1989, No.3, p. 27. 
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alternative basis. Nonetheless something new also took place. By secret ballot, 30 to 40 per cent 
of delegates to the conferences voted against the re-election of raikom and gorkom secretaries. 
In addition 29 secretaries, including eight first secretaries, did not get the necessary votes and 
had to leave the elected organs. The memorandum also criticised obkoms for their weak 
supervision of lower organs, their excessive tolerance toward raikom and gorkom secretaries 
and poor knowledge of their real authority. Moreover, it was implied that the delegates to the 
conferences were controlled, by stating that there were no serious critics on the reports of the 
candidates for the elections.38 
Later, the campaign reached the obkom level. However, no competitive election of 
first secretaries was implemented, though eight competitive secretary (not first) elections were 
carried out. Rather, it may be noticed that party conferences at this level showed how difficult it 
was to surrender the economic functions of the party. For example, in a Moscow obkom 
conference, a view that to decide a trivial problem for khozyaistvel111iki was not a task of the 
party committees was reported.39 
The Politburo decided on 11 Febmary 1989 to publish a detailed report on the 1988 
report-and-election campaign. According to this, one third of party groups had competitive 
election as well as almost half the workshop party organisations and PPOs. Table 4-2 shows the 
results at PPO level. Moreover, at raikom, gorkom, and okrugkom level, 1117 secretaries and 
269 secretaries were elected on an alternative basis. As mentioned above, only eight secretaries 
of obkoms and kraikoms were elected by competitive elections. Still, the party committees' 
composition was renewed more radically. Almost 60 per cent of raikoms, gorkoms, obkoms, 
kraikoms renewed their composition; 66 new secretaries, including three first secretaries, of 
obkoms and kraikoms, and 1433 secretaries, including 250 first secretaries, of raikoms, 
gorkoms, and okrugkoms were newly elected (though the methods were not necessarily 
38 Izvestiya TsK KPSS, 1989, No.1, pp. 94-98. 
39 Pravda, 12 December 1988, p. 3. 
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competitive). It is obvious that higher party organisations did not conduct competitive elections. 
Thus, this report stated that several party organs had insufficiently conducted alternative 
elections, and also expressed dissatisfaction with the preparation and discussion of the campaign, 
and complained that higher party organisations did not recognise the real situation at local 
leve1. 40 We can conclude that, while the report-and-election campaign was relatively active at 
lower levels, higher party organisations obstructed its full implementation or tended to ineliia. 
3. The Party Elections in 1989 
In February 1989, the CC Commission on the Questions of Party Construction and 
Cadre Work discussed the results of the 1988 report-and-election campaign. The published 
documentation of this commission meeting limited itself to positive comment and the empty 
claim that 'democratisation is impOliant.' 41 Nonetheless, Gorbachev and his reformist 
colleagues were not happy with the result. Thus, on 18 July 1989 the CC CPSU organised a 
meeting of first secretaries of union republics, kraikoms, and obkoms, in which Gorbachev 
argued for applying electoral approaches to cadre appointments rather than formalist 
nomenklatura one.42 
Then the Politburo decided to conduct a report-and-election campaign again. Of 
course, it was obligatory that small PPOs conducted the report-and-election exercise as the 1988 
instruction of party election had stated. Still, the Politburo decision 'On the Conduct of Reports 
and Elections in Party Organisations in 1989 (2 August 1989)' stated that 'it seems expedient at 
the same time to discuss reports of bureaux of raikoms, gorkoms, okrugkoms, obkoms, 
kraikoms, and the CC of union republican parties on their activity at the plenum of 
corresponding committees.' Thus, all party organisations up to the CCs of union republican 
40 Izvestiya TsK KPSS, 1989, No.3, pp. 12-25. 
41 Pravda, 28 February 1989, p. 2. 
42 Pravda, 19 July 1989, p. 3. 
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parties were to face the campaign again. In addition, this decision urged party organisations to 
freely discuss current problems on an alternative basis. 43 This was a reconsideration of 
democratic centralism de facto, at least in its traditional sense. 
However, the report on the campaign one month later showed dissatisfaction with the 
situation: 'an analysis of the reports and elections that have just started shows that, in many 
party organisations, they are proceeding in the old fashion and in the form established for 
decades;' 'RepOlis and elections are intended to help change all orders of internal party relations, 
to establish, in each party organisation, a situation of friendliness, free and creative exchange of 
opinions, and presenting and discussing any alternative proposals;' 'With elections, the 
alternativeness, glasnost' [openness], and unconditional consideration of opinions of 
communists and non-communists should become a lUle. ,44 
Under such pressure from above (and probably from below, that is, from rank and file 
patiy members), the competitive elections at obkom level finally took place, though it is not 
clear that these elections were related to the report-and-election campaign. The first attempt was 
the Chelyabinsk obkom first secretary election on 12 August 1989. N. D. Shvyrev, first secretaty 
of Chelyabinsk obkom, was asked to resign due to harsh criticism. The new first secretary, 
Aleksei Litovchenko, formerly second secretary of this obkom, was elected from three 
candidates.45 On 7 September, Kaliningrad obkom plenum elected a new first secretaty. At the 
beginning there were more than ten candidates who were discussed in raikoms, gorkoms and the 
obkom bureau beforehand. The plenum screened them and brought two candidates (the obkom 
second secretaty and the chairman of the oblispolkom) in the electoral list. Finally Yurii 
43 Izvestiya TsK KPSS, 1989, No.9, p. 7. Emphasis added. 
44 Pravda,3 September 1989, p. 1. 
45 Pravda, 13 August 1989, p. 2. Note on obkom first secretaries' names. As one can see, 
Russian newspapers hardly mention a person's full first name, but only his initial. Thus, some 
persons' names are indicated as full surname with initials of first name and otchestvo here. Still, 
because the elected first secretaries' full names are available in Izvestiya TsK KPSS, the author 
tried to mention full first names as far as he could check. 
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Semenov, the second secretary, was elected Kaliningrad obkom first secretmy.46 Sakhalin 
obkom held a competitive election on 24 October 1989. Though again at first seventeen people 
were named as candidates, only four candidates were included in the electoral list. Viktor 
Zhigailo, a former obkom secretmy, was elected obkom first secretmy.47 On November 30 
Kareliya obkom plenum also held a competitive election. Twenty candidates were reduced to 
two, Nikolai Kir'yanov, an obkom secretary, and Yu. A. Kuznetsov, first secretalY of 
Petrozavodsk gorkom. In the event Kir'yanov was elected obkom first secretary.48 As to the 
first secretary at union republican level, the Ukrainian Central Committee had a competitive 
election on 28 September 1989, which followed Vladimir Shcherbitsky's retirement. Though at 
first six candidates were discussed, two candidates (Vladimir Ivashko, second secretary of the 
Ukrainian party, and Stanislav Gurenko, a Ukrainian party secretary) were brought into the 
electoral list. Finally Ivashko received a majority of votes and was elected first secretary.49 If 
such a competitive election had been sufficiently implemented, this logical consequence might 
have been that these elections made a nomenklatura system within the party unnecessmy. In fact, 
on 15 October 1989, Pravda reported a meeting of the CC Commission on the Questions of 
Party Construction and Cadre Policy, which admitted the necessity of a renewal of cadres, of a 
change in cadre promotion practices, further democratisation of the party including elections, 
and abolition of the nomenklatura system. 50 
However, it is clear that, as we have seen, the candidates were rather significantly 
screened even in competitive elections at higher levels. Thus, in most competitive elections, the 
final candidates were not surprising figures in view of traditional career patterns (e.g. second 
46 Pravda, 8 September 1989, p. 2; RLIReport on the USSR, Vol. 1, No. 37 (September 15, 
1989), p. 35. 
47 Pravda, 25 October 1989, p. 3. 
48 Pravda, 1 December 1989, p. 2. 
49 Pravda, 29 September 1989, p. 2; Pravda Ukrainy, 29 September 1989, p. 2; RLIReport on 
the USSR, Vol. 1, No. 40 (October 6, 1989), p. 32. 
50 Pravda, 15 October 1989, p. 2. See also RLIReport on the USSR, Vol. 1, No. 43 (October 27, 
1989), pp. 25-26. 
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secretary, chairman of oblispolkom, gorkom first secretary of major city in the oblast' and so 
forth). In addition, it is very suspicious that, in general, the report-and-election campaign in 
1989 was active. Detailed data on the results of the 1989 report-and-election campaign is 
available only up to PPO level, that is, there are no systematic data on higher level elections. 
According to Table 4-2, the number of PPOs that conducted reports and elections was small, 
compared with the previous year. It means that, even at the PPO level, the campaign was not 
active or that many PPOs might not have thought reports and elections were compulsOlY 
because almost all of the PPOs had reports and elections the previous year and, as the 1988 
instruction says, only small PPOs originally were to conduct the repOlis and elections. In 
addition, some PPOs, it was reported, did not hold reports and elections in the proper way: in a 
party organisation, participants could know the coming meeting would take place just one day 
beforehand; some party organisations hindered the attendance of non-communists in the 
meeting. 51 Nonetheless, the fact that the reports and elections was relatively better conducted at 
lower levels had some importance. The most vocal delegates were PPO secretaries at the 28th 
Party Congress. 
4. Party Elections in 1990 up to the 28th Party Congress 
Under such a situation of inactive reform, the shock to regional level secretaries came 
from outside the party in early 1990. Elections of the Congress of People's Deputies in Russia, 
Supreme Soviets in other union republics, and local soviets were to be held in February-March 
1990. These elections were to be conducted under a new and difficult situation for the CPSU 
because of an amendment to article six of the USSR constitution. Party secretaries had to realise 
that they would lose the elections without turnover of the leadership of each party committee. 52 
51 Izvestiya TsK KPSS, 1990, No.2, pp. 65-67. 
52 In addition, these local soviet elections did not necessarily mean secretaries should be 
'democrats'. Their struggle for survival in the elections produced a mixed picture in ideological 
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In addition, many party secretaries, including first secretaries, actually failed to win seats in 
soviets. Some of the secretaries who failed the election had to resign the post of first secretary. 
Then the election to the vacant post was sometimes conducted in a competitive way. 
Another stimulus to party election was the March CC plenum (1990) decision 'On the 
Term for Calling of the 28th Congress of the CPSU, Conducting the Report-and-Election 
Campaign in the Party, the Norms of Representation and the Procedure of Election of Congress 
Delegates,' which provided for the conduct of reports and elections at obkom and higher 
levels. 53 From the fragmentary records of the Politburo meeting on 7 March, it is possible to 
infer that the decision to conduct a report-and-election campaign before the 28th Party Congress 
was controversial.54 Thus, before the congress, only higher party organisations were to conduct 
reports and elections. 55 However, the timing of reports and elections was, it seems, entrusted to 
terms: Some first secretaries became 'democrats', others turned into 'conservatives', and others 
transformed into 'nationalists'. Though they showed various political standpoints, their logic 
had the common element: to survive. See Kimitaka Matsuzato, 'Roshiano Chihoseido: 
Daikaikaku kara 1995nen Chihojichihoshiko made, [Regional Institution in Russia: From the 
Great Reform to Law on Local Autonomy in 1995]" in Juten Ryouiki Kenkyu Hokoku Shu, 
'Sw'abu Yurashia no Hen do , [Occasional Papers on 'the Changes in the Slavic-Eurasian 
World'] No. 25 (1996), p. 178. McAuley argued that in the process of local soviet elections, 
Leningrad obkom made the first open rebellion against the centre. See Mary McAuley, 'Politics, 
Economics, and Elite Realignment in Russia: A Regional Perspective,' Soviet Economy, Vol. 8, 
No.1 (1992), p. 60. While this consequence can be partly attributed to the lack of consistent 
policy of the CPSU leadership, this was a logical consequence of a local election. This also 
means a democratic way does not necessarily turn out an ideal result. 
53 Materialy Plenuma Tsentral 'nogo KomUeta KPSS, 11, 14, 16 marta 1990 g. (Moskva: 
Politizdat, 1990), pp. 180-183. 
54 The stenographic record of this meeting on this topic (March CC plenum) is almost 
completely omitted and shows only top page and the last page. Thus, the author can only infer 
that it was controversial from Gorbachev's statement in the meeting 'Then, before the congress, 
to elect only delegates to the congress was proposed and do not conduct reports and elections in 
the party. So, what about the preparation for the congress? Where is the platfOlm, where is its 
discussion? Where is the pre-congress discussion, which should show us the opinions of 
communists and on platform and on [patty] Rules.' TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 42, d. 28, p. 2. 
55 However, a later report on the report and election campaign states that about one third of 
workshop and primary party organisations and 40 per cent of raikoms, gorkoms, and okrugkoms 
conducted meeting and conference before the 28th Party Congress. See Izvestiya TsK KPSS, 
1991, No.5, p. 68. Though the author could not investigate why this happened, perhaps it may 
be because some meetings for delegate election to the 28th Party Congress also became report 
and election meetings. 
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~l~~tio}fSi.bk~?r~ ,tb.bi8t~1. Party Congress, with which ODr,bachev was not satisfied.56 On 13 June 
1990 Vadim Medvedev, CC secretary and a Politburo member, reported that 140 oblast' and krai 
pmiy conferences and 10 union republic pmiy congresses had taken place, Among them 88 
conferences and 8 congresses elected their own party committees, It means that, for example, 
the union republican party congress elected its Central Committee,57 
So, many party organisations canied out party elections, some of which were 
competitive, Most widely broadcast was the case of Volgograd obkom, Vladimir Kalashnikov 
had been first secretary since 1984, His career was that of a typical khozyaistvennik. Born in 
1929, after graduating from Stavropol' agricultural-economy institute, he became a head of 
agricultural technician in 1950, then a director of a MTS (MachinelY and Tractor Station) of 
sheep farming sovkhoz in 1955, Though his full-time party work began in 1961 as second 
secretary of a raikom, he returned to economic managing work after that Before becoming first 
secretary of Volgograd obkom, he had been RSFSR Minister of Land Reclamation and Water 
Management58 At the beginning he worked well as first secretary, However, he lost his prestige 
quickly. The obkom faced public demonstrations criticising privileges and conuption. Party 
members began to think that they needed a political leader rather than a khozyaistvennik. On 24 
January 1990 the Volgograd obkom held a plenum, at which there were repeated calls for the 
leader's resignation. On the 30th of the month, the plenum agreed to Kalashinikov's retirement 
The new first secretary was elected by competitive election at a report-and-election oblast' party 
56 TsKhSD, f. 89, p, 42, d, 28, p. 2. 
57 Pravda, 14 June 1990, p, 2, 
58 Izvestiya TsK KPSS, 1989, No, 2, p. 69, 
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conference in March. Though once the number of candidates grew to 28, three candidates 
remained after self-resignation. Aleksandr Anipkin, first secretary of the Volgograd gorkom, was 
elected first secretary. 59 
Other cases of obkom first secretary competitive elections were briefly reported. 
Chernigov obkom elected Vasilii Lisovenko as first secretary in competitive and secret election 
on 22 January 1990.60 In the Kabardino-Balkar ASSR the competitive election took place with 
the transfer of former first secretary, Evgenii Eliseev, to a post in the CC apparat. The post was 
competed for by two candidates, the chairman of the republican Supreme Soviet and the second 
secretary of the republican CC. In the event, the second secretary, Valerii Kokov, won. 61 On 27 
February Kaluga obkom plenum elected a first secretary from three candidates. Valerii 
Sudarenkov, working as deputy chairman of the council of ministers of the Uzbek republic and 
having worked as first secretary of Kaluga gorkom, was elected the new obkom first secretary.62 
On 24 March the Buryat obkom plenum approved the transfer of its first secretalY, Anatolii 
Beryakov, to the RSFSR State Committee on Ethnic Questions. The plenum recommended that 
lower party organs discuss suitable successors.63 On 6 April the obkom plenum elected first 
secretary Leonid Potanov, working as deputy chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Turlanen 
republic and formerly a secretary of Buryat obkom.64 At Sverd10vsk oblast' party conference 
eight candidates were advanced for the first secretaryship. Aleksandr Gusev, Asbest gorkom first 
secretary, was elected on 7 April. On the same day, Ul'yanovsk oblast' party conference elected 
first secretary Yurii Goryachev, chairman of Ul'yanovsk soviet, from two candidates out of an 
59 Pravda, 28 January 1990, p. 2; Partiinaya Zhizn', 1990, No.8 (April), pp. 45-47; Dawn 
Mann, 'Authority of Regional Party Leaders Crumbling', RLI Report 011 the USSR, Vol. 2, No.8 
(February 23, 1990), pp. 1-6. 
60 RLIReport on the USSR, Vol. 2, No.5 (February 2, 1990), p. 26. 
61 RLI Report on the USSR, vol. 2, No.9 (March 2, 1990), pp. 36-37. 
62 Pravda, 28 February 1990, p. 2. 
63 Sovetskaya Rossiya, 25 March 1990, p. 2. 
64 Sovetskaya Rossiya, 7 April 1990, p. 2. 
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original 20.65 On 26 April Tyumen' and Ufa party conferences elected first secretaries on an 
alternative basis. Also on 26 April Kirovograd obkom plenum elected a new first secretary from 
three candidates. 66 Boris Gidaspov was re-elected Leningrad city and oblast' party first 
secretary from five candidates at a joint conference of Leningrad city and oblast' party 
organisations. 67 Kemerovo oblast' party conference re-elected Aleksandr Mel 'nikov first 
secretaty on an alternative basis and also Vologda and Gorno-Altaisk oblast' party conferences 
had competitive first secretary elections.68 Magadan, Amur, Smolensk and Voronezh oblast' 
party conferences also had competitive elections for first secretaty.69 
Thus, many competitive elections for first secretaries took place during this period. 
However, it is difficult to establish how universal such attempts at competitive elections were. 
Nonetheless, we can recognise some effects of the competitive process. Firstly, secret and 
competitive party elections did not necessarily result in the victory of so-called 'democrats'. 
Gidaspov (Leningrad), Mel 'nikov (Kemerovo) and others were 'conservative' in a sense. 
Whether or not this was a result of 'apparat games' or electoral cheating cannot be detern1ined. 
Still they could not have won without any support from rank and file party members. In addition, 
it should be remembered that these figures were different from strongly ideological 
conservatives like Nina Andreeva. Rather, their claim mainly related to keeping 'law and order' 
but not necessarily opposing some form of market economy. It is not unreasonable to think that 
such figures, who advocated restoring public order, could receive some support in a worsening 
situation. The competitive elections gave a chance of promotion to such new 'law and order' 
type 'conservatives'. Secondly, once obkom leaders had been elected by competitive elections, 
65 Sovetskaya Rossiya, 8 April 1990, p. 2. 
66 Pravda, 27 April 1990, p. 3. 
67 Pravda, 29 April 1990, p. 2; RLiReport all the USSR, Vol. 2, No. 18 (May 4, 1990), p. 39. On 
Leningrad party conference, see also Pravda, 26 April 1990, p. 2. 
68 Pravda, 29 April 1990, p. 2. 
69 Sovetskaya Rossiya, 1 June 1990, p. 5; Sovetskaya Rossiya, 2 June 1990, p. 7; Pravda, 2 June 
1990, p. 2; Pravda, 8 June 1990, p. 2. 
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they could be independent of the centre. Thus, the General Secretary's nomenklatura power 
must have been eroded. If the party election was considered in order to destroy local cliques, 
this was an unintended result. Overall, competitive elections accelerated organisational disarray 
in the party. Thirdly, it seems that the result of these competitive elections made it easy for 
regional party secretaries to accept the principle of a competitive election in the new party Rules. 
In the next few sections, the process toward the 28th Party Congress is investigated. 
VII. Emerging Fractions and Controversy over Party Renewal 
In the run up to the 28th Party Congress, fractions within the party emerged. Let us 
briefly consider the fractions that tried to influence the delegates' election to the congress. After 
the Central Committee published its platform as a draft of the new Party Programme, two major 
'platforms' emerged around the beginning of 1990: the Democratic Platform and the Marxist 
Platform. 
The February CC plenum discussed and approved the platform 'Toward Humane, 
Democratic Socialism'. This platform was rather liberal in tern1S of its perspective for the entire 
political and economic system, that is, it supported a regulated market economy, a multi-party 
system, and the establishment of a new federal state. However, it was not very reformist on 
internal party matters: supporting the concept of vanguard rather than parliamentary party, no 
reference to the nomenklatura system, and keeping, while claiming renewal of their concepts, 
the ban on fractions and democratic centralism.70 
The Democratic PlatfOlm had its origins in the 'Moscow Party Club', which was 
formed in April 1989.71 The Moscow Party Club's immediate goal was to call an extraordinary 
70 Materialy Plenuma Tsntral'l1ogo Komiteta KPSS, 5-7 fevralya 1990 g. (Moskva: Politizdat, 
1990), pp. 353-382. 
71 On the Democratic Platforn1, the author is heavily indebted to Igor' Chubais, 'The 
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CPSU congress. Then it developed its aims including reform of the procedure for delegate 
election to the party congress. At the same time, it began to organise its basic policy, which was 
crystallised at the all-union conferences of the Democratic Platform in January and April 1990. 
Their basic policy was to transform the CPSU into a social democratic parliamentary party. In 
order to do so, they proposed a multi-party system, a federal principle overall, a tenitorial 
principle for the PPO, the replacement of democratic centralism, freedom of fraction formation, 
and abolition of the nomenklatura. 
The Marxist Platform was rooted in people who left the Moscow Party Club. It held its 
first conference in April 1990. Their policy was much more moderate than that of the 
Democratic Platform: it supported a market economy, a party for workers, a guarantee of the 
rights of minorities and replacement of bureaucratic centralism, still opposing fraction activity 
and a parliamentary party.72 
These were the first organised fractions de facto since the 10th Party Congress of 1921. 
Some proposals of the Democratic Platform in particular had some resonance among the mass 
media including party journals. For example, some argued for implementation of the electoral 
principle in cadre work, which would have led to demolition of the nomenklatura mechanism.73 
There was a suggestion that cadre selection should be open to a variety of people rather than 
based on a nomenklatura list. 74 It was reported that one raikom in Murmansk city had abolished 
Democratic Opposition: An Insider's View,' RLI Report on the USSR, Vol. 3, No. 18 (May 3, 
1991); Julia Wishnevsky and Elizabeth Teague, '''Democratic Platform" Created in CPSU', RLI 
Report on the USSR, Vol. 2, No.5 (February 2, 1990); Vyachelav Shostakovskii, 'Obnovlyaya 
Kontseptsiyu Partii', Politicheskoe Obrazovanie, 1989, No. 18 (December), pp. 5-12; Graeme 
Gill, The Collapse, pp. 122-125. See also Toshihiko Ueno, 'Sorenpokyosanto Dai28kaitaikaiwo 
megum Shomondai [Problems of the 28th Congress of the CPSU)', Hogakukenkyu, Vol. 68, No. 
2 (Febmary 1995), p. 344. 
72 Glasnost', 1990, No.2, (21 June), pp. 4-5. 
73 V. Abramov, 'Iskorenit' Byurolaatizm', Partiinaya Zhizn', 1990, No.3 (Febmary), pp. 62-66. 
74 N. Kuz'menkok, 'Ne Po Nomenklaturnoi Lestnitse', Partiinaya Zhizl1', 1990, No.6 (March), 
pp.30-31. 
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its nomenklatura list, which had consisted of 286 postS.75 With such views, platforn1s strived to 
win the delegate election to the 28th Party Congress, as is investigated in the next section. 
VIII. The 28th Party Congress and Competitive Elections 
1. Delegate Election to the 28th congress 
(a) Decisions on the Electoral Procedure and their Critics 
The CC Commission on the Questions of Party Construction and Cadre Policy 
discussed the procedure for delegate election to the 28th Party Congress. The Commission 
expressed the view that the procedure should be maximally democratised and supported the 
direct participation of communists in the process. 76 The proposal of the Commission was 
submitted to the February CC plenum (1990). The CC platfOlID that was approved at the CC 
plenum stated that the election of delegates to the party conference and congress should be 
conducted with the direct participation of communists on an alternative basis.77 Based on it, the 
CC Commission of Party Construction and Cadre Policy wrote a draft of 'the Procedure of 
Delegates Election to the 28th CPSU Congress', which envisaged the following points: 1. The 
candidates would be nominated by primaty party organisations. 2. The election should be secret 
and competitive. 3. The candidates could be investigated at the raion and city party conference. 
4. The plenums of obkoms, kraikoms, union republican party could define the procedure of 
delegate election. 5. A huge primary party organisation could directly elect the delegates with 
the decision of the plenums of obkoms, kraikoms, and union republican parties. 6. The oblast', 
krai, union republican party conference could elect delegates. 7. Delegates from the military and 
75 Pravda, 5 May 1990, p. 4. 
76 Pravda, 4 February 1990, p. 2. 
77 Materialy Plenuma Tsentral'nogo Komiteta KPSS, 5-7 fevralya 1990g. (Moskva: Politizdat, 
1990), p. 379. See also RLIReport on the USSR, Vol. 2, No.7 (February 16, 1990), pp. 37-38. 
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MVD troops would be directly elected from the party conferences of military districts. 78 This 
draft after a little modification was approved at the March CC plenum as an attached document 
of the CC plenum decision, 'On the Term of the 28th CPSU Congress, Conducting of the 
Report-and-Election Campaign in the Party, the Norms of Representation and the Procedure for 
Election of Congress Delegates'. 79 
However, there were critics of this procedure. Firstly, though it was decided that 
delegates were to be elected basically from electoral districts, the party conference could elect 
delegates in some cases. Some people feared that party conferences could screen candidates 
who did not suit full-time party workers. 8o Secondly the delegates from the armed forces were 
to be elected only from party conferences rather than electoral districts. 81 Thirdly the plenums 
of obkoms, kraikoms and union republican parties could define the procedure 'taking into 
account the situation of party organisations and opinions of communists'. But who were to be 
'communists' in this context: party ranks or party workers? And how could communists 
determine 'the situation'? 82 Fourthly, some argued that, without publishing candidates' 
affiliation to any platform in the electoral list, communists would not be able to decide whom to 
vote for. 83 
Nonetheless, it cannot be denied that this procedure was more competitive and 
appeared better for reformers like the Democratic Platform than the previous procedure. The 
delegates' election took place under this procedural rules. 
(b) The CC Open Letter and the Delegates Election to the 28 th Party Congress 
As discussed above, one of main aims of the Democratic Platform was to send their 
78 Pravda, 27 Februmy 1990, pp. 1-2. 
79 Materialy Plenuma Tsentrali'nogo Komiteta KPSS, 11, 14, 16 marta 1990 g., pp. 180-188. 
80 Sovetskaya Kul'tura, 21 April 1990, p. 4. 
81 Pravda, 7 March 1990, p. 3. 
82 Moskovskie Novosti, 1990-10 (11 March), p. 3. This is a comment of Vyacheslav 
Shostakovskii, rector of Moscow Higher Pmty School and one of the leaders of Democratic 
Platform. See also Sovetskaya Kul'tura, 24 March 1990, p. 3. 
83 Sovetskaya Kul'tura, 12 May 1990, p. 4. 
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delegates to the forthcoming 28th Party Congress. However, the party leadership was clearly 
apprehensive about this platform. This became clear with the publication of the CC open letter, 
'For Consolidation on a Principled Basis' which appeared on 11 April 1990.84 
The Politburo decided to write an open letter on 22 March, which was to make clear 
the party leadership's antagonistic view toward the Democratic Platform. The decision states, 
'To consider it is expedient to adhere the direction of ideological and organisational demarcation 
from the supporters of the "Democratic Platform" and other groups whose activity is directed to 
the split of the CPSU.' Even if 'other groups' are mentioned, it is obvious that the main target 
was the Democratic Platform. The Politburo entrusted the Secretariat to prepare the letter and 
the draft of decision on this matter.85 Then, the Politburo on 9 April discussed the content of the 
prepared letter and whether or not it should be published. As Gorbachev says in his memoirs, he 
seems to have preferred to send a telegram to party organisations rather than publishing a 
letter.86 Only Yakovlev was very critical of the letter, supported the idea of a telegram, and 
moderately supported the Democratic PlatfOlID though he added that the CC platform was 
superior theoretically and practically.87 However, other reformist Politburo members, for 
example, Medvedev, Frolov, and Shevardnadze, did not strongly oppose the letter.88 Others 
supported publication of the letter because the CC needed to make its position clear. Without it, 
they argued, it would cause anxiety and confusion among party members.89 It seems that 
Gorbachev could not help but publish the open letter, though he asked Medvedev to rewrite it. 90 
84 Pravda, 11 April 1990, p. 1. For details of the politics of the CC open letter, see Gordon 
Hahn, 'The Politics of the XXVIII CPSU Congress and the Central Committee Open Letter', 
Russian HistOlY, Vol. 22, No.4 (Winter 1995), to which the author is indebted. 
85 TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 9, d. 87, p. 1. 
86 TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 42, d. 27, p. 2; Mikhail Gorbachev, Zhizn' i Reformy, Vol. 1 (Moskva: 
Novosti, 1995), pp. 540-541. Mihaeru Gorubachofu, Gorubachofu Kaisoroku, Jo (Tokyo: 
Shinchosha, 1996), pp. 694-695. 
87 TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 42, d. 27, p. 5. 
88 Ibid, p. 7 (Medvedev), p. 9 (Shevardnadze), p. 10 (Frolov). 
89 For example see ibid, p. 12 (Prokofev). 
90 Ibid, p. 16. 
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The CC open letter was published, which severely criticised the Democratic Platform: 
'Declaring themselves "consistent democrats", ... they attack the ideological and organisational 
basis of the CPSU ... '; the Democratic Platform tried 'to convert our party to a kind of formless 
association with full freedom of factions and groupings, that is, to practically min it.' This 
recommended also expelling members of Democratic Platform from the party.91 This open 
letter caused some controversy. It certainly seems to have discouraged the Democratic Platform 
supporters. Some of them thought that the party was impossible to reform itself and left the 
party. Criticism was also widespread among other organisations or movements. The Komsomol 
condemned the open letter at its all-union congress.92 The Marxist platfOlw also criticised the 
letter because, they argued, the Central Committee was motivated only by material rather than 
ideological considerations. 93 The meeting of secretaries of republican parties, kraikoms, 
obkoms, and series of gorkom, and raikoms, which discussed ideological-political work, took 
place on 25 April, where the open letter was critically mentioned.94 
Probably the most important effect of the open letter was its influence on the election 
of delegates to the 28 th Party Congress. The Politburo discussed the questions of preparation for 
the 28th Party Congress and the Russian party conference on 3 May, when the delegate election 
was just beginning. In his report Razumovskii said that the CC open letter had a big influence 
on the course of the delegate election and the report-and-election campaign.95 Although he 
mentioned that the letter was, on the whole, perceived as an appeal for the consolidation of 
healthy party forces while the departure of party members was increasing, it seems that the letter 
encouraged so-called 'conservatives' to come forward to the forthcoming party congress. In 
addition, Gorbachev did not hide his critical view of the Democratic Platform, stating, 'What 
91 Pravda, 11 April 1990, p. 1. 
92 RLIReport on the USSR, Vol. 2, No. 17 (April 27, 1990), p. 24. (Central Television, 16 April) 
93 RLIReport 011 the USSR, Vol. 2, No. 17 (April 27, 1990), p. 25. (Pravda, 16 April) 
94 Pravda, 25 April 1990, p. 2. 
95 TsKhSD f. 89, p. 42, d. 28, p. 2. 
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about the "Democratic Platform"? ... There is no concept, and nothing on the party is well 
thought out at all. There is only a concept such as ruining the party. That is all. ,96 As discussed 
above, one of the original aims of Democratic Platform was to send their delegates to the party 
congress. The CC open letter discouraged the Democratic Platform members. 
On the other hand, Gorbachev's prime concern about delegates' election was the social 
composition of delegates. Probably he presupposed that worker and peasant party members 
would suppOli his reform and that the party apparat consistently opposed him. Though it is not 
possible to precisely discern how much effect on the social composition of delegates the letter 
had, the report on delegate election in progress at the Politburo meeting on 3 May was shocking 
for Gorbachev. According to Razumovskii, 80 per cent of delegates were to be elected from 
electoral districts rather than the party conference. The elections were certainly competitive. Up 
to the date of the meeting 19,800 people had been advanced as candidates for 4,382 mandates. 
232 delegates had been already elected at the time. Among them, workers accounted for 12.1 
per cent; peasants (kolkhoz workers) for 1.7 per cent; women for 7.3 per cent, and party workers 
for 24 per cent. Among candidates, the figures were workers 10 per cent, peasants 4 per cent and 
women 10 per cent. Though the ratio of worker delegates increased in comparison with that of 
worker candidates, these were shocking figures for Gorbachev. He asked how many workers 
there were among the 19,800 candidates, but Razmovskii did not answer.97 Passivity of workers 
was also reported by Yurii Manaenkov, CC SecretaIY and a Russian bureau member. Among the 
candidates to the Russian party conference (the delegates were to attend the all-union party 
congress as well), about 13 per cent were workers. He added that administrative pressure should 
be utilised in order to strengthen the representation of workers. 'Simply no other way exists.' 
Gorbachev was angry with this and said, 'Then I should speak frankly that our party apparat 
together with economic managerial leaders is doing this [lowering workers' representation].' 
96 Ibid., p. 6. 
97 Ibid., p. 2. 
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Manaenkov responded, 'Our party apparat is doing this because there are very, very many party 
workers among delegate candidates. Almost a quarter. Thus, the party apparat is connected with 
this. ,98 Nikolai Ryzhkov, chairman of the Council of Ministers, said that many party secretaries 
had become candidates and pushed out the working class. Gorbachev responded that the 
problem was that the workers had not advanced themselves as candidates. 99 Consequently 
Gorbachev stressed the importance of electing workers and peasants 100 and the Politburo 
appealed for electing more workers and peasants to the forthcoming party congress. 101 
Then, the elections continued. Some reports on the delegates' election began to appear. 
On 11 May the North Osetiya oblast' party conference elected delegates to the party congress, 
including Evgenii Primakov, a member of the Presidential Council and a candidate member of 
the Politburo. 102 The congress of the Turkmen party and seven oblast' party conferences in 
Kazakhstan elected delegates to the all-union congress on 12 May.103 The Georgian party 
congress elected delegates to the all-union party congress on 16 May.104 Many delegates were 
elected also from electoral districts. In Arkhangel'sk, Tula, Smolensk, and Kazan' competitive 
delegate elections in electoral districts were reported. Delegates elected in Smolensk included 
Anatolii Luk'yanov, the chairman of Supreme Soviet and a Politburo member. Egor Ligachev, 
CC secretary and a Politburo member, was elected from an electoral districts of Belgorod 
oblast', though one report suggested that he had failed to secure election in Moscow. 10S From 
Moscow city, Gorbachev, Ryzhkov, Shevardnadze, Yakovlev, Vladimir Kryuchkov, chairman of 
the KGB and a Politburo member, and Yurii Maslyukov, CC secretariat and a Politburo member, 
98 Ibid., p. 8. 
99 Ibid. 
100 Ibid., p. 27. 
101 Pravda, 5 May 1990, p. 1. 
102 Pravda, 12 May 1990, p. 2. 
103 Pravda, 13 May 1990, p. 2. 
104 Pravda, 17 May 1990, p. 2. 
105 Pravda, 27 May 1990, p. 2; Argumenty i Fakty, 1990-21 (26 May-l June), p. 3; Ibid., 
1990-22 (2-8 June), p. 6. 
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were elected. From Khabarovsk, Dmitrii Yazov, Minister of Defence and candidate member of 
the Politburo, was elected. 106 The result of delegates' elections of Politburo members, 
candidate members and CC secretaries were published later (see Table 4-3). The Leningrad, 
Voronezh, Elista, Tashkent, Kuibyshev, Irkutsk, L'vov, and Kirov cases were also reported. 107 In 
one electoral district in Moscow city, Viktor Ryabov, a CC official, was elected on 10 May on 
an altemative basis.l08 In many regions, the results of delegate elections were reviewed in the 
party conferences. 109 From Table 4-3, we can recognise that delegate elections in party 
conferences were frequently non-competitive. In addition, it can be inferred from a report of the 
Red-Flag Northem Fleet party conference that some of the delegate elections of party 
organisations in armed forces were not conducted on an altemative basis. llo 
On the process, some complaints on the organisation of the election appeared. In 
Omsk oblast' 168 candidates had been advanced for 34 mandates. More than one fourth of 
candidates were party workers who were skilled in political manoeuvring. They could become 
delegates while pushing out workers. III One worker delegate felt that the election had been 
organised unfavourably to him and suspected that he had been the victim of an 'apparat 
game,.112 An ill-prepared election was also reported in a letter from Kiev city, in which it was 
announced that the election would take place just one day beforehand. In addition, by not 
showing the candidates' positions on the platform in the electoral list, they did not have any 
criterion to judge them. I 13 Two weeks before the 28th Party Congress, Vladimir Lysenko, one of 
leaders of the Democratic Platform and a delegate to the 28th Party Congress, expressed his 
106 Pravda, 31 May 1990, p. 2. On Gorbachev's election, see RLIReport all the USSR, Vol. 2, 
No. 21 (May 25 1990), p. 27. 
107 Pravda, 31 May 1990, p. 2; Ibid., 6 June 1990, p. 2. 
108 Izvestiya TsK KPSS, 1990, No.6, p. 155. 
109 Pravda, 4 June 1990, p. 2; Ibid., 9 June 1990, p. 2. 
110 Pravda, 7 June 1990, p. 2. Nonetheless, the Far East Military District Party Conference had 
a competitive delegates election. See Yazov in Table 3. 
III Pravda, 19 May 1990, p. 3. 
112 Pravda, 2 June 1990, p. 3. 
113 Pravda, 9 June 1990, p. 3. 
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concern that 48 per cent of delegates would be full-time party workers, and that less than 7 per 
cent would be workers and peasants. I 14 
2. The Establishment of the Communist Party of the Russian Soviet Federal 
Socialist Republic 
Before considering the result of the delegates' election, let us trace the process of the 
establishment of the Communist Party of the Russian Soviet Federal Socialist Republic.115 The 
idea of a Russian party dates back to September 1989 when the CC plenum on nationality issues 
took place. This plenum'S platform proposed to examine the possibility of the foundation of a 
Russian 'conference' in which the republican issues would be discussed. 116 This led to the idea 
to revive the Russian bureau that had existed under Khrushchev, which the Politburo decided to 
propose to the CC plenum on 8 December 1989,117 and the December CC plenum agreed to its 
foundation. 118 
Nonetheless, the Russian bureau was not active: Up to the Russian conference, it had 
only three meetings (15 Januaty, 3 April, 9 June). 119 The first meeting was devoted to a 
consideration of the economic sovereignty of Russia and the matter of republic and local soviet 
elections. 120 The March CC plenum decided to hold a Russian party conference, at which the 
same delegates who were elected for the 28th all-union Party Congress were to participate, and 
114 Moskovskie Novosti, 1990, No. 24 (17 June), p. 9. 
115 For details of this process, see Toshihiko Ueno, 'Sorenpokyosanto Dai28kaitaikaiwo'. 
116 Materialy Plenuma Tsentral 'nogo KomUeta KPSS: 19-20 sentyabl)ia 1989 g. (Moskva: 
Politizdat, 1989), p. 225. The author must use the word 'conference' here because at that time 
the establishment of the Russian party organisation was uncertain. There was still some 
possibility that the Russian party 'conference' became a just coordinating place of lower party 
organs. After the establishment of CP RSFSR was decided, the conference was to become a 
'congress' . 
117 TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 9, d. 85. 
118 Materialy Plenuma Tsentral'nogo Komiteta KPSS: 9 dekablya 1989 g. (Moskva: Politizdat, 
1989), pp. 37-38. 
119 Izvestiya TsK KPSS, 1990, No.9, p. 24. 
120 TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 23, d. 28. 
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the CC plenum entrusted the Russian bureau to form the preparatory committee for the Russian 
conference. 121 The second meeting of the Russian bureau approved the establishment of a 
preparatory committee of the Russian party conference, which consisted of 87 members. 122 
Because no Russian bureau meeting was held until 9 June, which was just before the Russian 
party conference, the real preparatory work was canied out by the preparatory committee rather 
than the Russian bureau. The preparatory committee pressed the party leadership for the 
establishment of the Russian Communist Party. 
Other movements toward the Russian party became active. On 22-23 April the 
Committee of the United Front of Workers of Russia, a conservative fraction in the party, held a 
congress to discuss the formation of a Russian Communist Party. Participants criticised 
perestroika and demanded dismissing the leadership, including Ligachev who was known as a 
conservative. 123 Ligachev himself supported the foundation of a Russian Communist Party, 
though he added the necessity to keep the CPSU framework and party unity.124 Ligachev was, 
according to Gorbachev, the strongest proponent of its foundation in the central leadership. 125 
Gorbachev states in his memoirs that he was worried that the Russian party might 
become a base for anti-reform groups to fight against the CC CPSu. 126 The precise time when 
Gorbachev finally decided to establish the CP RSFSR was at the Politburo meeting on 3 May. 
At the beginning of this meeting Gorbachev appeared reluctant to establish the Russian party. 
He mentioned the possibility that the Russian party would dominate the CPSU, given its 
121 Materialy Plenuma Tsentral 'nogo KomUeta KPSS: 11, 14, 16, marta 1990g., p. 188. 
122 Izvestiya TsK KPSS, 1990, No.5, pp. 14-19. 
123 RLIReport on the USSR, Vol. 2, No. 18 (May 4, 1990), p. 28. (TASS, April 22; Independent, 
April 23) 
124 RLIReport on the USSR, Vol. 2, No. 21 (May 25, 1990), p. 2l. (Pravda, May 12) 
125 Mikhail Gorbachev, Zhizn' i Reformy, Vol. 1, p.531; Gorubachofu, Gorubachofu Kaisoroku, 
Jo, p. 684; Gorbachev, Memoirs (London: Transworld Publishers, 1996), p. 352. 
126 Gorbachev, Zhizn' i Reformy, Vol. 1, p.531; Gorubachofu, Gorubachofu Kaisoroku, Jo, p. 
684; Gorbachev, Memoirs, p. 352. 
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predominant size. 127 However, many of the pm1icipants supported the establishment. 
Manaenkov,I28 Ligachev,129 Gumer Usmanov, CC secretary,I30 Aleksandr Vlasov, chairman of 
the RSFSR council of ministers and a Politburo member, I3I Egor Stroev, CC secretary and a 
Politburo member,132 Girenko, CC secretary,133 and Yurii Maslyukov, chairman of Gosplan and 
a Politburo member,134 and Primakov,135 all basically supported the creation of the Russian 
party. Medvedev,136 Ryzhkov,I37 and Boris Pugo, chairman of Party Control Committee and a 
candidate member of the Politburo,138 thought there was no choice but to create the Russian 
party. Vitalii Vorotnikov, chairman of the Presidium of RSFSR Supreme Soviet and candidate 
member of the Politburo,139 and Lev Zaikov, CC secretary and a Politburo member,140 were 
neutral. Yakovlev,141 and Frolovl42 were a little negative. Given such a situation, Gorbachev 
judged that he could not resist the demand for the creation of the Russian Party. 143 
The last meeting of the Russian bureau (9 June) mainly discussed, firstly, the social 
composition of the delegates to the Russian conference/congress, secondly, the date-schedule, 
thirdly, the naming of the Russian party. Gorbachev expressed alarm that the ratio of pm1y 
workers among delegates had once amounted to 48-50 per cent and that it decreased by 44 per 
cent by the time of the meeting. Because such high representation of party workers was 
127 TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 42, d. 28, p. 10. 
128 Ibid., p. 9. 
129 Ibid.,p.12. 
130 Ibid., pp. 12-13. 
131 Ibid., p. 13. 
132 Ibid., p. 14. 
133 Ibid., p. 17. 
134 Ibid., p. 22. 
135 Ibid., p. 26. 
136 Ibid., p. 20 
137 Ibid., p. 20. 
138 Ibid., p. 25. 
139 Ibid., p. 15. 
140 Ibid., p. 18. Zaikov neither supported nor criticised the idea of a Russian party itself. 
141 Ibid., p. 15. 
142 Ibid., p. 24. 
143 Ibid., p. 29. 
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unacceptable, it was proposed to invite 200 workers and peasants to the Russian party 
conference and 350 to the all-union party congress. 144 It was also proposed by Usmanov that 
some guests from other union republican parties be invited. 145 As to the schedule, the 
conference/congress was to take place in two stages. The problem was whether or not at the first 
stage the conference/congress would elect the Central Committee of the Russian party. 
Gorbachev proposed to elect only the first secretary at the first stage, and to elect the CC after 
the all-union congress, that is, at the second stage. 146 Concerning the naming, it was expressed 
that communists from the Chechen-Ingush organisations thought the name should be 
Communist Party of Russian Federation or RSFSR rather than Russian Communist Party. 
Prokof' ev also stated that the name should be the Communist Party of the RSFSR. 147 
Finally the day of the Russian party conference arrived. 
3. The Social Composition of Delegates to the Russian Conference and the 28th 
Party Congress 
The Russian conference/congress began on 19 June 1990. The number of delegates 
was 2768 in total. Most of the delegates were elected from single mandate electoral districts 
(2020 in number or approximately 73 per cent). From multi-mandate districts were elected 257 
delegates (9.3 per cent) and from the various party conferences, 491 delegates (17.7 per cent) 
were elected. 148 Thus, the party conference did not filter the delegates velY much, though, as we 
have seen, some critics of the electoral procedure had been afraid of this. Nonetheless, the social 
composition of delegates showed a large increase of party secretaries in comparison with the 
2ih Party Congress and the 19th all-union Party Conference as Table 4-1 shows. In particular, 
144 TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 23, d. 29, p. 4. 
145 Ibid., p. 13. 
146 Ibid., p. 16. See also TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 8, d. 72. 
147 TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 23, d. 29, p. 22. 
148 Pravda, 21 June 1990, p. 3. 
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the ratio of okrug, raion and city party committees secretaries rose enormously. 149 
Why did the election result in such a high level of representation of party workers? 
Some argue that this was a result of the apparat's mobilisation. Gorbachev states in his memoirs 
about this result, 'The conference and, of course, the congress [of CP RSFSR] turned into 
forums of party functionaries of mainly raion and city teams. This was the result of elections in 
the process of which party apparatchiki organised vigorous pressure to simply make themselves 
delegates,\50 According to Hahn, the preparatory committee of the Russian conference was the 
main machine of apparat mobilisation. He says the committee was 'the traditional apparat filter 
intended to control the delegate election process from Moscow and ensure that party 
apparatchiki dominated the RCP conference. ' 151 
This argument, however, needs some qualification. If the preparatory committee had 
been the only filter, the ratio of apparat among delegates would have been much higher in 
Russia than in other union republics. For comparison, it is necessary to investigate the social 
composition of delegates to the 28th all-union Party Congress. 152 The 28th congress of the CPSU 
took place from 2 July to 13 July. The number of delegates was 4683 in total. The social 
composition of delegates to the congress shows that fewer full-time party workers came from 
other union republics. Party workers accounted for 40.7 per cent. In the Russian republic the 
party workers ratio was certainly higher (42.3 per cent) than that of other republics (38.3 per 
149 Incidentally, at the 28th Party Congress, Razumovskii was not elected CC secretaty or a 
Politburo member. In addition, he had not been a member of the Presidential Council. Thus, his 
political life finished at the 28th Party Congress. It may be partially because of the result of the 
report and election campaign and the delegate elections to all-union party congress and the 
Russian conference, with which Gorbachev was obviously dissatisfied. 
150 Gorbachev, Zhizn' i Reformy, Vol. 1, p.533; Gorubachofu, Gorubachofu, Jo, p. 686; 
Gorbachev, Memoirs does not have the corresponding sentences. 
151 Gordon Hahn, Russia's Revolution fi'om Above, 1985-2000: Reform, Transition, and 
Revolution in the Fall of the Soviet Communist Regime (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction 
Publishers, 2002), pp. 137-138. 
152 XXVIII s"ezd Kommunisticheskoi Partii Sovetskogo Soyuza: stenograficheskii otchet, Vol. 1, 
(Moskva: Politizdat, 1991), pp. 182-184. 
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cent).153 Thus, the mobilisation of the party apparat by preparatOlY committee of the Russian 
conference may have taken place. 
Nonetheless, what was the apparat's method of mobilisation is not clear. One might 
expect that the party conference that elected the delegates became a filter because the delegate 
elections at the conference were, as we have seen in Table 4-3, frequently non-competitive. 
However, this is not the case. As Table 4-1 shows, at the 28th Party Congress the delegates from 
single mandate electoral districts were 2968 (63.4 per cent). From multi-mandate districts 497 
delegates (10.6 per cent) were elected. From the various party conferences 26 per cent (1218 in 
number) of delegates were elected. This means that in the union republics except for Russia, 
more delegates were elected from party conferences and fewer delegates were from single 
mandate electoral districts, though in these republics the representation of party workers was 
lower than in Russia. Thus, it is not possible to conclude that the party conferences that elected 
the delegates became the method of filter or mobilisation, even if some critics of the delegate 
electoral procedure had expected so. 
Perhaps, contrary to the critics' expectation, the single mandate electoral district 
method was more favourable to lower level party workers. As Table 4-3 shows, the delegate 
electoral district (single mandate) consisted of one or two raions. This might have been better 
for party workers to exercise their influence. In addition, lower party workers had replaced old 
party workers in reports and elections since 1988 and had been newly elected. It was natural that 
such newly elected party workers became delegates. 
Moreover, the 38.3 per cent representation of party workers in other union republics 
than Russia is high enough to assume that the same logic worked evelywhere, which helped 
party workers in general to advance. As discussed above (see VIII -l-(b)), we can add the 
153 The figure 38.3 per cent was calculated by the following way: {Total party workers to the 
28th party congress (1905)-Party workers to the Russian conference (1171)} / {total delegates to 
the 28th party congress (4683)-total delegates to the Russian conference (2768)) 
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following points that influenced the delegates' election. Firstly the CC open letter obstructed the 
Democratic Platform and its potential supporters. This was shown by the fact that the 
representation of intellectuals, who we may assume were the main component of Democratic 
Platforn1 supporters, did not increase. Secondly, party workers' manoeuvring or 'apparat games' 
certainly took place. Thirdly, the workers and peasants were passive in the process. Thus, the 
elections to the Russian conference/congress and the 28th Party Congress resulted in a high level 
of representation of party workers. 
However, it is a different matter to think that most party workers were conservative, 
which is assumed by many researchers. To investigate this is the task in the next sections. 
4. The Election of First Secretary of the CP RSFSR 
On 22 June the election of first secretary of CP RSFSR took place on an alternative 
basis. Valentin Kuptsov, head of the CC department on Work with Social and Political 
Organisations, was recommended by Gorbachev. 154 Other major candidates were Ivan Polozkov, 
first secretary of Krasnodar kraikom, and Oleg Lobov, second secretary of the Arn1enian CP. ISS 
At the first election none of the candidates received enough votes. Only 343 delegates voted for 
Kuptsov and 2278 votes were against him. Votes for Polozkov were 1017 and 1604 votes were 
against him. Votes for Lobov were 848 and 1773 votes were against him. 156 So a run-off 
election had to be held between Polozkov and Lobov. The final result was that Polozkov won a 
majority against Lobov (1396 versus 1066).157 
This was a difficult result for the all-union party leadership and was interpreted as the 
party apparat's conservative resurgence by many researchers. Nonetheless, the difficulty was not 
154 Gorbachev, Zhizn' i Reformy, Vol. 1, p.536; Gorubachofu, Gorubachofil, Jo, p. 691. 
ISS Probably Lobov was one of guests from other union republican parties. 
156 Uchreditel'nyi s"ezd Kommunisticheskoi Partii RSFSR: Stenograjicheskii Dtchet, Vol. 2 
(Moskva: Politizdat, 1991), pp. 169-170. 
157 Ibid., p. 187. Incidentally, Gorbachev mistyped votes for Lobov as '1056'. See Gorbachev, 
Zhizn'i Reformy, Vol. 1, p.538; Gorubachofu, Gorubachofu, Jo, p. 692. 
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only because Polozkov was a well-known conservative figure, but also because Kuptsov, the 
very person recommended by the leadership, lost. He did not go even to the run-off. This was 
the meaning of a competitive party election. As had already happened at oblast' level, once 
competitive palty elections took place, the centre could not interfere in the process any longer. 
This very thing happened in the largest and most important union republic. Organisational 
disarray was accelerated. In a sense, this was the climax of competitive party elections. 
Was this, however, a conservative resurgence? To some degree, the answer must be 
positive. Still Polozkov did not win with an overwhelming majority. If every patty worker had 
been conservative in ideological terms, Polozkov could have won with a first-round majority. 
The crucial factor appears to have been an anti-centre feeling among communists. It seems that 
they voted against the party leadership rather than for 'conservatives', that is, they preferred not 
electing Kuptsov to electing Polozkov. As we have seen, at least at the PPO level 
report-and-election campaigns had been taking place more or less on an alternative basis since 
1988. It is not unlikely that while newly elected PPO secretaries felt responsible to their 
electorates, they were frustrated by their limited influence on the general party affairs, on the 
course of events, and on the party leadership. The debate at the 28th Party Congress will show 
this in the next section. 
5. Controversy over Party Renewal at the 28th Party Congress 
On 5 July 1990, the 28th Patty Congress held section meetings. The largest section was 
'Renewal of the Party', which became a place of stormy debates. ISS More than 1230 delegates 
participated in the section. The main speakers were Polozkov as chairman, Pugo, and 
Manaenkov. 
However, ordinaty participants were more vocal than the main speakers. The 
158 For the fullest discussion on this section, see Stephen White, 'The Failure of CPSU 
Democratization', The Slavonic and East European Review, Vol. 75, No.4 (October 1997). 
153 
traditional way of chairing did not work any more from the beginning. Many participants tried 
to shorten the time of Pugo and Manaenkov's speech.159 In addition, due to participants' 
pressure, representatives of the mass media were allowed to enter. 160 
The main points of debates in the section were the status of PPOs, vanguard or 
parliamentary party, democratic centralism, fractions within the party, and renewal of the party 
leadership. Many rather radical proposals were presented by various people. A construction 
engineer demanded that PPOs decide the structure of raikoms, gorkoms, and obkoms; that PPOs 
keep 80 per cent of collected membership dues; and that the Central Committee should consist 
of about 200 people and become a full-time organ. If such proposals were going to be approved, 
and if the minority's opinion was to be taken into consideration, democratic centralism could be 
supported. 161 According to the head of the militaty of the NOlih West military border, the 
crucial problem was the widening gulf between the leadership and patiy masses. 162 The paliy 
secretary oflvanovo energy institute stated that the CPSU had not become a 'political party' in a 
real sense to the present day; the party should become a parliamentary, rather than vanguard, 
patiy.163 The party secretary in the central construction bureau of ocean mechanics in Leningrad 
said that neither the conference nor the congress but the Central Committee decided the most 
important questions. 164 An energy worker from Krasnoyarsk krai demanded to examine first 
secretaries at all levels and to change the name 'democratic centralism' to 'general democratic 
159 Rossiiskii Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Sotsial'no-Politicheskoi Istorii (RGASPI) fond (f.) 582, 
Opis' (0.) 6, ed. khr. 16, pp. 4-5. 
160 Ibid., p. 10. 
161 Ibid., p. 16. Hereafter the author intentionally introduces various reformers' speeches 
without organising the contents, because the author thinks these velY assertive but not organised 
at all views were a main feature in this section meeting. In addition, the author does not mention 
speaker's name if they are not a high rank person, because it seems to me that it is not impOliant 
to denote worker or PPO secretaries' names in this context. 
162 Ibid., p. 19. 
163 Ibid., pp. 21-22. 'Party secretary' hereafter in this section denotes a PPO or workshop patiy 
organisation secretaty, ifnot specifically noted. 
164 Ibid., p. 27. 
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centralism' .165 The head of the military history institute of the Defence Ministry stated that if a 
party referendum would not act as before, they would face the risk of degeneration into a 
'secretaries' party,166 The deputy head of the faculty of Novosibirsk higher military political 
school proposed to elect congress delegates by secret, competitive, and direct ballot; but he 
denied other platforms and fractions except for the CC platfonn. 167 The general director of a 
science-production combine from Moscow called for the renewal of 90 per cent of the party 
leadership and to change the raikom and gorkom plenum into the council of PPO secretaries. 168 
The head of a department of scientific research institute in Moscow said, 'maybe ... the 
CPSU-this is the PPOs. PPOs are the velY party, not its basis;' and he proposed to change the 
name 'democratic centralism' to 'democratic unity'. 169 The party secretary of a chemical 
factOlY asked for the election, from below, from PPO secretaries to the General Secretary on an 
alternative basis. 170 The party secretary of a trust from Kazakhstan asked to elect the Central 
Committee from electoral districts. l7l The party secretary of a metallurgy production combine 
proposed to abolish the obkom apparat, leaving the raikom and republican party apparat. 172 The 
head constructor of a production combine in Khar'kov said, 'millions of communists ... are not 
attracted because they do not have any influence on party policy making.' 173 A party veteran of 
Oktyabr' raion of Moscow city supported the idea of the council of PPO secretaries and 
shrinking the raikom apparat. 174 The party secretmy of Orekhovo-Zuevo cotton spinning 
combine in Moscow oblast' asked that PPOs could retain 80 per cent of collected membership 
165 Ibid., p. 28. 
166 Ibid., p. 33. 
167 Ibid., p. 36. 
168 Ibid., p. 40. 
169 Ibid., pp. 44-45. 
170 Ibid., p. 54. 
171 Ibid., p. 61. 
172 Ibid., p. 63. 
173 Ibid., p. 64. 
174 Ibid., p. 66. 
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dues.175 M. A. Mukhametov, first secretary of Sibai gorkom in Bashkir ASSR, proposed to 
create a horizontal stmcture in the party.' 176 The deputy party secretary of Ural polytechnic 
institute demanded a series of rights for PPOs: to decide the PPO stmcture by itself, to summon 
electoral organs, to stop implementing the central decisions that do not seem appropriate for 
PPOs, to elect party congress and conference delegates, to call referendums at the raikom level, 
and to retain 75 per cent of collected membership dues. 177 
From these speeches it is obvious that many participants, including PPO secretaries, 
were reform-oriented. In addition, that their fmstration came from their limited influence on the 
entire party policy, state of affairs, and the leadership is clear too. It should be remembered that 
the party was not necessarily a citadel of conservatives. 
Nonetheless, it is also impressive that they were fmstrated individually. That is, though 
their demands certainly had some common elements, they did not organise them beforehand. 
For example, some demanded that PPOs could keep at least 50 per cent of membership due, 
others demanded 75 per cent and others 80 per cent. Thus, the final decisions at the party 
congress inevitably became the product of compromise. 
6. Elections at the 28th Party Congress 
Before seeing some congress resolutions, let us consider elections at the party 
congress. The 28th Party Congress held some elections, including General Secretaty, deputy 
General Secretaty, the Central Committee. Although the General Secretary election was 
certainly competitive, the candidate other than Gorbachev was less well-known, therefore it 
cannot be said that this election was impOliant (nonetheless it should be remembered that 
175 Ibid., p. 73. 
176 Ibid., p. 76. 
177 Ibid.,pp. 77-78. 
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Gorbachev received 1116 'against' votes). 178 An important election was that of deputy secretmy. 
The main candidates were Ligachev and Ivashko. The result was a little surprising. Ivashko got 
3109 positive votes and 1309 against votes. Ligachev received only 776 positive votes and 3642 
delegates voted against him.179 This was a humiliating defeat for Ligachev. If all party workers 
had been conservatives, Ligachev, a famous conservative figure, would have won. Here we can 
recognise again that congress delegates were not necessarily 'conservative' but anti-centre or 
anti-current leadership. This can be understood from the fact that a radical proposal to directly 
elect the Politburo and Secretariat from the party congress rather than from the Central 
Committee was rejected by a very nan-ow margin of 87 votes (1959 delegates voted for and 
2046 were against). 180 
The new Central Committee was elected by a rather complicated but not competitive 
procedure. The General Secretary and his deputy were ex officio members. For electing other 
members, two lists were prepared by the leadership. The first list included 311 members, in 
which five members were allocated for each union republic and further seats were filled by 
representatives for each 100,000 of their membership. The second list was a 'central list', which 
elected 99 members. The second list originally included 85 members but was supplemented at 
the congress. The congress approved these lists. In the end, the new central committee consisted 
of 412 members. 181 The turnover rate was remarkable. Almost 90 per cent of its members were 
newcomers. Local and PPO level party officials, intellectuals and workers increased their 
representations. The younger generation was co-opted. Women's representation increased. More 
nationalities were represented. 182 Nonetheless, this was not the Central Committee that 
178 XXVIII s "ezd Kommunisticheskoi Partii, Vol. 2, p. 295. 
179 Ibid., p. 391. 
180 Ibid., p. 173. 
181 Izvestiya TsK KPSS, 1990-8, p. 3; Evan Mawdsley and Stephen White, The Soviet Eliteji-om 
Lenin to Gorbachev: The Central Committee and its Members, 1917-1991 (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2000), pp. 203-204. 
182 Ibid., pp. 198-206. 
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reformist party members wanted. It had not been elected on a competitive basis. The congress 
just modified and approved lists that had been prepared beforehand. In addition, the 
predominant majority had been determined by the first list. The congress could modify and 
supplement only the second list that included only 85 members originally. As Gorbachev said in 
his memoirs, 'because the predominant part of future CC members were represented by 
delegates of union republics, the struggles for these posts had ended before the congress.' 183 
This was a product of compromise like the congress resolutions that we will see in the next 
section. 
7. Decisions on the Competitive Election and Party Renewal 
The 28 th Party Congress approved the platform which tumed into the 'Programmatic 
Declaration' and the new party Rules. Let me consider some points regarding party election and 
renewal. 
Conceming intra-party nomenklatura, the final decisions at the 28 th congress called for 
the abolition of the nomenklatura approach. 184 The Programmatic Declaration stated, 'In its 
cadre work, the party repudiates formalism and a nomenklatura approach;' 'The congress 
favours direct and, as a rule, contested elections of secretaries of patiy committees and delegates 
to party forums, with a secret ballot and the unrestricted nomination of candidates.' 185 The new 
party Rules also stated, 'The party's leadership [and] executive control bodies are elected. They 
183 Gorbachev, Zhizn' i Reformy, Vol. 1, p. 561; Gorbachofu, Gorbachofu, Jo, p. 719. 
184 Regarding fractions, territorial base of primary party organisations, and departyisation of 
military force, the results were ambiguous. Though some of these issues will be treated in the 
next chapter, for more details see Stephen White, 'Background to the XXVIII Congress' and 
'The Politics of the XXVII Congress', both in E. A. Rees ed., The Soviet Communist Party in 
Disarray: The XXVIII Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (London: 
Macmillan Press, 1992); Toshihiko Ueno, 'Sorenpokyosanto Dai28kaitaikaiwo meguru 
Shomondai [Problems of the 28th Congress of the CPSU]', Hogakukenkyu, Vol. 68, No. 2 
(Februaty 1995). 
185 Pravda, 15 July 1990, p. 3; Current Digest of the Soviet Press (CDSP), Vol. 42, No. 37 
(1990), pp. 20-21. 
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are elected by secret ballot. The ballot includes any number of candidates.' 186 Thus, basically 
the reformers' demand were realised on this point. Still, the word 'favour' and 'as a lUle' were 
ambiguous. Thus, some problems were left. 
The Programmatic Declaration rejected 'democratic centralism in the form it took 
under the administrative-command system'. And the minority was given the right to uphold its 
view. 187 However, the new party Rules stated, 'The CPSU lives and operates on the basis of 
ideological unity and party comradeship and the principle of democratic centralism'. 188 Again, 
this depended on one's interpretation. 
As to fractions, to organise 'platforms' was allowed by the Programmatic Declaration 
and the party Rules. 189 However, the creation of fractions was prohibited by the party Rules. No 
clear distinction between fractions and platfom1s was made. The ambiguity was not overcome, 
because these two documents, overall, were the products of compromise. The fact that the 
congress failed to approve the new party Programme was evidence in itself of its compromise 
nature. 
After the congress, the mass exodus of party members accelerated. Certainly some part 
of them left the party for pragmatic reasons. When the administrative function of the party was 
lost, joining the party was not a prerequisite of career promotion any more. It was natural for 
them to leave the party. Nonetheless, other part left because they were disappointed with the 
party reform. As we have seen, some delegates, including a number of party workers, were 
certainly refOlm-oriented. The compromising nature of the new Central Committee, the new 
party Rules, and the Programmatic Declaration did not satisfy such reformist party members. 
186 Pravda, 18 July 1990, p. 1; CDSP, Vol. 42, No. 38 (1990), p. 15. 
187 Pravda, 15 July 1990, p. 3; CDSP, Vol. 42, No. 38 (1990), pp. 20-21. 
188 Pravda, 18 July 1990, p. 1; CDSP, Vol. 42, No. 38 (1990), p. 15. 
189 Pravda, 15 July 1990, p. 3; CDSP, Vol. 42, No. 38 (1990), pp. 21; Pravda, 18 July 1990, p. 
1; CDSP, 42-38 (1990), p. 16. 
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IX. After the 28th Party Congress 
1. Party Elections after the 28th Party Congress 
As mentioned above, the Programmatic Declaration and new Rules committed the 
party to competitive elections. In October 1990, the CC Secretariat published the draft 
instruction 'On the Procedure of the Elections in the CPSU and Recall from the Composition of 
the Electoral Organs.' 190 This instruction was revised and approved at the January joint CC and 
CCC plenum (1991) as part of the 'Normative-Methodological Documents of the CPSU'. 191 If 
these rules had been universally applied, all party elections should have been competitive. 
However, these were not universal at all. Though there is no systematic data on party 
elections after the patty congress, it is possible to estimate how vigorous the competitive party 
elections were. Although in August 1990 two competitive obkom first secretary elections 
(Krasnodar and Ivanovo) were reported, these were only part of them. l92 This tendency 
continued until August 1991. In particular, in 1991 competitive party elections became fewer. 193 
Some elections clearly mentioned their non-alternative basis. 194 Thus, it is not possible to argue 
that competitive party elections entirely replaced appointment from above, despite the 
Programmatic Declaration and new party Rules. 
190 Pravda, 30 October 1990, p. 3. 
191 Materialy ob "edinennogo Plenuma Tsenfral 'nogo KomUeta i Tsentral 'noi Kontrol 'noi 
Komissii KPSS, 31 yanvarya 1991 g. (Moskva: Politizdat, 1991), pp. 113-120; Izvestiya TsK 
KPSS, 1991, No.3, pp. 19-22. 
192 See, Pravda,S August 1990, p. 3; Ibid., 16 August 1990, p. 2. 
193 Though the author tried to see all obkom level election results in Pravda, the author cannot 
deny that he might have missed some results. Nonetheless, the basic tendency of rare 
competitive elections can be shown. On competitive party elections, see Pravda, 2 September 
1990, p. 2; 12 September 1990, p. 2; 18 September 1990, p. 3; 23 September 1990, p. 2; 6 
October 1990, p. 2; 12 October 1990, p. 3; 21 October 1990, p. 2; 21 October 1990, p. 1; 27 
October 1990, p. 2; 28 October 1990, p. 4; 4 November 1990, p. 2; 25 November 1990, p. 2; 29 
November 1990, p. 2; 1 December 1990, p. 4; 2 December 1990, p. 2; 9 December 1990, p. 2; 
24 December 1990, p. 2; 21 February 1991, p. 2; 1 May 1991, p. 2; 3 June 1991, p. 2; 4 July 
1991, p. 2; 12 August 1991, p. 2; 19 August 1991, p. 2. 
194 For example, see Pravda, 28 September 1990, p. 2; 15 August 1991, p. 2. 
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In addition, from these elections we can understand one more important issue: the 
reason first secretaries left their posts. The reason 'in order to concentrate on the work of 
chairman of oblast' soviet' increased enormously.195 When the party was deprived of its 
traditional administrative function, the post became less attractive for many first secretaries. Or, 
they could not understand the new function of the party as a 'political party'. 
2. Intra-Party Nomenklatura 
As infelTed from these insufficient electoral attempts, the implementation and 
interpretation of the abolition of intra-party nomenklatura were mixed. The abolition of the 
nomenklatura approach was, it seems, related only to non-party posts. The meeting of the 
Secretariat of 30 August 1990 stated that the CC CPSU would confirm only leading party 
workers and also leaders of printing organs, academic establishments and scientific institutions 
within the jurisdiction of the CC CPSU, while it agreed to abolish nomenklatura postS.1 96 In 
October 1990, Oleg Shenin, CC SecretalY, reported on the reduction of cadre posts examined by 
the CC CPSU from about 15 thousand to 2 thousand, which included what was mentioned as 
party workers and so forth.197 Therefore, according to their interpretation, the intra-party 
nomenklatura would be retained. This can be recognised by the last nomenklatura list that was 
disclosed later. It was proposed by the CC Organisational department, and included 945 
members who were responsible for personnel work (the CC CPSU, CC CP RSFSR, CCC 
(Central Control Commission) CPSU, and CCC CP RSFSR) as the first group. These posts were 
entirely subject to the confirmation of the Secretariat of the CC CPSU. In the second group, 
1882 posts (first secretaty and second secretaries ofCC CP of union republic, secretaries ofCP 
RSFSR, first secretaries of republican committees, kraikom, obkoms, gorkoms of Moscow, Kiev, 
195 For example, see Pravda, 12 August 1990, p. 2; 25 August 1990, p. 2; 26 August 1990, p. 2; 
2 September 1990, p. 2; 28 September 1990, p. 2; 10 April 1991, p. 2; 4 July 1991, p. 2. 
196 Pravda, 30 August 1990, p.2. 
197 Izvestiya TsK KPSS, 1990, No. 10, p. 6. 
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and Tashkent, secretaries of all-army party committee, party committees of KGB, MVD internal 
troops and railway troops, and also workers of apparat of the CC CPSU, leaders of organs of 
party press, party scientific institutions and the Lenin museum) were included. In this group, 
1502 posts were subject to the confirmation to the Secretariat of the CC CPSU, which excluded 
42 posts of responsible workers of the CCC CPSU apparat and 338 posts of the apparat of the 
CC and CCC CP RSFSR from the total of 1882 posts. This excluded part was subject to 
inspection of the sector of recoding and analysis of cadres of the Organisational Department of 
the CC CPSu. Therefore, the subjects of the CC's confirmation were 2447 (945+1502), which 
were a few more than the officially announced figure (about 2 thousand). As a result, this list 
suggests that, although the subject of the CC's confirmation in the nomenklatura list did reduce 
in size and probably the appointments to these posts were to be confinned ex post jacto, many 
party posts were still under the jurisdiction of the nomenklatura liSt. 198 
3. The Attempts to Recover the Organisational Unity 
From the above it seems that the party leadership, after the 28th Party Congress, tried 
to recover the organisational unity that had been lost due in part to the introduction of the 
electoral mechanism. As we have seen in the last chapter, the party apparat on internal party 
affairs had not faced such a huge reorganisation. Thus, the party leadership had the potential to 
198 TsKhSD, Fond 89, Perechen' 20, Delo 77, List 3-4, 7. This Fond 89 list did not have full 
post list of the second group. Incidentally, Hahn's account of this list includes misleading points. 
Firstly, he mistyped number of posts of the second group as 1182. Secondly, he does not 
distinguish Secretariat confirmation from the Organisational department's confilmation. Thirdly, 
he states 'Still subject to CC departments' "confirmation" --- second secretaries and secretaries 
of partkomy from union republic level down to obkomy, of partkomy of the army and public 
organizations, heads of partkom departments from union republic down to olmlzhkomy.' See 
Hahn, Russia's Revolution fi'om Above, p. 393. However, it is not the case. These were in sixth 
group in the list, which 'supposes the collection of brief directory-biographical information.' 
See TsKhSD Fond 89, Perechen' 20, Delo 77, List 5. In addition this sixth group included 
responsible workers in social organisations, national economy, means of mass information, and 
so forth, which Hahn does not mention. It is unlikely that the party could claim its control over 
these organisations in August 1991. The problem of paliy control over the state was discussed in 
Chapter 3. 
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mobilise its power so as to recover party unity. Shenin played the main part in this mobilisation. 
On 3 December 1990, the CC Secretariat approved a decision 'On the Orientation of 
Patiy Committees on the Questions of Strengthening the Organisational Work for the 
Stabilisation of Political and Economic Situation in corresponding with the Programmes of CC 
General Secretary, USSR President'. This decision attached a memorandum complaining of the 
situation in the party: 'The organisational work and control of implementation are extremely 
weak and propaganda in local mass media is not widely developed;' 'in several regions, given 
decisions are practically left without attention.' Thus, 'CC Secretariat notes that ... strict 
intra-party discipline, timeliness and consistency in implementation of targets acquire 
exceptional significance.' 199 In the draft of his speech at the meeting of first secretaries of 
union republican parties, republican parties, kraikoms, and obkoms, Shenin emphasised the 
interrelation of central and lower party organs. He stated, 'It is necessary to organise the 
uninterrupted work of party structures at all levels within the limitation of the precisely defined 
responsibility of each level. ,200 The joint plenum of the CC and CCC in January 1990 approved 
the decision 'On the Organisational and Political Strengthening of Party Organisations'. This 
decision mentioned 'to reform the system of direct connection between the CC and party 
organisations.'201 In July 1991, Shenin argued for the restoration of vertical relations in cadre 
work.202 He was undoubtedly eager to recover the vertical structure of the party. 
Of course, it is not clear that his attempts were successful. It seems that centre-republic 
relations never recovered. In particular the Baltic parties increasingly became independent. On 
the other hand, centre-oblast' relations in Russia would allow a mixed interpretation. 
Circumstantial evidence like uncompetitive party elections and the nomenklatura list seems to 
199 TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 20, d. 13. 
200 TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 23, d. 2, p. 22. 
201 Materialy ob "edinennogo Plenuma Tsentral'nogo Komiteta i Tsentra1 'noi Komissii KPSS: 
31 yanValya 1991 g. (Moskva: Politizdat, 1991), pp. 109. 
202 Izvestiya TsK KPSS, 1991, No.7, p. 6. 
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suggest Shenin's attempts to recover the vertical structure were somewhat successful. 
4. Reform Movements toward the 29th Extraordinary Party Congress 
While such attempts to recover the vertical structure were activated by the party 
apparat, reformist elements within the party kept trying to transform the palty into a 'political 
party'. The agendas important to reform from within were the new party Programme, and 
fractional or platform activity in the party. 
The new patty Programme had been discussed since the 28th Party Congress. After the 
CC plenum in July, the draft of the new Programme was published in August. This document 
was very social democratic or 'democratic socialist' in its language, rather than communist. It 
accepted some fOlm of market economy, various political parties, plurality of political 
opinions. 203 The July CC plenum decided to summon an extraordinary party congress 111 
November to December 1991, in which the new party Programme was to be approved,z°4 
Probably Gorbachev intended to split the party with refOlmist elements at the extraordinaty 
party congress. 
Among such reformist groups, the most progressive movement was the Democratic 
Movement of Communists, which was successor to the Democratic Platform that had fallen 
apart. It supported social democracy, some sort of market economy, and splitting the party. 
Though the Marxist platform was more moderate than the Democratic Movement of 
C . h d '11' 205 ommul1lst, t ey expresse a Wi 1I1gness to cooperate. 
Moreover, the first secretaty of CP RSFSR, Polozkov, resigned in August. Kuptsov 
became the new first secretaty. Because Polozkov had been under attack from both reformers 
and conservatives, his resignation itself did not give an advantage to reformers. Still the new 
203 Pravda, 8 August 1991, pp. 3-4. 
204 Pravda, 27 July 1991, p. 1. 
205 For details see Dawn Mann, 'Divisions within the Communist Party Intensify', RLI Report 
on the USSR, Vol. 3, No. 30 (July 26, 1991), pp. 4-5. 
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first secretary Kuptsov was more reform-oriented. 
Under such conditions, it is clear that there was some possibility to reform the CPSU 
from within. At least, one could recognise that there was a rather clear cleavage over the new 
party Programme. Still it was too late for Gorbachev to take an initiative. This does not 
necessarily mean that the August attempted coup put an end to the reform effort. Rather the 
party had dropped into an unprecedented crisis after the 28th Party Congress. Since 1990 the 
party had lost 4.2 million members. In the meantime, the party organisations were disintegrating, 
and the party apparat lost confidence in its activity as we have seen in the last chapter. 
Furthem1ore, the party faced a financial crisis and its property was fragmented, as we will see in 
the next chapter. Probably the ideal chance of ref 01111 was the 28th Party Congress. Why did 
Gorbachev fail? Let us consider it as a conclusion. 
X. Conclusion 
From our discusstion above, it seems possible to understand why the party refom1 
failed at the 28th Party Congress. Firstly conservative resistance to reform unquestionably 
existed. The election of Polozkov as CP RSFSR first secretary was shocking to the party 
leadership as well as ordinary party members. The mood created by Polozkov's election led to a 
grave atmosphere at the beginning of the all-union party congress. The conservative reaction 
was undoubtedly a partial reason for the failure of party reform. 
Secondly, the weakness of the opposition outside the party did not encourage the 
reform movement within the party. In the Polish case (1980), the 'Solidarity' movement pressed 
party reformers to organise 'horizontal structures' and competitive party elections. In the 
Hungarian case (1989) the opposition was weaker than' Solidarity', but, it seems, stronger than 
'Democratic Russia'. At least the opposition parties could seriously challenge the Hungarian 
Socialist Party, which led to its further reform. It is instructive that in Lithuania the communist 
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parties split up and more reformist parts survived as a social democratic party (the Lithuanian 
Democratic Labour Party). 
Thirdly we can see the weakness of the organised reform movement within the party. 
True, the Democratic Platform emerged. True, as we have seen, many communists, including 
PPO secretaries, were reform-oriented. Though their importance should be recognised, how well 
organised they were was far from clear. As we have seen, it is impressive that at the section of 
'renewal of the party' at the 28th Patiy Congress, speakers were very assertive but did not form a 
united front at all. They offered a multiplicity of criticisms and proposals, but did not present a 
coherent alternative. In addition, it seems that 'reformers' in the party consisted of various kinds 
of people. While some were very radical, that is, seemed to try to transform the CPSU into a 
liberal-right wing party in a Western sense rather than a social democratic party, others were still 
loyal to 'democratic socialism'. Moreover, such reformers as the Democratic Platform, in my 
impression, could not get rid of mutual suspicion. It is well known that so-called 'Democrats' at 
the time in general failed to form a collective identity.206 It seems that this was the case with the 
Democratic Platform as well. Therefore, the Democratic Platform fell apart quickly. It also 
lacked a clear leadership. A series of famous figures were certainly included in the Democratic 
Platform. Still they failed to make a united front. This was one of the reasons why so-called 
'Democrats' failed to command a majority at the 28 th Party Congress. Probably the only 
possible way to organise the reformers would have been if Gorbachev had provided the 
leadership. 
However, Gorbachev did not approach the reformers very much. There were two 
reasons. Firstly Gorbachev was personally very critical of the Democratic Platform, as we have 
seen (VIII-I-b). Secondly he had to manage the power vacuum. He might have had some 
chance to organise reformers at the 28th Party Congress. However, if Gorbachev had provided 
206 See M. Steven Fish, Democracy pom Scratch: Opposition and Regime in the New Russian 
Revolution (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), pp. 81-93. 
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leadership for the reformers, the party would have split up and have lost its ties with the security 
organs. This was a too risky choice for Gorbachev, given the power vacuum that had been 
created by reforn1 of the party apparat. As the author had argued in the last chapter, the Soviet 
political system went into the phase of the 'power vacuum' that was characterised by 
immobilism at the time of the 28th Party Congress. The Presidency established itself very slowly. 
Thus he did not have any other alternative power base than the party. If the party had split at the 
28th Party Congress, the emerging chaotic situation might have become worse. It seems that this 
was a really hard decision for Gorbachev. He chose not to split the party, and this accelerated 
the rapid exodus from the party. 
The attempts at party refOlm created unintended results --- 'unintended' if the 
hypotheses mentioned above (III) were the case. Thanks to party elections, local cliques became 
independent. The breakdown of old career patterns did not necessarily promote better 'political' 
cadres, and more democracy could not always resolve every problem. The party failed to 
become a political party and suffered organisational disalTay. 
While, on the one hand, the party lost its traditional administrative functions, it failed 
to find new functions. In the end, the party lost its raison d'etre. After the 28th Party Congress, 
the mass exodus of party members accelerated. The patty lost nearly 4.2 million members 
between 1990 and the middle of 1991. This exodus had a serious impact on the future of the 
party (see Chapter 5). What, then, remained with the party? They were huge property assets and 
ties with security organs. We will investigate further the party finance and property in the next 
chapter and party-military relations in Chapter 6. 
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Table 4-1: The Social Composition of the Delegates to the 2i" Party Congress, 19th Party Conference, 
th 
----- - -
- -- -- ------- --- -- 7 -----~- - _.--
---- ----
2ih 19th Founding 28th congress 
congress conference congress of (2-14 July 
(25 (28 June-l Russian CP 1990) 
February-6 July 1988) (19-23 June, 4-6 
March September 1990) 
1986) 
The place of election 
Single mandate electoral district 2020 (73%) 2968 (63.4%) 
Multi-mandate electoral district 257 (9.3) 497 (10.6) 
The party conferences 491 (17.7) 1218 (26) 
Ethnic groups 72 72 47 63 
Total number of delegates 5,000 (100) 5,000 (100) 2,768 (100) 4683 (100) 
New delegates (percentage of renewal) 3,827 3934 (84.0) 
(76.5) 
Women 1,352 1,258 (25.2) 173 (6.3) 344 (7.3) 
(27.0) 
Workers 1,705 1,638 (32.8) 264 (9.5) 543 (11.6) 
(34.1) 841 (30.4)' 1,548 (33.1i 
People engaged in industry, construction, transpOli, 1,375 577 (20.8) 1,005 (21.5) 
communication (27.5) 
Workers in agricultural economy 872 (17.4) 866 (17.3) 235 (8.5) 483 (10.3) 
353 (12.8)? 738 (15.8)? 
Kolkhoz members 118 (4.3) 255 (5.4) 
Economic leaders Approximately 
17% (796 in 
number) 
Leaders of productive and scientific-productive 355(7.1) 354 (7.1) 210 (7.6) 
combines, enterprises, building, constructive 
olXanisations and engineer-technical service 
Directors of sovkhoz 80 (1.6) 74 (1.5) 60 (2.2) 
Chairmen of Kolkhoz 116 (2.3) 108 (2.2) 75 (2.7) 
Scientific and creative Intellectuals 436 (8.7) 245 (8.9) 339 (7.2)3 
392 (8.4) 
Writers, prominent artist, honoured teachers, 156(3.1) 
doctors 
Workers of scientific and higher educational 114(2.3) 175 (3.5) 
establishment 
Workers of education 93 (1.9) 
Workers of public health 41 (0.8) 
Workers of culture and ali 69 (1.4) 129 (4.7) 
Workers of mass information 43 (0.9) 34 (1.2) 53 (1.1) 




Party activist in a broad sense 3,153 (63.1) 
Secretaries of the CC CPSU 12 (0.3) 
Secretaries of the CCs CPs of republics, kraikoms, 290 (5.8) 242 (5.2) 
obkoms 
Secretaries ofkraikoms and obkoms 97 (3.5) 
Secretaries of okrugkoms, gorkoms, raikoms 570 (11.4) 537 (10.7) 421(15.2) 1075 (22.9) 
Secretaries of agrarian raikoms 250 (9.0) 
Secretaries of PPOs, shop party organisations, party 698 (14.0) 762 (15.2) 
groups 
Secretaries ofPPOs 339 (12.2) 486 (10.4) 
Heads and deputy heads of departments and 90 (1.9) 
instructors of party committees 





Workers in soviet 305 (11.0) 
Workers of trade union, komsomol, and other social 31 (Ll) 
organisations 
Peoples' deputies 3,376 3,119 (62.4) 2,737 (58.4) 
(67.5) 
Peoples' deputies of the USSR 113 (4.1) 276 (5.9) 
Peoples' deputies of the union republics and 516 (11.0) 
autonomous r~ublics 
Peoples' deputies of Russian republic 126 (4.6) 
Peoples' deputies of autonomous republics in 102 (3.7) 
Russian republic 
Peoples' deputies of locals soviets in Russian 1,387 (50.1) 
republic 
Armed forces, ministry of internal affairs, KGB More than 6% 
(281n) 
Armed forces 183 (6.6) 
Sources: The 2711l congress, Pravda, 28 February 1986, p. 5; XXVII s"ezd KOllllllllllisticheskoi Partii Sovetskogo 
SOYlIza: stellograficheskii otchet, Vol. 1 (Moskva: Politizdat, 1986), pp.268-271. The XIX conference, Pravda, 30 
June 1988, p. 5; XIX VsesoYlIzllaya kOllferelltsl)la KOlllllllllzisticheskoi Partii Sovetskogo Soyuza: stellograficheskii 
otchet vol. 1 (Moskva: Politizdat, 1988), pp, 132-134. The founding congress of Russian CP, Pravda, 21 June 1990, p. 
3. The 28th congress Pravda,S July 1990, p. 4; XXVIII s"ezd KOllll1lllllisticheskoi Partii Sovetskogo SOYlIza: 
stellograficheskii otchet, Vol. 1 (Moskva: Politizdat, 1991), pp. 182-184. The composition of party workers in the 28th 
congress,Izvestiya TsK KPSS, 1990, No.8, p. 128. See also Toshihiko Ueno, 'Sorenpokyosanto Dai28kaitaikaiwo 
meguru Shomondai [Problems of the 28th Congress of the CPSU]', HogakukellkYlI, Vol. 68, No.2 (February 1995), 
pp. 336-337. 
I This figure is 'Workers' plus 'People engaged in industry, construction, transport, communication' calculated by the 
author. 
2 This figure is 'Workers' plus 'People engaged in industty, construction, transport, communication' calculated by the 
author. 
3 This figure excludes 'workers in mass information' calculated by the author. 
4 This figure includes 'Secretaries ofPPOs, shop party organisations, party groups' calculated by the author. 
5 This figure is calculated by the author from the sub-categories. 
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Table 4-2: Results of the Report-and-Election Campaign (1988-1990) 
1988 1989 1990 
N umber of PPOs 441578 
PPOs which 441,531 (99.99%) 158,505 
conducted elections 
PPO secretaries 441,531 163,261 ** 
elected in the 
report-election 
meetings 
PPO secretaries 212,414 (48.81 %) 70,004 (42.9%) 
elected from two or 
more candidates 
PPOs which 398,278 (100%)* 310,133 (100%) 
conducted election (in 
territorial party 
organisations) 
PPOs secretaries 398,575* 384009 
elected (in territorial 
party organisations) 
PPO secretaries 193,214 (48.5%)* 136,498 (44.0%) 
elected from two or 
more candidates (in 
territorial party 
organisations) 
*Izvestiya TsK KPSS, 1991-5 states both results of 1988 and 1990 report and election campaign. 
However, the 1988 result differs from the previously reported one in Izvestiya TsK KPSS, 
1989-3. Though it is not clear why this happened, probably the later figures exclude PPOs 
directly subordinate to the CC CPSU (e.g. PPOs in military organs). 
**The number of elected secretaries was not the same as the one of meeting because of the 
changes of the structures of some party organisations in the course of reports and elections. 
Source: 1988: Izvestiya TsK KPSS, 1989, No.3, p. 18; 1989: Izvestiya TsK KPSS, 1990, No.2, p. 
67; 1988* and 1990: lzvestiya TsK KPSS, 1991, No.5, p. 70. 
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Table 4-3: The Results of Delegate Elections of Party Leaders 
Place of the election Number of Number Number of 
Candidates of Voters Votes 'for' 
(%) 
M. S. Frunze raion, Moscow city (single 2 2953 1803 (61.3) 
Gorbachev mandate) 
L. N. Zaikov Donsk city, Tula oblast' (single 3 4621 2833 (61.3) 
mandate) 
V. A. Ivashko Solonyanskii and Tomakovskii 2 3834 3681 (96.0) 
raions, Dnepropetrovsk oblast' 
(single mandate) 
V. A. Dzerzhinskii raion, Moscow city 20 38840 30171 (77.7) 
Kryuchkov (multi-candidate, 12 mandates) 
E. K. Ligachev Ivnyanskii and Prokhorovskii raions, 3 3576 2852 (79.8) 
Belgorod oblast' (single mandate) 
Yu. D. Frunze raion, Moscow city (single 3 3123 2032 (65.0) 
Maslyukov mandate) 
V. A. Dokshitskii Lepel'skii raions, 1 4448 4005 (90.0) 
Medvedev* Vitebsk oblast' (single mandate) 
N. I. Ryzhkov Leningradskii raion, Moscow city 10 2493 1527 (61.3) 
(single mandate) 
E. A. Kievskii raion, Moscow city (single 2 2838 2110 (74.4) 
Shevardnadze mandate) 
A. N. Yakovlev Koroshevskii raion, Moscow city 65 16838 10670 (63.4) 
(multi-mandate, 6 mandates) 
A. P. The Kyrgyz Party Congress (37 37 937 867 (92.5) 
Biryukova* mandates)-
A. V. Vlasov* The Rostov Oblast' Party 3 982 933 (74.6) 
Conference (3 mandates) 
A. I. Kardymovskii and Smolemnskii I 3579 3438 (96.1) 
Luk'yanov* raions, Smolensk oblast' (single 
mandate) 
E. M. Severo-Osetinsk Oblast' Party 10 534 527 (98.7) 
Primakov* Conference (10 mandates) 
B. K. Pugo* The Dushanbe City Party 6 579 548 (94.6) 
Conference (6 mandates) 
G. P. The Latvia Party Congress (16 29 404 347 (85.9) 
Razumovskii mandates) 
D. T.Yazov The Far East Militaty District Party 13 528 496 (93.4) 
Conference (10 mandates) 
O. D. Baklanov Science Production Combine 2 3565 2855 (80.0) 
'Yuzhno', Dnepropetrovsk oblast' 
(single mandate) 
A. N. Girenko Genichskii raion, Kherson oblast' 2 3473 2997 (86.3) 
(single mandate) 
Yu. A. Volovskii raion, Lipetsk oblast' 1 3026 2923 (96.6) 
Manaenkov* (single mandate) 
E. S. Stroev* Dolzhanskii, Kollnyanskii, and 1 3461 3420 (98.8) 
Maloarkhangel'skii raions, Orlov 
oblast' (single mandate) 
G. I. Usmanov Chistopol' city and 2 2713 2083 (76.8) 
Novosheshminskii raion, Tatar 
ASSR (single mandate) 
I. T. Frolov* The Chimkent Oblast' Party 16 733 726 (99.0) 
Conference (16 mandate) 
V. N. Volotnikov and N. N. Slyunikov did not agree to participate in the delegate elections 
Source: Glasnost', 1990, No.2 (21 June), p. 3. 




























Chapter 5 Financial Crisis and Commercial Activities 
I. Introduction 
After the 28 th Party Congress, Gorbachev more or less succeeded in depriving the 
CPSU of its administrative functions, but failed to transform the party into a 'political party' as 
we have seen in the previous chapters. Therefore, I have argued that 'the party lost its raison 
d' etre. ' However, as Ronald Hill argues, the party was not only an administrative organ, but also 
an economic actor.! Its huge property assets and massive incomes from nearly 20 million party 
members made the party an economic actor distinguished from any other organisation in the 
Soviet Union. Certainly the party's economic role needs further investigation. 
This chapter analyses the disintegration of the CPSU from a budgetary perspective.2 
Previous chapters have mainly focused on Gorbachev's attempts at party reform, on personnel 
matters and institutional changes. The budget has been scarcely researched. 3 However, in 
general, the budget is one of the keys to sustaining any organisation. A more detailed 
investigation is accordingly necessary to understand the disintegration of the CPSU. 
The structure of the argument is as follows. Firstly, the process of budget formation is 
! See Ronald J. Hill, 'The Communist Party and After', in Stephen White, Alex Pravda and Zvi 
Gitelman eds., Development in Soviet & Post-Soviet Politics (London: Macmillan Press, 1992), 
p. 70; Ronald J. Hill, 'The CPSU: Decline and Collapse', Irish Slavonic Studies, Vol. 12 (1991), 
p. 101. 
2 The argument of this paper is mainly based on my previous article in Japanese. See Atsushi 
Ogushi, 'Sorenkyosanto Hokaikateito Yoinno Bunseki [The Analysis of the Process and the 
Cause of the CPSU Disintegration]" Roshiakenkyu [Russian Studies], Vol. 31 (October 2000). 
However, the earlier article included some misunderstanding. Therefore, I hope that my 
previous opinion on this topic should be replaced by this disseration. 
3 Some exceptions that mention the financial aspects include Graeme Gill, The Collapse of a 
Single Party System: The Disintegration of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994); Evan Mawdsley and Stephen White, The Soviet 
Elite ji'om Lenin to Gorbachev: The Central Committee and its Members, 1917-1991 (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2000), esp. chapter 6; Gordon M. Hahn, Russia's Revolution ji'0/1I Above: 
Reform, Transition, and Revolution in the Fall of the Soviet Communist Regime (New Brunswick: 
Transaction Publishers, 2002). 
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discussed. I move on to consider the budget of the CPSU, then the origins of its financial crisis, 
and finally, the measures that were taken in an attempt to deal with the crisis. 
II. The Process of Budget Formation 
The prerequisite to discussing the budget is an examination of its formation, which 
became an object of controversy in the party's final years.4 Because the main income of the 
party budget was membership dues, let me primarily trace flows that were included. Figure 5-1 
indicates these flows. It is clear that the Primary Party Organisations (PPOs) monthly collected 
membership dues from individual members and transfened the entire sum to a conesponding 
obkom or an equivalent pmty committee (e.g. kraikom). Obkoms distributed these funds and 
their own incomes (e.g. membership dues from PPOs directly supervised by obkoms, profits 
from regional party newspapers, and so forth) to raikoms and gorkoms within their tenitory and 
for their own use.s In the Union republics which did not have oblast' level organisations (e.g. 
the Baltic states), PPOs directly would transfer collected dues to the Central Committee of the 
Communist Party (CC CP) of the Union republic. All of this can be infened from the draft 
'Instruction on the membership dues and financial economic activity of the CPSV' which 
appeared in Pravda on 30 October 1990. Although this document was prepared to change the 
old way of budget formation, if we compare it with the final version, it seems that the draft 
followed the old practice. The draft states 'Accepted sums of membership dues are fidly passed 
. " to establishments of saving banks ... for their subsequent transfer to special current accounts 
of obko/lls, kraikoms, autonomous republican committees and CCs CPs of Union republics 
4 Unfortunately, my research on this point is limited. The argument in this section includes 
inferences from fragmented information. 
S See the statement of Gennadii Veselkov, chairman of the permanent commission of Central 
Control Commission (CCC), 'On Control for implementation of the budget of the CPSU and 
auditing of financial and economic activity' at that time. Pravda, 8 January 1991, p. 3. 
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,6 There is no reference to raikoms and gorkoms here. This statement was changed in the 
resolution adopted at the joint plenum of the Central Committee and Central Control Committee 
(CCe) in January 1991 as follows: 'Accepted sums of membership dues are passed ... to the 
establishments of saving banks ... for their subsequent transfer to the special or current accounts 
... of corresponding party committees. ,7 Therefore, the flow of money from PPOs to obkoms 
would be evident from what has been discussed above.8 
Although it is more obscure at higher levels, it seems that the CCs of Union 
Republican party organisations deducted some income from obkoms and redistributed it among 
obkoms. So, it seems, did the CC CPSU, that is, the CC CPSU deducted pmi of the incomes 
from the CCs of Union republican party organisations, and in the territOlY of the RSFSR, from 
obkoms9, since the RSFSR did not have its own party committee until 1990. This is suggested 
by the fact that Vladimir Ivashko, First Secretmy of the Ukrainian CP at that time, reported to 
the 28th Congress of the Ukrainian CP that the Ukrainian party had transferred 48 million 
roubles in 1988 and 51 million roubles in 1989 to the CC CPSu. The amount of transfer, 
according to Ivashko, depended on the balance of the republican party's budget. 1o It seems that 
the CC CPSU received more funds from well-developed party organisations like the Ukrainian 
and redistributed them to weaker party organisations, and so would the CC of Union republican 
party organisations do to obkoms within their republics. Nikolai Kruchina, Administrator of 
Affairs of the CC CPSU, stated at the 28th congress in July 1990 that the excess of income over 
expenditure of obkoms, kraikoms, and CCs CPs of union republics was transferred to the budget 
6 Pravda, 30 October 1990, p. 3 (article I. 11). Emphasis added. 
7 Izvestiya TsK KPSS, 1991, No.3, p. 48 (article I. 11). Emphasis added. 
8 However, AlIa Nizovtseva, deputy chairman of the Central Auditing Commission, stated in 
the 28th Party Congress, 'Some party organisations --- mainly PPOs but also gorkoms and 
raikoms --- announced their refusal to transfer (fully or partially) the collected party dues to the 
party committees' accounts.' Pravda, 4 July 1990, p. 4; XXVII! s "ezd Kommunisticheskoi Partii 
Sovetskovo Soyuza: Stenograjicheskii Otchet, Vol. 1 (Moskva: Politizdat, 1991), p. 220. This 
may suggest some gorkoms and raikoms collected membership dues. Still, it seems that my 
argument is basically accurate. 
9 Hereafter I use the word 'obkom' includes its equivalents. 
10 Pravda Ufo'ainy, 26 June 1990, p. 4; FBIS Soviet Union, 1 August 1990, p. 79. 
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of the CPSU and directed into subsidies for the patiy organisations which could not cover their 
expenditure from their own resources. II A memorandum on the budget of the CPSU prepared 
for the 28th Congress in the summer of 1990 indicates that some party organisations did not 
receive enough income to sustain themselves, and that the CC CPSU covered their deficit by a 
subsidies from its own funds and redistribution. 12 
However, reported budgetary data did not show the redistribution. It was in fact 
impossible to recognise from the budget figures which party organisations received how much. 
This is because the CC CPSU compiled the figure of the budget from the sum of the Union 
republican parties and RSFSR obkoms without indicating redistribution. Let me provide a 
simplified example. If the CPSU had two Union republican parties, and if one republican party 
organisation's total income was 100 roubles and expenditure 120 roubles, and another's income 
150 roubles and expenditure 130 roubles, then the CPSD's income figure would be 250 
(100+ 150) roubles plus its own income, and expenditure would be 250 (120+ 130) roubles plus 
its own expenditure. The CC CPSU might redistribute to cover the deficit of the fonner Union 
republican party, but it would not be shown in the budgetary figures. This method can be 
infelTed from the fact that KlUchina presented the budget of Communist Parties of 'Union 
republics' rather than the CPSU as a whole at the joint plenum of the CC and Central Control 
Commission (CCC) that took place in January 1991. In addition, he stated that the budget of the 
CP RSFSR was calculated as the sum of the budgets of republican 13, krais, and oblast party 
organisations together with expenditures to maintain the apparat of the CC and CCC RSFSR. I4 
Accordingly, redistribution was not reflected in budget figures and the income of the CPSU was 
reported as total membership dues plus other incomes. The real figures will help to clarify these 
calculations. 
II Pravda, 5 July 1990, p. 5; XXVIII s "ezd KOl11l11unisticheskoi Partii Sovetskovo Soyuza Vol. 1, 
p.232. 
12 Izvestzj!a TsK KPSS, 1990, No.8, p. 91. An excerpt appeared in Uchitel'skaya Gazeta, 28 July 
1990, p. 1. 
13 At that time, 'autonomous republics' were called just 'republics.' 
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III An Overview of the Budget of the CPSU in its Final Years 
It is possible to investigate the budget of the CPSU in the late period very fully if not 
completely with sources that are now available. Of course, budget information had been an 
important topic at party congresses before perestroika. 15 Nonetheless, the perestroika period 
was the first time this topic was politicised. In February 1989, Pravda published an article on 
the party budget as a response to readers' letters, which itself indicated that the use of 
membership dues had become a politically important topic. 16 In March 1990 Kruchina was 
interviewed on the budget. According to this interview, party income in 1989 was 2,568.9 
million roubles and expenditure was 2,386.8 million roubles. 17 Alla Nizovtseva, deputy 
chairman of the Central Auditing Commission, presented slightly different figures on the 1989 
party budget to the 28th Party Congress, in which income was reported as 2,695.8 million 
roubles and expenditure was 2,279.2 million roubles. 18 Though the reason this discrepancy 
occurred is not clear, these two accounts do at least made it clear that the party's 1989 budget 
was in surplus. 
However, the financial situation became worse after that. One party archive document 
shows that a Politburo meeting held on 22 March 1990 discussed a cut in expenditure. 19 Table 
5-1 shows the budget plan of 1990 submitted to the 28th Party Congress. 20 According to this, 
income would be about 2.7 billion roubles and expenditure about 2.1 billion roubles. 
Nonetheless, in this plan the problem of a deficit was not ignored; it stated that the sharp fall in 
14 Pravda, 6 February 1991, p. 4. 
15 Ronald J. Hill and Peter Frank, The Soviet Communist Party, 3rd ed. (Winchester, Mass.: 
Allen & Unwin, 1986), p. 57. 
16 'Tainaya Ii kassa?' Pravda, 10 February 1989, p. 3. 
17 Pravda, 12 March 1990, p. 3. 
18 Pravda, 4 July 1990, p. 4; XXVIII s "ezd KOIIZmunisticheskoi Partii Sovetskovo Soyuza Vol. 1, 
p. 219 (income), p. 222 (expenditure). 
19 Tsentr Khraneniya Sovremennoi Dokumentatsii (TsKhSD), fond (f.) 89, perechen' (p.) 9, 
delo (d.) 88, page (p.) 1. 
20 As tables 5-1,5-2,5-3,5-4,5-5 show, the details of the budget of 1990 were changed several 
times. 
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income that had already occurred would lead to a deficit of 1.6 billion roubles?l The problem is 
whether or not the plan was correctly fulfilled. It is possible to trace the process of 
implementation through party documents. Table 5-2 shows the implementation for a half-year 
period.22 This indicates that during the first half of 1990 the plan was fulfilled relatively well, 
though Kruchina mentioned the decrease in income from membership dues.23 Taking into 
account the fact that the mass exodus from the party accelerated after the 28th congress, one 
might assume that the plan had worked well during its first year. The final implementation is 
shown in table 5-3. First of all, it is necessary to notice that the plan itself was modified: the 
income target of 1990 was significantly reduced from about 2.7 billion roubles to 2.36 billion 
roubles, the main reason for which was the change in expected membership dues. In comparison 
with the first half year's income (about 1.32 billion roubles), the final income in the year (about 
2.28 billion roubles) means that the second half year's income was about 960 million roubles. 
During this year, in other words, party income had fallen by about 360 million roubles. 
Secondly, while the first half year's expenditure was about 930 million roubles, final 
expenditure was about 2 billion roubles without including the apparently unimplemented 
decision to assist Chernobyl' victims. In other words, in the second half year expenditure 
increased to almost 1.06 billion roubles (about 140 million roubles more than in the first half of 
the year).24 This tendency is confirmed in some published comments. For example, in 
September 1990 Nikolai Kapanets, deputy Administrator of Affairs, indicated that the deficit 
2l lzvestiya TsK KPSS, 1990, No.8, p. 93. An excerpt in Uchitel'skaya Gazeta, 28 July 1990, p. 
1. 
22 TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 8, d. 43, pp. 1-14. This document was presented on 21 September 1990 to 
Boris Pugo, Chairn1an of the Central Control Commission (CCC) of the CPSU, by Kruchina, 
Administrator of Affairs of the CC CPSU. 
23 Ibid., pp. 2-3. 
24 Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 8 August 1991, p. 5. Pravda shows only total sums. See Pravda, 29 
July 1991, p. 2. However, Nezavisimaya Gazeta argued that this total sum included the 
unimplemented decision of 28th Party Congress to support Chernobyl' victims. Later Pravda 
responded that the financing for victims was implemented. Pravda, 12 August 1991, p. 1. The 
author cannot confirm which was the case. 
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would be 1.5 billion roubles. 25 It is clear from these comments that the patty budget worsened 
considerably after the 28th congress. 
In 1991 party finance went into crisis. Kruchina, in a speech at the Januaty 1991 joint 
plenum of the CC and CCC on the draft 1991 budget of the Union republican party 
organisations, admitted that the party faced a huge deficit of about 1 billion roubles.26 This 
budget was approved by the joint plenum.27 The indexes of the budget of the Union republican 
parties are shown in Table 5-4. Several months later, the 1991 budget plan of the CPSU 
appeared as a resolution of the plenum of the CC CPSU that was held on 26 July, which 
projected that income would be 1,394.0 million roubles and expenditure 2,494.0 million roubles, 
that is, the planned deficit was 1.1 billion roubles.28 Although this resolution did not show the 
details of these estimates, which were entrusted to the Secretariat of the CC CPSU for 
elaboration in the process of their implementation, a secret document, disclosed in the non-party 
press, shows these details (Table 5_5).29 Since the reasons for the financial crisis will be 
investigated in the following sections, we may for the moment simply confirm that the CPSU 
was already facing a financial crisis before the attempted coup. 
Of course, a financial crisis does not immediately lead to bankruptcy. The CPSU had 
reserve funds and huge property assets, including buildings which became an object of 
controversy between soviets and party in the same way in which the property of the communist 
parties of Eastern Europe had been nationalised during the demise of communist regimes in 
those countries. At a press conference on 12 December 1990, Ivashko, deputy General Secretaty, 
25 Pravda, 14 September 1990, p. 3. 
26 Pravda, 5 February 1991, p. 4. 
27 Pravda, 6 Februaty 1991, p. 6, p. 2. The draft of resolution is TsKhSD f. 89, p. 23. d. 3, pp. 
1-3 and this draft was approved in the meeting of Politburo on 30 January 1991. See TsKhSD f. 
89,p.42,d.31,p.25. 
28 Pravda, 29 July 1991, p. 2. During the time between the January joint CC and CCC plenum 
and July CC plenum, some information on the budget was presented by party journals. See 
Glasnost', 1991, No.9 (28 February), p. 7; Partiinaya Zhizn', 1991, No.7 (April), pp. 37-42. 
29 Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 8 August 1991, p. 1, p. 5; FBIS Soviet Union, 15 August 1991, pp. 
31-34, 16 August 1991, pp.13-16; TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 23, d. 28. Fond 89 shows more detailed 
items than Nezavisz'maya Gazeta. 
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stated that the total property of the party was 4.9 billion roubles and that its reserve funds were 
4.4 billion roubles.30 After the attempted coup, the news that CPSU property was about 4 
billion roubles in value was publicised.3l Although it is clear that the CPSU had enormous 
property, it was mainly in the form of real estate --- that is, assets rather than current income ---
and it cannot be denied that the balance between income and expenditure had deteriorated 
shmply. 
N. The Reasons for Financial Crisis 
1. Decrease of Membership Dues 
Why, then, did this financial crisis happen? The first reason was the fall in the number 
of party members. 32 Table 5-6 shows the changes in the number of members, which indicates 
the rapid fall that took place from 1990 to 1991. This was not because of a natural decline but 
because members were leaving the party, for reasons including their differences over the policy 
direction in the party. A massive contraction occurred after the 28th congress, as many party 
members were disappointed by the compromising character of its proceedings. Secondly, since 
the locus of power was shifting from party to soviets, deputies did not need to stay in the party. 
For example, over twenty deputies to the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet from L'vov oblast' and city 
announced that they were resigning from the party in April 1990.33 In July 1990, Sylenko, a 
deputy from Khar'kov, reported that all deputies who were members of the Democratic 
Platform intended to leave the party?4 Thirdly, many studies of career patterns have shown that 
30 Pravda, 13 December 1990, p. 4; RLIReport 011 the USSR, Vol. 2, No. 51 (21 December, 
1990), p. 36. 
3l RLIReport 011 the USSR, Vol. 3, No. 36 (6 September 1991), pp. 80-81. 
32 On the more detailed study of decrease of party members, see Deno, 'Sorenpokyousanto'; 
Gill, The Collapse, pp. 153-154; Philip Hanson and Elizabeth Teague, 'Soviet Communist Party 
Loses Members,' RLiReport on the USSR, Vol. 2, No. 20 (18 May 1990). 
33 RLIReport 011 the USSR, Vol. 2, No. 15 (13 April 1990), p. 36. 
34 RLIReport on the USSR, Vol. 2, No. 31 (3 August 1990), p. 34. This source does not state 
Sylenko's first name. 
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for many people joining the party had been just a necessary condition for appointment and 
promotion, and had not necessarily been based on a strong commitment to patty policy. 
Therefore, when staying in the party ceased to be a necessary condition, the number of people 
leaving the party naturally increased. 
This decrease of members not only meant its reduction as an organisation, but also 
influenced the party budget, since well over half of its income, at least apparently, consisted of 
membership dues.35 Boris Pugo, Chairman of the Central Control Commission (CCC), reported 
in August 1990 that, during the first half of 1990, 370,000 members had left the party, another 
150,000 had not paid their membership dues, and 250,000 had been expelled.36 Oleg Shenin, 
Secretary of the CC CPSU and a Politburo member, reported in October 1990 that since the 
beginning of that year 800,000 people had left the party, but only 200,000 had joined, and that 
the party budget would face more than a 1 billion rouble deficit.37 At the July CC plenum 
(1991), Gorbachev told that the party had lost 4.2 million members over the previous one and a 
halfyears. 38 
What Pugo said above made clear that even people who stayed in the party did not 
necessarily pay membership dues. In addition, Pugo reported to a plenum of the CCC CPSU on 
10 October 1990 that more than 1 million members were not paying dues, that 10,000 were 
paying incomplete amounts, and that many party organisations were holding them back for their 
own purposes.39 Kruchina stated in his speech at the joint plenum mentioned above, 'The patty 
does not receive a part of the income because some PPOs are slow to transfer funds to higher 
party organisations, refuse to pay for full-time party workers from their own funds, and 
sometimes spend them selfishly for purposes which do not help party work as a whole. In 
35 Some sources insist appropriation from the state budget was quite common. See Stephen 
Handelman, Comrade Criminal (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995), pp. 98-100. 
36 RLIReport on the USSR, Vol. 2, No. 32 (10 August 1990), pp. 34-35. 
37 Pravda, 18 October 1990, p. 5; FBIS Soviet Union, 18 October 1990, p. 31; RLIReport on the 
USSR, Vol. 2, No. 43 (26 October 1990), p. 36. 
38 Pravda, 26 July 1991, p. 2. 
39 Pravda, 12 October 1990, p. 3. 
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addition, the free-rider moods are growing; they keep demanding the increase of subsidies from 
the centre.'40 In March 1991 Gennadii Veselkov, deputy chairman of the CCC CPSU, reported 
that over l.3 million communists were not paying their dues.41 The bitih of the Communist 
Party of the Russian Republic made this problem additionally complex. Because the Russian 
Party was conservative in ideological terms, lower patiy organisations in the republic faced a 
problem in that they belonged to it. Some organisations refused to send their funds to the CC CP 
RSFSR, and considered whether to withhold payment or send their dues directly to the CC 
CPSU.42 
The change in the rate of membership dues also led to a fall in income. This rate 
change was agreed at the 28th Party Congress and was stated in the new party Rules. As table 
5-7 indicates, the new Rules changed the rate from 3 per cent of 'salary' as a maximum to 2 per 
cent of 'income.' Kapanets explained this concept in an interview in September 1990.43 
Afterwards, the definition of 'income' was finally defined by an 'Instruction on the payment of 
membership dues and financial-economic activity of organisations of the CPsu.' 44 This 
'Instruction,' a document defining the way to pay membership dues, and 
financial-and-economic activity which will be discussed below, was approved by the January 
1991 joint plenum of the CC and CCC as part of the 'normative-methodological documents of 
the CPSu.' A draft had appeared earlier and after the approval a further explanation appeared in 
a party journa1.45 The characteristics of these documents on membership dues were as follows. 
Firstly, they precisely defined the concept of 'income,' which consisted of salary plus other 
bonuses, and rewards; that is, instead of a decrease in the rate, the range of membership dues 
was increased. Secondly, conditions for exemption from payment were strictly denoted. These 
40 Pravda, 5 February 1991, p. 4. 
41 Rabochaya Tribuna, 2 March 1991, p. 2; FBIS Soviet Union, 7 March 1991, p. 44. 
42 KOl11somol'skaya Pravda, 12 September 1990, p. 2. 
43 Pravda, 14 September 1990, p. 2. 
44 Izvestiya TsK KPSS, 1991, No.3, pp. 46-55. 
45 Pravda, 30 October 1990, p. 3 is on the draft. Partiinaya Zhizn JJ 1991, No. l3 (July), pp. 
22-27 is on the further explanation. 
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indicated the central organisation's wish to collect membership dues by all possible means. 
The new instruction caused confusion in local organisations. One letter on 30 April 
1991 from members of the party bureau of a PPO in Orel oblast"s statistical administration to 
the Organisational Department of the CC CPSU explained that they considered some articles of 
the 'Instruction' were not appropriate to their circumstances. Although their understanding of 
'income' excluded state tax and charitable payments, the 'Instruction' appeared to provide for 
deduction of dues from total income including sate tax and charitable payments. This was 
considered, according to the letter, by rank-and-file communists, who took the view that the 
party leadership was interested in collecting as much dues as possible and in maintaining the 
comfortable conditions of full-time party workers; some members left the party because of it. It 
was necessary, they claimed, to persuade the mass of communists and explain the aims and the 
amount needed; then 'in a word, we consider this norm of the instruction is not acceptable. ,46 
This antagonistic feeling toward the centre must have been pervasive since the 
non-payment of membership dues increased very rapidly. Table 5-2 indicates that the income 
from membership dues was about 800 million roubles in the first half year for 1990 and Table 
5-3 shows that the final income from membership dues was about 1.25 billion. That is, the 
second half year's income from dues in 1990 was only about 450 million roubles, nearly half of 
the first! Budget plans of 1991 (Table 5-5) were also based on the expectation of a decrease 
from about 1.3 billion roubles to about 930 million roubles. 
2. Decline of Publishing Activity 
A decrease in profits from publishing activity as well as membership dues contributed 
to the financial crisis. Publishing activity suffered in general at that time. This hit party presses 
as well as others. For example, Pravda lost subscribers from 6,870,1 00 in January 1990 to 
46 TsKhSD f. 89, p. 11, d. 184. pp. 1-4. See also White, 'Communists and their party in the Late 
Soviet Period', The Slavonic and East European Review, Vol. 72, No.4 (October 1994), p. 658. 
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504,800 in October.47 As Table 5-5 shows, the 1991 budget plan assumed that profits from 
publishing activity were likely to decrease enormously (its share in total income was expected 
to fall from 44.2 per cent to 20.6 per cent) and that it would in future need subsidies from the 
party. The reason for this decline in publishing activity was, firstly, that people were now able to 
choose from among alternative information sources, and secondly, that the severe economic 
situation prevented people buying newspapers. 48 In addition, the economic situation caused a 
rise in the price of publishing materials, which added to the decline. 
V. Reconstruction of the Budget I: Structural Change of Budget Formation 
Thus, the party faced a financial CrISIS and tried to reconstruct the party budget 
accordingly. The first method to do this was to restrict expenditure. There was a proposal to cut 
expenditure on 22 March 1990 at a Politburo meeting, though the details of this proposal are not 
clear.49 In addition, it is well known that a mass reduction in the party apparat was attempted by 
Gorbachev during the perestroika period whose purpose was not to cut expenditures as much, 
but to prevent podmena or a substitution of the state function by the party and to concentrate on 
political activities as I have argued in Chapter 3. Nonetheless, this might be regarded as a 
helpful step towards reducing expenditure. In fact, one of the major reasons for the arrears of 
membership dues, as we have seen, was that rank-and-file party members did not want to 
support full-time workers by their contributions. However, the effect of the apparat reduction 
was minimal at most or even the opposite. Kruchina repOlied accordingly in a document of 15 
October 1990, which circulated among secretaries of the CC CPSU and the Chairman of the 
CCC CPSu. According to this, regardless of the massive cut in the number of full-time workers, 
total expenditure on the maintenance of the CC CPSU and CP RSFSR apparat would increase 
by 9.15 million roubles or 22.6 per cent over 1990 because of the increase in social insurance, 
47 Pravda, 12 October, p. 6. 
48 RLI Report on the USSR, Vol. 2, No. 40 (5 October 1990), pp. 31-32. 
49 TsKhSD f. 89, p. 9, d. 88, p. 1. 
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meeting and other costs.50 The other document of 15 January 1991 reported an increase in 
travelling costs to the Baltic countries. 51 These increases in management costs offset the 
savings that might have been expected to follow the reduction in the full-time central apparat. 
The more important method of expenditure reduction was structural change in the 
fom1ation of party budget, particularly decentralisation of the right of budget formation. Firstly, 
PPOs were given the right to retain 50 per cent of collected membership dues, though, as noted 
above, PPOs had had to transfer the total sum of collected dues to obkoms. This proposal was 
offered by Gorbachev at the plenum of the CC CPSU of March 1990, where he stated 'In the 
context of democratic reconstruction (perestroika) of the CPSU, essential changes in the order 
of formation and expenditures of the party budget are foreseen by the draft of the party Rules . 
. .. To leave up to 50 per cent from the sum of collected membership dues at their disposal. ,52 
Kruchina also mentioned this proposal in an interview. 53 This proposal was approved by the 
28th Party Congress and included in the new party Rules. 54 
Secondly, a transition to the self-financing of each party organisation was proposed 
and approved by the 28th Party Congress. 55 These new ways of budget formation were defined 
in detail by a document on the 'Mechanism of formation, implementation and control of the 
budget of the CPSU,' a decision of the Secretariat of the CC CPSU of 8 March 1991 which 
prescribed the fom1ation and use of collected revenues. 56 This demarcated the financial power 
of central and local party organisations; each Union republican party was supposed to be 
self-financing in the formation and utilisation of its own budget, which was made up of 
membership dues, profits from local papers and receipts from production-and-economic 
50 TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 8, d. 42, pp. 10-16. 
51 TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 5, d. 10, pp. 1-3. 
52 Pravda, 12 March 1990, p. 2. 
53 Pravda, 12 March 1990, p. 3. 
54 For the resolution on the party budget, see Pravda, 12 July 1990, p. 1. For new party Rules, 
see Pravda, 13 July 1990, p. 2. 
55 Pravda, 12 July 1990, p.l. 
56 Pravda, 28 June 1991, p.2; Izvestiya TsK KPSS, 1991, No.7, pp.17-21. The draft of the 
'Mechanism' is in Pravda, 17 December 1990, p. 2. 
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activities. PPOs utilised up to 50 per cent of their incomes; central funds were supposed to 
consist of profits from the central press, receipts from production-and-economic activities of the 
Department of Administration of Affairs, the dues of members who were outside territorial party 
organisations (e. g. the armed forces), and others. 
These policies were considered to be one of means of activating PPOs and lower party 
organisations, and the leadership, it seems, intended that this should be the case. For example, 
Veselkov, chairman of the permanent commission of Central Control Commission (CCe) 'On 
Control for implementation of budget of the CPSU and auditing of financial-and-economic 
activity' at that time, reported such an intention in an interview, in which he responded to letters 
from communists who hoped that party organisations would be allowed to become independent 
in the resolution of their financial problems. 57 
However, taking into account the fact that most expenditure was directed to the 
maintenance of lower level party organisations and PPOs, these policies can be regarded as 
another form of expenditure restriction. When Table 5-4 (the budget of the Union republican 
parties) is compared with Table 5-5 (the budget of the CPSU), the total deficit in the former is 
about 1 billion roubles and that in the latter it is 1.1 billion. Thus, the deficit of the CC CPSU 
was 100 million roubles. It is evident that most of the deficit derived from lower organisations. 
There are some references to financial decentralisation as a solution to the financial crisis. For 
example, the budgetary memorandum for delegates to the 28th Party Congress mentioned it. 58 
How would lower level party organisations and PPOs act, given financial autonomy? 
Under conditions of a rapid fall in members and arrears of membership dues, each organisation 
faced a financial crisis. Naturally, they demanded subsidies from the central organisation. 
Ivashko, First Secretary of Ulaainian CP at the time, reported that only ten oblast' level party 
organisations in the republic (Dnepropetrovsk, Donetsk, Zaporozhe, Crimea, Lugansk, L'vov, 
57 Pravda, 8 January 1991, p. 3. 
58 Izvestiya TsK KPSS, 1990, No.8, p. 93. 
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Odessa, Khar'kov, and Kiev oblasts and Kiev city) made a surplus.59 In October 1990 Shenin, 
CC Secretary and a Politburo member, observed that all pmty organisations needed subsidies 
except for two (Moscow and Leningrad).60 In an interview in March 1991 Veselkov complained 
of the free-rider attitude in which all party organisations asked for money but did not want any 
interference in how they spent it and indicated that all party organisations would receive 
subsidies except for Moscow gorkom; for example, he stated that 70-80 per cent of expenditure 
would be covered by subsidies in the Kirghiz, Tajik and Turkmen party organisations, and four 
republics, two krai and six oblast' party organisations in Russia. 61 Some of these demands for 
subsidies can be seen in the letter from V. Pymashevskii, a secretary of the Latvian CP, on 29 
January 1991, which requested subsidies and more allocations from the centre since inflation 
had been accelerating and the Latvian Council of Ministries had decreed an increase in salaries. 
Responding to this demand meant an increase in expenditure. While the Department of 
Administration of Affairs of the CC CPSU asked for party workers in state organisations and 
enterprises to be paid by each organisation, it accepted on 18 February 1991 that full-time party 
workers should be paid from the party budget.62 Since this case was likely to have been more 
urgent than other requests, how pervasive this response was cannot be clarified. If this case was 
more general, subsidies must have been correspondingly larger. 
59 Pravda Ukrainy, 26 June 1990, p. 4; FBIS Soviet Union, 1 August 1990, p. 79. Graeme Gill's 
account on this point is misleading. Firstly, he miscounts party organisations as 11. Secondly, he 
writes as if the '11' party organisations made profits at the all-union level. However, Ivashko 
was First Secretary of the Ukrainian CP at that time and stated this at the 28th Ukrainian CP 
congress. Therefore, it is natural to think his report concerned only the Ukrainian republic. See 
Gill, The Collapse, p. 155. 
60 FBIS Soviet Union, 18 October 1990, p. 31; RLIReport on the USSR, 2-43 (26 October 1990), 
p. 36. Shenin's statement, it seems, excluded oblast' level party organisations in Union republics 
other than the RSFSR, since his report differed from Ivashko's statement mentioned above too 
much if it included them. These organisations in republics other than RSFSR would not be 
within the jurisdiction of the CC CPSU as Figure 5-1 shows. Incidentally, although Shenin did 
not suggest whether this 'Moscow' meant Moscow city or oblast', it would be reasonable to 
infer Moscow gorkom from Veselkov's comment. See the next note. In the case of Leningrad, it 
seems, city and oblast' organisations had been merged. See RLIReport on the USSR, Vol. 2, No. 
9 (2 March 1990), p. 39. 
61 Rabochaya Tribuna, 2 March 1991, p. 2; FBIS Soviet Union, 7 March 1991, p. 44. 
62 TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 11, d. 78, pp. 1-2. Ivashko's agreement was singed in 20 Februmy. 
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Even so, it seems that subsidies and allocations were not enough, since party 
organisations began to disappear. The number of PPOs, which had consistently increased, 
declined in 1991 as Table 5-8 shows. Moreover, some higher party organisations began to 
dissolve. For example, Tomsk gorkom dissolved itself because of a cut in its apparat and a fall 
in income, though four raikoms in the city continued to work.63 Even in a relatively well-placed 
city such as Leningrad the situation was serious. Boris Gidaspov, first secretary of the Leningrad 
obkom and secretaty of the CC CPSU, said at a plenum of the obkom that it was necessary to 
reduce the number of raikoms in order to manage the financial problem.64 
VI. Reconstruction of the Budget II: Increasing Income 
The second way to reconstmct the budget was to raise income. For a start, the pressure 
to collect membership dues increased. In this period many calls were made for party discipline. 
For instance, Pugo declared at the plenum of the CCC CPSU in October 1990 that resolute 
measures to strengthen discipline and to overcome negative tendencies were necessaty.65 
Veselkov mentioned the strengthening of party discipline in his interview of March 1991.66 
Both decisions on the budget of the CPs of Union republics and the CPSU in 1991 referred to 
discipline. 67 
Another and more important method was commercial activity. Though this activity has 
often been considered entirely secret by some researchers, this is not necessarily the case. Many 
published documents and comments before the collapse plainly mention such activities. The 
memorandum on the budget of the CPSU prepared for the 28th Party Congress implied the 
63 RLIReport on the USSR, Vol. 2, No. 35 (31 August 1990), p. 33. 
64 FBIS Soviet Union, 27 September 1990, p. 95. 
65 Pravda, 12 October 1990, p. 3. 
66 Rabochaya Tribuna, 2 March 1991, p. 2; FBIS Soviet Union, 7 March 1991, p. 44. 
67 The 1991 budget of the CPs of Union republics is Pravda, 6 Febmaty 1991, p. 2; TsKhSD, f. 
89, p. 236, d. 3. The 1991 budget of the CPSU is Pravda, 29 July 1991, p. 2. Though TsKhSD, f. 
89, p. 23 d. 25 is also on the 1991 budget of the CPSU, it does not refer to discipline. 
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importance of this, noting 'more effective use of the existing material and technical base of the 
party for additional attraction of incomes. ,68 A resolution of the congress approved the party 
exercising its rights as a judicial person and rationally using them to strengthen its financial and 
material resources. 69 Kapanets made clear in an interview that party committees should actively 
engage in entrepreneurial activity, utilise their material basis to achieve these aims, and create 
joint enterprises including participation in foreign partnership and associations. 70 Gidaspov, 
similarly, mentioned the importance of commercial entrepreneurial activity at a plenum of the 
Leningrad obkom.71 Pugo also referred to the need to develop enterprise activity and new 
sources of income at the plenum of October 1990.72 In December 1990, Ivashko reiterated at a 
press conference that earning money was not prohibited and announced that a special committee 
on financial and economic activity had been created, though enterprise activity was to be 
implemented in accordance with laws and party principles. 73 Both the 'Instruction' and 
'Mechanism' devoted much attention to financial economic activity. Especially in the 
'Instruction' there were many changes between the draft and final resolution, which would 
suggest controversy around this problem.74 The resolution on the budget of the CPs of Union 
republics envisaged greater income from production and economic activity and more effective 
utilisation of the party's material resources. 75 Veselkov insisted on the need to develop 
production and economic activity though he said that the Department of Administration of 
Affairs had not yet engaged in this to a significant extent.76 The budget plan of the CPSU in 
1991 also showed the strong expectation that income would be increased by commercial 
68 Izvestiya TsK KPSS, 1990, No.8, p. 93. 
69 Pravda, 12 July, 1990, p. 1. 
70 Pravda, 14 September 1990, p. 3. 
71 FBIS Soviet Union, 27 September 1990, pp. 94-95. 
72 Pravda, 12 October 1990, p. 3. 
73 Pravda, 13 December 1990, p. 4; RLI Report on the USSR, Vol. 2, No. 51 (21 December 
1990), p. 36. The statement 'earning money ... ' was published only in RL. 
74 On the draft 'Instruction,' see Pravda, 30 October 1990, p. 3. The resolution is published in 
Izvestiya TsK KPSS, 1991, No.3, pp. 46-55. The 'Mechanism' is in Pravda, 28 June 1991, p. 2 
and Izvestiya TsK KPSS, 1991, No.7, pp. 17-20. 
75 Pravda, 6 February 1991, p. 2. 
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activity.77 After the attempted coup, Ivashko observed, 'you know that economic and 
commercial activity was recently allowed -- strictly within the limits of current legislation -- to 
party committees.'78 From these published accounts, it is apparent that the party did not hide 
engaging in commercial activity and it is unsatisfactory to represent such activities as evidence 
of some sort of a scandalous party underground. 
However, secret documents also existed. A secret decision of the CC CPSU (21 March 
1990) agreed with Kruchina and head of the CC State and Law Department, A. Pavlov's 
memorandum that under the multi-party system, the party should expect an attack on its 
property from other parties. So, it recommended, the party should utilise its status as a 'judicial 
person' in order to protect it. 79 According to another Kruchina's memorandum of 11 May 1990, 
the CC CPSU decided to send some party workers to France and Italy in order to look into these 
countries' financial and economic activity.80 The similar decision to visit Austria took place on 
12 November 1990.81 On 23 August 1990, a document, 'On urgent measures for organising 
commercial and foreign economic activities of the party,' recommended creating an 'invisible' 
party economy in order to adapt to a new transitional environment based upon the market and 
multiparty competition. 82 One document, 'Personal obligation to the CPSU,' suggests that 
secret commercial activity was carried out by entrusted people who vowed to carry out party 
tasks in any post and in any situation, not to expose their own status as an entrusted person, to 
keep financial and material means on behalf of the party, to return them on the party's first 
76 Rabochaya Tribuna, 2 March 1991, p. 2; FBIS Soviet Union, 7 March 1991, p. 44. 
77 Pravda, 29 July 1991, p. 2. 
78 Pravda, 30 September 1991, p. 3; Current Digest o/the Soviet Press, Vol. 43, No. 39 (1991), 
p. 16. 
79 TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 39, d. 29, pp. 1-9. 
80 TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 11, d. 6, p. 1. 
81 TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 21, d. 46, pp. 1-3. In this document, Kruchina asked an approval to send 
party workers. See Ibid., p. 1. Ivashko's agreement can be found on the same page. 
82 KOl11somol'skaya Pravda, 31 October 1991, p. 1. See also Elizabeth Teague and Vera Tolz, 
'CPSU R.I.P.', RLI Report on the USSR, Vol. 47, No.3 (22 November 1991), p. 5; Hahn, 
Russia's, p. 218. 
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demand, and to maintain strict confidentiality.83 A meeting of the Secretariat of the CC CPSU 
on 11 June 1991 agreed the proposal on the development of the production and economic 
activity of the party.84 Though the content of the proposal was not clear, after some 
modification it was sent to the Politburo. A Politburo decision on 11 July 1991 accordingly 
proposed production and economic activity to every party committee as a means to cover 
deficits and achieve a transition to self-financing.85 
In addition, the party leadership tried to hide the commercial activity. In April 1991, 
the Administration of Affairs responded a letter from secretary of a workshop party organisation 
in Omsk that was written in February 1991. In the letter, the party worker asked if or not the 
party engaged in a banking activity as was stated by a local soviet deputy. Kapanets denied any 
banking activity of the party and added that the production and economic activity was basically 
publishing.86 
There is only fragmentary information on these commercial activities and a full 
account may be impossible because of Kruchina's suicide.87 Rather a lot of examples of the 
CC's activity are disclosed. The central party organisation leased vacant party buildings and 
rooms to associations, companies and so forth.88 More important cases are the ones that the 
party invested in or created a commercial company. For example, on 29 August 1990 the CC 
Secretariat decided that the Administration of Affairs should undertake a joint venture with a 
West Gemlan tourist company.89 On 8 October 1990 Kruchina wrote a memorandum asking to 
create a joint venture on the basis of Institute of Social Sciences under the CC CPSu. This was 
projected to utilise the property of the Institute (e.g. a dormitory) that had not been used.90 
83 KOl11somol'skaya Pravda, 7 December 1991, p. 1. See also Hahn, Russia's, p. 253. However, 
no completed form of this document was found. Moscow Ne-ws, 20 (16-22 May 2001), p. 5. 
84 TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 23, d. 7, p. 8. 
85 TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 12, d. 28, pp. 1-3; Istoricheskii Arkhiv, 1992, No.1, pp. 7-8. 
86 TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 22, d. 22, pp. 1-8. 
87 Rather a lot of examples are introduced by Handelman, Comrade Criminal, esp. chap.6. 
88 See TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 11, d. 186; p. 8, d. 17-19; p. 23, d. 1; p. 11, d. 8; p. 11, d. 27. 
89 TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 5, d. 3, pp. 1-2. 
90 TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 21, d. 40, pp. 1-5. 
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Kruchina's memorandum on 15 October 1990 (circulated to the CC Secretariat) shows that he, 
taking in account an opinion of a branch of the CC Administration of Affairs, asked pemlission 
to establish a joint venture with a state consortium 'Ekoprom,' though the decision of the 
Secretariat is not clear.91 
Some cases took place in cooperation with local party organisations. The CC CPSU 
with Leningrad obkom opened a commercial bank 'Rossiya', in which 30 million roubles (15 
million roubles each were paid by CC and Leningrad obkom) were accumulated as start-up 
capital. The bank was registered by USSR State Bank on 27 June 1990.92 After its 
establishment, some negotiation between the CC and the obkom also took place. Although 
Gidaspov, first secretary of Leningrad obkom, requested (on 27 September 1990) 500 million 
roubles at 3-4 per cent interest for 3 years as a deposit, Kruchina agreed on 22 March 1991 to 
send 50 million roubles for two years at a rate of 6 per cent interest per year.93 There were more 
cases of the centre-local cooperation in commercial activity. On 20 August 1990 the Moldavian 
party organisation sent to the CC Administration of Affairs a memorandum requesting 10 
million roubles in total for two years to finance their twelve (including six informal) joint 
ventures. Kruchina then sought permission to do so, probably from the Secretariat.94 The 
Kazakh party organisation asked the CC Administration of Affairs to invest 100 million roubles 
in order to managing a commercial bank 'Kompartbank' on 13 Februaty 1991. Kruchina then 
wrote a proposal to send the money to the 'Kompartbank"s account in the condition of annually 
1 0 per cent interest rate, though it is not clear whether or not this proposal was approved by the 
Secretariat.95 On 14 June 1991, the Kyrgyz party organisation requested 7.5 million roubles 
from the CC Administration of Affairs in order to finance Chui obkom's commercial activity. 
91 TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 11, d. 18, pp. 1-2. 
92 TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 21, d. 13, pp. 1-2. 
93 Ogonek, 1991, No. 46 (9-16 November), p. 4; TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 5, d. 15, p. 1. See also 
RLIReport on the USSR, Vol. 2, No. 42 (19 October 1990), p. 48. 
94 TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 11, d. 19, pp. 1-3. Though it is not clear where Kruchina sent his memo, it 
is reasonable to think it was sent to the Secretariat, inferred from the style of this document. 
95 TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 11, d. 84, pp. 1-5. 
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The Administration of Affairs allocated 4.9 million to the Kyrgyz party.96 In Moscow, Yurii 
Prokofev, first secretary of Moscow gorkom, and B. Balashov, first secretary of Moscow 
obkom, proposed to create a joint-stock company, to which Kruchina agreed on 5 August 
1991.97 
Some regional cases were also reported. In Perm', party officials created a commercial 
fim1 and began hotel management and a rent-a-car service. 98 Zaporozh'e obkom in Ukraine 
approved a proposal that a party committee in an automobile factOlY co-founded two small 
enterprises.99 In Tatarstan, a liquor factory was managed by the party headquarters. 100 
In addition, after the attempted coup, many cases appeared in the mass media. A 
joint-stock commercial cooperation received millions before the attempted COUp.101 According 
to Moscow News, the topic of party money was featured more than seven thousand times by 
mass media. 102 
While the first aim of commercial activity was, of course, to cover financial deficits, it 
had a second implicit purpose, as the secret documents showed, which was to protect party 
property against the soviets. Party officials knew the experience of East European communist 
parties in which their property had been nationalised after the regimes collapsed. Yeltsin 
claimed in his speech at the 28th Party Congress that people would react by nationalising party 
property if the party did not refom1 itself. This meant that his word, 'nationalise,' could function 
as a threat. The Democratic Platform, in fact, proposed to transfer all party property to the 
soviets. 103 One memorandum signed by head of the CC Department of Legislative Initiatives 
and Law Questions, V. Babichev, Deputy Head of the CC Organisational Department, Yu. 
96 TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 33, d. 14, pp. 1-3. 
97 Ogonek, 1991, No. 46 (9-16 November), pp. 4-5. 
98 Mary McAuley, 'Politics, Economics, and Elite Realignment in Russia: A Regional 
Perspective', Soviet Economy, Vol. 8, No.1 (1992), p. 75. 
99 izvestiya TsK KPSS, 1991, No.8, pp. 96-98. 
100 Stephen White, Russia Goes Dry: Alcohol, State and Society (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996), p. 112. 
101 Moscow News, 37 (15-22 September 1991), p. 7. 
102 Moscow News, 38 (22-29 September 1991), p. 7. 
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Ryzhov, and Kruchina on 12 May 1991 argued strongly that the attempts to nationalise the party 
propelty were illegal, which shows that the party leadership was threatened by such attempts. 104 
One document on commercial activity mentioned above clearly identifies this aim, stating, '[A]s 
the lesson of the communist parties of Eastern Europe proved, non-acceptance of timely 
measures on legalisation of the party property ... inevitably threatened painful consequences.' \05 
The proposal from Prokof' ev and Balashov mentioned above also suggests this aim: faced with 
the threat of nationalisation of party property, 'Moscow gorkom and obkom of the CPSU 
together with legal experts and specialists conducted a series of conferences and meetings on 
the questions of securing the normal activity of patiy organs and preserving party property 
under the present circumstances. According to the Opll1lOn of legal experts, the only right 
decision is the creation of joint-stock companies of the private type with a change of property 
and transferring its own share to legitimate capital in the form of fixed funds.' 106 Thus, to 
protect party property was another important aim of commercial activity. In any case, both 
purposes of commercial activity can be summarised in simple words: to rescue the patty. 
VII. The Consequences of the Commercial Activity 
The commercial activity, however, led to paradoxical results. Firstly, it caused a 
functional change in the CPSU from an administrative organisation to a commercial one by 
strengthening the position of the Administration of Affairs Department within the party. On 30 
July 1991, the CC Secretariat took a secret decision, which allowed the Administration of 
Affairs to become an 'independent subdivision' of the apparat of the CPSU. With this decision, 
the Administration of Affairs was to be able to engage in commercial activity more vigorously 
103 Argumenty i Fakty, 31, 4-10 August 1990, p2.; FBIS Soviet Union, 14 August 1990, p. 32. 
104 TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 11. d. 86, pp. 1-3. This memorandum was agreed by Ivashko on 13 May 
1991. 
\05 K0l71so111ol'skaya Pravda, 31 October 1991, p. 1. See also Hahn, Russia's, p. 218. 
106 Ogonek, 1991, No. 46 (9-16 November), pp. 4-5. 
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by using the party property.107 It seems that this decision shows that the party was becoming a 
commercial organisation by its attempts to protect its property, while losing its traditional 
administrative function. 
In addition, secondly, these activities paradoxically caused the fragmentation of party 
property. That is, party property was taken over and 'privatised' by many individual party 
members, by enterprises including foreign ones, by local patty committees and, probably, by 
foreign Communist parties. 108 
On this phenomenon, two explanations have been presented. The first explanation is a 
'conspiracy theory' which suggests that the party apparat engaged in commercial activity to 
enhance their private interests. It seems to me that this explanation attributes the problem to 
malicious intention too much. It tries to reveal how bad the party apparat was so eagerly that its 
description becomes more or less scandalous. The second explanation is neo-institutionalism, 
which is more theoretical and sophisticated. According to this, firstly local party organisations 
(agents) faced a financial crisis because of the devolution of budgetary rights and began 
commercial activity by utilising party property, which led to its fragmentation and a hierarchy 
breakdown (the equivalent of a run on the bank). Then, the central organisation (principal), on 
the other hand, realised this and tried to protect its property firstly by resorting to power against 
local organisations, and later by commercial activity. The central organisation, according to this, 
unintentionally gave local organisations incentives to increase their private interests by 
. . . I h 109 ll1stttutlOna c ange. 
Although this explanation is at first sight persuasive, the temporal sequence of the 
neo-institutional explanation is not supported by most of the evidence. It overlooks the fact that 
it was the central organisation that commanded local organisations to engage in commercial 
107 TsKhSD f. 89, p. 20, d. 64, pp. 1-13. 
108 K0l11sol7101'skaya Pravda, 31 October 1991, pp. 1-3. 
109 Steven L. Solnick, Stealing the State: Control and Collapse in Soviet Institutions 
(Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press, 1998). Solnick states that his argument on the 
CPSU is not intended to be rigorous. Ibid., p. 228. 
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activity. Certainly, only a few statements appear to indicate local initiative. For example, in the 
28th Party Congress's session 'renewal of the party' V. N. Shbev, second secretary of Lithuania 
(the CPSU platform) urged to start commercial activity, because of his party's desperate decline 
in membership. I 10 At a concluding address of the founding Congress of CP RSFSR, Polozkov 
stated that the party Rules gave local party organisations full independence in engaging in 
economic activity. I I I Gidaspov stated at the Leningrad obkom plenum, 'There is no need to 
wait for some instruction from executive authorities of the CPSU on this matter [commercial 
activity].' 112 However, except for Shbev's statement, these statements can be interpreted as 
recommendations of commercial activity from the centre to local organisations that had not 
engaged in it yet. In addition, it was discussed that Gidaspov conducted commercial activity in 
close cooperation with the centre. The 'Mechanism' defined the production-economic activity as 
relatively centralised. 1I3 The secret document of July 1991 mentioned above might suggest that 
commercial activity was not vigorous at local level because, if a 'run on the bank' had happened, 
the centre would not have recommended commercial activity to local organisations. 114 In 
addition, even such a local case as the Zaporozh'e obkom published in Izvestiya TsK KPSS 
suggests that the centre recommended other lower patiy organisations to follow their way. I 15 
It seems that both existing explanations use the wisdom of hindsight, that is, they 
speculate about the cause by reasoning backwards from the results. True, commercial activity 
caused the fragmentation of party propeliy. True, this would entail certain illegal activity. True, 
many party officials consequently received benefits from commercial activity. Nonetheless, it 
seems to me that the people who directed and engaged in commercial activity seriously wanted 
110 Rossiiskii Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Sotsial'no-Politicheskoi Istorii (RGASPI), fond (f.) 582, 
opis' (0.) 6. ed. khr. 16, p. 39. 
III Materialy Uchreditel 'nogo s "ezda Kommunisticheskoi Partii RSFSR (Moskva: Politizdat, 
1990), p. 133. 
112 FBIS Soviet Union, 27 September 1990, p. 94. 
113 Pravda, 28 June 1991, p. 2; Izvestiya TsK KPSS, 1991, No.7, pp. 17-20, esp. III, 
'Organisation of control for the party budget.' 
114 TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 12, d. 28, pp. 1-3; !storicheskii Arkhiv, 1992, No.1, pp. 7-8. 
115 !zvestiya TsK KPSS, 1991, No.8, pp. 96-98. 
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to save the party rather than to make a profit for themselves. The very intention paradoxically 
caused fragmentation. In order to cover financial deficits and to protect party property against 
the soviets, they began to engage in commercial activity, and this made it necessary to transfer 
profits to individual members, enterprises and others for protection since keeping them in one 
place would leave them vulnerable to confiscation. When Yeltsin gave a final blow to the party, 
they realised that the entity they sought to protect had been fragmented and that the money had 
ended up in their own hands. Here we may be able to see the paradox between an intention and 
a result just as in Weber's account of the emergence ofcapitalism. 116 
Hence, Yeltsin's role was not to destroy the party but to fill the vacuum which had 
been created by the party's self-destruction. The following words of de Tocqueville would be 
tlUe also for perestroika if the words 'July monarchy' are changed to 'party': 'So the July 
monarchy had fallen, fallen without a stlUggle, not under the victors' blows, but before they 
were stlUCk.' 117 
VIII. Conclusion 
Schumpeter once referred to the budget as the essence of the state. 118 If so, the budget 
of the CPSU might be the essence of essences. The CPSU suffered a financial crisis before the 
attempted coup because of the fall in its membership, an increase in the number of members 
who did not pay dues in full or at all, and a recession in patiy publishing. The devolution of 
budgetary rights to improve the situation caused a rebellion in lower party organisations. 
Commercial activity that was originally intended to save the party led to the functional change 
116 Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, trans. by Talcott Parsons 
(London: Routledge, 1992). 
117 Alexis de Tocqueville, Recollections, trans. by J. P. Mayer (London: Macdonald, 1970), p. 
61. 
118 Joseph A. Schumpeter, 'The Crisis of the Tax State', in Richard Swedberg, ed., Joseph A. 
Schumpeter: The Economics and Sociology of Capitalism (Princeton NJ.: Princeton University 
Press, 1991), p. 100. 
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of the CPSU from an administrative into an economic organ, and finally the fragmentation of 
party property. 
A radical change in economic relations frequently involves a huge cost in terms of 
violence. The apparat's independence as a 'bourgeoisie' made the collapse of the USSR, 
regardless of its scale, relatively peaceful. 
So far we have seen the process that the party lost its traditional administrative 
function in Chapter 3, that the party failed to find a new function as a 'political patty' in Chapter 
4, and that the party changed its function into an economic organ, which caused a fragmentation 
of party property in this Chapter. We should consider the party's last remaining tie with the state 
organs and the final blow to the party: party-state relations and the August attempted coup in the 
next chapter. 
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Figure 5-1: The Flow of Money in the CPSU 
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Table 5-1: Budget Plan of the CPSU in 1990 (presented at the 28th party congress) 
Name of income and expenditure Approximate percentage 
(%) 
Income 
1. Party membership dues 1,612,860.0 59.65 
2. Deduction from profits of party publishing 1,075,840.0 39.8 
3.0ther receipts 15,000.0 0.55 
Total 2,703,700.0 100 
Expenditure 
1. Expenditure on maintenance of local party 1,587,600.0 75.0 
organs and party establishments 
2. Expenditure on maintenance of central 28,700.0 1.4 
patty establishments 
3. Expenditure on apparat of the CC CPSU 22,305.0 1.1 
4. Expenditure on economic security of 18,195.0 0.8 
activity of the CC CPSU and measures for the 
acquisition and utilisation of means of office 
equipments and connections 
5. Expenditure on maintenance of sanatoria 15,900.0 0.7 
and equipment within the jurisdiction of 
Department of Administration of Affairs of 
the CC CPSU 
6. Expenditure on acquisition of computing 24,200.0 1.1 
technology for patty committees and party 
establishments, and on programming security 
7. Expenditure on constmction and repair of 378,800.0 17.9 
buildings of party organs, party publishing, 
and patty establishments 
8. Expenditure on financing of international 10,450.0 0.5 
activity of the CPSU, on the partial 
patticipation in publishing of a journal 
"Problems of peace and socialism" 
9. Expenditure on holding the 28t11 Congress 5,600.0 0.3 
of the CPSU 
10. Reserves for covering unforeseen 25,000.0 1.2 
expenditures of local and central party organs 
Total 2,116,750.0 100.0 
Excess of incomes over expenditures 586,950.0 
Source: Izvestiya TsK KPSS, 1990, No.8, p. 95. Percentages of incomes, total incomes and the 
differences between exceeding incomes and expenditures are added and some details are omitted. 
199 
Table 5-2: On the Implementation of the CPSU Budget over the First Half Year of 1990 
(Thousand Roubles) 
Name of income and expenditure Approved III Implemented over Implementation 
1990 the first half year in % 
Income 
1. Party membership dues 1,612,860.0 798,995.3 49.5 
2. Deduction from profits of party 1,075,840.0 512,217.8 47.6 
publishing 
3.0ther receipts 15,000.0 10,735.4 7l.6 
Total 2,703,700.0 1,321,948.5 48.9 
Expenditure 
1. Expenditure for the apparat of the CC 40,500,.0 16,069.9 39.7 
CPSU 
2. Expenditure on the maintenance of 1,538,900.0 709,730.6 46.l 
local party organs and party 
establishments 
3. Expenditure on the maintenance of 28,700.0 13,540.8 47.2 
central party establishments 
4. Expenditure on the maintenance of 15,900.0 5,829.2 36,7 
equipments within the jurisdiction of 
Administration of affairs department of 
the CC CPSU 
5. Expenditure on the need of Primary 43,700.0 15,705.7 35.9 
Party Organisations 
6. Expenditure on acquisition of 20,2000.0 3,547.5 17.6 . 
computing technology for party 
committees and party establishments, 
elaboration of technical conditions and 
I programming 
7. Expenditure on constmction and repair 378,800.0 147,473.8 38.9 . 
of buildings of patty organs, party 
establishments and party publishing 
8. Special expenditure 25,050.0 12,157.3 48.5 
9. Reserve for the party budget 25,000.0 2,568.1 10.3 
Total 2,116,750.0 926,622.9 43.8 
Excess of incomes over expenditure 586,950.0 395,325.6 67.4 
Source: TsKhSD Fond 89, Perechen' 8, Delo 43, p. 5. This document was presented by Kruchina to 
Pugo on 21 September 1990. 
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Table 5-3: On the Implementation of the 1990 CPSU Budget 
(Thousand Roubles) 
Name of income and expenditure Approved with Implemented Result 
the consideration 
of modification 




1. Patiy membership dues 1,277,000.0* 1,245,835.9 -31,164.1 -2.4 
2. Deduction from the profit of party 1,043,360.0 971,019.5 -72.340.5 -6.9 
publishing 
3. Other receipts 40,000.0 67,944.9 +27,944.9 +69.9 
Total 2,360,360.0 2,284,800.3 -75,559.7 -3.2 
Expenditure 
1. Expenditure on financing the activity of 1,210,340.0 1,197,819.3 -72,520.7 -6.0 
local party organs and party 
establishments 
2. Expenditure on financing the activity of 372,260.0 370,359.8 -1,900.2 -0.5 
primary party organisations of Union 
republics 
3. Expenditure on maintenance of central 28,700.0 27,368.5 -1,331.5 -4.6 
party establishments 
4. Expenditure on apparat of the CC 22.305.0 18,617.2 -3,687.8 -16.5 
CPSU 
5. Expenditure on economic security of 18,195.0 15,984.5 -2,210.5 -12.1 
the activity of the CC CPSU and holding 
of all party events 
6. Expenditure to maintenance of 12,000.0 11,505.2 -494.8 -4.1 
sanatoria and equipment within the 
jurisdi cti on of Department of 
Administration of Affairs of the CC 
CPSU 
7. Expenditure on acquisition of 20,200.0 21,209.0 +1,009.0 +5.0 
computing technology, the elaboration of 
technical conditions, and programming 
8. Expenditure to constlUction and repair 378,800.0 364,570.4 -14,229.6 -3.8 
of buildings of party organs and patiy 
~ublishing 
9. Expenditure on financing 18,150.0 14,368.6 -3,781.4 -20.8 
organisational measures, conducting 
sociological research and inter party 
contracts of the CPSU 
10. Reserves 25,000.0 12,267.5 -12,732.5 -50.9 
Total 2,105.950.0 1,994,070.0 -111,880.0 -5.3 
Excess of incomes over expenditure on 254,410.0 290.760.3 +36.320 14.3 
financing the activity of patiy committees 
and patiy establishments and development 
of their material basis 
Expenditure on the decision of the 28 tll 
congress of the CPSU 
Transferred from funds of the CPSU to 500,000.0 --- --- ---
realisation of health measures for children 
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residing in the accident zone of the 
Chernobyl' Nuclear Power Station 
Total on the expenditure part of the 2,494.070.0 --- --- ---
budget of the CPSU 
Exceeding of expenditure over incomes -209,269.7 -209,269.7 -9.2 
recovered at the expense of insurance 
funds of the CPSU 
... 
----- -- -
Source: Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 8 August 1991, p. 5; FBIS Soviet Union 16 August 1991, pp. 15-16. 
Although the item of approved membership dues (*) is 1,227,000.0 in the sources, it is a clear 
misprint and has been corrected. 
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Table 5-4: Budget Plan of the Communist Parties of Union Republics in 1991 
/ 
Name of income and expenditure Planned for 1991 Approximate 
Percentage (%) 
Income 
1. Party membership dues 76,4345.0 84.2 
2. Deduction from profits ofpaliy publishing 110,755.0 12.2 
3. Incomes from production, financial-economic activity and 32,840.0 3.6 
other income 
Total incomes 907,940.0 100 
Expenditure 
1. Expenditure to financing activity of party committees and 981,460.0 49.9 
party establishments 
2. Expenditure to financing activity of primary party 482,180.0 24.5 
organisations 
3. Expenditure to construction of building of party organs, 195,000.0 9.9 
accommodation by partial patiicipation, and to repair of 
housing 
4. Expenditure to construction of object of party publishing 107,000.0 5.4 
5. Financing of unprofitable publishing of party organs 9,300.0 0.5 
6. Subsidies to publish newspapers of party okrugkoms, 193,000.0 9.8 
gorkoms, raikoms 
Total 1,967,940.0 100 
Resources of insurance funds of the CPSU directed to 1,060,000.0 
covering of deficit of the budget of the CP Union republics 
(Excess of expenditure over income) 
Source: Izvestiya TsK KPSS, 1991, No.5, p. 7l. Percentages are added and some details are omitted. 
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Table 5-5: Budget Plan of the CPSU in 1991 
(Thousand Roubles) 
Name of income and expenditure Approved in Foreseen III Changes from 
the Budget of 1991 1990 to 1991 




1. Party membership dues 1,277,000.0 927,200.0 54.1---66.5 
2. Deduction from the profit of patiy publishing 1,043,360.0 286,780.0 44.2---20.6 
3. Incomes from production-economic activity 40,000.0 180,020.0 1.7---12.9 
and other rece~ 
Total income 2,360.360.0 1,394,000.0 100---100 
Expenditure 
1. Expenditure for financing the activity of party 1,515,640.0 1,292,760.0 71.9---51.8 
committees and patiy establishments of CP union 
republics, and development of its material basis 
2. Expenditure for financing activity of primary 372,260.0 482,180.0 17.6---19.3 
party organisations of CP union republics 
3. Subsidies for publishing the newspapers of --- 193,000.0 Non---7.7 
okrugkom, gorkoms, and raikoms of the party 
Total expenditure on the budget of the CPs of 1,887,900.0 1,967,940.0 89.6---78.9 
Union republics 
4. Expenditure for financing the activity of party 10,883.0 120,525.0 0.5---4.8 
committees and primaty patiy organisations in 
the USSR Aimed Forces 
5. Expenditure for financing the activity of 28,700.0 27,700.0 1.3---1.1 
central party establishments 
6. Expenditure on apparat of the CC CPSU 22,105.0 32,560.0 1---1.3 
7. Expenditure for holding plenums and meetings 18,395.0 23,800.0 0.9---1 
of the permanent commission of the CC CPSU 
i and other all party events, and economic security 
of the activity of the CC CPSU apparat 
8. Expenditure for maintenance of medical-health 12,000.0 26,300.0 0.6---l.l 
establishments and equipment within the 
jurisdiction of the Department of Administration 
of Affairs of the CC CPSU 
9. Capital investment to the development and 75,500.0 133,300.0 3.5---5.3 
reconstruction of central patiy publishing 
material basis, central party establishments, 
medical-health establishment and equipment 
within the jurisdiction of the Department of 
Administration of Affairs of the CC CPSU 
10. Expenditure on financing organisational 18,150.0 24,000.0 0.8---1 
measures, conducting sociological research and 
inter-party contacts of the CPSU 
11. Expenditure for acquiring electronic 20,200.0 28,000.0 0.9---l.l 
computing technology and new models of office 
equipment, elaboration of technical conditions 
and programming 
12. Expenditure for financing the activity of the ---- 4,300.0 Non---0.2 
Central Control Commission of the CPSU 
13. Reserves (for unexpected expenditure in 25,000.0 105,575.0 1---4.2 
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connection with price increases for 
material-technical resources communication 
services and so on) 
Total expenditure 2,105,950.0 2,494,000.0 100---99.9 
Resources of CPSU insurance fund directed to 1,100,000.0 
cover the deficit of patty budget 
Source: Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 8 August 1991, p. 5; FBIS Soviet Union, 16 August 1991, pp. 14-15; 
TsKhSD Fond 89, Perechen' 23, Delo 25, pp. 3-13. Approximate percentages are added. Although 
Fond 89 shows more details of each item, it does not include expenditure items 2 and 3. 
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Table 5-6: Ch M 
Year. Mon. Day Member Candidate Member Total 
1989. 1.1. 18,975,725 512,097 19,487,822 
1990. 1.1. 18,856,113 372,104 19,228,217 
1990. 10.1 17,742,638 
1991. 1.1 16,516,100 
Source: 1989, Izvestiya TsK KPSS, 1989, No.2, p. 138; 1990 1.1, Izvestiya TsK KPSS, 1990, No.4, 
p.1l3; 1991, Partiinaya Zhizn', 1991, No. 11, p.31. The other figure is from Toshihiko Ueno, 
'Sorenpokyousanto Kaitaikateino Bunseki [The Analysis of Disintegrating Processes of the CPSU]', 
Kokusaiseiji [International Politics], 104 (October 1993), p. 18. See also Philip Hanson and 
Elizabeth Teague, 'Soviet Communist Patty Loses Members', RLIReport on the USSR, 2-20 (18 May 
1990), p. 2. 
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Table 5-7: Change of the Rate of the Membership Dues 
Old Rule New Rule 
Monthly salary Membership dues Monthly Incomes Membership dues 
Up to 70 roubles 10 kopecks Up to 70 roubles 10 kopecks 
71-100 r 20 kopecks 71-100 r 20 kopecks 
101-lSOr l.0 % of monthly salaty 101-lS0r 30 kopecks 
lSl-200r l.S % of monthly salary lSl-2S0r 1 % of monthly income 
201-2S0r 2.0 % of monthly salary Above 2S0 2 % of monthly income 
2S1-300r 2.S % of monthly salary 
Above 300r 3.0 % of monthly sala~ 
Source: Old Rule, Graeme Gill, The Rules of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Armonk: M. 
E. Sharpe, 1988), p. 2S0. Translation is modified. New Rule, Pravda, 18 July 1990, p. 2. 
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Table 5-8: Numb fP . 
---- ----
Party 0 . f 
---- -- -- - ---
Year. Month. Day. Number 
1989. 1. 1. 441,949 
1990. 1. 1. 443,192 
1991. 1. 1. 426,226 
Sources: 1989, Izvestiya TsK KPSS, 1989, No.2, p. 142; 1990, Izvestiya TsK KPSS, 1990, No.4, p. 
115; 1991, Partiinaya Zhizn', 1991, No. 11, p. 32. See also Toshihiko Ueno, 'Sorenpokyosanto 
Kaitaikateino Bunseki [The Analysis of Disintegrating Processes of the CPSU]', Kokusaiseiji 
[International Politics] 104 (October 1993), p. 25. 
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Chapter 6 Party-Military Relations and the August Attempted Coup 
I. Introduction 
In previous chapters, we have seen the party had been 'dead' de facto due to the loss of 
its raison d'etre and fragmentation of its property. Now we have to look into the final blow to 
the party. Three days that shook the world, the attempted coup in August 1991, became the final 
blow. Immediately after the coup failed, the party's activity was suspended by Russian President 
Yeltsin. There are many mysteries around the attempted coup even now. Firstly, why was the 
coup attempted? Some argue that it was for reviving the old, that is communist, regime. Others 
argue that the attempted coup was for maintaining social order. Secondly, what was the main 
organisation that attempted the coup? While a view that the security organs, especially KGB, 
played a leading role was advanced by many researchers, others argue that the party led the 
COUp.l Thirdly, why did the coup fail? It is too simple to argue that the resurgence of 'civil 
society' beat conservative forces. Fourthly, what was the relationship between the party and the 
military under Gorbachev's reforms? All these questions are related to the role of the party in 
relation to the security organs. This chapter tries to answer these questions by analysing 
party-military relations during the final years of the perestroika period. 
In order to consider these issues, it seems expedient to take in account three factors 
suggested by existing theories of military intervention. The first factor is structural. As Samuel 
Huntington argues, a military coup takes place when the political participation exceeds the 
political institutionalisation, which leads to a chaotic social order and 'praetorianism'. 2 
Secondly, the leadership is crucial. According to trans ito logy, a military coup is a failure of 
1 Note on terminology: I denote, by the 'military' or 'security organs', the am1ed forces, the 
KGB, some troops (railway, border and so forth), and the police or the Ministry of Intemal 
Affairs (MVD). 
2 Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven, CT.: Yale 
University Press, 1968). 
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regime soft-liners.3 The third factor emphasises the organisational interest and unity of the 
military establishment.4 It is not my intention to decide which theory is better to explain the 
Soviet case, but to utilise these theories in order to help set research agendas for understanding 
the attempted August coup. The agendas of research are accordingly defined as follows: Firstly, 
as suggested by the organisational theory, Gorbachev's refOlm of party-military relations during 
perestroika should be researched to understand the split within the party-military establishment. 
Secondly, whether or not the chaotic 'power vacuum' situation led to praetorianism should be 
researched. Finally the political leadership during the attempted coup will be discussed. 
II. Party-Military Relations before Perestroika 
Before discussing party-military relations under Gorbachev's reforms, let us briefly 
consider the basic structure of their relations. 
1. Theories of Party-Military Relations 
When one considers civil-military relations, the relations are usually those of the 
government and the military. In fact, in formal institutional terms, the armed forces (Ministry of 
Defence), the KGB and the MVD were under the jurisdiction of the Council of Ministers 
(government) also in the Soviet Union. However, it is well known that the primary task of the 
Council of Ministers was to manage the economy. It seems that the Council of Ministers did not 
supervise these ministries velY much. Therefore, in the Soviet Union, the party's relation with 
the military was of vital importance. How strong the party control was is a controversial issue. 
3 Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter, Transitions fi'om Authoritarian Rule: 
Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1986), pp. 24-25. 
4 In fact, O'Donnell and Schmitter add well-placed and professionally respected military 
officers as a crucial factor. Their presence, which means that the military is divided, makes the 
coup risky and less successful. See O'Donnell and Schmitter, Transitions ji'OlIl Authoritarian 
Rule, p. 25. 
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There are three theories of the role of the party in party-militaty relations. 5 The first theOlY 
emphasised conflicts between the party and military (a conflict theory). According to this theory, 
as Soviet military professionalism increased, the militalY required more autonomy from the 
party, which led to continuous conflicts. This theory is under the influence of the pluralist 
school in the Soviet and Russian studies. The second one suggested congmence rather than 
conflict (a congmence theory). This argued that the relationship was characterised as 
cooperation between the party and the military. Particularly in terms of ideologies, the military's 
philosophy was congment with the party's ideology. The third theory (a participation theory) 
stressed interaction between the two organisations, but the party's priority was accepted. The 
military was active in bargaining in the military-specific spheres, but not in domestic governing 
spheres. We can return to these arguments in a concluding section after analysing party-military 
relations during the perestroika period. In any case, it is widely acknowledged that the patty had 
controlling mechanisms over the military. Let me briefly argue the main ones.6 
2. Controls over Personnel 
The first controlling mechanism was the party's staffing (nomenklatura) system. The 
important posts in security organs were included in the Central Committee's nomenklatura list. 
5 My research on this topic is limited. My description is based on the following literature: 
Timothy J Colton, 'Perspectives on Civil-Military Relations in the Soviet Union', in Timothy J. 
Colton and Thane Gustafson eds., Soldiers and the Soviet State: Civil-Militmy Relations fi'0111 
Brezhnev to Gorbachev (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990); Timothy J. Colton, 
Commissars, Commanders, and Civilian Authority: The Structure of Soviet militmy Politics 
(Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press, 1979); William E. Odom, The Collapse of the 
Soviet Militmy (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1998); Condoleezza Rice, 'The Party, 
the Militaty, and Decision Authority in the Soviet Union', World Politics, Vol. 40, No. 1 
(October 1987); John W. R. Lepingwell, 'Soviet Civil-Military Relations and the August Coup', 
World Politics, Vol. 44, No.4 (July 1992). 
6 Party control was not limited in the following four measures. For example, the Politburo 
discussed many internal KGB affairs like the creation of some sectors. See Tsentr Khraneniya 
Sovremennoi Dokumentatsii (TsKhSD), fond (f.) 89, perechen' (p.) 9, delo (d.) 18; d. 111. In 
addition, the Secretariat approved the proposal of the KGB to changes in payment of salaries to 
staffs of the KGB in foreign countries on 16 March 1990. This decision asked the Council of 
Ministers to work out further elaboration. See TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 13, d. 48. One can add more 
concrete examples of other control measures. Still the following four measures seem cmcial. 
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Thus, it was not possible to become a high rank military officer without the party's confirmation. 
For example, the Politburo approved the release of one general in the army from his post on 11 
August 1989.7 Moreover, the Secretariat's confirmation of the KGB's personnel changes is 
recorded on 29 August 1989.8 In the armed forces, the party controlled the composition of the 
military councils of the military districts. The military councils were responsible to the CC 
CPSU, the government and the Ministry of Defence for the condition and the fighting 
preparation of the armed forces. The personnel composition of the militalY councils was 
confirmed by the CC CPSU. Moreover secretaries of the republican parties, obkoms and 
kraikoms participated in the military councils.9 The actual Secretariat's confirmation of the 
personnel changes of the some autonomous republican and oblast military councils is recorded 
in the party archives on 12 April 1990. 10 
3. Party Membership 
The second measure was party membership. Most or all military officers were required 
to become party members. As Hough stated in the late 1970s, 'Almost 90 percent of all military 
personnel are party or Komsomol members. Officers seem to enter the party at a younger age 
than other college graduates ... and party membership seems to become universal among all 
officers past their mid-twenties.' 11 Once an officer became a party member, of course he had to 
observe party discipline. 
4. Party Organisations in Security Organs 
Although party members in any organisation in the Soviet Union, if they were more 
7 TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 9, d. 17. 
8 TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 2, d. 7. 
9 TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 11, d. 73, p. l. See also Jerry F. Hough and Merle Fainsod, How the Soviet 
Union Is Governed (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1979), p. 492. 
10 TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 2, d. 6. 
11 Hough and Fainsod, How the Soviet Union Is Governed, p. 393. 
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than three, were supposed to form a primary party organisation (PPO), party organs in the 
military were somewhat stronger than in other organisations: in addition to ordinary PPOs at 
lower (up to battalion) level, the party controlled political organs in the military. At the centre 
the Main Political Administration (MP A) was organised, which supervised lower political 
organs that were formed down to regiment or sometimes battalion level. 12 Political organs 
supervised PPOs at lower levels. The MPA had its presence in the party's Central Committee as 
an equivalent of the CC departments. The political organs controlled line officers, and also were 
engaged in political education and propaganda work, including pUblication of books and 
joumals. 
5. The Party Apparat 
Finally, the party apparat monitored the activity of the security organs. The CC 
Department of Administrative Organs engaged in monitoring. As the author discussed in 
Chapter 3, the pmiy organised its apparat so as to parallel state ministries. The CC Department 
of Administrative Organs mainly supervised the Ministry of Defence (thus Armed forces), of 
Intemal Affairs (police), of Justice, the Committee for State Security (KGB), and the 
prosecutor's office. 
To investigate what happened when Gorbachev's reform attempt changed these control 
mechanisms is the subject in the following sections. 
III. Reform of Party-Military Relations at the Early Stage of Perestroika 
In the early period of perestroika, the party-militmy relationship was not a primmy 
subject of Gorbachev's reform. Some reform was related to intemal militmy affairs, and foreign 
12 My description of the structure of political organs is based on Colton, Commissars, esp. chap. 
1. See also Odom, The Col/apse, p. 36. 
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policy rather than party-military relations. 
1. Reform toward the 'Law-Based State' 
The first militaty related issue was to arrange security organs appropriate to the 
principle of a 'law-based state'. It is well known that in the Soviet Union some acts of the 
security organs had exerted power above the law. The principle of 'law-based state' called for a 
legal restriction or at least a new interpretation of the law. This issue basically concerned the 
MVD and the KGB rather than Armed Forces, because the basic task of armed forces was not to 
sustain domestic order but to protect the country from foreign enemies. 
For example, in December 1988 A. Pavlov, head of the CC State and Law Department, 
wrote a memorandum to Politburo members in which he, referring to Nagorno-Karabakh, 
Azerbaijan and Almenia, asked that a group be formed to discuss the problem of a legal 
regulatOlY procedure that was necessary to introduce a provisional special administrative form 
in the case of emergencies, because there was no such legislative act. Then the Politburo 
decided to form a discussion group comprising some representatives of the Ministries of 
Defence, Justice, Internal Affairs, the KGB and so forth and entmsted it to work out this 
problem. 13 
From September to November 1989, a huge cOl'luption case, which was related to 
former Uzbek first secretaty I. B. Usmankhodzhaev, was investigated by the prosecutor's office. 
Usmankhodzhaev stated that he gave money to top party leaders, including Ligachev,14 M. 
Solomentsev, former Politburo member and chairman of the Committee of Party Control,15 G. 
Romanov, former CC secretalY and a Politburo member,16 I. Kapitonov, former CC secretary 
13 TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 4, d. 8, pp. 1-8. 
14 TsKhSD, f 89, p. 24, d. 8; g. 9. 
15 TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 24, d. 10. 
16 TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 24, d. 11. 
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and a Politburo member,17 and V. Grishin, first secretary of Moscow gorkom and a Politburo 
member. 18 Then all of them were investigated and proved innocent. This case allows various 
interpretations. Firstly, they might have been tmly innocent, but prosecutors hoped to present 
themselves as strong figures fighting against conservative leaders. 19 Secondly, they might have 
been engaged in illegal activity, but they might have been strong enough to exert influence on 
the prosecutor's office. In fact Ligachev wrote a memorandum full of anger to a USSR General 
Prosecutor, A. Ya. Sukharev/o and Gorbachev.21 Romanov also wrote a similar memorandum 
to the CC CPSU, the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, the USSR prosecutor's office.22 
Thirdly, some reformist sections of the party leadership might have tried to humiliate them, 
especially Ligachev. Though we cannot define which is the case, it is wOlih noting that such an 
active top leader as Ligachev was investigated. 
As another step toward the law-based state, reform of the military courts can be 
indicated. On 18 January 1989 Viktor Chebrikov, KGB chairman, made a proposal to establish 
an autonomous military-judicial educational establishment and to widen the competence of the 
military courts. The Politburo positively responded to this proposal and sent the proposal to 
Dmitrii Yazov, Defence Minister, A. Lizichev, head of the MPA, Vadim Bakatin, Minister of 
Internal Affairs, and others for further elaboration.23 
2. Supports for the Military Control and Reduction 
It is very well known that Gorbachev launched a 'new thinking' foreign policy that 
necessitated arms control and reduction. Early military reform included support for this policy. 
17 TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 24, d. 12. 
18 TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 24, d. 13. 
19 Ligachev supported this argument. TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 24, d. 22. In addition, one party 
document strongly criticised these prosecutors. TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 30, d. 13. This document was 
written by 'Po Nishanov' without his title. 
20 TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 24, d. 22. 
21 TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 24, d. 25. 
22 TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 24, d. 23. 
23 TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 7, d. 15. 
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Because this was not always related to party-military relations, a brief mention seems sufficient. 
The fond 89 party archive shows that the Politburo decided on 12 May 1989 in the name of the 
CC 'On the measures in connection with the 70th year of the MPA in Soviet army and navy', 
attached to which was Defence Minister D. Yazov's address. The address asked the MPA to 
implement the military reform, stating that 'the most important task is practical realisation of 
new political thinking in the realm of the country's defence ... ,24 
Nonetheless, this policy caused dissatisfaction within the military. Still, at the early 
stage, such views were not advanced strongly, probably because the Soviet military had a 
tradition of not interfering in politics. 
3. Renewal of Cadres and the Nomenklatura System 
Just as in other organisations in the USSR, the renewal of cadres also took place in 
security organs. For example, in the KGB, one third of leading cadres were renewed and half of 
the workers in the post of the CC nomenklatura lists were appointed for the first time from 1985 
to 1988.25 In addition, a small modification of personnel controlling measures over the KGB 
and Defence Ministry was approved by the Politburo on 6 July 1989. The decision allowed the 
KGB and Defence Ministry to select cadres without taking into account the party membership, 
and asked to shorten the CC nomenklatura list of the KGB and the Defence Ministty. It was 
taken in order to improve the KGB and Defence Ministry's conspiratorial activity?6 It seems, 
nonetheless, that the general picture of party control over military personnel did not change as a 
result of this decision. For example, though the Politburo, prompted by a memorandum of A. 
Soshnikov, the deputy head of the CC State and Law Department, decided to delegate the right 
to appoint the chairmen of the KGB of Union republics to union republican Supreme Soviets on 
17 August 1989, chairmen were to be appointed by Supreme Soviets after the confirmation of 
24 TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 12, d. 23, p. 3. 
25 TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 51, d. 15, p. 10. 
26 TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 10, d. 38. 
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the CC CPSU and the CC of republican parties.27 Thus, party control over personnel was 
secured de facto. Moreover, the party archives include party control over the personnel of the 
military councils. For example, on 30 March 1990 the Politburo, in the name of the CC CPSU, 
confirnled M. Burokyavichyus as first secretary of the Lithuanian party (CPSU platform). 
Simultaneously it was decided that he become a member of the Baltic military council.28 
Moreover, as mentioned above (II -1), the Secretariat confirmed the personnel changes of the 
military councils of some autonomous republics and oblasti in Russia on 12 April 1990.29 In 
addition, the Secretariat decided to include the post of head of a newly established institution of 
the KGB, the Centre of Public Relations, into the CC's nomenklatura list and confirmed A. N. 
Karbainov as head of the Centre on 23 May 1990.30 These documents tell us the party's control 
over military personnel did not change at the early stage of the perestroika period. 
4. Reorganisation of the Party Apparat 
Reorganisation of the party apparat took place in late 1988 as we have seen in Chapter 3. 
The Administration Department was reorganised into the State and Law Department. However, 
research into the internal structure of the State and Law Department reveals that no significant 
change took place in terms of personnel numbers, its jurisdiction and so forth. Thus, we can 
conclude that, at the early stage of perestroika, Gorbachev did not attempt to change party 
control over the military. More importantly, the party apparat reorganisation in general created a 
'loss of power' and a 'power vacuum' situation. It led to increasing praetorianism, which we 
will discuss later. 
27 TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 4, d. 12; f. 89, p. 9, d. 20. 
28 TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 8, d. 76. 
29 TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 2, d. 6. 
30 TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 11, d. 122. The establishment of the Centre of Public Relations of the KGB 
was approved by the Politburo on 10 April 1990. TsKhSD, f. 89, p.9, d. 111. 
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IV. Reform of Party-Military Relations at the Late Stage of Perestroika 
1. Reform of the Party Organisations in the Military 
(a) Decision of the Party Congress 
Together with the establishment of the presidency in March 1990, article six of the 
USSR Constitution was amended in order that the leading role of the party be abolished. Under 
such conditions, party control over the military became problematic. In particular, the opinion 
that the military should be 'de-politicised' was advanced by many radical reformers, that is, they 
supported the abolition of political organs in the military. Most of the workers in the MP A and 
political organs, of course, opposed such an idea. The 28th Party Congress became a battlefield 
of the two groupS.31 It was reported that delegates from military party organisations to the 
congress who put on their unifOlm gave a threatening impression. In the end, the result was a 
compromise. The new party Rules did not state anything on the MPA, which was previously an 
equivalent of the CC department. In addition, according to the new party Rules, party work in 
the military was to be carried out by the primary party organisations and elected party organs 
that were to work in close cooperation with the military councils, commanding officers, 
military-political organs, and corresponding territorial party organisations; an all-army party 
conference was to be organised in order to elect the party committee in the armed forces. 32 The 
resolution 'On the basic direction of the military policy of the party in the contemporary period' 
asked to make precise the function of party organisations and political organs, but 'the Congress 
opposes the de-politicisation of anned forces'. Political organs should engage in ideological and 
political education rather than party work, while the party was to create and arrange its own 
31 For details, see E. A. Rees, 'Party Relations with the Military and the KGB', in E. A. Rees 
ed., The Soviet Communist Party in Disarray: The XXVIII Congress of the Communist Party of 
the Soviet Union (London: Macmillan Press, 1992); Stephen Foye, 'Defense Issues at the Party 
Congress', RLI Report on the USSR, Vol. 2, No. 30 (July 27,1990); ViktorYasmann, 'The KGB 
and the Pariy Congress', RL/ Report on the USSR, Vol. 2. No. 31 (August 3,1990). 
32 Materialy XXVIII s" ezda K0I11111unisticheskoi Partii Sovetskogo Soyuza (Moskva: Politizdat, 
1990), pp. 117-118. 
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mechanism in the military.33 Therefore, political organs were to survive not as part of the party 
but as part of the state stmcture. 
(b) Further Decisions 
The implementation of 'de-partyisation' of political organs and the establishment of 
more regular patty committees in the military were, however, far from a smooth process. At the 
end of the party congress, it was announced that Aleksei Ligichev was replaced as head of the 
MP A and that Nikolai Shlyaga was appointed as a new head. Shlyaga had worked in the CC 
State and Law Department, that is, he was a party official. This was regarded as a sign that the 
MP A would not surrender its ties with the party.34 Soon after the party congress (on 23 July 
1990), Shlyaga wrote a memorandum to the CC. He argued that forming party organisations in 
the military should be completed in the course of a report-and-election campaign after the 
adoption of resolutions 'The Regulation on political organs in the USSR armed forces' (see 
below) and 'The Instmction on the work of the party organisations in the USSR armed forces' 
(see below). During the transitional period, he proposed that it was expedient to preserve for 
political organs the right to select and place cadres, count the party membership dues, and so 
forth, that is, he argued that political organs should retain control of patty-related work in the 
meantime.35 A. Pavlov, head of the CC State and Law Department, and Yu. Ryzhov, deputy 
head of the Party Constmction and Cadre Work, supported his proposal, adding that a similar 
idea had been advanced by political organs in the KGB and the MVD, on 26 July 1990.36 
Though it is not clear whether or not the Secretariat or the Politburo took any decision on this 
matter, the process of implementation of the new party stmcture suggests that Shlyaga's 
proposal was supported. 
A memorandum dated 21 August 1990 (without signature) that was circulated to CC 
33 Ibid., p.188. 
34 Stephen Foye, 'Soviet Army's New Political Chief on Reform of Military-Political Organs', 
RLI Report on the USSR, Vol. 2, No. 31 (August 3, 1990). 
35 TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 11, d. 58, p. 2. 
36 Ibid., p. 1. 
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secretaries showed the dissatisfaction in the MVD with the reform of political organs. 
According to the memorandum, V. Bakatin, Minister of Internal Affairs, and V. Karpochev, head 
of political administration of the MVD, submitted a proposal to create a new unified service 
section on the basis of cadre and political organs after the FeblUaly CC plenum (1990). 
Although the CC State and Law Department and the CC Department of Party ConstlUction and 
Cadre Work, supported the proposal, and submitted a draft of a decision to the CC CPSU for its 
examination on 16 July 1990, no decision was taken.37 The memorandum indicated many other 
similar cases.38 It demanded to make clear the precise position of the CC on the place of the 
party organisations in the system of law-enforcement organs and on the fate of the political 
department and political apparat of the MVD.39 
President Gorbachev, under such circumstances, took a further step toward the 
'departyisation' of the military. He issued a presidential decree, 'On the reformation of political 
organs of the USSR armed forces, KGB troops, internal troops of MVD, and railway troops' on 
3 September 1990. It asked the Ministry of Defence, the MPA, the KGB, and MVD to work out 
the draft of 'the Regulation on the military-political organs' within three months for the policy 
of the demarcation of the state and party functions. 40 
The presidential decree aggravated party activity in the militaly. Even the 
self-liquidation of the party organisations in law-enforcement organs took place. Thus, the 
Secretariat decision on 16 October 1990, 'Questions of activity of party organisations in 
law-enforcement organs,' and its attached memorandum 'On the question of de-politicisation of 
law-enforcement organs' were the response to such a situation. They argued that party activity 
in the law-enforcement organs be allowed in legal terms, and urged communists in these 
37 TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 8, d. 53, p.11. 
38 Ibid., pp.9-1O. 
39 Ibid., pp. 11-12. 
40 Vedomosti S"ezda Narodnykh Deputatov SSSR i Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR, 1990, No. 37 (12 
September), p. 908. 
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organisations to activate their work,4! 
The party had to accelerate the formation of the new party organisations in the military. 
The draft 'Instruction on the work of the party organisations in the USSR armed forces' was 
published on 25 October 1990, which defined the structure of the military party organisations.42 
In addition, the Secretariat's decision 'On urgent measures in connection with a strengthening 
anti-army appearance in a series of regions of the country' (15 November 1990) demanded that 
the MPA work out measures to strengthen the discipline and unity of military collectives in the 
course of the forthcoming report and election period, and the formation of the new party 
structure in the military.43 
In legal terms, the reform of political organs and the structure of the new paliy 
organisations in the military were completed in January 1991. On 11 January a Presidential 
decree, 'On approval of General Regulations on military-political organs,' was issued.44 With 
this decree, military-political organs officially became state rather than party organs. On the 
party side, the January CC plenum (1991) approved an Instruction 'On the work of 
organisations of the CPSU in the USSR armed forces'. According to this, the structure of party 
organisations in the military was to be similar to those in other organisations. At the bottom the 
PPOs were created by the general party meeting, and at higher levels the party committees were 
to be organised by party conferences. The party committees were to be autonomous and have 
the right to create their own apparat. The all-army party conference was to become the leading 
organ of the military party organisations, which was to elect the executive and control 
commissions, and establish the structure of the executive organs and members of their apparat. 
Party organisations in the military were to organise political work such as propaganda and 
41 Izvestiya TsK KPSS, 1990, No. 11, pp. 20-23. 
42 Krasnaya Zvezda, 25 October 1990, pp. 1-2; FBIS SovietUl1iol1, 31 October 1990, pp. 51-54. 
Incidentally, Odom misunderstands this instruction as a final decision. See Odom, The Collapse, 
p.214. 
43 TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 8, d. 68, pp. 2-3. 
44 Vedomosti S"ezda Narodnykh Deputatov SSSR i Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR, 1991, No.3 (16 
January), pp. 138-140. 
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education of the party's military policy, theory of Marxism-Leninism and so forth.45 
(c) Implementation of Decisions 
Then, the report-and-election campaign began in the military party organisations. After 
the plenum (on 5 February 1991), the Secretariat decided to send a letter 'To party organisations, 
and all communists of the armed forces, troops of the KGB, internal troops of the MVD and 
railway troops' to all leaders of the security organs and the MPA. The letter asked communists 
in the militalY, in the process of the campaign, to pay more attention to the concerns of military 
collectives, participation in cadre policy, ideological education, and strengthening the party's 
influence on military officials.46 
However, it can be recognised from some party documents that demarcation of the MP A 
and the political organs from the party and the creation of new party organisations were not 
smooth. In the process of the report and elections in the military party organisations, there was 
one difficult problem, that is, the position of full-time party workers in the newly formed party 
organisations in the military. The USSR law 'On Public Associations' allowed an interpretation 
that the term as full-time party workers in the military could not be counted as a working period 
in the military. It would affect the payment of pensions, receipt of an award for long continuous 
service and so forth. For example, on 20 November 1990 N. Nazarov, secretary of the party 
committee in the KGB, indicated this problem in his memorandum to the CC CPSU 'On the 
legal status of military service workers of the KGB who are joining full-time party work' .47 
Dmitrii Yazov and Shlyaga also raised this problem in their memorandum on 3 December 
1990.48 Three days later Yurii Manaenkov, CC secretary, wrote a similar memorandum to other 
secretaries. According to him, this problem caused serious concerns among militaty officers 
who had become full-time party workers. Then he attached a draft of a presidential instruction 
45 Izvestiya TsK KPSS, 1991, No.3, pp. 56-59. 
46 TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 20, d. 32. 
47 TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 11, d. 72, pp. 14-16. 
48 Ibid., pp. 8-9. 
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ordering the Council of Ministers to take an appropriate decision.49 
The similar difficulty in implementing reform of the party organisations in the MVD is 
shown by a memorandum 'On several issues of party-political work in the system of the MVD' 
from A. Malofeev, a Belorussian party secretary, to the CC CPSU on 15 January 1991. He 
argued that 'in our opinion, an unjustified rush toward the abolition of political organs is there.' 
In addition, reorganisation of the political and cadre service, which had been publicised in the 
beginning of 1990, was prolonged, and the unified service on the work with staff had not yet 
been created. All these caused absentmindedness, lack of confidence in their activity, and 
resignation from their work among the staffs of internal affairs organs. Criticising the central 
MVD leadership that was removing party organisations from any influence on the staff, 
Malofeev indicated that the terms spent as full-time party workers in internal affairs organs were 
not to be counted as periods working in internal affairs organs.50 This probably meant the same 
service continuity problem. On 4 February Boris Pugo, Minister of Internal Affairs, responding 
to this memorandum, demanded that the government suspend some parts of a related decree, 
and asked the CC to support his demand? 1. Kovyrnin, deputy head of the CC Organisational 
Department, wrote a memorandum to support the position of Malofeev and Pugo on 7 March 
1991. 52 Though it is not known whether or not the Secretariat or the Politburo took a further 
decision on this matter, this clearly shows the considerable difficulty in reorganising the paliy 
organs in the MVD. 
As suggested by the memorandum above, political organs began to disappear, and the 
party, which was supposed to have no further relations with political organs, showed anxiety. 
The CC Organisational Department sent a memorandum to the Secretariat, 'On the work of 
party committees on realisation of the CC Secretariat's recommendation of the strengthening to 
49 Ibid., pp. 1-6. 
50 TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 22, d. 49, pp. 2-3. 
51 Ibid., p. 4. 
52 Ibid., pp. 5-6. 
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fight against crimes' (without a date). The Secretariat decided to consider the matter and 
forwarded the memorandum to Luk'yanov on 15 February 1991. This memorandum negatively 
evaluated the presidential decree 'On the formation of the USSR Committee on coordination of 
activity of law-enforcement organs under the President' because it led to a campaign of 
de-politicisation or liquidation of political organs in the MVD. On the other hand, the 
Secretariat memorandum 'On the question of de-politicisation of the state and law-enforcement 
organs', according to the Organisational Department's memorandum, made it possible to 
suspend the atmosphere of liquidation of party organisations in the MVD. 53 
In addition, even when the party committees in the military were created anew, it seems 
that the MPA kept some influence on them. For example, on 28 January 1991 a meeting of 
communists of Kemerovo garrison approved a decision to form a united party committee of 
Kemerovo garrison that was directly subordinate to the central military party committee apparat. 
They sent this decision to the CC CPSU, the central military party committee, the MPA and so 
forth. 54 Thus, it seems that this implied that the MPA was still related to party affairs. 
In any case, the process of the report and elections went on. For example, the Secretariat 
approved the Organisational Department's proposal to hold a party conference of the Western 
Military Unit Group on 7 March 1991.55 The party conference of railway troops was reported 
on 13 March.56 
The all-army party conference was held on 29 and 30 March 1991. Shlyaga, in his 
address, argued that the conference concluded the process of transforn1ation of the party 
53 TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 23, d. 9. Incidentally the presidential decree mentioned in the 
memorandum was issued on 29 January 1991 based on article four of the USSR Supreme Soviet 
decision 'On the situation of the country' (23 November 1990). See Vedol71osti S"ezda 
Narodnykh Deputatov SSSR i Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR, 1990, No. 48 (28 November), p.1282; 
1991, No.6 (6 Februaty), p. 242. In addition, the Secretariat memorandum, 'On the question of 
de-politicisation of the state and law-enforcement organs' mentioned in this memorandum is 
probably the same as above mentioned 'To the question of de-politicisation of law-enforcement 
organs' in Izvestiya TsK KPSS, 1990, No. 11, pp. 21-23. 
54 TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 8, d. 2. Emphasis added. 
55 TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 5, d. 13. 
56 Pravda, 13 March 1991, p. 2. 
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organisation in the armed forces. 57 Gorbachev and Yazov also addressed the conference. 58 The 
conference elected an all-army party committee and a plenum of the all-army party committee 
elected Major General Mikhail Surkov secretary of the all-army party committee. 59 Later he 
was elected a Politburo member at the April CC and Central Control Commission (CCe) joint 
plenum (1991).60 Officially, by this conference, reform of the military party organisations had 
been completed. Nonetheless, whether or not party control over security organs was over is 
problematic, which can be recognised by investigating other controlling measures: the party 
apparat and personnel control. 
2. Reorganisation of the Party Apparat 
As discussed above, after the 28 th Party Congress, political organs were not under the 
jurisdiction of the party, and the party began to organise party committees in the militmy. Then 
the CC department that would supervise these party committees was to be reorganised. At the 
October CC plenum (1990), the second reorganisation of the CC apparat was reported. The 
State and Law Department was divided into the Ethnic Relations Department and the 
Department on Legislative Initiatives and Law Questions. However, these departments were not 
to supervise party organs in the militalY. The Organisational Depmiment was to supervise them 
as we have seen in Chapter 3. It seems that this was related to a change in the mode of party 
control over the military. We can recognise this change by investigating party control over 
personnel. Let us see it in the next section. 
57 Krasnaya Zvezda, 30 March 1991, p. 1; FBIS Soviet Union, 4 April 1991, p. 47. For details 
of the all-army party conference, see Stephen Foye, 'Rhetoric from the Past: The First All-Army 
Party Conference', RLI Report on the USSR, Vol. 3, No. 16 (April 19, 1991); Stephen Foye, 
'Maintaining the Union: The CPSU and the Soviet Armed Forces', RL/ Report on the USSR, Vol. 
3, No. 23 (June 7, 1991). 
58 TASS, 31 March 1991; FBIS Soviet Union, 2 April 1991, pp. 51-52 (Gorbachev); Krasnaya 
Zvezda, 2 April 1991, pp. 1-2; FBIS Soviet Union, 2 April 1991, pp. 52-54 (Yazov). 
59 Krasnaya Zvezda, 2 April 1991, p. 1; FBIS Soviet Union, 3 April 1991, p. 46. 
60 Materialy ob" edinennogo Plenuma Tsentral 'nogo Komiteta i Tsentral 'noi Kontrol 'noi 
Komissii KPSS, 24-25 aprelya 1991 g. (Moskva: Politizdat, 1991), p. 5. 
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3. Personnel Control 
Party control over personnel had not changed very much before the 28th Party Congress, 
as discussed above. Nonetheless, after the 28th Party Congress, some reform attempts were made 
in the demarcation between the party and the state. On 11 January 1991 Yu. Ryzhov, deputy 
head of the Organisational Department, sent a memorandum asking for a reconsideration of the 
current situation whereby the CC CPSU confirmed the composition of the military council 
beforehand, and party secretaries participated in the military counci1.61 
However, it seems that the party tried to change the method of control over the military 
from direct to indirect control through communists in the military. The party did not lose interest 
in the education of cadres. Shlyaga sent a memorandum on 28 May 1991 to the CC in order to 
oppose the abolition of the military science course in the academy of social sciences of the CC 
CPSU and other social and political institutions of the CPSu.62 A. Degtyarev, head of the 
Ideology Department, wrote a memorandum on 27 June, supporting the opinion of Shlyaga.63 
The Secretariat agreed with Degtyarev's memorandum.64 
In addition, for such indirect control, the personnel of party committees in the military 
should be stable. On 15 May 1991 the Secretariat accepted a proposal of the all-army party 
committee to modify the Instruction 'On the work of organisations of the CPSU in the armed 
forces in the USSR'. The modification was made to give the military party committee the right 
to define the number of subordinate apparat, though previously the paliy conference approved 
the structure and number of the apparat. Moreover, the terms of election of party committees 
were to be extended from every two-three years to every five years or more. 65 Probably this 
61 TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 11, d. 73, pp. 1-2. 
62 TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 20, d. 70, pp. 7-8. 
63 Ibid., pp. 3-4. 
64 Ibid., p. 2. This decision does not indicate its date. 
65 Partiinaya Zhizl1', 1991, No. 11 (June), p. 32; Izvestiya TsK KPSS, 1991, No.8, p. 38; 
TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 5, d. 19. 
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modification was intended to stabilise the personnel of the military party apparat. 
The nomenklatura list that was submitted by the CC Organisational department on 6 
August 1991 excluded the posts of command-in-chiefs in the armed forces and other 
commander posts in KGB and MVD troops. Thus, the direct party control over personnel in the 
military was to end. However, the nomenklatura list included the posts of secretaries of the 
all-army party committee, of the KGB party committees, and of party committees of MVD 
troops in the same category as first and second secretaries of union republican parties.66 Though 
probably the appointments to these posts were to be confirmed ex post jacto, this meant that 
party posts in security organs were as important to the party leadership as the first and second 
secretaries of union republican parties. In summary, though a change in paliy control over 
personnel certainly took place, the party faced considerable difficulty in entirely relinquishing it. 
4. Organisational Disarray in the Military 
In addition and more importantly, such reform attempts of party-military relations 
caused organisational disarray in security organs, as party archives tell us. 
Firstly, security organs were losing authority. In many regions an anti-army atmosphere 
began to appear. The CC Commission on Military Policy made a proposal to the Secretariat 'On 
urgent measures in connection with a strengthening the anti-army appearance in a series of 
regions of the country' (without a date), arguing that an anti-army atmosphere was becoming 
stronger in Baltic, Trans-Caucasus, and Moldavian republics and West-Ukraine. In some of 
these republics, military officers were deprived of their residential entitlement, which led to a 
situation where they lost their rights in residential areas to medical treatment, their children's 
education and so forth. Even physical attacks on military officers were taking place. Prompted 
by this memorandum, the Secretariat took the decision that had the same title as the proposal 
66 See Chapter 3 and Atsushi Ogushi, 'Pmiy-State Relations during Perestroika', paper 
presented to the annual conference of the British Association for Slavonic and East European 
Studies (BASEES), 3 April 2004, p. 21. 
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(On urgent measures) on 15 November 1990, which asked party organisations in these republics 
to take urgent measures to protect the militmy.67 Another report of the discussion of the 
Commission on Military Policy that was written by Oleg Baklanov, CC secretary, on 8 January 
1991, complained of a widespread tendency to evade conscription.68 
Secondly, the relationship between security organs and the party became problematic. 
On 1 March 1991, Kryuchkov sent a memorandum to the Cc. The KGB, he argued, supported 
the Secretariat decision 'On the work of party committees on the realisation of the CC 
Secretariat's recommendation of strengthening the fight against crime' (15 February 1991) that 
advanced an idea to hold an all-union meeting of workers of organs of the Internal Affairs, the 
KGB, the prosecutor's office, the court, and the judicimy, as well as a zonal meeting-seminar of 
party secretaries of these organs. However, Kryuchkov asked that the coordinating activity for 
the preparation of the all-union meeting be entrusted to the KGB. V. Babichev, head of the CC 
Department on the Legislative Initiative and Law Questions, responded that in a situation where 
a series of meetings of law-enforcement organs had already taken place, 'Yu. Golik, chairman of 
the Committee on the coordination of activity of law-enforcement organs under the USSR 
President, considers it inexpedient to hold the all-union meeting ... until the conclusion of a 
Union Treaty'. In addition, Babichev argued that the CC Organisational Department carried out 
the zonal meeting-seminars.69 Therefore, it implied that the party rejected any initiative of the 
KGB on this matter. 
Under such circumstances, the party organisations in security organs tried to influence 
central party affairs. Surkov proposed to invite some secretaries of the military party committees 
to the CC plenum on 14 May 1991. Ryzhov and G. Orlov, deputy head of the General 
67 TsKhSD, f. 89, p.8, d. 68. 
68 TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 22, d. 2, p.2. 
69 TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 8, d. 15. Incidentally in this source the date of the Secretariat's decision is 
noted as 16 February. However, the decision itself shows the date as 15 February. See TsKhSD, 
f. 89, p. 23, d. 9, pp.1-2; f. 89, p. 20, d. 37, p. 1 (note 55). Thus, the date '16 February' is, it 
seems, a mistake. 
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Department, issued a memorandum in support of the proposal on 31 May.70 Probably this 
proposal was supported by the Secretariat or the Politburo because the secretaries of the military 
party committees actually participated in the July CC plenum.71 Moreover, a letter dated 21 
June 1991 from the deputy secretary of the patty committee of a Chernomorskii (Black Sea) 
fleet to the CC showed concern about the passive position of the CPSU and demanded the 
summoning of an extraordinary party congress to discuss the new party Programme.72 A similar 
letter from parts and establishments subordinate to the central Air Defence Military (PVO) Unit 
to the CC was accepted on 22 July. The argument of this letter was not conservative in 
ideological terms. Criticising both the ways to capitalism and to the totalitarian order, it sought 
to construct a society based on associational ownership of the means of production. Real 
democrats and communists, according to this letter, could agree with such an aim, and this was a 
necessary condition for combining all constructive social forces. Then it demanded an earlier 
summoning of an extraordinary party congress and more democratic delegates' elections.73 
Nonetheless the situation became worse for the party. On 30 April 1991, Ryzhov wrote 
a memorandum 'On the course of realisation, by party committees, of the CC Secretariat's 
recommendation on the questions of strengthening the fight against crime', which was 
circulated to CC secretaries and the CCC chairman.74 Ryzhov reported how patty organisations 
were endeavouring to prevent crimes. In order to strengthen the connections among party 
organisations of law-enforcement organs, a subdivision under the department of Party 
organisational and cadre work was created in some republics and oblasti. Kemerovo, Pskov, and 
Sakhalin obkoms created councils of primary organisations' secretaries of law-enforcement 
organs under obkoms.75 Still, the report admitted many difficulties with fighting crime. It is 
70 TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 11, d. 93. 
71 Pravda, 26 July 1991, p. l. 
72 TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 8, d. 3, p. 3. 
73 Ibid., pp. 3-4. 
74 TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 22, d. 71. 
75 Ibid., p. 5. 
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worth citing: 
Under the influence of a series of "Democratic" Soviets that are taking the course 
toward the de-partyisation of law-enforcement organs, several communists took a 
waiting position, some individual communists left the party, or ... "suspended" their 
own party membership. Practically party organisations in law-enforcement organs in 
Armenia, Georgia, Latvia, Estonia, and Moldova stopped their activity. The attempts to 
self-liquidate party organisations in court organs and legal work in RSFSR and Ukraine 
appeared. And in a series of regions (Leningrad and Zakarpat'e obkoms) they had 
already stopped existing in these structures. The situation is more complicated in that 
re-elected party secretaries in most cases cease to be full-time. They do not have 
working experience in new conditions. Sufficient and qualified methodological help 
from the sides of individual raikoms is not given. Many party committees consider that 
at present methodological recommendations are insufficiently published in the central 
party press.76 
Then this report proposed to create a party structure in law-enforcement organs, which 
was, from bottom to the top, similar to the one in the armed forces. 77 It is not clear whether or 
not this proposal was accepted. However, even if it was, it seems that there was not enough time 
to implement such an organisational change. It is more important in our context to note that, 
despite some party officials' resistance, the party organisation in the military was disintegrating. 
Therefore, we can conclude that security organs were gradually becoming more independent of 
the party, but this did not mean that they could retain their organisational unity. On the contrary, 
these organs were thrown into disarray. 
76 Ibid., pp. 6-7 
77 Ibid., p.8. 
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v. Increasing Praetorianism 
As the author have argued in Chapter 3, reform of the party apparat led to a 'loss of 
power' and a 'power vacuum'. In Chapter 3 we have seen the leadership's recognition of the 
power vacuum. Of course, recognition is not necessarily reality. We have to consider the actual 
situation at that time. A universal phenomenon is a rise in the crime rate when a 'power vacuum' 
is created. This was the case also in the Soviet Union. Let me consider the situation at the time, 
which will make clear that these structural factors caused a military intervention. 
1. Rise of Crime 
The crime record from the late 1980s to 1990 was given in a memorandum of the 
prosecutor's office dated 11 February 1991 that was circulated to CC secretaries and the CCC 
chairman. According to this, in 1987 crimes decreased 9.5 per cent and in 1988 they slightly 
increased (3.8 per cent). But in 1989 the rate increased steeply (3l.8 per cent). This tendency 
continued in 1990. The number of recorded crimes was 2,786,605 (a 13.2 per cent increase), 
including 422,647 serious ones (a 15.0 per cent increase). Except for Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, 
and the Tajikistan republic that showed only a moderate increase, this was an all-union tendency. 
In addition, all kinds of crime showed increase: murder (15.9 per cent), serious injury (12.2 per 
cent), rape (2.7 per cent), robbery (16.6 per cent), embezzlement (23.8 per cent), speculation 
(14.6 per cent) and so forth.78 
In 1991 the MVD reported many dangerous incidents around the country to the CC 
CPSu. The fond 89 party archives contain some reports around the time of the all-union 
referendum on the future form of the Union. They include the situation in Nagorno-Karabakh 
(14 March),79 demonstrations, movements, and strikes around the country (15 March),8o the 
78 TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 22, d. 16. pp. 4-5. For more detail data, see pp. 4-20. 
79 TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 22, d. 6l. 
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situation of union republics concerning the referendum (16 March),81 the process of referendum 
all over the country (18 March),82 and the situation of South Osetia (19 March).83 In general all 
of these reports emphasised the violent and chaotic situation. 
As far as the fond 89 party archive is concerned, further reports of the MVD can be 
found around the end of July to the beginning of August. The MVD reported on the situation in 
Latvia and Lithuania (29 July),84 Lithuania (31 July),85 and of Azerbaijan, Lithuania and Latvia 
(1 August).86 Again, these reports referred to the chaotic situation in these republics. 
The memorandum by Ryzhov mentioned above, 'On the course of realisation, by party 
committees, of the CC Secretariat's recommendation on the questions of the strengthening the 
fight against crime', noted a rise in the crime rate from January to March 1991 in many places: 
Estonia (38.9 per cent), Armenia (23.3), Mari (33.5), Chuvash (28.9), Omsk (48.2), Vladimir 
(40.9), Nizhnii Novgorod (39.5), Kamchatka (39.3), Tver' (37.8), Kaluga (36.8), and 
Novosibirsk (34.4).87 
The possibility that these reports overemphasised the danger of the situation in order 
to demand more security attention cannot be discounted. In addition, the definition of a crime 
was highly controversial in this period. Nonetheless, it does not seem irrational to argue that the 
situation was so explosive that some emergency measures were desirable at least for some 
central leaders. Praetorianism was certainly increasing. 
2. Increasing Dissatisfaction within the Military 
The security organs came forward in such situation in the late 1980s to 1991. For 
80 TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 22, d. 62. 
81 TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 22, d. 63; d. 64. 
82 TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 22, d. 65. 
83 TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 22, d. 66. 
84 TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 28, d. 34. 
85 TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 28, d. 35. 
86 TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 28, d. 36. 
87 TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 22, d. 71, p. 7. 
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example, Kryuchkov proposed to the CC CPSU the creation of an administrative section in the 
KGB on 4 August 1989, though it is not clear if the CC supported this proposal. The section was 
intended, the proposal explained, to secure the constitutional order.88 Similar proposals were 
advanced by Kryuchkov several times. For example, on 9 December 1989, he proposed to 
establish a unit with special tasks in KGB troops and the Politburo agreed on 22 December.89 In 
addition, Kryuchkov asked to create a special military unit in the KGB on 16 F ebmary 1990 and 
the Politburo approved it on 16 March 1990.90 
Moreover, economic chaos, which was due in part to the party apparat reorganisation, 
led to economic crimes, though the definition of a crime in this sphere was more difficult than in 
other spheres. To respond to this situation, 1. Skiba, head of the Agrarian Policy Depatiment, 
and A. Vlasov, head of the Department of Social and Economic Policy, wrote a memorandum, 
'On the necessity to strengthen the fight against crime in the sphere of the economy' (18 March 
1991). After indicating many incidents related to economic crimes, they asked the party to show 
support and defence to law enforcement organs. The Secretariat discussed this problem on 22 
Mall and approved a decision on 3 July 1991.92 The above-mentioned memorandum 'On the 
course of realisation, by party committees, of the CC Secretariat's recommendation on the 
questions of the strengthening the fight against crime' showed serious concern in the party about 
the chaotic situation.93 
Thus, the political arena during 1990 to middle of 1991 was dangerous enough to call 
for militaty intervention. The problem was who would provide leadership, which was not 
resolved until August 1991. 
88 TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 18, d. 127. 
89 TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 10, p. 49. 
90 TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 10, d. 55. 
91 TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 20, d. 49. 
92 Izvestiya TsK KPSS, 1991, No.8, pp. 61-66. 
93 TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 22, d. 71. 
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VI. The August Attempted Coup 
1. Development of Events 
This chapter does not give a detailed account of the August COUp.94 A very basic 
chronology follows. Around 5:00 pm on 18 August Gorbachev (who was in Foros on holiday) 
realised all his phones were cut off. Soon after that, Oleg Baklanov, deputy chairman of the 
Defence Council, Oleg Shenin, CC Secretary, Valerii Boldin, the president's chief of staff and 
head of the CC General Department, Valentin Varennikov, deputy minister of defence and 
commander of the ground force, and Yurii Plekhanov, head of the Secret Service that guarded 
the president, visited Gorbachev in order to ask him to support the Emergency Committee 
(GKChP) or to delegate his authority to Gennadii Yanaev, vice president. The GKChP was 
composed of these eight persons: Yanaev, Baklanov, Valentin Pavlov, prime minister, 
Kryuchkov, Dmitrii Yazov, defence minister, Boris Pugo, minister of internal affairs, Aleksandr 
Tizyakov, president of the Association of USSR State Industry, and Vasilii Starodubtsev, 
chairman of the USSR Union of Peasants. Gorbachev refused both support and delegation. 
Baklanov and others confined Gorbachev in Foros, and went back to Moscow. 
At 6:00 am on 19 August, the GKChP announced that Yanaev was assuming the 
authority of the president because Gorbachev had become ill. Some troops went into Moscow. 
94 The following literature gives more detailed analysis of the process of the attempted coup, to 
which I am heavily indebted. John B. Dunlop, The Rise of Russia and the Fall of the Soviet 
Empire (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993), chap. 5; John B. Dunlop, 'The 
August Coup and Its Impact on Soviet Politics', Journal of Cold War Studies, Vol. 5, No. 1 
(Winter 2003); Odom, The Collapse, chap. 14; Jerry F. Hough, Democratization and Revolution 
in the USSR, 1985-1991 (Washington, D. C.: Brookings Institution, 1997), chap. 13; Gordon 
Hahn, Russia's Revolution ji'om Above: Reform, Transition, and Revolution in the Fall of the 
Soviet Communist Regime (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers, 2002), chap. 9; Brian 
D. Taylor, 'The Soviet Military and the Disintegration of the USSR', Journal of Cold War 
Studies, Vol. 5, No.1 (Winter 2003); Amy Knight, 'The KGB, Perestroika, and the Collapse of 
the Soviet Union', Journal of Cold War Studies, Vol. 5, No. 1 (Winter 2003); Nobuo 
Shimotomai, Dokuritsukokkakyodotai heno Michi [The Road to the CIS] (Tokyo: Jijitsushin, 
1992), chap. 6-7; Nobuaki Shiokawa, "'Kimyona Kudeta" kara "Roshia saigono Kakumeihe" 
[From a "Strange Coup" to the "Last Russian Revolution"]', Sekai [The World], 1991, No. 11, 
(November 1991), pp. 55-68. 
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The KGB failed to arrest Russian president Yeltsin, and he and his team arrived at the 'White 
House' (the building of the Russian parliament) around 10:00 am. They issued an 'appeal to the 
Citizens of Russia' that called for the action to fight against the GKChP. Some thousand people 
gathered to support Yeltsin and his team. The GKChP did not take any action on 19-20 August. 
At 3:00 am on 21 August the GKChP finally decided to storm the White House, but, 
after a small clash that caused three civilian deaths, the troops stopped taking further action. The 
GKChP members realised that they were failing. Around 2:00 pm, Kryuchkov, Yazov, Baklanov, 
Anatolii Luk'yanov, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet, and Vladimir Ivashko, deputy 
General Secretary of the CPSU, went to see Gorbachev. Yeltsin sent a Russian govemment 
delegation including Aleksandr Rutskoi, the Russian vice president, to capture the plotters. In 
Foros, the GKChP members were arrested by the Russian delegation. 
The greatest mystery is why the coup failed so easily. At the beginning, many analysts 
emphasised the strength of the opposition of Yeltsin and his team. However, the more 
convincing explanation is, it seems, the weakness of the GKChP side.95 Thus, let us consider 
the leadership of the coup plotters and the organisational problem, especially the party in the 
coup, in the following sections. 
2. Leadership 
It is well known that the coup was ill prepared and that plotters behaved indecisively. 
There are many episodes which illustrate this matter. For example, after the GKChP members 
knew that Gorbachev refused to cooperate, Luk'yanov, who visited the GKChP, asked whether 
or not the GKChP had a plan. Yazov answered that they did not have, though Kryuchkov 
insisted that they did have one.96 Another episode tells that Pavlov was apparently drunk, or 
95 Among the works cited above, Hough and Shiokawa particularly emphasise the weakness of 
the GKChP. Hough, Democratization, pp. 432-448; Shiokawa, "'Kimyona Kudeta''', pp. 58-63. 
Shiokawa stayed in Moscow at the time of the attempted coup. 
96 Odom, The Collapse, p. 312. 
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suffered a nervous breakdown.97 From circumstantial evidence, one may argue that the GKChP 
members believed that Gorbachev would support the emergency measure. According to 
Gorbachev, Baklanov said 'We do the dirty work. After that, you can return [to your job]. ,98 
Also, it is reported that, when going back from Gorbachev, Baklanov, puzzled by his response, 
said 'But he thought that was the only solution. What has changed?,99 This matter raised the 
possibility of a conspiracy theory, that is, that Gorbachev implicitly approved the COUp.IOO We 
will probably never know if this was the case. Nevertheless, they should have prepared to 
implement the plan without Gorbachev's approval. This attempted coup was so ill prepared that 
it gives us the impression that they might have failed even with Gorbachev's support. Thus, it is 
reasonable to think something urged them to take sudden action. 
The problem is why they attempted such an ill-prepared coup. The background was the 
chaotic situation as discussed above. However, most scholars agree that the Union Treaty was 
the most immediate catalyst for the attempt. The Union Treaty was a product of continuous 
negotiation between Gorbachev and republican leaders, especially Yeltsin, since April. The final 
version was agreed at a secret meeting of Gorbachev, Yeltsin and Nazarbaev on 29-30 July. The 
draft, which would have reduced the powers of the central institutions including security organs, 
was published on 14 August and was due to be signed on 20 August. 101 The plotters had to 
prevent the treaty being signed. Moreover, Pavlov was showed the draft only on 12 August. 
Thus, they did not have enough time to prepare a well-organised plan. 
Nonetheless, Gorbachev presents another argument. He argues that the KGB bugged the 
meeting on 29-30 July, in which participants (Gorbachev, Yeltsin, and Nazarbaev) agreed to 
97 Hough, Democratization, p. 430. 
98 Mihairu Gorubachofu, Gorubachofit Kaisoroku, Ge (Tokyo: Shinchosha, 1996), p. 647; 
Mikhail Gorbachev, Zl1izn' i Reformy, Vol. 2 (Moskva: Novosti, 1995), p. 559. 
99 Hough, Democratization, p. 436. 
100 Dunlop supports the argument that Gorbachev supported the coup. See Dunlop, 'The August 
Coup'. 
101 This published version was supposed to be agreed on 23 July. However, it included a new 
agreement on taxation ofthe 29-30 July meeting. See Hough, Democratization, pp. 425-426. 
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remove Kyuchkov and Pavlov. Therefore, they attempted the coup to save themselves. t02 Again, 
we cannot find a clear answer on this matter so far. Nonetheless, it should be noted that this 
argument explains their sudden action. 
Still, it seems that there was another reason for the failure of the coup, that is, 
organisational weakness, which we consider in the next section. 
3. The Party in the Coup 
As discussed above, the party had controlled various security organs. Therefore, it 
appears natural to assume that the party played an active role in the coup. In fact, Shenin, CC 
secretary, and Boldin, head of the General Department, went to Foros to see Gorbachev as 
representatives of the GKChP. However, the role of the party as an organisation was ambiguous. 
On 19 August, several (but not all) CC secretaries assembled and decided to send a coded 
telegram to all union republican party committees, kraikoms, obkoms, stating 'Take measures 
for the participation of communists in cooperation with the GKChP'. On 20 August the 
Secretariat sent a second telegram to 'ask to regularly inform the CC CPSU of the situation in 
regions, the atmosphere of people, the adopted measures for strengthening order and discipline, 
and the reaction of people to the measures of the GKChP'. Several party committees, including 
Samara, Lipetsk, Tambov, Saratov, Orenburg, Irkutsk, Tomsk, Altai, Krasnodar, and others, 
supported the actions of the GKChP. However, most party committees took a 'wait-and-see' 
position.t03 Moreover, the GKChP's announcement never mentioned the party or communism. 
Neither the Politburo nor the Central Committee could decide on its attitude. Ivashko, deputy 
General Secretary, was in a hospital on the first two days of the coup, and proposed to see 
Gorbachev on 21 August. Thus, on the one hand, some segment of the party apparat welcomed 
the coup attempt (though it did not playa major part). On the other hand, refOlmist segment of 
t02 GOlUbachofu, Gorubachofu Kaisoroku, Ge, pp. 643-645; Gorbachev, Zhizn' i Refonny, Vol. 
2, pp. 556-557. 
103 Pravda, 23 October 1991, p. 2. 
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the party, faced with an unexpected event, showed total confusion. True, the party had not 
completely lost its ties with security organs as discussed above. Therefore, it was involved in, 
but did not lead the coup. 
Because the party did not or could not take the initiative of the coup, security organs 
showed organisational disarray. Hough states, 'the lines of command were never clear.' Troops 
had been divided among the Ministry of Defence, the KGB, and the Ministry of Internal 
Affairs. 104 Without the integrating force, that is, the party, this system could not work well. 
Organisational disarray was an additional factor in failure of the coup. 
This also means that the August attempted coup was not a communist but an ordinal)! 
coup. As mentioned above, the plotters never referred to communism in the coup. Their aim was 
to restore 'law and order'. 
VII. The End of the CPSU 
As we have seen in Chapter 3, before the attempted coup, Yeltsin had issued a 
presidential decree 'On suspending the activity of organisational structures of political parties 
and mass social movements in state organs and establishments of RSFSR' (20 July 1991), which 
was to prohibit the party organisations in state organs within the territory of Russia. 105 The 
failed coup presented him a great chance to give a final blow to the party. Immediately after the 
attempted coup, Yeltsin issued a presidential decree, 'On suspending the activity of the 
Communist Party of RSFSR' (23 August 1991).106 Though Gorbachev once showed the 
intention to continue party reform after coming back from Foros, soon he realised people's 
disillusionment with the party. On 24 August Gorbachev resigned as General Secretary and 
104 Hough, Democratization, p. 447. 
105 Izvestiya, 22 July 1990, p. 1. 
106 Vedomosti S"ezda Narodnykh Deputatov RSFSR i Verkhovnogo Soveta RSFSR, 1991, No. 35 
(29 August), pp. 1426-1427. 
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called on the CC to dissolve itself. 107 On 25 August Yeltsin issued a presidential decree, 'On 
property of the CPSU and the Communist Party of RSFSR' to nationalise party property. 108 No 
strong activity opposing the decree took place. The party had been 'dead' de facto. On 6 
November the CPSU was banned by Yeltsin's presidential decree, 'On activity of the CPSU and 
the CP RSFSR' .109 The history of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, which had been 
the nerve centre controlling the organic body, ended. 110 Accordingly, the end of history of the 
Soviet Union was nearing. 
VIII. Conclusion 
Despite the resistance from both the party and the military sides to losing ties with each 
other, the party was gradually losing its control over the security organs. Moreover, this led to 
organisational disarray in the military. Here the party's superiority over the military is clear. The 
above discussion makes clear that the party was the only integrator of these security organs. 
Thus, our findings cannot support the conflict theOlY. If conflict had been a feature of 
party-military relations, the military would have welcomed the party's losing control. In 
addition, the fact that the coup was an ordinaty coup contradicts the congruence theory, because, 
if congruence had taken place, the coup would have been communist. 
Probably the control theOlY was closest to the reality of three theories. This means 
neither that there was no conflict between the party and the military, nor that in some cases the 
interests of the party and military became congruent. Nonetheless, we must stress the fact that 
107 Izvestiya, 26 August 1991, p. 2. 
108 Vedoll1osti S"ezda Narodnykh Deputatov RSFSR i Verkhovnogo So veta RSFSR, 1991, No. 35 
(29 August), pp. 1434-1435. 
109 Vedomosti S"ezda Narodnykh Deputatov RSFSR i Verkhovnogo Soveta RSFSR, 1991, No. 45 
(7 November), pp. 1799-1800. 
110 The metaphor 'the nerve centre controlling the organic body' comes from Takayuki Ito, 
'Tagenteki Minshushugino Seidoka: Tooshokokuni okeru keiken, 1989-92 [The 
Institutionalisation of Pluralist Democracy: From Experiences in Eastem Europe, 1982-92], 
Roshiakenkyu [Russian Studies], Vol. 16 (April 1993), p. 36. 
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the military velY reluctantly went into the coup despite the velY favourable environment. When 
the military was more or less freed from the party, its leaders realised that the military needed to 
resort to the final measure independently. The August attempted coup was an example of 
ordinary military-led praetorianism. However, the military had neither the capacity nor the 
autonomous decision-making experience to rule the country. In addition, the leadership of the 
coup was remarkably weak. Thus, the military-led coup failed. 
As we have seen in previous chapters, the party had lost its administrative functions but 
had failed to find a role as a political party. Thus, the party had lost its raison d'etre. In addition, 
the party's property had been fragmented before the attempted coup. Faced with the final blow 
by Yeltsin, the party fell without a struggle. The party, which, based on a self-proclaimed 
'universal' ideology, had been proud of its monolithic unity and monopolistic control for more 
than seven decades, did not have the capacity to fight any more. 
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Chapter 7 Generalisation and Conclusion 
I. Introduction 
We have traced the process of the disintegration of the CPSU in previous chapters. 
The task of this chapter is to generalise our argument. How universal was the experience of 
the CPSU compared with those of other communist regimes? And what are the theoretical 
implications of our argument? Before discussing these issues, let me summarise my rather 
complicated story of the CPSu. 
II. Summarising Our Argument 
Figure 7-1 shows the course of events of previous chapters. Before Gorbachev's 
perestroika began, the Soviet political system faced a dilemma between monolithic unity and 
monopolistic control. In order to sustain monopolistic control, the party leadership needed to 
allow de Jacto autonomy to lower patty organisations, which undermined monolithic unity. In 
addition, if it was to exercise a practical monopoly across the entire society, the party had to 
exercise a whole series of functions, including economic ones, which led to an increase in the 
number of khozyaistvenniki (economic managers) in the party. The party, therefore, could not 
concentrate on 'political' activity alone. 
Gorbachev's political reform programme was, it seems, aimed at activating the 
party's 'political' activity through dismissing its economic function. Reforms of party-state 
relations mostly concerned the economy-related party apparat. In addition, Gorbachev 
introduced competitive elections of party secretaries. This policy, at least in part, was intended 
to destroy established career patterns in the party. In order to improve 'political' activity, party 
secretaries were now expected to be political leaders who engaged in propaganda, agitation, 
and so forth, rather than pragmatic khozyaistvenl1iki. Competitive elections would have 
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improved the political skills of such party leaders. Moreover, competitive elections could 
have been useful in improving centre-regional relations by destroying regional and local 
cliques from below. 
However, these reforms led to unintended consequences. Firstly, by reorganising the 
patty apparat, especially the economic-related departments, the leadership created a 'loss of 
power' and a 'power vacuum'. When the party stopped intervening in economic management 
work, governmental organs that had depended on the party for a long time did not prepare to 
assume these power and also stopped working. A presidency that was created in order to 
manage such a situation failed to organise its staff and mechanisms as exemplified in the very 
late establishment of the presidential apparat in December 1990. This power vacuum 
influenced many later events. Secondly, competitive party secretary elections made lower 
organs more autonomous than before. It seems that the establishment of the CP RSFSR 
marked the climax of this tendency. Thirdly, the CPSU failed to transform itself into a 
'political party'. It did not end its ties with the security organs due in part to the 'power 
vacuum', a self-fOlTI1ulation as a vanguard party rather than a parliamentaty party, the 
production principle for organising PPOs, democratic centralism, and the ban on fractions. 
Furthern10re, it failed to approve a new party programme. Thus, while the party lost its 
traditional administrative function, it failed to find a new function. The party lost its raison 
d'etre, which accelerated a mass exodus of members. 
The rapid decline in party membership caused a financial crisis, because the party 
budget mostly consisted of membership dues. In addition, the soviets demanded the 
nationalisation of party property. The party needed to protect its property. Commercial 
activity was a response to such a situation. Nonetheless, commercial activity unintentionally 
caused the fragmentation of party property. 
On the other hand, the 'power vacuum' expanded so much that some emergency 
measures seemed necessary to, at least, some top state leaders. The situation became 
increasingly chaotic and even the unity of the country appeared fragile to some of its leaders. 
'Praetorianism' was increasing. Thus, the August attempted coup was aimed to restore 'law 
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and order' rather than 'communist' rule. However, some members of the party apparat 
committed to the coup activity because the party did not lose its ties with security organs 
entirely. Then the party as a whole was involved with the attempted coup when Yeltsin 
suspended its activity. Because the party had lost its raison d'etre and its property had been 
dispersed well before the coup attempt, the party had no choice but to accept the reality that it 
was 'dead' de facto. When the party had completed its history, the end of the Soviet Union 
was also likely to follow. 
Compared with existing studies of the collapse of the CPSU, my study emphasises, 
firstly, a 'power vacuum' rather than the strength of a conservative party apparat. Secondly, 
though the financial crisis of the party has been scarcely discussed by other scholars, it had 
important consequences for the party. Thirdly, CPSU specialists have not discussed party-
military relations in the perestroika period very much. On the other hand, though there are 
many studies of the Soviet militaty, they are very military-oriented (for instance, the military 
capacity of the Soviet army) rather than focusing on party-military relations. Thus, this is one 
of the few studies on this issue. Finally, although my argument supports some possibility of 
party reform that was dependent on Gorbachev's leadership (see Chapter 4), Gorbachev was 
stmcturally constrained by the 'power vacuum' in which he was located. 
III. Comparison with Other Communist Cases 
1. Case Selection 
How universal is the experience of the CPSU? To consider this issue, we have to 
compare it with those of other countries. Let us limit our analysis to communist regimes. 
Though to compare the Soviet collapse with, for example, Latin American transitions might 
be useful for some purposes, only other communist parties' experience seems to have direct 
comparability for our purpose, because, as far as I know, only the communist regime 
stabilised itself for several decades, had a party that attempted monopolistic control and was 
proud of its monolithic unity, and collapsed more or less from within. In ordinaty 
authoritarian regimes, regime control was not as strict as in communist regimes. Though the 
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Nazi regime in Germany seems to have controlled society to a significant degree, it collapsed 
within a rather short period, and from outside. The communist regime was more or less 
umque. 
Nonetheless, it does not seem practically possible to take into account all communist 
regimes. We have to limit ourselves to cases that are appropriate for our purpose, though a 
case selection frequently entails bias. The criteria for the choice of cases should be made 
clear. The first and most important criterion is whether or not there was an attempt to reform 
the communist party within the communist period. Many East European countries changed 
their regimes without, or with few, party reforms. In many cases, the regime, faced with a 
huge popular uprising, lost its confidence. The Hungarian case is unique in this sense. The 
Hungarian communist party (the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party) was successfully 
transformed into a social democratic party before the collapse of communist rule. Although it 
is well known that ex-communist patiies in East Europe returned to a political arena, these 
parties reformed themselves after regime collapse. I In this sense, among the East European 
cases in 1989, only the Hungarian seems to be comparable with the Soviet case. Another 
important case is the Polish communist party (the Polish United Workers' Party) in 1980-1. 
Far-reaching party reforms were attempted at the same time as the crisis of the 'Solidarity' 
movement. This case seems important also in a sense that a regime (and party) crisis caused 
military intervention just as in the Soviet Union. In 1988-9, however, the Polish case does not 
necessarily seem comparable. Though it is well known that the Polish post-communist party 
transformed itself into a social democratic party (the Social Democracy of the Republic of 
Poland, later Democratic Left Alliance) and could become a majority party, these events took 
I See John Ishiyama, 'The Sickle or the Rose? Previous Regime Types and the Evolution of 
the Ex-Communist Parties in Post-Communist Politics', Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 
30, No.3 (June 1997). He states, basing himself on A. Agh, that 'the Hungarian Socialist 
Party was unique in the communist world in that it emerged before the collapse of state 
socialism and not after it, unlike all the other renamed and afterwards reformed parties of the 
post-communist world.' Ibid., p. 321. 
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place after regime change. Thus, the two cases are to be compared with the Soviet communist 
party.2 
2. The General Problem in the These Countries 
As we have seen in Chapter 2, the communist party in general was bound to face a 
general problem. When the party tried to extend its control over the entire state and society, it 
had to exercise so many functions that its monolithic unity was undermined. The regime 
could escape this problem in the early post-revolutionary period or in watiime. But, the more 
complicated the system became, the more difficult it was for the party to control it. Party 
control was gradually undermined. 
However, there were variations among the communist countries in the way in which 
they experienced these general problems. As we have seen the Soviet case in Chapter 2, the 
career patterns of party officials and regional autonomy are keys to understanding these 
variations. 
In Poland, according to Paul Lewis, Edward Gierek, first secretary of the Polish patiy, 
tried to appoint well-educated people to provincial party secretarieships. Higher education 
became almost universal among provincial party secretaries (including both first and other 
secretaries) around 1975 to 1980, which was the same as the Soviet Union. Still, unlike the 
Soviet case, the predominant qualification was in economics, then industry and agriculture. If 
we can, as Lewis did, assume that economics qualifications were given by higher party 
schools, their educational qualifications possibly did not provide them with sufficient 
competence. In terms of career experience before becoming party secretaries, about a third of 
provincial first party secretaries had some production-related experience, though other (not 
first) secretaries had more such experience. The predominant background among provincial 
first secretaries was governmental and administrative activity. They did not have much 
2 Nonetheless, the author cannot claim that my study of the Hungarian and Polish cases is 
empirically rigorous. Rather, my purpose is to illustrate the generality and uniqueness of the 
Soviet experience. In addition, though the Yugoslav, Hungarian (1956) and Czechoslovakian 
(1968) cases may be comparable, they are beyond my knowledge. 
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experience of party work before becoming party secretaries either.3 Thus, we can assume that 
the rise of economic managers in the party was less significant in Poland than in the USSR. 
Concerning regional autonomy, Polish provincial first secretaries, unlike Soviet ones, 
did not enjoy significant autonomy. Gierek's reform of provincial party organisations in 1975, 
which increased the number of provincial party committees, strengthened central power vis-a-
vis the regions. Moreover, as a result of this reorganisation, lower party organisations were 
expected to come closer to ordinmy people.4 In addition, the Polish state body vis-a-vis the 
party was somewhat stronger than the Soviet one. Demarcation of the party and state 
functions was frequently claimed, and strengthening 'political' activity was advocated. At the 
time of deepening economic crisis and volatile public opinion, provincial party secretaries 
without autonomy found it difficult to carry out their functions. Provincial party committees 
were placed in a contradictory position. Thus, we can conclude that the 'unsolvable problem' 
in Poland was not the party's monolithic unity but in its monopolistic control over state and 
society. 
In Hungmy, the party had attempted to recruit various intellectuals after 1956 under 
Janos Kadar, its first secretary. Nonetheless, this did not necessarily lead to the rise of 
economic managers within the party apparat. Firstly, many professionally qualified people 
were recruited into state bodies rather than the party. Secondly, within the party, well-
educated people were primarily placed in the central rather than regional party organisations. 
This may have been related to the dominance of the capital city (Budapest) in a small country 
with an imperial legacy. Thirdly, it seems that intellectuals in the humanities and social 
sciences rather than those with a technocratic background had a rather strong influence in 
comparison with the Soviet case. Many reformers like Imre Pozsgay had a humanities and 
social science background. They were still loyal to socialism, but, under the influence of the 
western New Left, were inclined to a social democratic fOlm of socialism. Thus, the rise of 
3 Paul G. Lewis, Political Authority and Party Secretaries in Poland 1975-1986 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1989), chap. 2. 
4 Ibid., pp. 68-71. 
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economIC managers within the lower party organisations was less significant also in 
Hungary. 5 
The degree of regional autonomy in the Hungarian party is not clear. Still, we may be 
able to assume that lower party organisations were less autonomous in Hungary than in the 
USSR. Firstly, the capital city was too large. Secondly, the lower party organisations probably 
did not interfere in economic activity very much compared with other communist countries 
because of more market-oriented economic policies. Thirdly, many lower level party 
secretaries were, it is reported, conservative. Thus, although at the central level the party's 
recruitment policy worked relatively well, at lower levels many intellectuals who joined the 
party and frequently had humanities and social science backgrounds were isolated from 
political power. The 'unsolvable problem' in Hungary was that the party apparat more or less 
retained its monolithic unity, but it was isolated from intellectual party members. In the Soviet 
case, the lower party apparat itself was becoming autonomous, as we have seen. 
3. The Reform Process 
These different forms of general problems led to different reform processes. 
Monopolistic control in Poland was originally weaker. In Poland, the weakest point in the 
regime was the linkage between the party and society. Therefore, the party confronted society. 
The price increase in July 1980 immediately led to workers' strikes in August. A Gdansk 
agreement allowed the establishment of 'free trade unions' alongside the leading role of the 
party. The new trade union 'Solidarity' became a movement and spread into other areas 
including peasants, university students, academics, journalists and so forth. The 'Solidarity' 
movement tried to establish a realm independent of the party. This attempt involved a 
reconsideration of the nomenklatura system.6 
5 See Rudolf L. Tokes, Hungm)' 's Negotiated Revolution: Economic Reform, Social Change, 
and Political Succession, 1957-1990 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 
140-160; Patrick H. O'Neil, Revolutionfrom Within: The Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party 
and the Collapse of Communism (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 1998), pp. 71-86. 
6 See Takayuki Ito, 'Controversy over Nomenklatura in Poland: Twilight of a Monopolistic 
Instrument for Social Control', Acta Slavica 1aponica, Vol. 1 (1983); Takayuki Ito, 'Porando 
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Pushed by the movement, the party was forced to reform itself. Firstly, the first 
secretary was changed. Stanislaw Kania became the new first secretary. Secondly, within the 
party, some movements began to construct horizontal relations. Thirdly, there was the free 
election of party officials, in which most old party officials were replaced. The new Central 
Committee was almost totally (more than 90 per cent) renewed at the extraordinary party 
congress in 1981. Nonetheless, this contributed neither to the rise of more competent people 
nor to recovering the party's political authority. The new Central Committee was occupied by 
political laymen. In the process of party election, the agendas primarily focused on personnel 
matters rather than policies or platforms. The new CC members, furthermore, did not have 
any other ideas on an alternative policy or political system. Moreover, the party faced a rapid 
membership decline. In addition to 300 thousand members who had left the party before the 
party congress, 500 thousand members left afterwards. The party lost its ruling capacity. 7 
While, on the one hand, the party could not rule the country, the 'Solidarity' 
movement, on the other, did not attempt to replace the party in a 'self-limiting revolution'. 
Therefore, a huge political vacuum was created. The only force capable of filling the vacuum 
was the armed forces. This led to the rise of Wojciech Jaruzelski, Defence Minister, who 
became first secretary and who declared martial law in 1981. The Jaruzelski regime shared 
many characteristics with authoritarian regimes rather than a 'post-totalitarian' regime, which 
made easier its transition in 1989.8 
"Rentai" Undo no Kobo [The Rise and Fall of the "Solidarity" Movement in Poland]" in 
Shigeru Kido and Takayuki Ito eds., Touou Gendaishi [Contemporary Hist01)' of Eastern 
Europe] (Tokyo: Yuhikaku, 1987). 
7 Takayuki Ito, 'Genzon Shakaishugi niokeru Shakaihendo to Seijitaisei: Porando niokeru 
Tonaisenkyo (1980-81) ni Sokushite [Social Change and Political System under Real 
Socialism: An Analysis of Party Elections in Poland, 1980-81]" Srabu Kenkyu [Slavic 
Studies], Vol. 31 (1984); Takayuki Ito, 'Nomenklatura and Free Election: A Polish 
Experiment, 1980-81', Acta Slavica /aponica, Vol. 6 (1988); Jerzy J. Wiatr, 'Poland's Party 
Politics: The Extraordinary Congress of 1981', Canadian Journal of Political Science, Vol. 
14, No.4 (December 1981); David S. Mason, 'The Polish Party in Crisis, 1980-1982', Slavic 
Review, Vol. 43, No.1 (Spring 1984); Z. Anthony Kruszewski, 'The Communist Party during 
the 1980-1981: Democratization of Poland', in Jack Bielasiak and Maurice D. Simon eds., 
Polish Politics: Edge of the Abyss (New York: Praeger, 1984). 
8 Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: 
Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe (Baltimore: The Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1996), pp. 255-292. 
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In Hungary, party reforms began in 1988. Regardless or because of previous 
economic reform efforts, the demand for political reform stemmed not from society but from 
local party intellectuals. They attacked the local party apparat by which conservative bosses 
dominated their own areas. Local intellectuals tried to create horizontally based groups, 
'reform circles', within the party. These reform circles became influential. Though at the 
beginning their relationship with the central reformist leaders was ambiguous, Pozsgay and 
Rezso Nyers, a politburo member, finally supported them. The reform circles demanded an 
extraordinary party congress, though the somewhat conservative party leader Karoly Gr6sz 
tried to call a palty conference rather than a congress so as to avoid more radical change. But 
finally Gr6sz made a concession and an extraordinary party congress was summoned. 
The reform circles extended their base and joined a reform alliance with other reform-
oriented groups. The reform alliance's platform shows some striking similarities with the 
Democratic Platform in the CPSU: a clear break with the past (a change of name, of practice 
from the communist period, and so forth), a transformation from a vanguard into a 
parliamentary party, abolition of the Workers' Guard (a semi-military organisation supervised 
by the party), abolition of party cells in workplaces, and nationalisation of party property. 
The extraordinary party congress took place in October 1989. The reform alliance 
could command a majority of congress delegates though they included opportunist reformers. 
This congress brought to an end the history of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party when 
they decided to found the Hungarian Socialist Party. Party reform succeeded in Hungary. 
Nonetheless, some difficult issues, including party cells in the workplace, the Workers' Guard, 
and party property, could not be resolved at the party congress just as in the case of the CPSu. 
A referendum organised by opposition parties decided to ban party cells in the workplace, 
disband the Workers' Guard, and nationalise party property. This well-known referendum 
included a choice on whether a presidential election should be held in advance of that for 
parliament. The result very marginally supported a parliamentary election in advance. Though 
the Socialist Party suffered a humiliating defeat in the parliamentary election, this forced the 
249 
party to reform itself further. At the 1994 parliamentalY election it could became a majority 
party.9 
4. Some Theorems 
Comparing the Soviet case with the other two, we can draw some general 
conclusions. Firstly, there are some prerequisites for successful communist party ref 01111. (i) A 
strong opposition outside the party is necessary. The 'Solidarity' movement was obviously 
stronger than any opposition movement in the Soviet Union. Though the Democratic Forum 
in Hungary was not a very strong organisation, it was strong enough to win a majority in the 
first democratic parliamentary election. Taking into account the fact that some difficult issues 
of party reform as party cells or property could be resolved only by pressure from the outside, 
a strong opposition was necessary. Democratic Russia, which was the largest opposition 
outside the party, could not hold such a position. (ii) A central leadership is required for 
successful party reform. Even if a reformist platform is organised from below, its relationship 
with the centre is important. Gorbachev, as we have seen in Chapter 4, did not ally his 
leadership with the Democratic Platform. In this sense, Gorbachev failed to play a role of 
Pozsgay or Nyers who more or less successfully provided leadership through the reform 
alliance in Hungary. 
The second conclusion is that the party is the core of power or power itself in a 
communist regime. When an opposition is not prepared to assume power, communist party 
reform creates a power vacuum. Such a vacuum led to introduction of matiiallaw in Poland 
and an attempted coup in the Soviet Union. In this sense, Gorbachev failed to play the role of 
Jaruzelski. We may assume that if the August coup had succeeded under the Gorbachev 
leadership, the new regime would have been closer to the Jaruzelski-type authoritarian 
regime, which might have made a future democratisation easier. 
9 O'Neil, Revolutionfi'om Within, pp. 93-198. 
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IV. Some Theoretical Implications 
Let us move on toward more general theoretical implications of our argument, some 
of which were discussed in the first chapter. Firstly, theories of a military coup are considered. 
Then, the issues of what the Soviet system was, how and why the Soviet system changed are 
discussed. 
1. Theories of a Military Coup 
We have discussed the August attempted coup in Chapter 6, which seems instructive 
for theories of a militaty coup. How to explain military intervention has been a challenging 
task for political scientists. Many military regimes have been established in Southern Europe, 
Latin American countries, and Asia (e.g. Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, Indonesia and Pakistan). In 
addition, the most troubling matter in the so-called 'third wave' of democratisation in these 
countries is military intervention. Naturally the task of explaining the reasons for militaty 
intervention or its absence has attracted many researchers. Though it may be schematic, let 
me categorise them into three types. 
(a) Structural Factors 
The first type is a structure-centred theory. Some stress the importance of the class 
structure of a corresponding countly. 'Bureaucratic authoritarianism' is an example. 10 
Influenced by dependency theOlY, this argues that the class structure of a developing country 
polarises at some stage of modernisation, which produces a favourable environment for 
militaty intervention. Still, class structure per se is not the explanation of military 
intervention. Based on Huntington's political institutionalisation theory, it argues that 
polarisation leads to greater political demands from the population. The level of participation 
exceeds that of institutionalisation, which causes praetorianism (militaty intervention). The 
problem is not modernisation itself but political de-institutionalisation. II 
(b) Leadership 
10 Guillelmo A. O'Donnell, Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism: Studies in 
South American Politics (Berkeley, CA.: Institute of International Studies, University of 
California, Berkeley, 1973). 
II Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven, CT.: Yale 
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The second theory is actor-centred. A prominent feature of the third wave of 
democratisation was the absence of military intervention. Thus, the explanation is directed to 
the reason it did not take place. O'Donnell and Schmitter argue that it was the result of 
'playing coup poker'. At the beginning of a transition, a regime soft-liner utilises the threat of 
a coup in order to keep the transition within limit. However, when the opposition is convinced 
that the threat is a bluff, it makes clear that regime soft-liners will also suffer from the coup, 
because regime hard-liners will expel not only the opposition but also regime soft-liners with 
the coup. Thus, both regime and opposition soft-liners tend to make a concession or 
cooperate. The skill of regime soft-liners is, according to this argument, vital. I2 Thus, the 
occurrence of a coup may be explained by the lack of political skill of a regime soft-liner or 
by the greater skill of regime hard-liners than soft-liners. In addition, the failure of a coup 
may be due to the lack of political skill of the regime hard-liners. 
(c) Organisational Factors 
In addition to large-scale stlUctural or environmental factors like praetorianism and 
the vety situational factor of the individual political leader's skill, it is necessary to mention a 
factor within the military organisation. In fact, O'Donnell and Schmitter add well-placed and 
professionally respected military officers as a crucial factor. Their presence, which means that 
the military is divided, makes the coup risky and less successful. 13 Therefore, the Soviet case, 
in which a coup took place but failed, may be explained by a divided military. Still the 
application of this theory to the Soviet case is not easy, because it differed from Latin 
American military regimes in that the communist party controlled the military. It is necessary 
to consider the division of party-military relations. 
(d) Implications of our Discussion 
Our discussion of party-military relations (Chapter 6) may suggest the following 
points. Firstly, stlUctural or environmental factors may be sufficient to increase the probability 
University Press, 1968). 
12 Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter, Transitions ji'om Authoritarian Rule: 
Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1986), pp. 24-25. 
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of a coup. The situation around 1990 and 1991 in the Soviet Union was dangerous enough to 
call for emergency measures. In fact, Gorbachev's turn to the right can be explained by the 
chaotic situation rather than pressure from conservative factions. However, secondly, strong 
leadership and organisational unity in the military are necessaty for a successful coup, which 
the Soviet case did not possess. Gorbachev, at least apparently, did not provide leadership. 
Other coup leaders were too ill-prepared. The organisational unity of security organs was not 
sustained due in the main part to the reform of relations between the party and security 
organs. These factors made the coup fail. 
2. What the Soviet System was: Theories of the Political Regimes 
(a) Controversy over Totalitarianism 
As we have seen in Chapter 1, there are controversies over totalitarianism in Soviet 
and post-Soviet studies and in political science in general. 14 The totalitarian school was 
challenged by many scholars in the 1970s. However, after the collapse of the Soviet-type 
political system, the totalitarian school returned to the central place in conceptualisations of 
such systems. The first reason is that people under the communist system by themselves 
began to use the totalitarian concept in the late 1980s. Some critics' view that the totalitarian 
concept was strongly influenced by the cold war, and, therefore, had a too confrontational 
implication, became difficult to justifY. Secondly, qualified pluralism tended to suggest that 
the system became stable by introducing such 'plural' elements as professionalism and so 
forth. This was not supported by the course of events. Finally it seems to me that the pluralist 
school tried to find too much similarity to Western, especially American, society. Hough's 
thought-provoking work on conceptualisations of the Soviet system is full of comparisons 
13 O'Donnell and Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule, p. 25. 
14 Apart from literature mentioned in Chapter 1, see Archie H. Brown, Soviet Politics and 
Political Science (London: Macmillan, 1974); Archie Brown, 'Pluralism, Power and the 
Soviet Political System: A Comparative Perspective', in Susan Gross Solomon ed., Pluralism 
in the Soviet Union (London: Macmillan, 1983); Nobuaki Shiokawa, "'Shakaishugi to 
Zentaishugi" Sairon ["Socialism and Totalitarianism" Revisited]" Juten Ryouiki Kenkyu 
Hokoku Shu, 'Surabu Yurashia no Hendo' [Occasional Papers on 'the Changes in the Slavic-
Eurasian World'] No. 14 (1996). 
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with the American cases and references to Robert Dahl's Polyarchy. Though Hough did not 
clearly say so, such a view gave an impression that Soviet society tended to be more and more 
liberal democratic. Now we know that Russia's path to liberal democracy is far more 
troubling. 
(b) The Implication of our Discussion 
What can our discussion tell us about this conceptual issue? First of all, although the 
pluralist school does not gather many supporters now, it certainly indicated some tendencies 
within the Soviet system, as we have seen in Chapter 2. The rise of economic managers and 
regional autonomy did exist. We should confirm some contribution of this school, even if it is 
not very fashionable. Still some problems remain. One problem in the pluralist school was 
that it assumed that such elements contributed to a regime's ruling capacity. However, these 
elements were obstacles for the central leadership. In addition, the pluralist school 
underestimated the centrality of the party apparat. In Chapter 3 and the above comparison, it 
was discussed that the party apparat was the core of power, therefore, its reform led to a 
power vacuum. Moreover, a conflict theory on party-military relations, which emphasises 
conflicts between the party and military rather than party control and is closer to the pluralist 
school, was not supported by our argument in Chapter 6. The contribution of the pluralist 
school was limited. 
Nonetheless, to dismiss the pluralist school does not necessarily mean to approve the 
totalitarian school. Because this concept has been used in many ways, we should distinguish 
at least two different ways. The first way is totalitarianism as an ideal type. If totalitarianism 
is an ideal type, totalitarianism is not reality. We can say that Stalin's Soviet Union was 
closest to totalitarianism in Soviet history, but was not totalitarianism itself. This use can be 
justified. Even some scholars, who are very critical of totalitarianism, have used this concept 
as an ideal type. 15 
15 See Nobuaki Shiokawa, Soren toha Nandattaka [What was the USSR?] (Tokyo: 
Keisoshobo, 1994), chap. 3. 
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The problem takes places when totalitarianism is an essentialist definition. Firstly the 
totalitarian model cannot explain change from within. For example, modernisation, it implies, 
can contribute to the perfection of its total control through hierarchical bureaucracy. But it 
created obstacles, as we have seen in Chapter 2. From the totalitarian perspective, 
Gorbachev's reform attempts can be considered as something irrational. He did not 
understand what he tried to do. Secondly, it is not clear that totalitarianism is limited only to 
the Stalinist period or can extend to the later period. If it is limited to the Stalinist period, it 
should be explained why totalitarianism had changed and what the later system was. At least 
the classical definitions presented by Friedrich and Brzezinski do not fit the later period. 
Classical totalitarianism, to some degree, may have been a product of a mirror image of 
Western, especially American, society, which later caused a totally opposite attempt to find 
too much similarity by the pluralist school. If totalitarianism extends to a later period, it 
should be explained what continued throughout Soviet history and why it changed. Modified 
totalitarianism may provide some clues to manage these problems. Certainly, Rigby's 'mono-
organisational society' has been one of the most sophisticated conceptualisations of the Soviet 
system. Partocracy also can be a plausible conceptualisation. The party dominated the country 
and within the party, as Leon Onikov, a former party worker, stated, 'less than 0.3 per cent 
people of its members [that is, the party apparat] fOlmed the real power in the CPSU'.16 
Nevertheless, modified totalitarianism does not necessarily provide a clue for understanding 
regime change. This conceptualisation may imply a bureaucratic dysfunction, the role of 
leadership, and so forth as reasons for the change. However, theories of regime typology and 
theories of regime change have developed rather separately.17 Thus, let us consider theories of 
political change first, and return this issue later. 
3. Why and How the Soviet System Collapsed: Theories of Political Change 
(a) Modernisation Theory 
16 Leon Onikov, KPSS: anatomiya raspada (Moskva: Respublika, 1996), p. 76. 
17 The most important exception is Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic 
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The content of modernisation theory was reviewed in Chapter 1. Our hypothesis was: 
Social and economic change or the failure to legitimate its rule through economIC 
development was the crucial factor in the Soviet collapse (modernisation theOly). 
This argument contributed to understanding increasing systemic difficulties in the 
long term. Our argument in Chapter 2 provides some evidence for this theory. 
However, modernisation theory has several weak points besides its euro-centrism. 
The first is the problem of threshold: it cannot define the critical point at which changes in the 
quantity of modernisation turn into changes in the quality of a political regime, in other 
words, what degree of modernisation leads to democratisation is not clear. Moreover, contrary 
to the hypothesis, the 'unsolvable problem' in the Soviet Union was created by, to some 
degree, economic development rather than economic decline (see Chapter 2). Secondly, the 
breakdown of a democratic regime cannot be explained by this approach. Despite 
modernisation, some democratic regimes broke down in some Southern European, Latin 
American, and Asian countries. Thirdly, the focus of this approach is 'society'. It concentrates 
its attention on social movements from below. However, the opening frequently begins with 
cracks within a regime rather than pressure from below as we have seen. Modernisation 
theory is not sufficient. 
(b) Transitology 
The hypothesis of Transitology was: 
The central factor in the Soviet collapse is the strategy of top elites, for example, Gorbachev, 
Yeltsin, Ligachev and so forth (transitology). 
Transition. 
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Certainly political leadership was always an important factor. I have argued in 
Chapter 2 that it depends on leaders' recognition how acute the problems are, which 
necessitates reform attempts. Or, as we have seen above, Gorbachev's failures to provide 
leadership with party reformers at the 28th Party Congress and plotters of the attempted coup 
were crucial. 
Problems in transitology, nonetheless, seem to remain. Firstly, transitology tends to 
restrict our perspective: researchers are likely to consider only events which concern 
democratisation. Events outside democratisation cannot be treated by transitology. Secondly, 
since transitology has strategic implication for democratisation, it is difficult for researchers 
to maintain their objectivity. Even the excellent biography mentioned above seems to be too 
generous to Gorbachev. 18 Thirdly and most importantly, although strategies by actors are 
important, its implication that, if the right strategies were applied, the transition would be 
successful is not plausible. Political actors do not have a free hand in choosing their strategies, 
that is, the choices of political actors are constrained by structure. The key problem is not 
what political actors want to do but what they can do. Transitology is not sufficient either. 
(C) New Institutionalisms and Marxist View 
Our hypothesis of new institutionalism was: 
Intra-state structure accumulated friction within the ruling body that led to the final collapse 
by the failure of reform (new institutionalism). 
This hypothesis may be always true. This reminds us of an old maxim: 'Men makes 
their history, but they do not make it just as they please; they do not make it under 
circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly encountered, given and 
18 Archie Brown, The GOl'bachev Factor (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996). 
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transmitted from the past'. 19 In fact, a sociological institutional study of Hungarian party 
reform begins with this maxim.20 
However, besides such very general hypothesis, individual studies that applied new 
institutionalism are not without problems. Firstly rational choice institutional accounts cannot 
be supported. A general problem of rational choice institutionalists is the wisdom of hindsight. 
We now know results, and who got benefits in the end. Rationalists argue that the results were 
created by beneficiaries who acted rationally in order to maximise their interests. 21 The 
Marxist view as well, it seems, made the same mistake. Still, as we have seen in Chapter 5, 
real histOlY is full of paradoxes. It is not always convincing that beneficiaries (for example, an 
ex-party-state elite who could transforn1 themselves into an economic elite) consistently 
sought to maximise their personal interests. Although rationalists' explanations are usually 
methodologically and theoretically sophisticated, they are frequently far from reality. 
Finally sociological institutionalism has a certain potential to broaden our 
understanding of communist collapse by integrating a structure-centred theory and an actor-
centred theory. Nonetheless, there have been only a few attempts so far to do so. In addition, 
though it emphasises social changes inside political institutions such as 'reds' and 'experts', 
sociological analysis does not relate it to a specific feature of a political regime. What we 
need is to understand the interconnection of the two theories: that of the Soviet-type political 
regime and that of its collapse. We do not have yet any satisfactory theOlY to explain what the 
Soviet system was, and how and why it collapsed. 
Therefore, we reach an extremely commonplace conclusion: every theory is the case 
to some degree and evelY theory is not the case to some degree. It must be remembered that 
existing theories of political change, especially 'democratisation', are not sufficient. It is 
necessary to broaden our perspective. My use of the concepts of the breakdown of democracy 
19 Karl Marx, The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte (New York: International 
Publishers, 1998), p. 15. A Japanese translation is Karu Marukusu, Rui Bonaparuto no 
Bw)!umeru Juhachinichi (Tokyo: Iwanamishoten, 1954), p. 17. 
20 O'Neil, Revolutionfi'om Within, p. xviii. 
21 M. Steven Fish states that the rationalist argument is 'deeply functionalist'. See M. Steven 
Fish, 'Postcommunist Subversion: Social Science and Democratization in East Europe and 
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was such an attempt. This dissertation could, it seems, demonstrate that these concepts work 
better than transitology's liberalisation and democratisation. 
Nonetheless, probably, in order to subvert existing theories, we need to conceptualise 
from reality rather than to borrow existing theoretical theorems. As de Tocqueville once said, 
'[a] new science of politics is needed for a new world'.22 By basing ourselves on reality, we 
will be able to integrate regime theory and political change theory. 
v. Conclusion 
Why have two theories developed separately? The reason, it seems to me, lies in 
theorists' obsession with universality. Ifwe limit the utility of the theory of political change to 
a specific regime, the theory, of course, loses its broader validity. If so, it is not a 'theory' in a 
strictly scientific sense. Theorists, therefore, consistently attempt to broaden the validity of 
their theories. It turns into a large N syndrome now. Even when small N case studies are 
conducted, they are only for proving the validity of existing theories. 23 Uniqueness of reality 
simply tends to be ignored. 
Nevertheless, histOlY never satisfies theorists' favourite words 'ceteris paribus'. 
Reality is always unique and multi-faceted. Some historically significant issues, for example, 
the Soviet collapse, need to be considered, however unique they are. The task of social 
science is not to make abstract models but to understand reality. I deliberately did not use the 
word 'democratisation' in the context of the Soviet and the CPSU collapse in order to escape 
from a reliance on existing theories. Moreover, I tried to describe events in detail, though they 
may be dlY and detailed, in order to escape the Procrustean bed. This dissertation was a first 
step for me in understanding a multi-faced Soviet reality. 'The owl of Minerva begins its 
Eurasia', Slavic Review, Vol. 58, No.4 (Winter 1999), pp. 797-798. 
22 Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America (London: Everyman's Library, 1994), p.7. 
23 See Paul Kubicek, 'Post-communist political studies: ten years later, twenty years behind?' 
Communist and Post-Communist Studies, Vol. 33, No.3 (2000). 
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flight only with the onset of dusk. ,24 In a sense we are only at the starting point for 
understanding what the Soviet system was, and why and how it collapsed. 
24 G. W. F. Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of Right (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1991), p. 23. 
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Appendix: On the Nomenklatura System and Nomenklatura as s Social Class 
1. Introduction 
The nomenklatura system had been regarded as the central mechanism for controlling 
the party hierarchy, the state and society in communist party regimes by many researchers. Thus, 
it is necessary to think of this more closely than other controlling mechanisms. Through this 
personnel appointment mechanism, higher party organs ruled lower ones within the party, and, 
outside the party, the party tried to control the state and society, which made the communist 
regime almost one huge organisation or 'mono-organisational society'. Strangely enough, 
however, less attention was paid to this system to explain the collapse of the regime during the 
perestroika period. The reason could be attributed to the fact that other changes including the 
creation of a presidential system, the power struggle between Gorbachev and Yeltsin, an 
economic crisis, national or ethnic 'resurgence' and others appeared more important and, of 
course, these were actually important. These affairs gave an impression that the locus of power 
had moved from the party. Therefore, nomenklatura, the party's personnel system, was lost from 
sight. In addition, before perestroika some scholars had tended to treat nomenklatura as a deus 
ex machina, that is, they had made an image that everything had depended on the nomenklatura. 
The anti-nomenklatura-oriented policy during perestroika could not be explained by such an 
understanding. Less attention might be a reasonable response to such an exaggerated image. 
Nonetheless, many studies that discuss elite continuity and turnover have been 
advanced after the collapse of the Soviet Union, some of which use the word nomenklatura. 
Then, some questions take place: firstly, what was and is the nomenklatura, since the personnel 
system itself collapsed together with the Soviet Union? Researchers might use the same word in 
different ways, which, without clarification, makes for confusion and little progress for 
understanding reality. Secondly, can we argue continuity and turnover without researching the 
real disintegrating process of nomenklatura? Researchers might argue continuity and turnover 
by analysing only results, which might lead to wisdom of hindsight. For example, some 
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continuity arguments might give the impression that elite continuity was the result of the 
nomenklatura's consistent planning to seek its own private interest. It is necessary to trace the 
disintegrating process of the nomenklatura system during the perestroika period. 1 
We have treated the party control of state organs in Chapter 3 and the intra-party 
nomenklatura in Chapter 4. In this appendix some remaining aspects of the nomenklatura are 
discussed. That is, the origin and structure of the nomenklatura system, party's mobilisation of 
society, and the nomenklatura as a social class are discussed. 
2. The Structure and Origin of Nome1lklatura 
The word nomenklatura has a Latin origin. Therefore, most European languages have 
a similar vocabulary, for example nomenclature in English. As shown by this word, 
nomenklatura originally meant a list. In the Soviet Union, the party controlled the lists which 
included important party, state, and social posts and people who were appropriate for the posts. 
These lists and people were called the nomenklatura. Therefore, the nomenklatura could 
indicate both a staffing system and people, which, it seems, caused some confusion. 
These nomenklatura lists were managed by party committees from the all-union level 
to raion. Each party committee had its own jurisdiction, which had been changed several times. 
Let me explain the early structure. At the Central Committee of the CPSU (all-union) level, 
there were three types of nomenklatura list. Nomenklatura no. 1 , which required to be approved 
by the Central Committee, included the heads of the party's highest bodies, the states posts (e.g. 
1 The author must admit his fonnulation of argument includes exaggerations. Some scholars try 
to clarify the meaning of nomenklatura and analyse the actual process of its disintegration. For 
example, Ronald J. Hill and John L6wenhardt, 'Nomenklatura and Perestroika', Government 
and Opposition, Vol. 26, No.2 (Spring 1991); David Lane and Cameron Ross, The Transition 
ji'om Communism to Capitalism: Ruling Elites ji'Olll Gorbachev to Yeltsin (New York: St. 
Martin's Press, 1999); Olga Kryshtanovskaya and Stephen White, 'From Soviet Nomenklatura 
to Russian Elite', Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 48, No.5 (1996). In Japanese, Takeshi Yuasa, 
'''Nomenkuratura'' Shintoshihyo niyoru Roshiatochi Eritono Bunseki [An Analysis of Cabinets 
and Russian Governing Elites through the Nomenklatura Saturation Index]" Roshia Toou 
Gakkai Nenpo [Annals of the Japanese Association for Russian and East European Studies], Vol. 
28 (199ged./ published in 2000). 
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Supreme Soviet of People's Economy, VSNKh) and others in 1925. Nomenklatura no.2 was 
conducted with the consent of the CC department of Organisation and Assignment. 
Nomenklatura no.3 was a supplementary list to nomenklatura no. 1 covering 'elective' posts, 
that is, 'elective' posts were decided before election. 2 This all-union level nomenklatura 
supervised oblast' leadership (e.g. first secretaries). At republican level, republican CC managed 
lower level oblast' leadership and some raion and city level leadership. The obkom's 
responsibility was some oblast level leadership, raion and city level one. In this way, the 
nomenklatura constituted a huge hierarchy.3 
When was the nomenklatura system established? According to Rigby, there were three 
preconditions. Firstly, the party apparat had to subordinate soviets, the state apparat and other 
organisations. However, the party apparat had not substantially existed up to 1919. The 8th party 
congress decided on the building of a full-time party officialdom. By 1921 the hierarchy of 
party secretaries became a principal instrument for subordination. Secondly, the party 
membership needed to be supervised by the party apparat. This took longer than the first 
precondition because of the Bolshevik tradition of intra-party democracy. Nonetheless, the 
resolution 'On Patty Unity' at the 10th party congress in 1921 led to a crucial step. Thirdly, it 
was necessary to assemble administrative resources (staffs, data banks, and so forth). Soon after 
the 8th congress, the Record and Assignment Department of CC was established. This 
Department enormously developed during 1920-1921. Meeting these preconditions, the 
nomenklatura system was founded in 12 April 1923 when the Orgbureau issued a resolution on 
the nomenklatura no. 1 and 2. Of course, the full establishment of this system took longer.4 It 
seems that this system consolidated around the end of 1920s with the establishment of the 
2 Tat'yana Petrovna Korzhikhina and Yurii Yr'evich Figatner, 'Sovetskaya nomenklatura: 
stanovlenie, mekhanizmy deistviya', Voprosy Istorii, 1993, No.7, pp. 26-27. 
3 Bohdan Harasymiw, 'Nomenklatura: The Soviet Communist Party's Leadership Recruitment 
System', Canadian Journal of Po litica I Science, Vol. 2, No.4 (December 1969): pp. 493-512. 
4 T. H. Rigby, 'The origins of the nomenklatura system', in his Political Elites in the USSR: 
Central leaders and local cadres fi-om Lenin to Gorbachev (Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 1990), pp. 
73-93. 
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Stalinist regime. In addition, as will be discussed later, the stabilisation of people III 
nomenklatura lists was a product of far later period. 
3. Party Control over Society 
As we discussed in Chapters 3 and 4, the higher party organs had controlled the lower 
ones' staffing, and the party had controlled state organs' staffing. In addition to them, patty 
control reached society. For example, Komsomol workers, factOlY managers, heads of collective 
farms, a trade union, scientific associations, and universities, and so forth were subjects of 
nomenklatura lists. There was no formal scope for social organisations independent of the party. 
Matsuzato argues that the reason the party needed such a huge personnel right was as follows. 
The first is the lack of a modem bureaucracy. Particularly in rural places, population density is 
remarkably sparse in Russia. The cost of a modem bureaucracy is very high in such places. If a 
village had 600 residents, only 200 of whom were old enough to work, it would be financially 
impossible to pay a policeman. The only way to ensure security would be to organise 
'voluntary' social work. In addition, the shortage of intellectual workers influences the 
underdevelopment of a modem bureaucracy. It is not possible to employ a young graduate from 
a university in a place where youth begins to work around 17 years old. Such a case is not rare 
in rural places of Russia. Matsuzato added the underdevelopment of a modem financial system 
as a condition which requires direct mobilisation from society.5 
Moreover, it seems that ideological requirements cannot be ignored. Matsuzato's 
argument is appropriate especially in rural areas and explains velY well the reason the 
mobilisation of society by the administration persists today. Nonetheless, as discussed, the 
nomenklatura was a huge hierarchical system from the centre to local areas. Marxist ideology 
envisaged the total transformation of society. It is natural that the party, the 'vanguard' of society, 
5 Kimitaka Matsuzato, 'Aparato Demokurashi: Roshia no Chusho Toshigun niokeru Seijito 
Gyousei [Apparatus Democracy: Politics and Administrations in Russian Counties and Small 
Cities]" Suravu Kenkyu [Slavic Studies], Vol. 43 (1996), pp. 97-105. 
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demanded to control every social organisation. 
To discuss what happened when the nomenklaturist control over society was removed 
1S beyond the scope of this appendix. Various forms of independent social organisations 
emerged during the perestroika period, some of which played a role of 'civil society', though it 
seems to me that they were weak, at least compared with Eastem European cases. It is far from 
clear whether or not they played an important role in the process of perestroika. 
4. Nome1lklatura as a Social Class 
As easily understood, people in nomenklatura lists were elites. Some argue they were 
even a ruling class.6 If so, their social position must have been secured. In this respect, a ruling 
class differs from a functional elite. The ruling class is distinguished from the rest of society by 
its stability, privileges, and a peculiar feeling of solidarity, while the functional elite's character 
is a non-inheritance of its position, its role or function itself, and lack of solidarity. It would be 
very likely that the nomenklatura was different from functional elites in many respects. 7 
Especially, they had privileges. Nonetheless, how stable it was is a controversial topic. Clearly, 
the nomenklatura was not secure during the Stalin or Khrushchev periods. Under Stalin, the 
nomenklatura was frequently a target of purge, and Khrushchev seriously reorganised the patty 
structure. It is not reasonable to regard the nomenklatura as a ruling class for all the Soviet 
period. Nonetheless, Brezhnev's policy of trust in cadres stabilised nomenklatura positions. It 
seems that it was in the Brezhnev period that the nomenklatura became a kind of ruling class. 
Still, whether or not the word 'class' was appropriate is controversial at least in a Marxist sense. 
Then, what was the privilege the nomenklatura had? Their salary lists are now 
6 Alec Nove, 'Is There a Ruling Class in the USSR?' Soviet Studies, Vol. 27, No.4 (October 
1975); Alec Nove, 'The Class Nature of the Soviet Union Revisited', Soviet Studies, Vol. 35, No. 
3 (July 1983); Michael Voslensky, Nomenklatura: Anatomy of the Soviet Ruling Class (London: 
Bodley Head, 1984). 
7 Takayuki Ito, 'Controversy over Nomenklatura in Poland: Twilight of a Monopolistic 
Instrument for Social Control', Acta Slavica Japon ica, Vol. 1 (1983), p. 61. 
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available. Various tables of3-3 show the salaries of full-time party workers since 1989. This list 
was made in order to increase the salary of full-time party officials. The Politburo approved the 
list on 3 August 1989.8 Though, unfortunately, these lists do not include the CC secretary's 
salary, at the 28th party congress, Alla Nizovtseva, deputy chairman of the Central Auditing 
Commission, revealed that a Politburo member earned 1200, candidate member received 1100 
and CC secretary earned 1000 roubles. 9 This statement may contradict the salary list, in which 
the salary of the first secretary of the Ukraine party was 1100 roubles per month, because the 
person in this post usually became a Politburo member and should accordingly have received 
1200 roubles according to Nizovtseva. There may have been salary increases after approving the 
salary lists. In any case, the salary of the Ukrainian party first secretary is the highest in the lists. 
The next highest is one of the head ofCC departments (1000 roubles). 
The salary lists of state officials are also included in TsKhSD, fond 89. 10 This list was 
made almost at the same time of the party workers' list. The Politburo approved the state 
officials' salary list on 20 September 1989. This list, unfortunately again, does not include the 
highest official, the chailman of the Council of Ministers. Still, it seems that its salary was not 
different from one of the second highest salaty post, the first deputy chairman of the Council of 
Ministers. Its salary was 1300 roubles per month. ll Other ministers or chairman of state 
committees earned 1000-900 roubles, which were almost as much as those of the CC 
departments' heads. The chairman of the Ukrainian Council of Ministers earned 1100 roubles, 
which was the same as the Ukrainian party first secretary. Thus, we can understand the salaries 
of the state officials were almost the same as those of equivalent party posts. 
8 Tsentr Khraneniya Sovremennoi Dokumentatsii (TsKhSD), fond (f.) 89, perechen' (p.) 9, delo 
(d.) 13. 
9 XXVIII s"ezd Kommunisticheskoi Partii Sovetskovo Soyuza: Stenograficheskii Dtchet, vol. 2 
(Moskva: Politizdat, 1991), p. 78. 
10 TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 9, d. 31, pp. 1-46. Incidentally, these lists include basically all state posts 
from the central to raion level, which makes clear the structure of a state bureaucracy. 
11 One strange thing is that the salary, 1300 roubles per month, was to be higher than that of 
Politburo members (1200 roubles). The reason is not clear. 
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It is difficult to argue such high rank nomenklatura's privileges in terms of salary. 
Certainly their salaries were higher than those of ordinary people (the average income, it was 
reported, was 201 roubles per month in 1987).12 Still, it seems to me that 1300 roubles was not 
too high as one of the most privileged persons in the country. It is reasonable to think that the 
nomenklatura's privileges were not necessarily its salaty. Gorbachev briefly refers to other 
privileges in the Japanese edition of his memoirs. Though his statements are attempts to justify 
his policy to open special hospitals and sanatoriums to some children and returned soldiers from 
Afghanistan and so forth, we can recognise high rank officers did have such privileges. Other 
privileges included special restaurants, cars, and dachas. 13 Of course, such privileges were not 
fair. Still it is difficult to decide whether or not they were too much compared with other 
countries or the current situation of Russia. Some may be sceptical about the widespread image 
of highly privileged nomenklatura. 
The importance of the perspective of nomenklatura as a ruling class is, it seems, not in 
the real composition and process of nomenklatura but in its influence on political discourse. 
Once the free area of speech was widened and criticism of the party was allowed, 
'nomenklatura' became a word to distinguish between 'us' and 'them'. Nomenklatura became a 
target of hatred which would include egalitarian anger about privileges and the anti-elite 
feelings of mass. For example, from a perspective of the nomenklatura as a social class, some 
dissatisfaction with privilege was published early in 1988. 14 This way of thinking may be still 
influential in Russia (and the author personally believes that criticisms of privileges are more 
justified at the present time than in the Soviet period). It seems that the current use of the word 
'nomenklatura' implies 'the revolution betrayed,' that is, the unfairness of elite continuity. To 
investigate this issue is beyond the task of this appendix. 
12 Rikao Kawabata et al eds., Roshia Sorell wo Shiru Jiten [Cyclopaedia of Russia and the 
Soviet Union] revised ed. (Tokyo: Heibonsha, 1994), p. 279. 
13 Mihairu Gorubachofu, Gorubachofil Kaisoroku, Jo (Tokyo: Shinchosha, 1996), pp. 577-579. 
14 'Izderzhki "Nomenklatury'" Kommunist, 1988, No.5 (March 1988), p. 42. 
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